

THE PORTUGUESE IN KANARA : 1498-1763

By

B. S. SHASTRY



4127

(A thesis prepared under the guidance of Dr. P. S. S.  
*late*  
Pissurlencar and submitted to the University of  
Bombay for the degree of Ph. D. in History)




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## PREFACE

Being interested in research in Modern Indian history, particularly South Indian, I was looking out for a suitable topic. Dr. P. S. S. Pissurlencar, whom I consulted, suggested that I might study the Portuguese activities in Kanara. The suggestion was of sufficient interest and attraction, and I gratefully accepted it.

Dr. Pissurlencar became not only my guide, but also a source of inspiration for me. I have endeavoured, to the best of my ability, to make use of his profound knowledge of source-materials. Unfortunately, his health was delicate for long and he expired on 10 July this year. However, it was my good fortune that he guided this thesis, to its virtual completion, before he ceased to be and I could submit the synopsis with his approval on 27 March.

It was absolutely necessary for me to learn Portuguese, for I was aware that a study of the Portuguese activities in Kanara would not be worth the name if it were not based upon Portuguese documents. I began to learn the language as soon as the topic for research was decided upon. During the course of about four years, I think, I have acquired a fair working knowledge of the language. It has, therefore, been possible for me to base my thesis on Portuguese sources, published as well as unpublished.

Most of the published sources, which I have made use of, are found in the Centre of Historical Research, Panaji. This Centre was established by the University of Bombay entirely with the help of a donation made by Dr. Pissurlencar of his personal collection of books, manuscripts, micro-films and photostat copies, comprising more than 4,000 items all put together. As long as the collection was in the personal possession of Dr. Pissurlencar, before he gave it away about three years ago, he used to lend certain books to his research students, including myself, to take them home for study; but later on, when he no longer had the collection in his possession, this facility was stopped. This became a matter of great inconvenience to me as I was a student residing nearly thirty miles away in


Margão, where I was and am a lecturer in the Chowgule College. Virtually no study was possible during the working days and it was impracticable to travel daily to Panaji. Besides, for a year or so, in 1965-66, when the collection was in the process of being transferred from the hands of Dr. Pissurlencar into those of the University, practically no book could be secured for study from the collection even to consult in Panaji, for the books, etc. were simply bundled up and kept in one place or another before being housed in the Menezes Bragança Hall building where they are preserved at present. All these necessitated a long period of nearly four years to complete my thesis. It would have been longer still, but for Principal D. B. Wagh of Chowgule College, who, with his sympathetic and encouraging attitude towards my efforts at research, enabled me to spend in Panaji one working day every week by freeing me from the College work on such days. Thus, during these free days, as well as on holidays and in the vacations I could stay in Panaji to study at the Centre and in the Historical Archives.

I gratefully record here my deep indebtedness to Prof. G. V. Kantak, who is looking after the Centre, for the fullest co-operation possible that he extended to me. It is virtually impossible for me to repay his thousand and one acts of kindness towards me.

I am thankful also to Dr. V. T. Gune, Director of the Historical Archives, Panaji, to his assistant, Mr. Gajanan Gantcar, and to other members of the staff of the Archives for giving me facilities to consult the unpublished documents preserved there.

Margão,

Date: 22- 9- 1969



ABBREVIATIONS

APO-BP : Arquivo Português Oriental by A. B. de Bragança Pereira.

APO-CR : Archivo Portuguez Oriental by J. H. da Cunha Rivara.

Assentos : Assentos do Conselho do Estado by P. S. S. Pissurlencar.

Cartas : Cartas de Afonso de Albuquerque published by the Royal Academy of Sciences, Lisbon.

CEO : Conquista Espiritual do Oriente by Paulo da Trindade.

Commentarios : Commentarios do grande Afonso Dalbuquerque.

D-AB : Década 13 da História da India by Antonio Bocarro.

D-DC : Da Asia de Diogo de Couto.

D-JB : Asia de João de Barros.

Documentação : Documentação para a História das Missões do Padroado Português do Oriente: India by António da Silva Rego.

DRI : Documentos Remettidos da India ou Livros das Monções published by the Royal Academy of Sciences, Lisbon.

EF : The English Factories in India by William Foster (1618-1669) and by Charles Fawcett (1670-1677).

História : História do Descobrimento e Conquista da India pelos Portugueses by Fernão Lopes de Castanheda.

JBBRAS : The Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society.

KNV : Keladinripa Vijaya by Linganna.

LCC : Livro da Correspondéncia do Canará.

LCF : Livro das Cidades e Fortalezas que a coroa de Portugal tem nas partes da India, etc. ed. Francisco Paulo Mendes da Luz.

Lendas : Lendas da India by Gaspar Correa.

LPFCP : Livro das plantas de todas as fortalezas, cidades e povoações do Estado da India Oriental by Antonio Bocarro. In APO-BP.

LRI : Livro de Regimentos e Instruções.

LRV : Livro de Reis Vizinhos.

Monções : Livro das Monções do Reino.

Orçamento : Orçamento do Estado da India (1574) by Diogo Velho.



(v)

Regimentos : Regimentos das Fortalezas da India by P. S. S. Pissurlencar.

Subsidios : Subsidios para a historia da India Portuguesa by R. J. de Lima Feijner.

VSCV : Vijayanagara Sexcentenary Commemoration Volume.

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## Chapter 1

### INTRODUCTION:

#### (a) The Portuguese arrive in India.

17 May, 1498 is an epoch making date in East-West relations. On that day Vasco da Gama, a Portuguese nobleman and navigator, reached Calicut on the Malabar Coast. He had set sail from Portugal on 8 July, 1497 with four ships and 170 men. Doubling the Cape of Good Hope, he reached Melinda on the eastern coast of Africa on 14 April, 1498. He developed friendly relations with the king of Melinda and procured the services of a Muslim pilot who knew the sea-route from Africa to India. This pilot, Ahmad ibn Májid, was a native of Gujarat and was an expert seafarer of the Western coast of India.<sup>2</sup> With his guidance,<sup>3</sup> Vasco da Gama easily reached Malabar.

This is not the place for a detailed discussion of the various motive forces which impelled, and the different causes and circumstances which enabled, the Portuguese to secure the distinction of being the first European nation to successfully discover a sea route to India via the Cape of Good Hope.<sup>3</sup> It is enough to say that the main motivating factors which brought the Portuguese to India were religion and commerce. It is said that when Vasco da Gama sent one of his sailors to Calicut, the latter was asked by two Muslim merchants of Tunis who could speak Castilian and Genoese: "What the devil brings you here? In search of what have you come from such a long distance?" Pat came the reply from the sailor: "We come in search of Christians and spices."<sup>4</sup> Vasco da Gama in fact supposed that the Malabarese were Christians and their temples were chapels. The Portuguese believed that the Indians had been converted to Christianity by St. Thomas. No wonder, therefore, that Vasco da Gama and his companions offered prayers before the image of 'Mary' in a temple in Calicut.<sup>5</sup> Of course, this mistake was discovered soon after and the Portuguese realised that the Hindus were far from being Christians. However, the king of Portugal then desired that the Hindu rulers and their subjects be converted to

6  
Christianity.

Advantages of the spice trade with the East was, no doubt, the more important motive force which brought the Portuguese to India. During the centuries that followed the fall of Jerusalem into the hands of the Muslims in 1187, the latter had monopolised the Eastern trade, for they controlled the Egyptian and Syrian coasts through the ports of which the eastern goods had to pass on to Europe. Spices, particularly pepper, were in universal demand in Europe, but the price was rigged up and made exorbitant by the Muslim rulers of Cairo and Persia who imposed high taxes on the articles <sup>7</sup> on their way to Europe. The Portuguese of the 15th century knew very well that any European nation which discovered a new sea route to the East, to India, and used this route for bringing the eastern spices direct to Europe, would become economically prosperous. The Muslims of North Africa and Persia would then be outflanked and their monopoly over the Eastern trade would be paralysed. This aim of the Portuguese was fulfilled with amazing speed within a decade or two after the arrival of Vasco da Gama in India. Vasco da Gama was received well at Calicut by king Zamorin who was a Hindu. The Muslim traders of Calicut tried to prevent any trade relations between the Zamorin and Vasco da Gama. Their intrigues resulted in some misunderstanding between the Zamorin and the Portuguese. Nevertheless, ultimately Vasco da Gama could load his ships with spices and other articles. He then sailed northwards along the coast until he reached Anjediva, off the Karwar coast in North Kanara, from where he set sail for Africa on his way back to Portugal where he reached on 29 August, 1499. Out of the four ships one was lost on the return voyage and out of the 170 men who had left Portugal in 1497 only 55 had survived. The voyage was, however, a great success. Vasco da Gama could exhibit to his countrymen the various spices and precious stones that were available in India and tell them of the articles which the Indians <sup>8</sup> demanded.

The king of Portugal now evolved a definite policy with regard to the East. He concluded that the advantages of the Eastern trade would be better secured by force than by peace, and that he should send priests to Christianize the East. Accordingly, on 9 March, 1500 a large fleet of 13 ships and 1,200 men, under the command of Pedro Alvarez Cabral, set sail from Lisbon for India. In addition to the men of war there were eight Franciscan Friars, eight chaplains and a vicar. <sup>9</sup> Cabral, after experiencing misfortunes, reached Calicut on 13 September, with only 6 vessels. He succeeded, after an interview with the Zamorin, in establishing a factory at Calicut; but soon misunderstandings arose and Cabral left Calicut with only three ships laden. However, he could procure goods at Cochin for his remaining ships. On 9 January, 1501 he sailed away from the Indian shores, leaving behind at Cochin about 30 Portuguese. When he reached Portugal on the last day of July of the same year he had only 5 ships out of the original 13. However, they were so richly laden that a good deal of profit was realised after selling the cargo of the merchandise <sup>10</sup> of the East.

In the meantime, in March, 1501, the third fleet of 4 vessels, under the command of João da Nova, had left for India. For the king of Portugal had apparently decided by then to send such a fleet to India every year. The fleet of 1501 avoided Calicut which was then hostile to the Portuguese and went to Cochin where it was soon laden with merchandise which was kept ready by the Portuguese left behind by Cabral. The fleet was back at home safely on 11 September, 1502.

In February, 1502 Vasco da Gama was sent again to India with a larger fleet of 20 ships. His brother, Estêvão da Gama, commanding five ships, sailed from Portugal in April of the same year. The two brothers met at Anjediva. Vasco da Gama had two significant instructions from his sovereign: one was to block, as much as possible, the Muslim trade between India on the one hand and the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea on the other; the second instru-

ction was that he should endeavour to divert the Eastern trade entirely to Portugal. Thus, the monopoly of the Eastern trade was to be transferred from the hands of the Muslims to those of the Portuguese. Accordingly, Muslim trading vessels were attacked on the Indian Ocean. On reaching the Malabar Coast he demanded of the Zamorin that the latter should expel from his kingdom all the Muslim traders. The Zamorin naturally refused to comply and Vasco da Gama caused wanton and cruel destruction to the Zamorin's ports, vessels and subjects. He then proceeded to Cochin where he succeeded in establishing a factory. Leaving Vicente Sodre with six vessels and one ~~caravel~~ to guard the coast, Vasco da Gama left for Portugal where he reached on 1 September, 1503.

In 1503 and 1504 also the king of Portugal sent his fleets to India. However, in 1505 this policy of sending out to India an annual fleet was given up. Instead, it was decided to appoint a viceroy who was to stay in his post in India for a term of three years. The first viceroy thus to be appointed was Francisco de Almeida who set sail from Lisbon on 25 March, 1505 with a fleet of 22 ships and 1,500 men. He had instructions, inter alia, to build fortresses at Kilwa, Anjediva, Cannanor and Cochin, and thus establish Portuguese supremacy over the waters of the Indian Ocean. In February, 1509 Almeida inflicted, off Diu, a crushing defeat on the fleet of the Sultan of Egypt which had come to the coast of Gujarat on the request of the king of Cambay.

Almeida was succeeded by the great soldier-statesman, Afonso de Albuquerque, on 5 November, 1509. With him began a new era in the history of the rise of the Portuguese power in India. He conceived the idea of establishing a territorial empire in India and succeeded in implementing it to a considerable extent. He captured and occupied Goa in 1510 and made it the headquarters of the Portuguese power in the East; in 1511 he conquered Malacca which gave the Portuguese control over the trade between India and China; and in 1515 he established Portuguese sovereignty over Ormuz, thus acquiring command over the entrance of the Persian Gulf. It was Albuquerque, therefore, who firmly laid the foundation of the Portuguese supremacy in the East and effectively curbed the

Muslim monopoly of trade with India and the East Indies. Though a territorial empire worth the name was never built by the Portuguese in India, their naval supremacy in the Indian Ocean and their control over the Eastern trade continued to remain unquestioned until the turn of the 16th century when the Dutch and the English entered the Eastern waters as competitors.

(b) The scope of the present work.

It is not the purpose of the present work to study the rise, decline and fall of the Portuguese power in India in its entirety from their arrival in 1498 to the end of their hold over Goa, Diu and Daman on 19 December, 1961. The region, the period and the aspects of study are limited as stated below.

REGION.

Kanara is the region of study for the present work. The territorial boundaries of a region do not remain permanent; they change for one reason or another. Today Kanara is divided into two districts: North Kanara and South Kanara. Both are included in the Mysore State. Kanara as a whole has a coast washed by the waves of the Arabian Sea and extending from the village Majali, about 5 miles to the north of the Kalinadi, to the village Talpadi, about 8 miles to the south of the river Netravati. The district of Belgaum and the territory of Goa are to the north of Kanara. The district of Dharwar lies to the north-east and the districts of Shimoga and Kadur border on the east. Coorg is to the south-east. The Kerala State lies to the south.

At the time of the arrival of the Portuguese, Kanara had different boundaries. Duarte Barbosa says: "Proceeding from this city (of Goa) along the coast, on the way to Malabar, there is a river which they call Ligua (the Kalinadi), which is the demarcation of the kingdom of the Daquem (Deccan) with that of Nar-singa (the Vijayanagara Empire), and at the mouth of the river, on a hill, there

is a fortress which they call Cintacora (Chitakul or ~~the~~ the present Sadashiva-gad), which the Sabaio (Yusuf Adil Khan of Bijapur) possesses here for the defence of his land, in which he has continually many foot-soldiers and cavalrymen, and here ends the kingdom of the Daquem on the northern side, which extends along the coast upto Chaul...."<sup>12</sup> Further, "Passing ~~this~~ this Cintacora, the immediate land beyond (the river) is of the great kingdom of Narsinga which is so vast that it has five very big provinces, and, each one, its own language. The first is along the coast upto Malabar, which they call Tolinate (Tulunadu)...."<sup>13</sup> And again, after referring to Mirjan, Honavar, Baindur, Barkur, Basrur and Mangalore, the ports along the coast downwards, he avers with regard to Kumbala: "This place of Cumbola has a lord who commands and governs it, appointed by the king of Narsinga, and stands face to face with the kingdom of Cananor, and here ends the kingdom of Narsinga on the coast of the province of Tolinate."<sup>14</sup>

The province of Tolinate, no doubt, is the province of Kanara, one of the big provinces in the Vijayanagara Empire. Thus, according to Barbosa the territories of Kanara began from the southern bank of the Kalinadi. In the south, Kanara included, as the above narration of Barbosa implies, Manjeshwara and Kumbala, which are now found incorporated in the territories of the Kerala State. He specifically mentions that Kumbala was subject to the Emperor of Vijayanagara and there the territories of the province of Kanara terminated.

Barros takes the southern boundary of Kanara a little more downwards. Says he: ".....from Aliga (the Kalinadi) to another river named Gangerecorá (Chandragiri), which is five leagues to the north of the Monte de Eli (Mount Deli), a notable cape on this coast, it will be forty six leagues. On which coast lie these localities: Ancolá (Ankola), Egorapá (?), Mergeu (Mirjan), the city of Onor (Honavar), capital of the kingdom, Baticalá (Bhatkal), Bendor (Baindur), Bracelor (Basrur), Bacanor (Barkur), Careara (?), Carnate (Karnad), Mangalor, Mangueirão (Manjeshwara), Cumbatá (Kumbala), and Gangerecorá, by which runs a river of this name which is the extremity and demarcation.....; all these localities belong to the province of Canará, subject to the king of Bisnagá (Vijayanagara)....."<sup>15</sup> Thus,

for Barros Kanara extended from the Kalinadi in Karwar to the river Chandragiri in Kasaragod.

Regarding the northern boundary of Kanara another authority may be noted. Afonso de Albuquerque, in one of his letters to the king of Portugal, writes:  
"....the other land of cintauola upto Goa is in your obedience...."<sup>16</sup> Cintauola is the Portuguese corruption of Chitakul, modern Sadashivagad on the northern bank of the Kalinadi. This land was traditionally included in the kingdom of Goa, as ~~said~~ stated in a treaty between the Portuguese and the Emperor of  
<sup>17</sup> Vijayanagara, Sadashiva Raya. Thus, the Kalinadi was certainly the northern boundary of Kanara.

<sup>18</sup> On the basis of the above authorities we may conclude that at the time of the Portuguese arrival in India, Kanara comprised ~~this~~ the area between the Kalinadi and the river Chandragiri, and between the Western Ghats and the Arabian Sea. This Kanara of the early Portuguese writers is taken into account in the present work.

#### PERIOD.

The period chosen for this work is from 1498 to 1763. The Portuguese came into contact with Kanara right in 1498. Vasco da Gama sailed northwards from Malabar along ~~this~~ the coast until he arrived, in mid-September, at a group of islands off Kundapur, two leagues from the mainland. He developed friendly relations with the natives there who brought to him fish and other provisions in return for which he gave them shirts and other articles. Before sailing away he placed in one of the islands, with the good will of the local people, a  
<sup>19</sup> Portuguese banner with the cross and the arms of the king of Portugal, probably as a mark of conquest and possession. Today these islands are known as Pigeon  
<sup>20</sup> islands, situated about 20 miles south of Bhatkal.

From the Pigeon islands the Portuguese fleet proceeded to Anjediva, a group of five islands, about five miles south-west of Karwar, and two miles from the

mainland. Here the Portuguese stayed for twelve days from 24 September to 5 October, cleaning and repairing their ships, filling fresh water, and procuring provisions. Vasco da Gama came to know from some natives, who brought him pumpkins and cucumbers, that there was plenty of cinnamon available there, but no other variety of spices. He secured, as a sample to be taken home, two large branches, full of leaves, from a cinnamon tree from a thicket where there were many such trees.

The natives seem to have become amicable with the Portuguese. Once twelve men in two small barques went to the Portuguese and offered them a large bundle of sugar canes. They requested Vasco da Gama to allow them to go on board the Portuguese ships in order to see. Apparently Vasco da Gama suspected some mischief and was irritated at the request. Just then some more natives arrived in two boats. Seeing that da Gama was not well disposed towards them, the first twelve asked the latter not to land. And then all of them sailed away.

Thus, the Kanarese and the Portuguese came to know each other, to some extent, right from the beginning of the latter's arrival in India. This contact ~~continued~~ continued in various spheres - political, commercial and religious - until the end of the Portuguese hold over Goa on 19 December, 1961.

However, the year 1763 marks an important stage in the Portuguese-Kanarese relations. In that year Haidar Ali Khan, de facto ruler of Mysore, brought to an end the line of Keladi rulers which had dominated Kanara for about two hundred years. The dynasty of the Keladi chiefs was established in 1499 when Chauda Gauda was appointed the Nayaka of Keladi by Vira Narasimha, Emperor of Vijayanagara. The event virtually coincided with the coming of the Portuguese to India. It is true that until the middle of the 16th century there was no direct relations between the Portuguese and the Keladi rulers; but in 1554 or a little earlier Sadasiva Nayaka, one of the successors of Chauda Gauda, was appointed governor of Chandragutti, Barkur and Mangalore.<sup>23</sup> The Keladi Nayakas thus entered the Kanara region and came into direct contact with the Portuguese. Since then, as shown

elsewhere, there were active relations between the two powers, some times friendly, at other times hostile, until the last ruler of the dynasty, namely, Rani Viramamaji, was overthrown in 1763 by Haidar Ali who initiated a new chapter in the history of Kanara. The period of a little over two hundred centuries and a half from 1498 to 1763, therefore, can be considered a distinct period of the Portuguese-Kanarese relations.

NATURE OF STUDY.

Emphasis has been placed on the political aspect of the Portuguese-Kanarese relations. However, two chapters, one on the Portuguese religious activities and the other on their commerce, have been added towards the end.

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Foot-notes:

1. K. M. Panikkar considers this as the beginning of the "Vasco da Gama epoch" in East-West relations, for the Western dominance over Asia began with the coming of Vasco da Gama to India and lasted for about 450 years until the British withdrew from India in 1947. Panikkar's work: "Asia and Western Dominance" has the sub-title: "A survey of the Vasco da Gama Epoch of Asian History, 1498-1945".

C. R. Boxer, in his work: "Four Centuries of Portuguese Expansion, 1415-1825: A Succinct Survey", quotes with near approval (p.1) a 16th century Spanish historian, Francisco López de Gómara, who says that the discovery of the sea route from Europe to India by Vasco da Gama was "the greatest event since the creation of the world, apart from the incarnation and death of him who created it."

2. D-JB, I, pp.151-2.

3. Several books and papers have been produced in this respect. Oliveira Bóeo, in his work: "Descobrimentos Marítimos e Explorações Terrestres", (pp. 36-42,

54), enumerates the following causes: (i) Portugal had an excellent coast; (ii) During the 14th century she consolidated her territorial boundaries in Europe and in 1415 she began her career of overseas expansion with the capture of Ceuta in North-West Africa; (iii) To fight against the Muslims, be they in Africa or in distant lands, and to spread Christianity among the pagans became her national policy; (iv) She took advantage of the nautical studies of the day in Europe; (v) The fear of the 'Mar Tenebroso' (Sea of Darkness) beyond the Cape of Bojador was removed with the voyage of Gil Eanes in 1434; (vi) It was believed that there was a Christian king, Prester John, at the flank of the Muslim empire who constantly fought against Islam; one of the purposes of the voyages of discovery therefore was to find out his kingdom and unite with him against the Muslims; (vii) Economically, Portugal was deficient in many products; the desire and necessity to improve her economy impelled her to further voyages of discovery after the conquest of Ceuta; (viii) Ethnically, a large portion of the population of Portugal consisted of the descendants of the ancient sea-faring peoples like the Greeks, the Celts and the Visigoths; (ix) The Portuguese secured (in 1428) a copy of the 'Book of Marco Polo', which gave them some valuable knowledge regarding the East, including India and China; and (x) Prince Henry the Navigator (1394-1460), by far, was the most eminent human agent who organised and directed the voyages of discovery, taking full advantage of the above factors and circumstances. He was motivated by (a) an intellectual curiosity of knowing the geography of the world; (b) a spirit of proselytisation and crusade - to convert and fight against infidels; and (c) a desire to develop overseas commerce and to colonise. His career as an explorer, conqueror and crusador began in 1415 when he captured Ceuta. By the time he died in 1460 his sailors had gone as far as the Mountain of Lion (leão) on the West Coast of Africa; his policy was continued by his successors without a break.

4. Velho, Alvaro: Roteiro da Primeira Viagem de Vasco da Gama, p. 40.
5. D-JB, I, pp. 157-8.
6. Rego, António da Silva: Portuguese Colonisation: a study of Royal Ordinances (Regimentos), p. 26.
7. Whiteway, R. S. : The Rise of the Portuguese Power in India, pp. 7-8.
8. Cambridge History of India, V, p. 4.
9. D-JB, I, pp. 181-2.
10. Cambridge History of India, V, p. 5.
11. Ibid., p. 6.
12. Barbosa, Duarte: Livro de, Tr. A. R. Machado, pp. 93-4.
13. Ibid., p. 94.
14. Ibid., p. 100.
15. D-JB, I, p. 357.
16. Cartas, I, p. 28. The letter dated 22 December, 1510.
17. Botelho, Simão: O Tombo do Estado da India, in Subsidios, p. 256.
18. Tomé Pires (The Suma Oriental of, Tr. Armando Cortesão, pp. 60-1) differs from these authorities regarding the boundaries of Kanara. According to him Kanara extended from Anjediva to Mangalore. Mirjan, Honavar, Bhatkal, Basrur, Brahmawar, Barkur, Udipi and Mangalore were its ports. Though Manjeshwara belonged to the Emperor of Vijayanagara, it was not a Kanarese port. Kumbala, of course, was far below and it was, therefore, in Malabar.

It may be pointed out that though Tomé Pires was in India, his stay here was for hardly one year and nine months (Ibid., pp. xxiv-xxvi, xxix). Duarte Barbosa, on the other hand, was in India from about 1500 to 1516 or 1517 (Longworth Dames, The Book of Duarte Barbosa, p. xxxiii). He also knew Malayalam very well (Ibid., p. xxxvi). His statements regarding the Kanarese boundaries, therefore, must be considered as more authentic. João de Barros too can be considered as having acquired greater knowledge of the Kanarese boundaries, though he never came to India. For as an official, long connected with the India House at Lisbon, he was familiar with Indian



affairs and as official historian he studied documents relating to India.

Later Portuguese writers also support Duarte Barbosa and João de Barros. Simão Botelho (op. cit., pp. 246-8), writing in 1554, included all the ports from Sadashivagad to Kumbala in Kanara. This writer was the superintendent of the treasury and was in India for a number of years between 1532 and 1554, visiting various ports, factories and fortresses.

Even in the 17th century the 'district of Canara' was described as extending between Goa and Cannanor, as can be seen in a royal ordinance dated 19 March, 1612. (DIR, II, p. 228.)

19. História, Liv. I, p. 62; Velho, Alvaro: op. cit., p. 70.
20. Gazetteer of the Bombay Presidency, vol. XV, pt. II, Kanara, p. 101.
21. Velho, Alvaro: op. cit., p. 71.
22. Ibid., p. 74.
23. Rao, N. Lakshminarayana: The Nayakas of Keladi, in VSCV, p. 258.

## Chapter 2.

### KANARA AT THE ARRIVAL OF THE PORTUGUESE.

#### (a) The Vijayanagara Empire.

Any discussion on the political and commercial situation in Kanara at the arrival of the Portuguese in India must be prefaced with the statement that this whole coastal region was subject to the sovereignty of the Vijayanagara Emperors. In 1336, Deva Raya, the Bairasu Odeyar of Barkur, whose authority extended at least from Karkal in South Kanara to Kumta in North Kanara, made over his kingdom to Harihara I, the first Emperor of Vijayanagara.<sup>1</sup> The rest of Kanara also came under Harihara's control. The whole region of Kanara remained under the Vijayanagara Emperors ever after until the latter half of the 16th century.<sup>2</sup> One Portuguese writer after another confirms that the province of Kanara from the Kalinadi to the river Chandragiri was a part of the great Vijayanagara Empire when the Portuguese came to India.

There were, however, a number of local chiefs in Kanara who governed small areas at the arrival of the Portuguese. The Vijayanagara Emperors allowed almost full independence to these chiefs within their respective jurisdictions, provided they maintained their quota of horse, foot and elephants in readiness for the immediate use of the Emperors,<sup>3</sup> and paid their annual tributes. That is why we find these chiefs entering into treaties with the Portuguese, as we shall see in the following chapters, independent of the Vijayanagara Emperors, and the Portuguese treating them as if they were independent kings, even though they knew very well that the chiefs were feudatories of the Emperors. It may be true that the Portuguese, for their own glorification,<sup>4</sup> treated the chiefs as kings, but the virtual independence the latter enjoyed under the Vijayanagara Emperors may be considered as an additional factor for the Portuguese attitude towards them.

Gersoppa, Barkur, Mangalore, Ullala and Kumbala were the feudatory principalities of Kanara at the time of the arrival of the Portuguese. We shall now

proceed to study the position of the chiefs of these principalities and their respective territorial jurisdictions at the turn of the fifteenth century and the beginning of the sixteenth. The study will include a discussion regarding the commercial importance of the ports and towns.

GERSOPPA.

The principality of Gersoppa was created by the Vijayanagara Emperors. A Jain family of Gersoppa was recognised as the ruling house of this principality.<sup>5</sup> The house was related by marriage to the Bairasu Odeyars of Barkur. The principality of Gersoppa extended, according to one Portuguese source, "from Honavar and Mirjan to Anjediva".<sup>6</sup> In fact it extended from the south bank of the Kali-nadi to Gersoppa itself on the south bank of the river Sharavati, for another source mentions the Kalinadi as the river "where the kingdom of Honavar separates from that of Goa."<sup>7</sup> By the 'kingdom of Honavar' is meant here the kingdom of Gersoppa, as the Portuguese often used the former expression to denote the kingdom of Gersoppa. Anjediva, Mirjan and Honavar were its principal ports. Gersoppa, about 16 miles inland, was its capital.<sup>8</sup>

Who was the ruler of Gersoppa at the arrival of the Portuguese? This is a difficult question to answer. Probably it was Berforé who may be identified with Basavaraja of Gersoppa<sup>9</sup> and who sent an ambassador to Goa in March 1510, at the instance of his suzerain, Krishna Deva Raya, and offered to assist the Portuguese against the Adil Shah of Bijapur.<sup>10</sup> Afonso de Albuquerque gives us some clue regarding the reign-period of Basavaraja. Wrote he to the king of Portugal: ". . . Merlao (Malhar Rao) was the nephew of the king of Onor (Honavar), who gave you Mirjeu (Mirjan), and his uncle owing to some discontentment which he had of him, banished him from the kingdom, and at his death he bestowed (the kingdom) to a younger brother of his (Malhar Rao's); and there was always a fight between both (the brothers); and Merlao always endeavoured to oust his younger brother, as he (Malhar Rao) was the true heir; this brother, while he ruled, I found him

a very bad man, friend of the Muslims, of little truthfulness, and hardly paying the dues of Mirjeu..... and would to God that the king of Onor, his brother, ~~the~~  
<sup>11</sup> died.... and he (Malhar Rao) succeeded to the kingdom."

The letter is dated 1 April, 1512. At the time of writing this letter Malhar Rao was the chief of Honavar, that is, Gersoppa, as can be seen from the letter itself. He succeeded his younger brother, who was just then dead. The younger brother's name, however, is not indicated; but he had succeeded the king who had given Mirjan to the Portuguese. Here it may be observed that the Portuguese secured Mirjan, probably in the first half of 1506, after a war between them and the king of Gersoppa in October of the previous year, as has been shown  
<sup>12</sup> elsewhere. Thus, Malhar Rao's uncle was ruling in 1505 and 1506. He seems to have been on the throne in 1509 also. For in an order of Albuquerque to the treasurer of Cochin, dated 1 December of that year we come to know that a present  
<sup>13</sup> was given to the son of "tyno, king of onor". Probably Malhar Rao's uncle was this 'tyno'.

Basavaraja may perhaps be identified with 'tyno', for the rulers of Gersoppa seem to have had the title <sup>14</sup> 'Wodearu Pritani' and 'tyno' may be considered as referring to the ending of the word 'Pritani'. Basavaraja cannot perhaps be identified with the younger brother of Malhar Rao, for Afonso de Albuquerque found the younger brother unfriendly towards the Portuguese, whereas Basavaraja offered to help them against the Bijapuris. Thus, we may say that Basavaraja Odeyar Pritani ('tyno' or 'Berforé' of the Portuguese) was the king of Gersoppa at least from 1505 to 1510. He was succeeded by his younger nephew, who, in turn, was followed by the latter's elder brother, Malhar Rao, in the beginning of 1512.

From the above quoted letter of Albuquerque, dated 1 April, 1512 another deduction may be made. Malhar Rao is mentioned as the nephew of the king of Gersoppa, who gave Mirjan to the Portuguese, and that he was the real heir to the kingdom. This indicates that Malhar Rao belonged to a ruling family in which the 'Aliyakattu' prevailed in respect of inheritance, namely, one's sister's

son, and not one's own son, was the heir. If 'tyno' is identified with Malhar Rao's uncle, then the latter had a son; yet the son did not succeed his father to the throne, even when Malhar Rao was exiled; instead, Malhar Rao's younger brother became the ruler. It is true that 'nephew' stands for one's brother's son also. However, Barros clearly says that Malhar Rao was "the nephew of the king of Honavar, and the heir of the same kingdom of Honavar, following the custom of the people of India (in which) the nephews, the sons of sisters, are the heirs and  
not one's own sons."<sup>15</sup>

Gersoppa chiefs were frequently at war with Goa. The latter kingdom had been annexed by Harihara II to his Empire in 1391, but it was lost to the Bahmanis in 1469 during the reign of Virupaksha II. The latter's successor, Virupaksha III, endeavoured to retake it, but in vain. Goa, in fact, remained in Muslim hands upto 1510 when it was conquered by the Portuguese. In the meantime, every Emperor of Vijayanagara had an eye on the territories of Goa, and it is likely that the chiefs of Gersoppa had instructions to create trouble for the Muslims of Goa. Barros confirms this, though the reason given by him is different. It may not be out of place here to give a long quotation from his work in which he vividly describes the political and commercial relations among Honavar, Vijayanagara, the Deccan and Goa. Says he: "This port (of Honavar) and that of Bhatkal, which is seven leagues ahead, with others of this coast, belonged to the king of Vijayanagara, and the king of Honavar (was) his vassal. These ports were, for a little less than forty years, the most celebrated along the whole coast, not only because the land was fertile by itself and abundant in provisions, where there was great shipment to all places, but also (because) it was the entrance and exit of all the merchandise for the kingdom of Vijayanagara, from which the king had great revenue, mainly from the horses of Arabia and Persia, which came here as the ports of the greatest profit, on account of the great value they had in Vijayanagara, as these horses were the principal force with which he defended against the Muslims of the kingdom of the Deccan, with whom he had war

continually, and who had encircled him on the northern side and had taken many of his territories.

"And owing to this fertility of the land and the trade of these ports, there was a great number of native Muslims here, whom they call naiteás (Navayats), who used to purchase the horses and sell them to the Deccan Muslims, on account of which the king of Vijayanagara received great damage, as they waged war against him with the horses, and more (damage) at the hands of the purchasers of the horses which he needed, on account of the doubled price.

"Finally, as a people harmful to his state, he ordered the king of Honavar, his vassal, that he should kill as many of these Muslims as he could, so that the others would flee from his land with fear. And in the Mohammadan year of 917, which is the year of 1479 in the era of Christ our ~~Redeemer~~ Redeemer, there was a slaughter of these Muslims in all the territories of Honavar and Bhatkal, just in the manner of a conspiracy, in which more than 10,000 died; and the others who were formed into a group, the people of the land giving them an occasion for their exit, went to live in the Island of Tissuari, wherein the city of Goa is founded.....

"On account of the outrage which was done unto these Muslims, they began, in hatred of the Hindus of Honavar, to people Goa and attract merchandise there, mainly the horses, so that they (the horses) could pass on to the kingdom of the Deccan, which work they accomplished shortly, as these things were shipped by the Muslims, who desired to favour their parties against the Hindus, on account of which the ports of Honavar and Bhatkal began to feel the damage. And in order to oblige the ships loaded with horses as well as other merchandise, which used to sail into these two ports always, to go to them and not to that of Goa, he (the Emperor of Vijayanagara) sent to the king of Honavar four Hindu captains, who, with a fleet of ships of oar, would compel all the ships to sail into his port, and would rob and cause all the damage they could to those (ships) which defended themselves.

"Of which fleet.....Timmayya.....was the Captain-major,.....who did all the

damage which he could to the Muslims by that coast,..... And before he came to this post, the king of Honavar had other captains, by reason of which there was always a war between the king of Honavar and the governors of Goa, and on account of this the fortress of Cintacorá (Sadashivagad) came to be provided as the frontier of enemies.

"The Muslims prevailed so much against the king of Honavar, especially after the Sabaio (Yusuf Adil Khan) became the lord of Goa, that the king of Honavar, having the habitation of the city at the mouth of the river, shifted it inside  
<sup>16</sup>  
(along) the river,...."

From the above extensive quotation it is clear that there were frequent wars between Gersoppa and Goa after the massacre of 1479. ~~X~~ Ten years prior to the massacre, as has been mentioned, Goa had fallen to the Bahmanis. Thus, when the Emperor sent four captains to the assistance of the king of Gersoppa he not only intended to hinder the commerce of Goa, but also probably to keep the Muslim master of Goa engaged so that it would be a good distraction for him, as he would be compelled to keep a portion of his army in Goa to defend it. Gersoppa, however, does not seem to have gained much against Goa.

The Gersoppa chiefs seem to have had differences with the rulers of Bhatkal or the Barkur chiefs also. In 1508, when Francisco de Almeida was in Malabar, Timmayya requested his help, apparently on behalf of the king of Gersoppa, against Bhatkal. However, when Almeida reached the Bhatkal river he found that the two chiefs had stopped fighting in deference to their suzerain, Krishna Deva  
<sup>17</sup>  
Raya, who had come to the temple of Gokarna to weigh himself against gold.

From Varthema and Duarte Barbosa we get good deal of information regarding the commercial importance of Honavar. The former says that the 'king of Honavar' had seven or eight ships which were on continuous voyage. There was much rice in Honavar. The people there lived longer than the Italians, for its climate  
<sup>18</sup>  
was very good.

Barbosa records that much trade was carried on in Honavar by the Malabarese

who took a considerable amount of black rice from there in exchange for cocoanuts and cocoanut-oil, palm-jaggery and palm-wine. Every year an infinite number of zambucos, big and small, came to Honavar from Malabar for this trade of rice, which was the staple article of food among the Malabarese.

In addition to Honavar, there were other ports and towns under the Gersoppa chiefs, as mentioned above. With regard to Mirjan, Barbosa says that it was situated on the bank of a great river of the same name, i.e., modern Tadri river. A big quantity of very bad black rice was grown there. This rice was purchased by the Malabarese who came there in small zambucos. The rice was exchanged for cocoanuts, cocoanut-oil and jaggery which the people of Mirjan liked very much.

Anjediva, by far, attracted the Portuguese right from the beginning. Vasco da Gama, as has been already shown, spent twelve days there in September-October, 1498, on his return voyage. He found there a 'church' built of stone; but it was damaged by the Muslims, and therefore, it was covered with straw; the natives worshipped there three black stones which were in the centre of the church. There was a beach in front of the 'church' and there were two tanks in the island.

Varthema says that both Hindus and Muslims lived in Anjediva. The climate there was not good, nor was the soil very fertile. Between the island and the mainland there was a very good port and in the island excellent potable water.

The Anjediva group of ~~islands~~ islands seem to have been very much utilised as a place of rest by the Muslim and Hindu sea-farers during the course of their navigation along the coast and between India and the ports of East Africa and the Middle East. The Portuguese also made similar use of the islands, which, however, do not seem to have been well populated on account of their bad climate and unfertile soil. The Gersoppa chiefs, in whose principality they were included, apparently neglected their development for these reasons. The islands were virtually nobody's land until the Portuguese decided to make them their own in 1505 by building a fortress there as mentioned elsewhere.

BARKUR.

In South Kanara, or Tulunadu proper, Barkur and Mangalore were two important governorships under the Vijayanagara Emperors. The Portuguese called Barkur as Bacanor. The town of Barkur was on the north bank of the Sitanadi. Basrur or Bracelor of the Portuguese writers was included in the territorial jurisdiction of Barkur, for Barbosa mentions them together, and, besides, they were not very far from each other. Basrur was located on the south bank of the river Haladi.  
<sup>24</sup>

Inscriptions belonging to different governors of Barkur from 1490 to 1510 have been discovered at the following places: Chaulikeri, Handali, Koteswar, Kalasa, Giliyara, Manigarakeri, Basrur, and Bandar. There were at least three chiefs at Barkur, in succession, from 1498 to 1510, namely, Sadharanadeva Odeya (1498, 1499), Basavarasa Odeya (1502, 1507, 1508), and Mallappa Nayaka (1510).  
<sup>25</sup>

Kedali Basavappa Arasu Odeyar, mentioned in an inscription of 1506 found by Buchanan in Baindur, may be identified with the aforesaid Basavarasa Odeya. Thus, Baindur came under the principality of Barkur. Tomé Pires included Bhatkal also within the kingdom of Barkur. Thus, the region from Bhatkal to Basrur belonged to the Barkur chiefs.  
<sup>26</sup>  
<sup>27</sup>

Commercially, Bhatkal was the most important port in Kanara. It was located about 25 miles south of Honavar. It was a river-port located about a mile from the shore. Many Muslim merchants resided in Bhatkal and there was a lot of traffic there. A great quantity of rice and sugar, especially of white sugar, was produced; and nuts and figs were available. However, there was neither wheat, nor barley, nor legume in Bhatkal.  
<sup>28</sup>  
<sup>29</sup>

According to Barbosa there was a great commerce of many articles of trade in Bhatkal. There were Muslims and Hindus among whom were prominent merchants. Every year, many ships from <sup>Ormees</sup> came to the port of Bhatkal to take white rice and powdered sugar, which was grown there in great abundance. They packed up the powdered sugar in small bags. So also much iron was shipped. These

three articles, namely, rice, powdered sugar, and iron, were the main merchandise of this place. There was also some pepper which was brought to that port by the Malabarese. There were many good miramulanos which were sold to the Muslims of Arabia and Persia.

The ships from Ormus brought to Bhatkal many horses and pearls which were sold there for the Vijayanagara Empire. However, after the Portuguese occupation of Goa the ~~Ormees~~ ships took these articles to Goa. Some ships from Mecca also came to Bhatkal for spices. The zambucos from Malabar came there to take iron and sugar, in exchange for much palm-sugar, cocoanuts, cocoanut-oil, palm-wine, pepper and some drugs. The Portuguese, after occupying Goa, did not allow the ships from Mecca and Malabar to trade with the ports of Kanara; but some of the ships ventured to go there for trade inspite of the Portuguese orders and regulations.

There was much demand in Bhatkal for copper, which was carried inland, for making coins, boilers and others utensils, which the people of the land used. Quicksilver, vermillion, coral, aluminium ore and ivory were sold there.

On account of the great commercial importance of Bhatkal special administrators seem to have been appointed at the port. Tomé Pires says that Damj Shetty, probably Dama Shetty, was "the governor" of the Hindus, and Cojatar, namely, Khwaja Attar, was ~~that~~ of the Muslims there. Duarte Barbosa mentions the R very Dama Shetty (Damachate) and another Reimas, probably Ramdas. The former was very rich with plenty of money and beautiful precious stones; and the latter was a nephew of the Vijayanagara Emperor. Commentarios also speaks of two administrators of Bhatkal, namely, Naodaquiçar, probably Nandakishore, and Condanechatim, probably Gundanna Shetty, who proposed to negotiate a treaty of peace with Afonso de Albuquerque.

At Baindur a great quantity of very good rice was gathered. They cultivated rice there in valleys and marshy plains. There were two crops a years. All the rice that was exported from Bhatkal came from Baindur.

To the ports of Barkur and Basrur came ships from abroad as well as from

Malabar for loads of rice. Much rice was exported to Ormus, Aden, and Xaer  
and more to Cannanor and Calicut. Though <sup>the</sup> Barkur country was small, it was  
<sup>37</sup>  
well populated.

The town of Basrur had a republican form of government. The people elected  
the oldest among themselves as the 'senators'. The merchants of Basrur were  
so rich that the people spoke of their wealth in terms of bharas of gold, each  
bhara weighing four quintals or 235.008 kilo grams. Considerable quantities of  
rice, ginger and pepper were produced in Basrur. Much cloth of fine quality  
<sup>38</sup>  
was also made there.

#### MANGALORE.

Mangalore, like Barkur, was a separate administrative unit under the Vija-  
yanagara Emperors. However, a common governor over the two regions was many a  
time appointed. Thus, Annappa Odeya was the governor of Mangalore and Barkur  
<sup>39</sup>  
in 1418. So also, in 1554 or a little earlier, as has been mentioned already,  
Sadashiva Nayaka of Keladi was appointed governor of ~~Shivamogga~~ Barkur and  
<sup>40</sup>  
Mangalore by Ramaraja.

Varthema, who might have been in Mangalore some time between 1504 and 1510,  
<sup>41</sup>  
says that "fifty or seventy ships are loaded with rice" in the port of Mangalore.  
Duarte Barbosa says that it was populated by Muslims and Hindus. Many ships  
came to the port of Mangalore to take loads of black rice, which was sold at  
Malabar. Ships laden with the Mangalore rice went to Aden also. Some pepper  
was grown there. The Mangalore river was amenable and beautiful. There were  
groves of cocoanut palms, sumptuous edifices, many rich and grand houses of  
<sup>42</sup>  
Hindu worship, and also many mosques.

#### ULLALA.

Ullala, the Olala of the Portuguese writers, does not seem to have attracted  
them until after the second decade of the 16th century. At the time of the

arrival of the Portuguese in India, chiefs belonging to the Chautar family ruled over Ullala and its neighbourhood to the south of the river Netravati. Like all the chiefs from the river Kalinadi to the river Chandragiri, the Chautars also were the feudatories of the Vijayanagara Emperors.

KUMBALA.

As stated already, Duarte Barbosa found Kumbala under a lord who was subject to the Emperor of Vijayanagara. It was on the frontier of the province of Kanara. The territorial jurisdiction of Kumbala seems to have extended as far as the north bank of the river Chandragiri in Kasaragod to the south of which commenced the territories of the king of Cannanor.

Very bad black rice was collected at Kumbala and the Malabarese came there to purchase and load it in their zambucos. They sold it to the poor class of the people in Malabar and the islands of Maldiva. This rice was very cheap and the merchants gained more in dealing in it than in white rice. Coir, which was used in making cables and ropes and which was a safe article of trade everywhere,  
43  
was given in exchange for the rice.

(b) Causes of the Portuguese success against native chiefs.

The first and the foremost cause of the Portuguese success in India was their possession of an excellent navy. During the 15th century they developed scientifically the art of building ocean-going ships which were equipped with cannons. These cannon-carrying ships were a novelty on the shores of India  
44  
when the Portuguese arrived here. Outside Europe, only the Ottoman Empire had a navy equipped with artillery; but when the Portuguese reached India, the Turks had no navy in the Indian Ocean to challenge them. By the time the Ottomans thought of attacking the Portuguese in this quarter, the latter had strongly

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established themselves. Though the Vijayanagara Emperors had a navy it was not strong enough to ~~expedition~~ compete with that of the Portuguese. In India gunnery was not developed then. This being the case, the native chiefs of Kanara cannot be blamed if they could not resist the Portuguese. The Gersoppa chief, no doubt, had a fleet under the command of Timmayya, but the ships were not equipped with guns and they do not seem to have been fit for fighting in deep waters.

Further, even though the Portuguese bombarded cities and ports, and caused damage to ships of merchandise on the Kanara coast, as we shall see in due course, the Vijayanagara Emperors had no desire to incur the hostility of the Portuguese by coming to the aid of the local chiefs and fighting the former. For both the Vijayanagara Emperors and the Portuguese had in Muslims a common enemy to fight. Vijayanagara frequently fought with the Muslim rulers of the Deccan. Friendship with the Portuguese could be of great help to her in procuring military equipment from abroad, particularly the horses from Ormus, which otherwise went to her enemy through the port of Goa, inspite of Timmayya's efforts to prevent it. That is why Krishna Deva Raya offered his friendship to the Portuguese when Goa was taken by them, as has been pointed out elsewhere.

The Kanarese trade, like the trade of all the East with the West, was under the monopolistic control of the Muslims. Therefore, Vijayanagara had every reason to welcome if her enemy was deprived of this monopoly by the Portuguese. The native chiefs might have complained to their suzerain concerning the Portuguese high handedness against them; but he apparently preferred to take no notice of the complaint, so that the Portuguese could, being free from the necessity of facing the Vijayanagara forces, devote their energy to curb the Muslims.

Foot-notes:

1. Sturrock, J. : The South Canara District Manual, pp. 63, 64.
2. Occasionally, during the course of these two centuries, the Bairasu Odeyars revolted against their suzerains, but they were usually suppressed. Thus, they endeavoured to regain their independence during the reign of Harihara II (1377-1404), but in vain. Again, in the reign of Virupaksha II (1465-85), Immadi Bairarasa Odeyar revolted; but when the imperial forces marched against him and encamped at Mangalore he took to flight. (Rao, Hayavadana C. : Mysore Gazetteer, vol. II, pt. III, pp. 1510-1, 1770-1.)
3. Sewell, R. : A Forgotten Empire, p. 131.
4. Ibid., p. 119.
5. Gazetteer of the Bombay Presidency, vol. XV, pt. II, Kanara, p. 283.
6. Pires, Tomé : The Suma Oriental of, Tr. Armando Cortesão, pp. 60-1.
7. Commentarios, II, p. 116.
8. The Portuguese sources show that Honavar and ~~Gersoppa~~ Gersoppa were not two different principalities, but were one and the same. The Portuguese used the expression: 'the king of Honavar' or 'the king of Gersoppa' to denote one and the same ruler. Afonso de Albuquerque, who had close contact with Kanara, says at one place that Mirjan was given to the Portuguese by 'the king of Honavar' (Cartas, I, p. 47); but in another place he states that the very Mirjan was given by 'the king of Gersoppa' (Ibid., I, p. 172). Tomé Pires (op. cit., pp. 60-1), as already mentioned, states that the region from Anjediva to Honavar belonged to the king of Gersoppa. Gaspar Correa writes in one context (Lendas, Tomo I, pt. I, p. 289) that Honavar belonged to the king of Gersoppa, and in another (Ibid., pt. II, p. 565), that Malhar Rao was the king of Honavar. If Honavar belonged to the king of Gersoppa, Malhar Rao, king of Honavar, was the king of Gersoppa. Thus, the expressions 'the king of Honavar'<sup>and</sup> or 'the kingdom of Honavar' in Portuguese mean the king of Gersoppa and the kingdom of Gersoppa, respectively.

9. Gazetteer of the Bombay Presidency, op. cit., p. 109.
10. Commentarios, II, pp. 183-4.
11. Cartas, I, p. 47.
12. Infra, pp. 30-6.
13. Cartas, IV, p. 209.
14. Gazetteer of the Bombay Presidency, op. cit., p. 283.
15. D-JB, II, p. 237.
16. Ibid., I, pp. 347-8.
17. História, II, pp. 424-5.
18. Varthema, L. de : Itinerário, Tr. Vincenzo Spinelli, p. 134.
19. Barbosa, Duarte : Livro de, Tr. A. R. Machado, p. 95.
20. Ibid., pp. 94-5.
21. Velho, Alvaro : Roteiro da Primeira Viagem de Vasco da Gama, p. 73.
22. Varthema, L. de : op. cit., pp. 133-4.
23. Infra, pp. 85-6.
24. Barbosa, Duarte : op. cit., p. 98.
25. Sastri, K. A. N. and Venkataramanayya, N. : Further Sources of Vijayanagara History, p. 149. The figures inside the brackets show the years in which the inscriptions belonging to the respective chiefs have been found.
26. Sturrock, J. : op. cit., p. 67.
27. Pires, Tomé : op. cit., p. 61.
28. Ibid., p. 62.
29. Varthema, L. de : op. cit., p. 133.
30. Barbosa, Duarte : op. cit., p. 96.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid., p. 97.
33. Pires, Tomé : op. cit., p. 62.
34. Barbosa, Duarte : op. cit., pp. 96-7.
35. Commentarios, II, pp. 291-2.
36. Barbosa, Duarte : op. cit., p. 98.

37. Ibid., pp. 98-9.
38. D-DC, VIII, p. 279. Also X, pt. I, pp. 380-1.
39. Moraes, G. M. : Mangalore, p. 4.
40. Supra, p. 8.
41. Varthema, L. de : op. cit., p. 133.
42. Barbosa, Duarte : op. cit., p. 99.
43. Ibid., pp. 99-100.
44. Panikkar, K. M. : Asia and Western Dominance, p. 29.
45. Ibid.

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Chapter 3.

GERSOPPA COLLABORATES IN THE PORTUGUESE OCCUPATION OF GOA

The kingdom of Gersoppa played an important role in the Portuguese occupation of Goa, which became the permanent headquarters of the Portuguese Empire in the East. To be sure, the early contacts between this kingdom and the Portuguese were not a happy event. In 1502 Vasco da Gama emerged with his fleet at the Honavar river chasing the fleet of Timmayya, whom da Gama wrongly considered as a Muslim pirate. Estêvão da Gama, Vasco's brother, was sent into the river with men, who, on entering the river, came across some palisades from where the natives shot at the Portuguese from small guns and bows. Estêvão, however, effected a landing and the enemy took to flight. The native ships were then set on fire and burnt with the cargo on board. Sailing up another estuary of the Honavar river the Portuguese landed at another place where also there were many men of war who were attacked and put to flight. This place, probably a part of the city of Honavar, was burnt with all that was there, after which the Portuguese safely returned to their fleet. Having thus accomplished the wanton and unnecessary misdeeds of burning the ships and the city the Portuguese fleet proceeded towards Bhatkal.  
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Better relations, however, developed between the Portuguese and the kingdom of Gersoppa during the Viceroyalty of Dom Francisco de Almeida (1505-09), though not without a clash. The Viceroy constructed a fortress in Anjediva in accordance with the instruction of king Manuel of Portugal. This clearly showed the intention of the Portuguese to establish themselves in India and to control the Indian trade and commerce on the western coast. Already, the exploits of the Viceroy against the Muslims in East Africa were known to the kings of India. No wonder, therefore, that the king of Gersoppa desired friendship with the Portuguese rather than their hostility. In the beginning of the month of October, 1505, he sent an ambassador to the Viceroy at Anjediva with

a present consisting of provisions. According to Correa, Timmayya himself was  
2 the ambassador.

The Viceroy readily agreed to be at peace with the Gersoppa chief. And, in order to show the fame and greatness of Portugal, he exhibited the spoils which he had brought from Mombasa. There were valuable and costly items  
3 (peças) among them at which the ambassador was awestruck.

Barros gives a different version of this peace negotiation between the Portuguese and the king of Gersoppa. The Viceroy sent a message to him by way of informing him of the Portuguese arrival at Anjediva. The Viceroy expressed his happiness in having him as a neighbour with whom he desired to have friendly relations, as commanded by his own sovereign, king of Portugal. He also informed the chief of Gersoppa that he had certain matters to be discussed with him. Finally, he requested the chief to let him know how they could meet each  
4 other for a discussion.

No reply came from the Gersoppa chief to this message, nor to others which the Viceroy sent later. However, one of the captains of the chief informed the Viceroy that his lord was in the hinterland, busy in the negotiation of a war and therefore not in a position to respond personally to the messages of the Viceroy. Francisco thought that this excuse and delay was deliberate on the part of the Gersoppa chief and that the latter desired to gain time to prepare himself for a showdown with the Portuguese. Yet, he received the messengers of the captain with politeness and hospitality, sending him presents and compliments. On the following day two ambassadors from the chief himself came to the Viceroy. They pretended to be innocent of what had happened between the Viceroy and the captain. They told the Viceroy that on hearing of the arrival of the Portuguese fleet at Anjediva and of the construction of the fortress in the island, their chief, who was busy with a war far away from the coast, sent them to the Viceroy with a view to develop friendly relations with the king of Portugal. The chief offered the Viceroy, through these ambassadors, all that was needed in respect of provisions and other things for providing the fortress.

After replying to these general offers, the Viceroy inquired why no response was made to his own messages. The ambassadors said that their chief was not aware of those messages. Regarding the role of the captain, the ambassadors told the Viceroy that their chief would feel for not being informed of the messages, but that it was legitimate for such captains to act cautiously in such matters as long as they did not know the mind of their lord. The ambassadors promised that they would let their chief know of this and would soon come back with his answer. The Viceroy pretended to be happy with this, thinking that the truth could be known from the reply that the ambassadors would bring from their chief. He sent them away with compliments, and presents in return for what they had brought with them.<sup>5</sup> The ambassadors apparently did not come back. Inspite of the Viceroy's suspicion, however, the Gersoppa chief seems to have desired friendship with the Portuguese then.

A few days later an incident occurred which led to a clash between the Portuguese and the chief. As Correa says, a ship belonging to Muslims and coming from Ormus loaded with horses, was seen by the Portuguese from Anjediva. The Viceroy ordered a caravel to chase the ship. The caravel, however, had to be towed by boats into the sea as there was no favourable wind at the bay where it was anchored. This caused a little delay. Nevertheless, on seeing the caravel chasing their ship, the Muslims entered the Honavar river, but the crew, with the fear which they had of the Portuguese, erred at the bar and the ship went aground. The Portuguese caravel did not enter the river, for the crew did not know the bar. Dom Lourenço, son of the Viceroy, who commanded the caravel, put out four boats and with his men approached the ship. The Muslims fled to the land. The Portuguese then began to remove the horses from the ship to their boats. While they were doing so, suddenly there arose a tempest with a strong wind which forced them to give up the work and hasten back to Anjediva. Next day when the sea was calm, the Portuguese went to the ship again to fetch the horses, but the horses were already taken possession of by the king of Gersoppa. The Viceroy sent words requesting him to give up the horses, but the king refused to do so saying

that the horses belonged to him since they were found lost within his jurisdiction. The Viceroy then considered the peace between the Portuguese and the Gersoppa chief as broken.<sup>6</sup>

Castanheda adds that there was a collection of nineteen horses in the ship from Ormus. By the time the tempest broke out, the Portuguese had removed nine horses into their boats. Before returning to Anjediva they entrusted these nine horses to the care of some native Muslims who were observing the Portuguese operation from the river bank. The Muslims were told that the Portuguese would return for the horses when the tempest stopped. However, when they actually came back they found that the Gersoppa chief had taken the horses from the Muslims, even though he was told to whom the horses belonged. Castanheda does not say whether the chief took possession of the remaining ten horses also from the ship. When the Portuguese request for the surrender of the horses was refused the Viceroy determined to wage a war against Gersoppa.<sup>7</sup>

According to Barros the ship carrying the horses was a large zambuco which approached Anjediva in order to take shelter there from a strong wind which had been blowing for two days. The crew soon realised that the island was occupied by the Portuguese with a large fleet. The zambuco therefore changed its course and sailed towards Honavar. Dom Lourenço and Lourenço de Brito, two of the Portuguese captains, were sent with their men to chase it. On approaching the zambuco the Portuguese found in it only twelve horses. When the storm broke out they entrusted these horses to the care of some local Muslims who, however, could not return them to the Portuguese, for the Gersoppa chief took them away. On the latter's refusal to surrender the horses, there followed a war between the two parties.<sup>8</sup> Thus, for the sake of a few horses the professed friends fought with each other.

Francisco de Almeida embarked from Anjediva on Thursday, 16 October, 1505 and reached the mouth of the Honavar river the same night in the moonlight. On Friday morning he sent Fernão Soares in a boat to find out whether the ships could enter the river. Soares, after a connoisseur, returned and reported that

ships, other than caravels and small vessels, could not enter the river and that many big ships which were equal in size to those of the Portuguese were aground in the river. Further, he found out from the people that the enemy could amass 4,000 soldiers at a short notice. Besides, some Muslims told him that they desired peace with the Portuguese, that they would urge the king to pay for the horses, and that their ships lying at the port should not be burnt in the meantime. The Viceroy waited the whole day to see if the Muslims would get the king to pay for the horses, but in vain. He then decided to attack the city. 600 men were ordered to embark in boats and other small vessels. They reached the city in the moonlight and before it was dawn. The Viceroy soon realised, however, that it was not desirable to attack until the morning since his men did not know the land well and the moonlight<sup>w</sup> was not enough to guide them. The attack was, therefore, postponed. The inhabitants of the city, in the meantime, took shelter in a near by hill along with their women, children and goods, for fear that the Portuguese would fall upon the city any time. They very much desired that their king paid for the horses, but he did not want to, since he was 'greedy', as if the Portuguese demanded the horses or compensation out of generosity!

In the morning next day, which was the 18th of October, again two Muslims went to the Viceroy and told him, on behalf of the merchants of Honavar, that they desired peace and that they would entreat the king once again to pay the Portuguese for the nine horses. This time the Viceroy's reply was that he would burn the ships lying at the port even if the horses were paid for, for he was sure that among the ships there were some belonging to Calicut the ruler of which was an enemy of the Portuguese on the Malabar coast. The envoys denied the presence of the Calicut ships and went away never to come back.

While these dilatory negotiations were going on, the Gersoppa chief did nothing but send his troops to fight the Viceroy whom he considered young and inexperienced. The Viceroy sent his son, Dom Lourenço, with some soldiers to

effect a landing and burn the ships, which was done. The enemy took to flight. On seeing the fire the Gersoppa chief sent additional troops. In all there were 4,000 men most of whom were bowmen and others were shieldmen with lances. The Gersoppa soldiers made a formation at the end of the city. The Viceroy too sent a reinforcement to his son, and he himself began to move to see that the fire was not extinguished by the enemy. The bowmen, well protected by the shieldmen, rained arrows on the Portuguese, led by Lourenço, one of whom was killed. However, the Portuguese managed to put the defenders to flight, killing thirteen of them. The Viceroy, who was observing all these from his boat, ordered his son to come back, fearing that he might chase the enemy too far and put himself in danger. Lourenço began to retreat accordingly; but seeing this the enemy thought that the Portuguese were doing so out of fear and attacked them on the river bank. The enemy fled, however, when the Portuguese began to bombard from their ships. In the meantime, the Viceroy himself received a wound on his toe of the left foot from an arrow-shot from the enemy. The wound was not a serious one and was soon cured. The Portuguese burnt 14 of the enemy ships and a great part of the city, and killed twenty two of the enemy troops and wounded many more. On their side, one Portuguese soldier was killed. The  
11  
Viceroy was the only one wounded.

Barros, however, writes that the Viceroy did not have the intention of destroying the city, because it belonged to a vassal of the Emperor of Vijayanagara with whom the Portuguese ~~were~~ wanted to be on friendly terms. What the Viceroy wanted, therefore, was to burn the ships belonging to Timmayya and  
12  
others, which alone was done.

Losing all hopes of withstanding the Portuguese attack, the Gersoppa chief decided to seek peace. He sent two envoys to the Viceroy with the message that he repented for what he had done, that he realised his error in breaking the friendship with the Portuguese, that he would pay for the horses on account of which the battle was fought, and that he would become a vassal of the king of

Portugal to whom he would pay tribute. The envoys themselves were to be hostages and they were to be beheaded if the chief did not send the promised money the following day. The Viceroy replied grandiloquently that he did not mind so much the taking of horses by the chief but his violence of truth, which ought to be guarded always, especially by the kings! He conceded peace because he did not want war! However, he did not have time then to settle terms of peace since he had much to do in Cochin where he ought to have been by that time. On reaching Cochin he would send his son with whom the chief could come to terms and pay for the horses. In the meantime he would give the chief a Portuguese flag so that no harm would be done to him by any of the Portuguese fleet. With this decision the Viceroy sailed away towards Cochin on the same day, 18 October.  
13

According to Barros, Timmayya played an important role in the negotiation for peace. The Viceroy was being treated for his wound in a ship in the afternoon of the day of the attack when Timmayya sought permission to see him. The request was granted. The Viceroy was impressed by Timmayya's personality. He had a noble and intelligent bearing. His dignified and honourable behaviour convinced the Viceroy that he could give him credence as the trusted envoy of the Gersoppa chief. Timmayya begged to be excused for not coming earlier, the cause for the delay being the various affairs entrusted to him by his chief. He told the Viceroy that he had paid for this delay, because some of the ships burnt by the Portuguese belonged to him personally; that he had come to the Viceroy to declare himself a vassal of the king of Portugal, which was not a new desire but one which he had right from the first day on which the Portuguese had arrived in India; that the Gersoppa chief also proposed to become a vassal of the Portuguese king; that the chief could not come personally to the Viceroy as he was indisposed; and that the offer of the vassallage both of Timmayya and his chief better be accepted as they would always be loyal to the king of Portugal. Payment for the horses was promised. Compensation for damage, if any, was also offered to the Portuguese, though the soldiers of Honavar had done noth-

ing but what was lawful in defence of the property of their king whose policy towards the Portuguese they did not know. The Viceroy was pleased with the talk but told Timmayya that he could not spare time then in settling terms of agreement since he had to hurry to Cochin in order to send loaded ships to Portugal. He would, therefore, send his son with powers to settle the terms later on. Although Timmayya was satisfied with the Viceroy's words, he did not want to go away without being promised that he and the Muslims of Honavar could ~~safely~~ move in the Indian waters without being molested by the Portuguese. The Viceroy made provisions for this safety and then Timmayya departed.

Correa records that the amount for the horses was 23,000 xerafins (about Rs. 69,000); and that the Gersoppa chief sent his nephew, son of his sister, to Anjediva, who was to remain in the island as hostage until the amount for the horses was paid to the Portuguese, and the sum of the tribute was agreed upon. In due course the chief paid the horse money. He also offered to pay an annual tribute of one thousand pardaos (Rs. 4,000) on the condition that Timmayya be allowed to sail about freely with his fleet. The Viceroy did not accept the condition, nor the tribute. However, friendship between the two came to be established. Timmayya supplied provisions to the Portuguese at Anjediva by which he gained much, for he could procure these provisions almost for nothing.<sup>15</sup> Thus, according to Correa no damage or tribute was charged by the Portuguese upon the Gersoppa chief, except the price of the horses for which the battle was fought.

Barros and Castanheda do not indicate how and when the actual treaty of peace was entered into between the Gersoppa chief and the Portuguese, and what were the terms of the treaty, though according to both of them the Viceroy went away to Cochin promising to send his son with powers to settle the terms of peace. However, from a letter written by the king of Portugal to the archbishop of Braga on 19 June, 1508, it appears that the Gersoppa chief gave to the Portu-

guese a place which was a sea-port busy with commercial activities. It was taken possession of by the Viceroy who appointed Portuguese officials to collect the dues from the port. The Portuguese gained annually one thousand pardaos  
<sup>16</sup> (Rs. 4,000) from this. Probably the place referred to in the letter is Mirjan, as can be gathered from another letter written by Afonso de Albuquerque to the king of Portugal on 1 April, 1512. Albuquerque's letter indicates that the Gersoppa chief gave Mirjan to the Portuguese and that the successor of this  
<sup>17</sup> chief hardly paid the dues from the place. Incidentally the second letter implies that the Portuguese did not have territorial possession of Mirjan, though both the letters say that the Gersoppa chief 'gave' them the place. What the Portuguese really got was the customs dues of Mirjan which amounted to one thousand pardaos a year. Thus, from these two letters it appears that the Gersoppa chief not only paid for the horses on account of which the battle was fought but also agreed to pay an annual tribute of one thousand pardaos in the form of customs dues from Mirjan.

It will be of interest to know more about Timmayya, who, in fact, played a significant role in the Portuguese conquest of Goa later on. The Portuguese knew him right from the year in which they arrived in India. As we have seen, Vasco da Gama stayed in the island of Anjediva for twelve days in September-  
<sup>voyage</sup> October, 1498, during the course of his return ~~journey~~ from India to Portugal. A few days after he landed there Vasco da Gama saw two big barques, which appeared like fustas, and in which there were many people singing and playing on musical instruments. The barques were being oared and had banners on the top of the masts. There were five more barques along the coast for their protection. Vasco da Gama, before the barques reached his ships, inquired from the Malabarese whom he had captured at Calicut, what kind of people were they in them. He was told that he should not allow the barques to come near; that the men inside were thieves; and that they were coming in order to ~~rob~~ rob the Portuguese ships if possible. Being thus alerted, Vasco da Gama ordered his men to fire

at the barques as soon as they reached within the range of a gun-shot. The men in the barques cried out "tambaram, tambaram", perhaps requesting the Portuguese to stop firing. They began to retreat, however, when they found that the Portuguese would not understand them and would not stop firing at them. Nicolau Coelho, a Portuguese captain, chased them in a vessel to some distance until  
18 he was signalled to return.

Castanheda says that Vasco da Gama learnt from the Malabarese that Timmaya was the leader of the thieves. Barros adds that as soon as Timmayya had news of the Portuguese arrival at Anjediva he set out from Honavar with eight ships which he fastened together and covered with boughs. The ships, therefore, appeared like a floating thicket. When they were within the fire-range they were bombarded and scattered by the Portuguese. Nicolau Coelho who chased them  
20 took one of the ships in which there were rice and other provisions.

Timmayya is thus referred to in the above Portuguese works as a pirate.  
21 Correa also calls him a corsair. The author of the Commentarios mentions him to have been of great service to the king of Portugal, but all the same he was  
22 "a man of low sort" and a pirate.

Was Timmayya really a pirate and a man of low sort? He was neither. To be sure, he robbed ships; but he did so as a servant of the Emperor of Vijayanagara whose orders he faithfully carried out. We have already seen that the Emperor sent four captains with Timmayya as captain-major to the Gersoppa chief with the command to compel all the mercantile ships to sail into the ports of Kanara, and to cause damage to those which persisted in going to Goa. He was not, therefore, a professional pirate. He attacked ships and emptied them of their goods in the service of his sovereign. He might have made over the spoils to the Emperor, keeping a share of it for himself as a reward for his effort, and for the king of Gersoppa in whose jurisdiction the ports were.

Timmayya's marriage with a princess of Gersoppa is another proof of his high  
23 birth and status. The Gersoppa chief would not have given the princess in

of

marriage to one who was a mere pirate and a man low sort. As Barros says,  
Timmayya's very bearing was noble and his behaviour refined, befitting men of  
high birth.

It is said that Timmayya was a Maratha. There does not seem to exist any  
basis for this supposition. The name 'Timmayya' is Kanarese. The Portuguese  
spelt it as Timoja, it being common to represent 'y' with 'j' in Portuguese. In  
fact, in one of the orders of Afonso de Albuquerque, dated 1 December, 1509, the  
name is spelt almost accurately as 'Tymoya'. Further, Correa and Tomé Pires  
record that Timmayya had his residence in Honavar, on the river bank, half a  
league from the coast. By religion he might have been a Jain, since he married  
the princess of Gersoppa, whose rulers were Jains.

Relations between Francisco de Almeida and Timmayya continued to be cordial.  
They corresponded with each other. Timmayya wrote to the Viceroy from Honavar  
on 9 November, 1508 in response to one from the latter: "Here they gave me your  
letter (in which you asked me) that I should send (messengers) to Diu to know  
howmany were alive (there). I sent these two men by land, who brought a letter  
which I am sending to you. From it you will know who are (alive). The captain-  
major came here, spoke to me, and went away soon. Never heard of him anymore.  
A ship came from Gramus to Dabul, and brought the news that there were sixty  
six (seis seis. Or is it only six, the word seis being repeated by the printer  
by mistake?) ships in Ormus. The captain did not say what his name was. I  
inquire daily about you, and whatever ships come from Cananor do not give me  
news about you. I think that you will come as early as possible, and let me  
know what I should do; and all that I shall do, because I am at the service of  
the king of Portugal and of your lordship; here there is news that the ships of  
Rumes will not come this year. Sir, these men who went to Diu, went a long way;  
I recommend them to be rewarded. I have a little (quantity) of cloves, camphor  
and black-wood; let me know if you would like to have it....."

From the above letter it is evident that the Viceroy had asked  
Timmayya to find out howmany were alive out of the nineteen Portuguese who were

30

taken prisoners after the naval battle between Dom Lourenço and the combined fleets of the Sultan of Turkey and Shah of Gujarat in 1507 in which the Portuguese were defeated and Lourenço, the Viceroy's son, was killed. Timmayya sent his men who brought a letter from there, probably from one of the prisoners. The letter was forwarded to the Viceroy through the same men who had brought it to Timmayya. Lourenço, on his way from Malabar to Diu, had a talk with Timmayya, as is mentioned in the latter's letter to the Viceroy. Timmayya also furnished the Viceroy with useful information about Ormus. At the same time he did not forget trade and commerce, for the Viceroy was offered some articles of trade.

In February, 1509 the Viceroy went to Honavar to meet Timmayya. However, the latter was not there as he had fled away fearing the Emperor of Vijayanagara who had come to the coast to weigh himself against gold in the temple of Gokarna. It is not clear why Timmayya was frightened of his sovereign. The king of Gersoppa came to the Viceroy with a tribute of 250 pardaos (Rs. 1,000) in addition to the one thousand which he had given. There apparently was some misunderstanding between Timmayya and the king of Gersoppa also, which was removed by the Viceroy.  
31

In the following year, 1510, began the interesting collaboration between Gersoppa and the Portuguese in conquering Goa for the latter. Afonso de Albuquerque, the successor of Francisco de Almeida, was proceeding from Malabar to the Red Sea Strait in the month of February. On the way Timmayya met him at Mirjan on the 24th of the month and inquired where he was going. Albuquerque responded saying that his intention was to go to the Red Sea and fight the fleet belonging to the Sultan of Egypt. Thereupon Timmayya expressed his surprise that Albuquerque should go so far as the Red Sea to fight the enemy when the latter was very near at hand in Goa. He informed Albuquerque that one of the captains of the Sultan had escaped from Francisco de Almeida, the previous Viceroy, and had come to Goa with some Rumes; that the Muslim governor of Goa had received the captain well; that among the Rumes there were some carpenters and caulkmen who had built ships and galleys in the Portuguese manner; that the captain had written to the

Sultan requesting him to send men as he had decided to stay in Goa which was a land with much provisions, wood, and a good port; and that the captain hoped to use Goa as a base of operation to expel the Portuguese from India and enable spices to reach Mecca and Cairo as before. Further, Timmayya told Albuquerque that the king to whom Goa belonged, namely, Yusuf Adil Shah, was dead and the successor was very young; that there were rebellions in the Deccan and therefore the defence of Goa was very weak; and that the time was ripe to attack Goa which could not withstand such a powerful fleet as that of Albuquerque. Timmayya thought that the bar of the River of Goa (river Mandovi) was three pathoms and a half deep at high tide and the whole of Albuquerque's fleet could enter. Albuquerque thanked Timmayya for the advice and information. However, he said that he could not take such an important decision as to attack Goa without consulting his captains, especially because a decision to go to the Red Sea Strait had already been taken. Timmayya was therefore sent away with the assurance that  
32  
he would be informed of the final decision.

Castanheda writes that Timmayya sent a message to Albuquerque who was then in Bhatkal, requesting the Portuguese Governor to let him know where they could meet each other. Albuquerque and his advisors decided that the meeting should take place in an island off Honavar. In the actual meeting, Timmayya informed Albuquerque that the Adil Shah had ordered to build in Goa twenty ships of the Portuguese type, five of which were already finished. In addition some barges also were made. The purpose of all these was to have a large fleet to fight the Portuguese and their friends. In Goa there was artillery and many good soldiers who were all Turks. The successor of Yusuf Adil Shah had withdrawn a ~~small~~ major portion of the garrison of Goa for his use elsewhere against rebels. Goa was thus ill-defended and the Portuguese could take it with ease.  
33

Correa too says that Timmayya met Albuquerque at Honavar with a present consisting of much provisions. Speaking of Goa, he told Albuquerque that there was a garrison of 200 Rumes with a captain who was assisted by those who had escaped

from Diu and Chaul after the battle of 1509 between Francisco de Almeida and the Muslims in which the former inflicted a ~~crushing~~<sup>decisive</sup> crushing defeat on the latter; that the people of Goa were not happy on account of the excesses of the <sup>34</sup>Rumes; and that the Portuguese would be welcomed by the discontented people there should the former appear before the city.

A few questions naturally arise here. Did Timmayya meet Albuquerque on his own accord or was he called for by Albuquerque? If he met the latter on his own, why was he so eager that the Portuguese should capture Goa? Did the Vijayanagara Emperor, whose servant he was, know of his invitation to the Portuguese?

As mentioned above, the author of the Commentarios writes that Timmayya met Albuquerque, but does not specify whether he did so on his own or Albuquerque asked him to do so; Castanheda mentions that Timmayya sought an interview with Albuquerque and met him at Honavar after the request was conceded; Correa too records that Timmayya met Albuquerque without being invited to do so. Only

<sup>35</sup> Barros and Faria e Sousa, who borrows heavily from the former, write that Albuquerque sent for Timmayya. However, the opinion of the first three authors that Timmayya met Albuquerque on his own initiative appears to be more acceptable. For several reasons Timmayya was eager that the Portuguese should capture

Goa. First of all, he had not succeeded against the Muslim power of Goa even

<sup>36</sup> though he had fought against it before. He now hoped that if the Portuguese succeeded in capturing Goa with his assistance, he could be made its governor

<sup>38</sup> and he would thus gain by it. Secondly, it seems that Timmayya had some inheritance in Goa which he was deprived of by his brother, Chidambara Timmayya

<sup>39</sup> (Cidabara Timoja). It is quite likely that his forefathers were natives of Goa when it was under the jurisdiction of the Vijayanagara Emperors. He thought that the inheritance would be restored to him if the Portuguese captured Goa with his help. Lastly, it is a fact that the Emperor of Vijayanagara, Krishna

<sup>40</sup> Deva Raya, was desirous of ousting the Muslim power from Goa. Once the Muslim power was curbed and Timmayya made governor of Goa, it could come under the

influence of Vijayanagara. Friendship could be established with the Portuguese and commerce could be developed with them, especially in respect of horses from Arabia and Persia. Being aware of this, Krishna Deva Raya might have instructed Timmayya to set the Portuguese on the territory of Goa, or, at least, the Emperor might have connived at what Timmayya was doing.

The effect of Timmayya's advice was positive on the Portuguese captains, nobles and pilots who, on being consulted by Albuquerque, came to the conclusion that Goa should be attacked and captured. Albuquerque, however, pointed out that there must be some motive for Timmayya to have given the information to the Portuguese, and that this gave cause to some suspicion. He therefore would not change his course until more concrete information about Goa was available.  
<sup>41</sup>

On 25 February, he sailed with his fleet from Mirjan. As he was emerging before the castle of Cintacora (Chitakul or Sadashivagad), Timmayya joined him with thirteen large armed vessels with many soldiers. Albuquerque was happy to receive him. On being inquired what news of Goa he had, Timmayya told Albuquerque that he had received some messages and letters from important men of Goa from which he had learnt that Yusuf Adil Shah was dead; that the governor of Goa had 1,000 soldiers; that these soldiers, however, were discontented because of non-payment of their salaries; that many of them were dying of hunger; that the depth of the Goa bar was three pathoms and a half as he had already informed; and that there was discontentment among the people of Goa. Albuquerque asked Timmayya why he kept on coming to him and advising him to take Goa. Timmayya's reply was that prominent Hindus of Goa had written to him saying that they were happy that the Muslim overlord of Goa was dead because he was robbing them and was tyrannical; that the whole of Goa was mutinous; and that if Timmayya desired to take Goa he could go there with his men and the Goans would hand over Goa to him willingly. Thereupon Albuquerque held another consultation with ~~the~~ his captains in his ship, along with Timmayya, who promised the Portuguese that he would accompany them by sea with his vessels

and besides he would send more soldiers by land. He also opined that the governor of Goa would surrender it on the mere approach of the Portuguese. Finally, it was decided that Timmayya should send his men by land in order to destroy places along the shore which belonged to the Muslims. Timmayya sent 2,000 of his men by land under the command of his brother-in-law and a Muslim, who had been a captain in the army of the Adil Shah but had deserted to Honavar. They fell upon the fortress of Chitakul which was being defended by a garrison. However, the defenders took to flight on the approach of the Portuguese fleet. Timmayya's men pulled down a part of the fortress and burnt the houses inside.<sup>42</sup> They also gathered a few guns.

With this success the Portuguese sailed towards Goa. Timmayya, sailing along the coast in one of his vessels, captured a Muslim who was walking along the shore. Timmayya took him to Albuquerque who questioned him about Goa. The Muslim said that he was a poor jogi. However, he had some news of Goa. He told Albuquerque that Yusuf Adil Shah was certainly dead; that the successor was in the hinterland; that the people of Goa were seething with discontent; that they were praying that Goa be attacked and taken by the foreigners; that the captain of Goa did not have more than 100 Turks with him; that Goa had 12 ships, many large boats and atalaias; and that four ships were loaded with merchandise - two for Aden and two for Ormus.<sup>43</sup>

It is rather strange that a jogi should know so many details, including facts and figures, about the situation in Goa. It is possible that the Muslim jogi was actually one of the agents of Timmayya, who was eager to convince Albuquerque that it was the most suitable time to attack Goa. He seems to have still feared that Albuquerque might not fall upon Goa, but might proceed towards the Red Sea, instead.

On 28 February, Albuquerque sent Antonio de Noronha, one of his captains, and a few pilots to fathom the Goa bar. Timmayya also was sent with them with two atalaias.<sup>44</sup> The party discovered that the bar was two fathoms deep at low tide and three at high tide. On the following day, 1 March, the Portuguese

attacked the castle of Pangij (Panaji) and captured it. Timmayya went to the north bank of the river where there was a bulwark with some artillery and about thirty soldiers; and as he was born a soldier, Timmayya "brought down his heavy  
45 hands upon them even as he sighted them." His victory there was not less praiseworthy than that of the Portuguese on the south bank, for he defeated the  
46 enemy and captured the artillery. With the fall of the Panaji castle the key to Goa was in the hands of the Portuguese.

The presence of Timmayya with the Portuguese in Goa was of great help to them. He rendered many services to them who were in a strange land and in the midst of strange people whose language they did not know. He acted as their linguist, collected information for them, acted as mediator between them and the natives, collected the revenues of Goa for them and fought on their behalf. He also advised them on various matters.

After capturing the castle of Panaji Albuquerque was worried concerning the ways and means of taking possession of the city of Goa too. That night he was told by a kinsman of Timmayya that the Muslim captain of the city had run away; that the fortress was deserted by the Turks and Rumes who did not want to fall into the hands of the Portuguese; and that the people of the city might  
47 indulge in looting. It meant that the city could be taken by Albuquerque without much fighting and it actually happened so, as predicted by Timmayya.

Being in possession of the city of Goa, Albuquerque summoned Timmayya and informed him that he had received definite information that there were many Turks living in different parts of Goa. He requested Timmayya to help him to oust these Turks from Goa. Timmayya consented to send his brother-in-law with large boats who would show the Portuguese the entrances of the various rivers  
48 of Goa of which they were ignorant.

In reward for his services to the Portuguese, Timmayya expected that Goa  
49 would be given to him as a jagir in return for an annual payment. He had already informed Albuquerque that Goa had a revenue of 200,000 cruzados (Rs. 800,000) a year<sup>50</sup> and that he would pay that much if he were made the adminis-

trator of the territories of Goa. Albuquerque, however, avoided giving him a definite answer in this respect. Timmayya then approached some of the Portuguese captains with his grievance and gained their support. This enabled him to wield more pressure on Albuquerque. Finally, the latter called a meeting of his captains and told them how well Timmayya deserved an award for the great services he had rendered the Portuguese in conquering Goa. He also pointed out that Timmayya was an example for others of the land to come to the service of the king of Portugal. He asked the captains to advise him regarding the nature of a reward for Timmayya. The captains were of the opinion that Timmayya should be entrusted with Goa because he had a good army with which he could defend and preserve it against the Turks and because he would pay an annual tribute. Albuquerque expressed his astonishment at the opinion of the captains and the reasons that they gave him justifying their contention. He pointed out that Goa was so important to the king of Portugal that it could not be given to Timmayya without securing it with a strong fortress. His intention was to make Goa the headquarters of the ~~few~~ Portuguese empire in India. He thought that Goa should not be leased out without knowing its exact income and without studying how it should be administered. He concluded therefore that it would be better to consider Timmayya as a vassal in the service of the king in Goa and not as one on whom would depend the fate of all. Realising the truth of Albuquerque's arguments the captains blushed for their earlier stand. Finally, it was decided to make Timmayya the Aquazil Mor (chief judicial and administrative official), and the captain of the people of Goa. He was also rewarded with the income of Mirjan. Timmayya was urged to be satisfied with this. As far as his desire to be made governor of Goa was concerned Albuquerque told him that he could not do anything without writing to the king of Portugal and receiving his instructions. Timmayya accepted these offers, though he was not very happy with them.

Timmayya was given for his stay two houses near a tank at the entrance of  
the castle. Later on the tank came to be known as the 'Timmayya Tank'. Luckily  
for him the Portuguese did not know that the houses were well stocked with mercha-  
ndise, which he took with him to Honavar in two zambucos. He thus enriched him-  
self.

53

Three days after Timmayya's departure to Honavar some Hindus came to Albu-  
querque and told him that they would leave for ever if Timmayya were to remain  
away. Albuquerque pretended not to understand what they said. He thought that  
it was a trick of Timmayya to get the governorship of Goa. Seeing that his scheme  
did not work Timmayya sent one of his captains to Albuquerque with the message  
that after leaving Goa he had realised that he had left Albuquerque without  
any one who could tell him about the customs of Goa and therefore he would like  
to return to the service of the Portuguese. Albuquerque, though aware that  
Timmayya was fretting and scheming for fulfilling his real desire, accepted his  
return. Timmayya came to Goa soon after.

54

On Timmayya's arrival Albuquerque assembled the prominent people of Goa  
and announced that he had appointed Timmayya as Aquazil Mor of the kingdom of  
Goa in the name of the king of Portugal and had given him all the power of justice  
over the Hindus as well as the Muslims; and that all should obey him. The Hindus  
were very happy with this award and honour which Albuquerque conferred on Timma-  
yya whom they carried in a palanquin throughout the city with great festivity  
and music. Albuquerque rented out all the territories of Goa, with the exception  
of the island itself, to Timmayya for 100,000 cruzados (Rs. 400,000) a year with  
the condition that Timmayya should pay for the army that was necessary for the  
defence of the territories farmed out to him. With all these Timmayya was satis-  
fied and soon began the duties of his office.

55

The native Muslims of Goa, however, could not bear that they should subject  
themselves to the justice of Timmayya whom they hated. Some prominent Muslims,  
therefore, went to Albuquerque and told him that they be allowed to leave Goa, for  
[redacted]

they "were very rich and honourable Muslims, and they could neither bear nor suffer to be constrained by the justice of Timmayya who was a Hindu, much different in law and customs from the Muslims." Albuquerque sent them home promising that he would do what was proper in the matter. He took up the matter with Timmayya who readily and loyally agreed to abide by whatever decision be taken by the Governor. Accordingly, he was relieved of the responsibility of administering justice to the Muslims which was entrusted to Cojebequi (Kwaja Beg) who was loyal and enjoyed the confidence of Albuquerque. Barros, however, writes that Mir Kasim was made the judicial officer of the Muslims. Timmayya continued to be the chief justice of the Hindus and to enjoy other favours which were conferred on him.

Timmayya seems to have been a little tyrannical and selfish in office, though generally of good service to the Portuguese. Writes Albuquerque in a letter to the king of Portugal: "Timoja, who is a mere tyrant, gives for it (Goa) 100,000 cruzados, and is obliged to have six or seven thousand men for defence. And further, though Timmayya was a friend of the king of Portugal he was "a very selfish man, and where it is possible, (for) good or bad, worked always for it (to meet his selfish ends); in our affairs I always received much benefit from him and very little damage."

Timmayya discovered that the revenue to be collected was very heavy. When the Vijayanagara Emperors were in possession of Goa the revenue was 150,000 xerafins (about Rs. 450,000) a year; but the Muslim rulers had doubled this up. Albuquerque, on being complained to by Timmayya and other prominent citizens, agreed to reduce the ~~xxxxx~~ amount of revenue again to the level of 150,000 xerafins.

Next, Timmayya advised Albuquerque that new coins should be issued to facilitate administration and commerce, and that the price of gold and silver should be raised so as to prevent them from being exported. Albuquerque hesitated a little regarding coins. However, after a few days, when Timmayya pointed out that it was impossible to carry on administration and trade without coins, Albu-

60

querque issued orders to mint Portuguese coins in Goa.

The Adil Shah attacked Goa in mid-May in an attempt to retake it from the Portuguese. However, before the fight began there were attempts at a peaceful settlement. Albuquerque sent Mir Kasim as his envoy to the camp of the Adil Shah. Timmayya warned him that Mir Kasim should not be trusted. Albuquerque thought that Timmayya advised him as he did because of his hostility towards Mir Kasim. Ultimately, however, Timmayya was proved right. Mir Kasim turned out to be a traitor.  
61

In the meantime, the Adil Shah had apparently complained to Krishna Deva Raya, Emperor of Vijayanagara, that the latter's feudatories were assisting the Portuguese against him. Timmayya was particularly mentioned in the complaint. However, the Emperor was in favour of the Portuguese as can be seen from the letter written by the chief of Gersoppa, Berforé or Basavaraja, offering his services to them against the Adil Shah. Timmayya was, in fact, an eyesore to the Adil Shah since it was because of the former that the Portuguese had captured Goa. The Adil Shah told Albuquerque, through envoys, that he had no complaint against the Portuguese because it was Timmayya and the Hindus of Goa who had surrendered it to them.  
62  
63

Timmayya did not trust the Muslims of Goa. As the Adil Shah was preparing to recapture Goa the conduct of the Muslims of that place became an important aspect. Timmayya told Albuquerque that the Goan Muslims had never reconciled themselves to the Portuguese occupation. He showed Albuquerque letters written by some prominent Muslims of Goa to the Adil Shah and the latter's replies. Albuquerque, however, thought that these letters might have been forged by Timmayya to avenge himself against the Muslims. Timmayya, nevertheless, was right again and when Albuquerque consulted him what was to be done in order to suppress and punish the guilty, he advised the Governor that the prominent Muslims as well as Hindus be summoned to reside in the castle so that they could be under vigilance. He advised the summoning of the Hindu chiefs also because he thought that in those critical days none could be tru-  
64

sted. Albuquerque appreciated the advice, but felt that the first chief to gather his family into the castle should be Timmayya himself. If the people saw that such an important and powerful personage like Timmayya himself sending his family without any embarrassment there would be no ground for any suspicion or scandal and they could easily be ordered to bring their families to the castle. Timmayya weighed Albuquerque's words and then agreed to send his wife and a son who were with him in Goa. On the arrival of Timmayya's family in the castle Albuquerque issued a notice that all responsible Hindus and Muslims should gather their families in the castle so as to avoid danger from the attacking forces of the Adil Shah. Though the people were worried a little at this notice, they readily obliged when they saw Timmayya's family in the castle. After this Albuquerque notified to the Muslims who were moving in the camp of the Adil Shah that if they did not return within six days their wives and children would be seized and their property confiscated.

Did Albuquerque doubt Timmayya himself ? No doubt the former gave good reasons justifying his opinion that the first one to send his family to the castle should be Timmayya. But the latter agreed to do so only after weighing what Albuquerque said. That Albuquerque had begun to have misgivings about Timmayya is discernible from the fact that an ambassador of the king of Gersoppa was appointed as the commandant of the soldiers at Augij pass without the knowledge of Timmayya.<sup>66</sup> This was only a beginning of the disfavour which Timmayya incurred of Albuquerque. By the end of the year, 1510, he began to consider Timmayya a man with undesirable qualities, as we shall see later on.

Albuquerque, being anxious for the safety of the Augij pass through which the forces of the Adil Shah were expected to attack Goa, but having no faith in the ability of Timmayya's men to defend the pass, sent Dom Antonio de Noronha there. All was in vain, for the Adil Shah's army succeeded everywhere and the Portuguese had to withdraw and take shelter, first in the castle and later in the ships, along with Timmayya and his men. However, one of Timmayya's captains, Menaique, probably Maha Naik, fought bravely in the clash and killed

30 or 40 ~~soldiers~~ soldiers of the enemy. Timmayya also fought valiantly along  
68 with his men.

Before embarking, Albuquerque ordered Timmayya to put to death all the  
Muslims - women and children - who had been gathered in the Panaji castle.  
Timmayya went with fifty of his men and executed the order, though he took  
some women with him to his vessels. Later on the women were taken by the Por-  
69 tuguese captains and soldiers, inspite of Albuquerque's remonstrances.

After being compelled to take shelter in his fleet in the middle of the  
Mandovi river in front of the Panaji castle, Albuquerque thought of spending  
the rainy season either in Anjediva or in Cochin, and wait there for the arrival  
of more ships and men from Portugal with the help of which he hoped to recapture  
Goa. However, it was already too late, it being the last phase of the month  
of May, and the mouth of the river being dangerous for sailing into the sea  
on account of the rains. It was, therefore, decided to spend the season in  
the river itself. In order to have sufficient stock of provisions Albuquerque  
decided to send Fernão Perez D'Andrade, one of his captains, to Anjediva and  
get provisions from there. Along with Fernão, Timmayya also was sent with  
instructions to procure provisions from the various ports on the coast. How-  
ever, when they approached the mouth of the river in their respective ships,  
they found the waters too rough there to enter the sea owing to a strong wind.  
They waited there that night, hoping that the waters would become quiet next  
day, but in vain. However, in the morning Fernão decided to enter the sea.  
Timmayya advised against the venture, but was ignored, with unfortunate con-  
sequences. ~~Fernão~~ Fernão's ship capsized while attempting to enter the sea.  
70 The crew and the equipment in the ship were saved only with great difficulty.  
Thus, the Portuguese fleet was confined to the river with limited stock of  
provisions. It was only in the middle of the month of August that the fleet  
could emerge into the sea.

While in the river, the Portuguese were subjected to a great deal of anxiety by the Muslims who fired at the fleet from the guns in the Panaji castle. Albuquerque wanted to silence the Muslim artillery, but none of his captains seemed to be ready to undertake the venture. It was in this critical situation that Timmayya offered his services. This enthused the Portuguese captains who then agreed to go with him to attack the castle. This task of putting out the Muslim fire from the castle was ~~accomplished~~ <sup>71</sup> on 14 June.

There were peace moves by the Adil Shah. One of his ambassadors to the Portuguese, Mustafa Khan, suggested that the Muslims might consent to give Goa to the Portuguese if Timmayya were delivered to the Adil Shah. Albuquerque was so annoyed at this suggestion that he retorted sharply that Timmayya was always a loyal servant of the king of Portugal and for his services he deserved great reward and honour, and that the Adil Shah would see the day when Albuquerque <sup>72</sup> would make Timmayya a great lord in the kingdom of the Deccan.

In- mid-July another attempt was made by Albuquerque to send some ships with the sick to Anjediva and also Timmayya to Honavar for provisions. Again, they could not enter the sea on account of a strong wind. They waited there hoping that the wind would subside sooner or later. Albuquerque, not knowing that these were stranded at the mouth of the river, sailed with the remaining fleet on 21 with a view to enter the sea. He only succeeded in joining them <sup>73</sup> and returning with them to the original position.

There was an acute shortage of food in the Portuguese fleet. Albuquerque sent his men in the midnight to a nearby island to fetch whatever provisions were available there. These men brought, among other things, some rice and a few ~~few~~ cows. They also captured two Brahmin girls. Five or six days later the girls' father apparently approached Timmayya and requested him to intercede on his behalf and get the girls released from captivity in return for a boatload of rice and other foodgrains for the Portuguese. When approached by Timmayya, accordingly, Albuquerque agreed to the release of the girls. That



night the latter were sent along with Timmayya and some Portuguese captains to the island where the girls' father was agitatedly waiting for them. The girls were handed over to the Brahmin. The Portuguese got a boatful of rice. They  
also secured 50 cows from the island.

Towards the end of July, Albuquerque realised that small ships could sail into the sea with little danger. Accordingly, he sent Timmayya to Honavar in order to procure as much provisions there was possible for the Portuguese. This time Timmayya could emerge into the sea and proceed to Honavar. A few weeks later Albuquerque himself sailed to Anjediva where he reached on 17 August.  
<sup>74</sup>  
<sup>75</sup>

While in Anjediva, Albuquerque received, through Diogo Mendez, one of the Portuguese captains, who just arrived from Portugal with a fresh fleet, a letter which was addressed to Timmayya by the king of Portugal. In the letter Timmayya was instructed to supply pilots to Diogo who was to sail to Malacca. Albuquerque told Diogo that Timmayya had no pilots, but that the letter be delivered to him so that he would be happy that a letter was addressed directly to him by the  
<sup>76</sup>  
king of Portugal. Apparently Timmayya was being talked of highly in the court of the Portuguese king. It might have been owing to Francisco de Almeida who had been in frequent contact with Timmayya and had been impressed by the personality of the important man from Honavar.

On August 19, Albuquerque left Anjediva for Cannanor. On the way he met Timmayya at Honavar. Diogo Mendez, who was with Albuquerque, gave Timmayya the letter of the king of Portugal. Timmayya was pleased with the letter and declared that he was always a vassal of the Portuguese king, and that he would be at his disposal. He told Albuquerque that the Adil Shah had left Goa within three days from the date on which the Portuguese fleet had sailed out of the river Mandovi, and that on the Adil Shah's departure the people of Goa had revolted and killed all the Muslim tanadars. Albuquerque was happy with this news. He requested Timmayya to encourage and maintain this state of affairs.

in Goa until he returned from Cannanor. He also entreated Timmayya to keep ready a good amount of provisions. Taking leave of Timmayya after this he set sail for Cannanor where he reached on 26 August.

From Cannanor Albuquerque sent a letter, dated apparently 8 or 9 September, to Timmayya through Lourenço Moreno, one of the captains. In the letter, Timmayya was addressed as Honourable Aquazil Mor and Captain of the Hindus of Goa, and the Chief of the lands of Chitakul. Albuquerque reminded Timmayya of his determination of recapturing Goa with Timmayya's advice and help. He desired Timmayya to help the enemies of Goa. He told Timmayya that he would send Lourenço da Silva and Fernão Vaz, who were good soldiers and captains, to command the soldiers marching in war; that the two captains be given befitting power because they were good soldiers and they would justify it; that he would himself join Timmayya very soon; and that he would be happy if Timmayya would send, by one of his large boats, news about Goa, particularly its armed strength. He wanted to know how many soldiers Timmayya could send to assist the Portuguese in retaking Goa. He requested Timmayya to send, through Lourenço Morena, the provisions which had been requested to be kept ready. Besides, the Governor requested Timmayya to compliment the king of Gersoppa on ~~the~~ his behalf and secure additional help from him. He promised to assist the Gersoppa chief later on with his person, soldiers, horses and arms, and to make him more powerful by getting for him the territories of the Muslims.

From this letter it is evident that Albuquerque depended upon Timmayya to a considerable extent. Albuquerque was very much in need of the information that the latter could collect and supply concerning the enemy, of the provisions he could provide, of the soldiers that he could give for fighting in Goa, and of his diplomacy.

Lourenço Moreno went to Honavar with the letter and Albuquerque got all that he wanted. Timmayya was preparing to aid the Portuguese. He sent the provisions asked for.

On his way back from Cannanor to Goa, Albuquerque anchored at the port of Honavar to take additional provisions and water. The king of Gersoppa and Timmayya, who were expecting his arrival there, went to him to talk. On being inquired what news of Goa and of the Adil Shah they had, they said that Goa had three captains with a garrison of 4,000 men, all Turks, Rumes and Coraçanes, and some peons of Balagate. They added that the native Muslims might constitute another force of 4,000; and that if Albuquerque was determined to take Goa it was the most appropriate time, for the Adil Shah was busy fighting his enemies in the Deccan. The king of Gersoppa and Timmayya were ready with all their men to march against Goa by land. Albuquerque thanked them for the news of Goa  
80  
and their readiness to aid him.

Timmayya and the king of Gersoppa had developed, in the meantime, a matrimonial relationship. The former was to marry the princess of Gersoppa. He invited Albuquerque to attend the marriage. In order to please his friend Albuquerque accepted the invitation. There was another factor also which enabled him to go to the wedding. There was a likelihood of a storm. In fact, the sea became rough after Albuquerque landed with many of his captains. He intended to return to the fleet soon after the wedding dinner, but he was held up in the land for three days on account of the storm which suddenly became furious. On the fourth day, when the force of the storm was less, he set out with the captains and their men for the fleet, but lost one boat with thirty men before he  
81  
could make for the ships.

Correa adds that Albuquerque landed with his men fully armed, telling Timmayya that the men did not have more beautiful dress than their arms; and that he wanted the king of Gersoppa to see the Portuguese in arms. Timmayya showed that he was pleased, but he "understood the Governor well". Already Albuquerque  
82  
had put another condition that the dinner should be served in his boats. Apparently all these were a precaution on the part of Albuquerque against any foul play upon the Portuguese when they were on the land.

83

The king of Gersoppa promised to send 4,000 men with Timmayya by land. The latter, on his part, sent one of his captains, Madhava Rao (Medio Rao), along with three ships to accompany Albuquerque. He promised to come himself by land  
84 with 6,000 men. Albuquerque gave Timmayya, by way of payment for the men that  
he promised, cloth worth 5,000 pardaos (Rs. 20,000). After this Albuquerque  
sailed to Anjediva.

In Anjediva, however, Albuquerque was told that he should not believe in the promises of Timmayya and the king of Gersoppa. He was also informed that these two men were scared of the Adil Shah with whom they did not want to be in worse relations, should the Portuguese fail to recapture Goa. Nevertheless, Albuquerque sailed into the river Mandovi and sent Manuel da Cunha with six ships to Old Goa and Agacaim to help Timmayya and his men who were expected to enter from that side. Manuel arrived at Agacaim via Benastarim, set it on fire and remained in the river quietly, expecting Timmayya with his men. In the meantime, Albuquerque consulted his captains whether they should wait until Timmayya arrived in order to recapture Goa or they should proceed to Cambay to capture that place. The captains were of the opinion that Goa should be taken forthwith. However, Albuquerque spent three days without taking any decision, still hoping that the help promised would come. Finally, he came to the conclusion that Timmayya and the king of Gersoppa were bribed by the Adil Shah. He also thought that Timmayya was delaying deliberately in order to avoid trouble and bloodshed which the latter knew would be necessary to take Goa, and that he might come after Goa was taken by the Portuguese without him. At any rate, Albuquerque did not wait any more for the help, attacked Goa and captured it on  
86  
25 November, 1510.

Madhava Rao, Timmayya's captain, who was sent with Albuquerque, as has been noted, played a prominent role in capturing Goa. Timmayya himself arrived  
87 at Goa, probably on 26 November, a day after Goa fell into the hands of the Portuguese. He brought ~~with~~ with him, not the promised 6,000 men, but only 3,000. He apologised for the delay and pleaded that he could not come earlier

88  
than he did.

Once again Timmayya was entrusted with the revenue affairs of Goa, with the exception of the Island, as the letter of Albuquerque to the king of Portugal written on 22 December indicates. Timmayya was to pay for the defence forces that were necessary for him.<sup>89</sup> Barros writes that Timmayya was appointed captain of the Hindus to whom he was to administer justice according to their usage. His jurisdiction, however, was limited. It did not include death, loss of property and other high causes.<sup>90</sup>

Timmayya, however, did not enjoy the offices for long. Albuquerque received a letter from Friar Luiz, whom he had sent to Vijayanagara as ambassador, in which the latter informed him that he should not trust the king of Gersoppa and Timmayya, for they were such scoundrels that they had written to the Emperor of Vijayanagara that if the latter wanted to capture Goa he should help them with foot-soldiers, cavalrymen and elephants and that they would take Goa for him before the Portuguese established themselves there.<sup>91</sup> This letter might have been one of the main factors which led to Timmayya's removal from office within five months after the appointment.

Another reason for his removal was Timmayya's attack on two merchant ships belonging to Chaul. He sailed with his own ships from Goa after telling Albuquerque that he was going to Honavar for which he was given permission. However, he proceeded towards Chaul and robbed the ships. Albuquerque arrested him and kept him in custody until the loot be made over to the Governor of ~~Chaul~~ Chaul who was a friend of the Portuguese. Fortunately for Timmayya, Malhar Rao, his protector, undertook to pay for the damage.<sup>92</sup>

Albuquerque himself wrote to the king of Portugal that Timmayya secretly armed three atalaias which he possessed and sent them to rob merchant ships. Thus, two ships of Chaul which were loaded with Indian cotton, and one of Ormus which was loaded with horses and pearls, were taken by his atalaias. All these three ships were carrying passports issued by Albuquerque. The merchant ships

were taken to Honavar and were not returned inspite of Albuquerque's repeated requests. On receiving a complaint from the Governor of ~~Saler~~ Chaul, Albuquerque arrested Timmayya and put him under the guard of a captain with twenty men.

Further, Albuquerque reported that Timmayya helped the Portuguese for his own profit. His administration of revenue affairs was full of tyrannical acts. And "if any one is to be condemned as a traitor, it should be Timmayya, because he allowed 300 unarmed Turks to enter the island of Goa even though he had 3,000 peons under his command," in May, 1510. This statement of Albuquerque is quite in contrast to the heroic defence efforts attributed to Timmayya by Gaspar Correa, who was also a contemporary writer, as he was the secretary of Albuquerque. Correa, however, adds that Timmayya had become very arrogant on account of the great service that he had rendered in taking Goa. He spoke to some of the Portuguese captains against Albuquerque. He said that the Portuguese lost Goa after its first occupation because of many mistakes that Albuquerque committed. The latter knew all these, but did not take any action against Timmayya until a proper opportunity offered itself.

Timmayya was removed from office when Malhar Rao offered to serve the Portuguese in Goa. Malhar Rao had been dispossessed of the throne of Gersoppa which was then being ruled by his younger brother. The former took shelter in Bhatkal whose chief was a relative of his. From there he endeavoured to regain his throne, but in vain. The king of Gersoppa, Malhar Rao's younger brother, sent a messenger to Albuquerque seeking ~~his~~ friendship of the Portuguese. He feared that Albuquerque might favour Malhar Rao. The latter, on coming to know that his brother was trying to secure the friendship of the Portuguese, sent his own messenger to Albuquerque seeking his friendship. He offered his services to the king of Portugal. Albuquerque accepted the offer, not only because Malhar Rao was known as a brave soldier but also because he was a captain whom the Hindus held in great esteem. Besides, Malhar Rao was born there in Goa and had always fought the Turks. When Goa, which was under Hindus then, was twice en-

97

circled by the Turks he fought in defence as a great and valiant soldier. Knowing all these Albuquerque sent galleys to fetch him from Bhatkal and also some ships to bring his men and horses. Besides, he sent two Portuguese captains by land with 2,000 Hindu soldiers to receive him at Chitakul. The tanadars and the people of Goa were told to receive and obey Malhar Rao as their own. All did so with love because of the esteem they had for him and because they wanted to be governed by him.

98

The king of Gersoppa, who came to know that Malhar Rao was embarking for Chitakul, sent his army immediately to Karwar and Ankola in order to harass Malhar Rao's passage. He feared very much that Malhar Rao would be aided by the Portuguese in dethroning him. However, Malhar Rao reached Goa without any trouble  
99  
inspite of his brother's watchfulness.

Malhar Rao, who reached Goa in the beginning of April, 1511, was well received by Albuquerque who arranged for all that was necessary for him and his  
100  
men to stay in Goa. The chief men of Goa were so happy at the arrival of Malhar Rao that they soon approached Albuquerque and requested him to make Malhar Rao their governor, for all the people desired it. Apparently these men did not know the real purpose for which Malhar Rao was in Goa. Albuquerque told them that on his part he was happy that they came to him with the proposal and that he would talk to Malhar Rao to know what he would say. Next day morning Albuquerque told Malhar Rao that he would like to farm out the lands of Goa to him and also to entrust the governance of the territories of Goa in his hands in return for 40,000 pardaos (Rs. 160,000) a year to be paid in four instalments to the king of Portugal or to his Governors in India. Malhar Rao was happy. Having concluded and signed the agreement in this connection, Albuquerque summoned the chief men and announced Malhar Rao's appointment. The people received the announcement  
101  
with great rejoicement. There were festivities and music according to their usages. After two or three days Malhar Rao proceeded to the mainland, taking with him  
102  
5,000 peons and 50 cavalrymen, and began to discharge the duties of his office.

Timmayya was naturally aggrieved. He wrote to the king of Portugal from whom he expected remedy. He also sought Albuquerque's permission to leave Goa for Honavar. Albuquerque, however, did not want that Timmayya should go out of Goa, for he feared that Timmayya might enter the services of the Adil Shah and thus become a formidable enemy. In order to appease him Albuquerque made him the 'receiver of all the money' of the land which Malhar Rao would collect; a post which satisfied him as he thought that he could enrich himself by it. Albuquerque also promised that after his return from Ormus, where he proposed to proceed then, he would give him the position held by Malhar Rao. This, however, was not a sincere proposal and both of them knew it. Albuquerque secretly instructed Malhar Rao to be watchful of Timmayya's movements. He also gave orders to his officers that they should not allow him to go out of Goa.<sup>103</sup>

After making all these arrangements Albuquerque left Goa for Malacca. In his absence the Adil Shah decided to attack and recapture Goa. He sent in May, 1511, one of his generals, Pulat Khan, to fall upon Malhar Rao and expel him from Goa. Timmayya, who was with Malhar Rao, was to be taken a prisoner. Being warned of Pulat Khan's attack, Malhar Rao awaited the enemy with his army. He sent Ishwar Rao (Iça Rao or Hicarrau) to a pass which the enemy had to use to enter Goa. However, Ishwar was so late that, on reaching the pass, he found it in the hands of the enemy. He was defeated and killed. Pulat Khan then fell upon Malhar Rao himself and defeated him also. In the end, on the advice of Timmayya, Malhar Rao betook himself to Vijayanagara. He was too ashamed to show his face to the Portuguese captain in the Island of Goa, Rodrigo Rabelo. Along with him Timmayya also went to Vijayanagara.<sup>104</sup>

While he was in Vijayanagara, Malhar Rao learnt that his brother was dead. He took permission of the Emperor of Vijayanagara and left for Gersoppa where he became king and always remained a faithful friend of the king of Portugal.<sup>105</sup>

While Albuquerque was on his way back from Malacca to Goa in 1512, he went to Honavar where Malhar Rao met him and told him that the Adil Shah was preparing to send a reinforcement of 20,000 men to Pulat Khan and, therefore, Albuquerque

106.  
should hurry to Goa.

107  
Timmayya died in Vijayanagara on account of illness. His wife and children went to Goa seeking Portuguese protection. By an order of Albuquerque, dated 11 January, 1513, Timmayya's family was ~~xxx~~ rewarded 40 pardaos (Rs. 160) in memory 108 of the services which Timmayya had rendered to the Portuguese during his lifetime. 109 Incidentally, the date of the order suggests that Timmayya died in the month of December, 1512. Albuquerque refers to Timmayya's wife and children in the order as those who had just come to Goa to live there. More than a fortnight might have lapsed between the death of Timmayya in Vijayanagara, the transmission of the news of his death to Honavar where his family was, and the latter's arrival in Goa. Barros comments that the provision for the upkeep of Timmayya's family was not only for the sake of Timmayya's services but also to show the people of Goa that the wives and children of those who fought and died for the Portuguese would be protected. 109 A son of Timmayya probably became a captain of some armed ships under the Portuguese, as one may infer from another order issued by Albuquerque to the factor of Goa on 5 February, 1513. Again, in 1515 we hear of 110 five months' provisions, which were in arrears, being made over to the family of Timmayya by Albuquerque's order. Thus, Timmayya's services were not forgotten 111 by Albuquerque inspite of his subsequent dislike of the former.

Thus ended an interesting chapter of the Portuguese relations with Kanara. Timmayya and Malhar Rao played a prominent role in the Portuguese conquest and occupation of Goa, and its administration and defence. Though Timmayya lost Albuquerque's favour later, his part in the first Portuguese conquest of Goa was immense. It was he who made Albuquerque change his decision of going to the Red Sea Strait and fall upon Goa instead.

Foot-notes:

1. Lendas, Tomo I, pt. 1, p. 289.
2. Ibid., pt. 2, p. 565.
3. História, II, p. 234.
4. D-JB, I, pp. 338-9
5. Ibid., p. 339.
6. Lendas, Tomo I, pt. 2, p. 565.
7. História, II, p. 236.
8. D-JB, I, p. 342.
9. História, II, pp. 236-7.
10. Ibid., p. 237.
11. Ibid., pp. 237-8; D-JB, I, pp. 343-6; Lendas, Tomo I, pt. 2, pp. 578-9.
12. D-JB, I, p. 346.
13. História, II, p. 239.
14. D-JB, I, pp. 346-7.
15. Lendas, Tomo I, pt. 2, p. 579.
16. Cartas, II, pp. 424-5.
17. Ibid., I, pp. 46-7.  
*Roteiro da*
18. Velho, Alvaro : Primeira Viagem de Vasco da Gama, pp. 73-4.
19. História, I, p. 64.
20. D-JB, I, pp. 170-1.
21. Lendas, Tomo I, pt. 1, p. 289.
22. Commentarios, II, p. 110.
23. D-JB, II, p. 227; Lendas, Tomo II, pt. 1, p. 141.
24. D.-JB, I, p. 346.
25. Dames, Longworth : The Book of Duarte Barbosa, Vol. I, p. 186, foot-note.
26. Cartas, IV, p. 205.
27. Lendas, Tomo II, pt. 1, p. 141; Pires, Tomé : The Suma Oriental of, Tr. Armando,  
p. 61.

28. Gazetteer of the Bombay Presidency, Vol. XV, pt. II, Kanara, p. 282.
29. Cartas, III, p. 303.
30. Danvers, F. C. : The Portuguese in India, I, p. 130.
31. História, II, p. 441.
32. Commentarios, II, pp. 110-111.
33. História, III, p. 19.
34. Lendas, II, pt. 1, pp. 50-1.
35. D-JB, II, p. 186.
36. Sousa, ~~Magazin de História~~ Manuel de Faria e : Asia Portuguesa, I, p. 291.
37. D-JB, I, p. 348; also II, p. 187.
38. Commentarios, II, p. 139.
39. D-JB, II, p. 187.
40. Commentarios, II, p. 183.
41. Ibid., p. 112; Lendas, Tomo II, pt. 2, p. 51.
42. Commentarios, II, pp. 112-7.
43. Ibid., pp. 117-8.
44. Ibid., pp. 118-9.
45. D-JB, II, p. 201.
46. Sousa, Manuel de Faria e : op. cit., I, p. 296.
47. Commentarios, II, pp. 124-5.
48. Ibid., pp. 135-6; Lendas, Tomo, II, pt. 1, p. 61.
49. Pissurlencar, P. S. S. : Colaboradores Híndus de Afonso de Albuquerque, in "Boletim do Instituto Vasco da Gama," No. 49 of 1941, p. 31.
50. Cartas, I, p. 55.
51. Commentarios, II, pp. 139-142.
52. Lendas, Tomo II, pt. 1, p. 62.
53. Commentarios, II, p. 142.
54. Ibid., pp. 142-3.
55. Ibid., pp. 143-4.
56. Lendas, Tomo II, pt. 1, pp. 62-5;

57. ~~Commentarios~~ D-JB, II, p. 207.
58. Cartas, I, pp. 22-3.
59. Commentarios, II, pp. 167-8; Lendas, Tomo II, pt. 1, pp. 74-5. Correa records that the annual taxes of Goa amounted to 150,000 pardaos (Rs. 750,000) of gold under the Vijayanagara Emperors.
60. Commentarios, II, pp. 171-4.
61. D-JB, II, pp. 207-8.
62. Commentarios, II, pp. 183-4; Lendas, Tomo II, pt. 1, pp. 80-1.
63. Ibid., II, p. 191.
64. Lendas, Tomo II, pt. 1, p. 83.
65. Commentarios, II, pp. 195-7; Lendas, II, pt. 1, pp. 88-9.
66. Commentarios, II, p. 198.
67. Ibid., p. 206. Correa mentions Menaique as the brother-in-law of Timmayya (Lendas, Tomo, II, pt. 1, p. 79).
68. Lendas, Tomo II, pt. 1, p. 93.
69. Ibid., pp. 95, 114.
70. Commentarios, II, pp. 223-4.
71. Ibid., pp. 229-30.
72. Ibid., pp. 246-7; Lendas, Tomo II, pt. 1, p. 113.
73. Ibid., pp. 251-2.
74. Ibid., pp. 254-5; Lendas, Tomo II, pt. 1, pp. 118-9. Correa says that the ~~25~~ Brahmin also was taken prisoner. He promised rice and other provisions if he and his daughters were released. He was taken to the place where he said the provisions were available. On proving true he was liberated along with his daughters.
75. Commentarios, II, pp. 255, 258, 259.
76. Ibid., p. 260.
77. Ibid., pp. 261-2.
78. Ibid., pp. 294-5.
79. Ibid., pp. 313-4.

80. Ibid., III, p. 2.
81. D-JB, II, pp. 227-8.
82. Lendas, Tomo, II, pt. 1, pp. 141-2.
83. Ibid., p. 142.
84. D-JB, II, p. 228.
85. Lendas, Tomo II, pt. 1, p. 142.
86. Commentarios, III, pp. 3-4, 7, 9.
87. Cartas, V, p. 185.
88. D-JB, II, p. 235.
89. Cartas, I, p. 27.
90. D-JB, II, p. 237.
91. Commentarios, III, p. 45.
92. Cartas, I, pp. 47-8; D-JB, II, p. 237.
93. Ibid., pp. 165, 179. Two letters dated 1 and 2 December, 1513.
94. Ibid., p. 165.
95. Lendas, Tomo II, pt. 1, p. 93.
96. Ibid., p. 160.
97. Goa belonged to Hindus prior to 1469. If Malhar Rao was born in Goa and fought against Turks when Goa was under Hindus, within the Vijayanagara Empire, then he was an old man of about 60 years in 1510, assuming that he fought against the Turks when he was about 20.
98. Commentarios, III, pp. 33-5; D-JB, II, p. 237; História, III, p. 117; Lendas, Tomo, II, pt. 1, pp. 160-1.
99. Commentarios, III, p. 35.
100. Cartas, II, p. 90.
101. Commentarios, III, pp. 35-6.
102. Ibid., pp. 36-7.
103. Lendas, Tomo II, pt. 1, pp. 161-2, 178.
104. Commentarios, III, pp. 229-30; Cartas, I, pp. 174-5; D-JB, II, pp. 294-5. Albuquerque mentions that Malhar Rao had 4,000 peons and 30 horses, where-

as in *Commentarios* the respective figures are 5,000 and 50. Barros writes that Malhar Rao was successful against Pulat Khan in the beginning, but the enemy's superior number began to tell upon him, and he was finally defeated.

105. *Cartas*, I, p. 136; *Commentarios*, III, p. 230.

106. *História*, III, p. 216; D-JB, II, p. 324.

107. *Commentarios*, III, 230.

108. *Cartas*, II, p. 107.

109. *Ibid.*, I, p. 179; D-JB, II, p. 295.

110. *Ibid.*, V, p. 404.

111. *Ibid.*, VI, p. 249.

~~SECRET~~

Chapter 4.

THE PORTUGUESE COVET BHATKAL.

In the last week of October, 1505 the Viceroy, Francisco de Almeida, received in Cannanor an embassy from Vira Narasimha, the founder of the Third Dynasty of the Vijayanagara Empire. Narasimha proposed an alliance of friendship between himself and the Portuguese. He would aid them with ships and would allow them to build fortresses in his ports, except in Bhatkal, which was already given to some one else; he would supply all that was necessary for the construction of the fortresses; and for greater solidarity of the friendship he would give in marriage his sister to the prince of Portugal. Narasimha also wrote a letter to the king of Portugal containing all these proposals,<sup>1</sup> and sent rich presents to the prince. The embassy was received well, but the Viceroy did not send a reply, as he thought that it was not a proper time to do so.<sup>2</sup>

Did Narasimha send this embassy on his own initiative or was it in response to one, if any, from the Viceroy ? To be sure, the latter had an instruction from the king of Portugal that he should send an envoy to Vijayanagara with presents. The king also had sent with him a letter addressed to the Emperor. However, the Viceroy was given the option of not sending the envoy, if the Portuguese interest would be better served by it than by sending an envoy.<sup>3</sup> In fact, there is no reference in Portuguese documents and chronicles to any embassy sent by the Viceroy to Vijayanagara until the year 1508.

Thus, it seems ~~probable~~ probable that Narasimha sent his embassy before he received any from the Portuguese. There was good reason for him to endeavour to secure the alliance of the Portuguese whose naval achievements might have been reported to him. "His six year reign (1503-9) was almost wholly spent in fighting and success did not always attend him,"<sup>4</sup> and, therefore, friendship and assistance were welcome from any quarter. Why not secure Portuguese alliance ? Both Vijayanagara and Portugal had a common enemy in Muslims

and the Adil Shah of Bijapur was intruding into the territories of Vijayanagara. It is also probably true, as the Portuguese believed, that the Franciscan Friar, Luis Salvador, who was in Vijayanagara for some time prior to 1505, influenced <sup>5</sup> Narashimha to seek friendship of the Portuguese.

The Viceroy, however, does not seem to have been satisfied with the proposals of the imperial embassy. Probably he had an eye on the port of Bhatkal, but Narasimha did not offer to allow the Portuguese to construct their fortress there. By now the Portuguese knew the commercial importance of Bhatkal. In 1501 and 1502 João da Nova and Vasco da Gama, commanding their respective annual <sup>6</sup> fleets to India, had developed close contact with the port. While they were in Bhatkal the commandants might have noted mentally the numerous ships being loaded with great quantities of rice, iron and sugar. They might have been impressed by the commercial importance of the place, its good port, its easy accessibility from sea and its strategic defence possibility against attack from the hinterland. They might have reported all these to their sovereign and countrymen.

Thus, when Francisco came to India as Viceroy, he should have known the importance and usefulness of Bhatkal. However, he was not in a hurry to obtain the place for constructing a fortress. For one thing, the king of Portugal, in his instructions to him, did not include Bhatkal among the places of India where Portuguese forts were to be erected. Secondly, when the Vijayanagara embassy came to him in 1505, he was busy constructing fortresses in Anjediva and other places according to the royal instructions. By 1508, however, the situation changed. The Portuguese realised that their fort in Anjediva was incapable of being defended against enemy attacks and therefore it was demolished in 1506, hardly one year after it was erected. The Viceroy now thought of securing a suitable alternative place on the Kanara coast for constructing a fortress. Bhatkal was the place which attracted him. Accordingly, he sent <sup>Tinoco,</sup> Pero Fernandes, along with Fr. Luis as ambassador to Vijayanagara. Luis had

been to Vijayanagara before and therefore he could be of much help to Tinoco. The Viceroy proposed to conclude a treaty of friendship as required by the Emperor in his embassy of 1505, in return for permission to erect a Portuguese fortress in Bhatkal. The embassy was not a great success. Tinoco could not fulfil its main purpose. The Vijayanagara Emperor seems to have talked to him and in general terms of peace ~~and~~ friendship without committing himself to anything concrete. By this time Vira Narasimha had strengthened his position in Vijayanagara by driving the Adil Shah and putting down many a rebellion within his Empire. He therefore did not need the Portuguese assistance in 1508 as badly as he did in ~~year~~ 1505. He virtually ignored the Portuguese embassy, as he was not prepared to forego so valuable a port as Bhatkal.

The Portuguese, however, did not give up their effort to obtain the place. In 1509 Afonso de Albuquerque suffered a mortifying defeat at the hands of the Zamorin of Calicut. The former, therefore, ardently desired to secure aid from the Vijayanagara Emperor, Krishna Deva Raya, who succeeded Vira Narasimha in the <sup>same</sup> year, in order to wreck vengeance on the Zamorin. He sent Fr. Luis, an astute Franciscan, to Vijayanagara with the proposal that the Vijayanagara Emperor should march against the Zamorin by land while Albuquerque himself would attack the enemy by sea; that he would assist Vijayanagara whenever necessary against their common enemy, namely, the Muslims; that he would undo the port of Goa and deprive the Muslim rulers of the Deccan of its commerce in Ormus horses; and that he would direct all the trade in horses to Bhatkal or any other port of the Vijayanagara Empire. Finally, it was also proposed that if the Vijayanagara Emperor allowed the Portuguese to trade and have a factory in any of his ports from Bhatkal to Mangalore, he should order his men to give the Portuguese a place to build a strong house, meaning a fortress; and that if he did so, all the commerce in horses and other articles of trade of Portugal would be secured for him. The embassy was despatched from Cannanor some time after 7 February, 1510.

From the letter which Luis wrote to Albuquerque from Vijayanagara it is

evident that the ambassador was instructed to obtain permission to build a fortress in Bhatkal. But when the ambassador put the subject before Krishna Deva Raya, the latter expressed his surprise that he should be asked to allow the Portuguese to build their fortress in that place. Clearly, the Emperor was not willing to concede the request.

Thus, this embassy also did not meet with success. Luis was received well by everybody in Vijayanagara except by the Emperor who had no intention as yet to commit himself to anything. The ambassador was in fact murdered, probably by the orders of the Emperor. Virtually no concrete reply was given to this embassy. Instead, Krishna Deva Raya sent towards the end of 1510 his own ambassadors to Goa which was securely occupied by the Portuguese by then. Albuquerque, however, refused to respond, excusing himself that he was not in a position to decide what to say since he had no response to his own proposals made through his ambassador, Fr. Luis, a year before. If Krishna Deva Raya could ignore Albuquerque's embassy of 1509, the latter was strong enough in 1510 to send back the former's without a concrete reply.

Albuquerque then began to make offers of friendship to the Adil Shah himself. This was a statesman-like move on his part. His desire was to develop friendly relations with his neighbour from whom he had snatched Goa, so that there would not be any more fight over the territory and that commerce in horses and other merchandise could go on smoothly. Krishna Deva Raya, on learning of Albuquerque's new ~~new~~ policy, sent his ambassadors again to secure horses and prevent them from falling into the hands of his enemy, the Adil Shah. However, Albuquerque had left for Malacca by the time the embassy arrived in Goa. On his return, Albuquerque resumed the diplomatic negotiations in October, 1512. He sent Gaspar Chanoca with the proposal that, as all the kings of India had given the Portuguese sites in their ports to build fortresses in order to protect the Portuguese commerce, and as he very much desired friendship with Vijayanagara, the latter ought to have pleasure in giving Bhatkal for

the erection of a fort (casa forte); that he desired that all the horses that came to Goa should go to Vijayanagara; and that though Fr. Luis, the first of his ambassadors, had written that the Emperor's words of friendship should not be trusted as long as the king of Gersoppa lived, he would ignore it, since his sovereign, king of Portugal, had commanded him several times that he should endeavour to gain the Emperor's friendship as the latter was a Hindu.

Response to this embassy came in, apparently as late as January, 1514.<sup>15</sup> Retelim Cherim, probably Ratna Shetty, arrived in Goa and presented to Albuquerque a letter in a folio of gold and told him that the Emperor, knowing the hostility between the Portuguese and the Adil Shah, had decided to wage a war against the latter; that if Albuquerque was of the intention still to fight the Adil Shah, he should let the Emperor know; and that the combined forces could make a short work of the enemy. The ambassador also spoke concerning the horses.<sup>16</sup> No reference was made to Bhatkal either by the ambassador or by Albuquerque during the course of this negotiations. Probably the latter did not want Bhatkal any more, since he had firmly secured Goa by then, as has been pointed out by Castanheda.<sup>17</sup> In fact no conclusive agreement was reached between the Portuguese and Vijayanagara during the governorship of Albuquerque regarding either the horses, which Krishna Deva Raya required so much, or the construction of a fortress in Bhatkal, which the Portuguese coveted.

As these negotiations between the Portuguese and Vijayanagara were being carried on, the former kept up their direct relations with Bhatkal, which had begun, as has been said, in 1501. In that year João da Nova sailed into the port of Bhatkal with his fleet. The Portuguese were not strangers to the natives there, for all along the coast the Portuguese deeds were talked about. The owners of the ships, which were anchored at the port, were anxious to know the intention of the Portuguese. They feared that the latter might cause damage to their ships. Some of the owners went in their boats to João with loads of rice, sugar, hens, oranges, and figs. Some others went to the king of Bhatkal to request him to send his messenger to find out the objectives of the Portuguese.

The latter, however, had peaceful intentions and soon commerce ensued between them and the local merchants, in which the Portuguese gained considerably. Unfortunately, there followed a robbery of the money belonging to the Portuguese. Though the money was recovered soon, the thieves escaped. João, after a consultation with his counsellors, decided not to sail away until the thieves were caught and punished. He wanted to show to the natives what would happen to those who behaved badly towards the Portuguese. Accordingly, the captain-major (João) sent a messenger to the king of Bhatkal requesting him to arrest the thieves and entrust them to the Portuguese. He declared that he would not allow any local ship to move out of the port. He also threatened that he would burn all the ships anchored there if the culprits were not handed over. At first the king of Bhatkal excused himself from the responsibility of arresting the thieves, though the merchants told him that they would complain to the Emperor of Vijayanagara, his suzerain, if no remedy was found by him against the Portuguese threat of burning the ships. But the king acted when João pressed further making a show of attack. The thieves were found out and handed over to the Portuguese. João ordered that they be hanged after their hands were cut off. He then sent a present to the king of Bhatkal and it was reciprocated. The Bhatkal chief told the Portuguese that they were always welcome  
16 to his port for trade.

In the following year Vasco da Gama, after burning ships in the Honavar river and a part of the city of Honavar itself, proceeded to the port of Bhatkal where there were many Muslim ships, which had come there for rice, iron and sugar. Being aware of Vasco da Gama's atrocities in Honavar the natives of Bhatkal were determined to defend themselves and had assembled some small guns on a rampart on a hill at the entrance of the river. Vasco da Gama sent his brother, Estêvão da Gama, with men and boats to effect a landing. The defenders hurled stones from the hill at the boats as they entered the river,

but the Portuguese succeeded in landing. And as they were marching to take  
the <sup>r</sup>ampant some Muslim envoys met Estêvão and said that they were going to  
Vasco da Gama with a message from the king of Bhatkal who was prepared to  
declare obedience to the Portuguese. Estêvão da Gama sent a Portuguese ~~soldier~~  
soldier with the Muslims to Vasco da Gama and awaited the latter's orders. The  
latter told the envoys that he did not come with the intention of causing harm  
to Bhatkal; but that he had ordered his men to fight as he had confronted  
hostility from the natives; that his sovereign, king of Portugal, was the lord  
of all seas and, therefore, all the ports where there was navigation should  
obey the king of Portugal and pay tributes to his men who moved about in his  
fleet; that this was a symbol of obedience, by which alone the ports would be  
free and secure in their trade and commerce; that the ports should neither  
trade in pepper nor admit Turks nor ships from Calicut; that if the king of  
Bhatkal was prepared to abide by these conditions of tribute and trade he  
should soon send his word of consent, lest the ships and the port would be  
burnt not only then and there but also every year so that no trade could be  
carried on in Bhatkal. Being reported of what Vasco da Gama declared, the  
king of Bhatkal proposed to give an annual tribute of 1,000 bags of ordinary  
rice for the Portuguese soldiers and 500 bags of fine rice for the captains;  
more he could not give as he was a tenant of the Emperor of Vijayanagara to  
whom Bhatkal belonged; nor could he give tribute in gold or silver. After  
verification, Vasco da Gama accepted these terms of peace and obedience,  
whereupon the king of Bhatkal sent his letter of obligation and the rice due.  
<sup>19</sup>  
Vasco da Gama gave the king the safe conduct and proceeded to Cannanor.

In 1508, as already stated, Francisco de Almeida was invited by Timmaya  
to help against Bhatkal; but on reaching the port Almeida found the belliger-  
<sup>20</sup>  
ents at peace. He went to the port again on 25 February, 1509 on his way back  
from the Konkan coast to Malabar. The Bhatkal chief met the Viceroy and  
declared himself a vassal of the king of Portugal. He bound himself to pay

every year 2,000 bags of good rice (giraçal) and paid immediately for that  
21  
year.

One does not know what made the Bhatkal chief to submit to the Portuguese  
*consequence*  
and pay tributes. Probably it was in *consequence* to the Viceroy's readiness  
to aid the Gersoppa chief against Bhatkal. The Bhatkal chief might have done  
so to secure his neutrality in case hostilities should break out again between  
Gersoppa and Bhatkal.

The Bhatkal chief seems to have considered this treaty valid only as long  
as Francisco de Almeida was the Portuguese Viceroy in India. For in the follow-  
ing year a messenger from the chief went to Afonso de Albuquerque who was in  
Goa after its first occupation. The latter was told that Condanechatim (Gunda-  
nna Shetty) and Naodaquiçar (Nanda Kishore), administrators of Bhatkal, desired  
friendship with the Portuguese and would subject themselves to the king of  
Portugal. Albuquerque did not respond to this message immediately as he did  
not have any ship to spare for the purpose of sending his reply to Bhatkal.  
However, in September, 1510, he sent Lourenço Moreno to come to an agreement  
with Bhatkal. Moreno was given the services of a Muslim of Cannanor, Porcassem  
by name, who was to act as his interpreter and to help him in the negotiation.  
Moreno was instructed to propose to the administrators of Bhatkal that the  
Portuguese should be provided with a house in which a factor could store his  
merchandise securely; that the house should be of stone and mortar, constructed  
at the cost of the Bhatkal administrators; and that an annual tribute of 2,000  
bags of rice should be paid to the Portuguese. However, Lourenço Moreno, on  
reaching Bhatkal, found that the administrators had changed their mind. They  
told him that they could not take any decision without knowing what their so-  
vereign, Krishna Deva Raya, would command in this matter. The Bhatkal chief  
might have sent his ~~messengers~~ messenger to Albuquerque in Goa in keeping with  
his sovereign's policy of empty offers to the Portuguese. Or he might have done  
so when it was thought that the Portuguese were a power to reckon with on the

Konkan and Kanara coasts and that it would be safer to be on friendly terms with them. But they were defeated and driven away from Goa by the Adil Shah, and therefore, they were not very strong after all. Accordingly, when Albuquerque revived the negotiations before recapturing Goa, the Bhatkal chief did not consider it necessary to provide any concrete answer. Besides, he might have received instruction from his sovereign, in the meantime, not to commit himself to anything specific, for the sovereign himself was dealing with the Portuguese embassy under Fr. Luis, who also had brought the proposal, among other things, that the Portuguese be allowed to have a fortress in Bhatkal.

By the end of 1510, the situation changed again. The Portuguese proved their strength by recapturing Goa. The Bhatkal chief, as well as the Emperor, sent their respective ambassadors to seek Portuguese friendship. The Bhatkal chief paid the arrears of tribute which he had agreed to pay in 1509 and offered the Portuguese a site for constructing a fortress in Bhatkal. The Portuguese Governor accepted the tribute and friendship, but rejected the offer concerning  
<sup>23</sup> fortress since he had no need of it, now that Goa was secured. It is difficult to say whether this rejection is true or not, because Albuquerque included in his embassy of 1512 to Vijayanagara the demand for a site in Bhatkal for the erection of a fortress, as we have seen above. At any rate, after the second occupation of Goa, Albuquerque was no more in a mood to play the second fiddle in his negotiations with Vijayanagara. He wanted to have his own terms regarding horses and, what is more, he was determined to undo the commerce of Bhatkal. He sent some captains to sail along the coast to compel all the merchant ships  
<sup>24</sup> to go to the port of Goa. In 1513 he sent Antonio Rapaso to the port of Bhatkal with orders to demand the surrender of a ship from Aden. Dama Shetty, administrator of Bhatkal,  
<sup>25</sup> complied with the demand. This policy deprived the Bhatkal port of its commerce of horses and other articles of trade. Thus, though Albuquerque failed to secure a site for the construction of a fortress or even a factory in Bhatkal, he succeeded in damaging the trade and commerce of that place.

Early in 1516, soon after the death of Afonso de Albuquerque, a quarrel appears to have taken place between the Portuguese and the local merchants of Bhatkal. Simão de Andrade, one of the Portuguese captains, assisted by a factor, Aleixo, was loading a large ship with provisions, including rice, sugar and iron, to be taken to Ormus. While this work was being carried on, a quarrel arose between the native merchants and the Portuguese in which twenty four of the latter were killed and many were wounded. The Portuguese were robbed of goods worth 10,000 pardaos (Rs. 40,000). Lopo Soares de Albergaria, successor of Afonso de Albuquerque, learning of this murder and robbery, emerged at the Bhatkal port, later on, with a view to avenge the damage. However, the Bhatkal chief sent immediately a messenger with boats full of refreshments, rice and sugar for the Portuguese Governor. The messenger told him that the incident had taken place in the absence of his chief at a place ten leagues away from Bhatkal and therefore he was not responsible for the incident. The real culprits were three old Muslim merchants whom the chief handed over to Soares advising him to <sup>hang</sup> ~~hang~~ them. He was also ready to give similar punishment to the wives and children of the guilty Muslims. However, none of these was punished, for Soares pardoned the three old guilty men when they fell at his feet and prayed for mercy with much weeping. What was the use of killing only these three ? They would not compensate the 24 Portuguese who were murdered. He also requested the Bhatkal chief not to punish their families. But at the same time he warned the chief that if such an incident of murder and robbery recurred he would hold the chief responsible and would reduce Bhatkal to ashes. Thus, no punishment was inflicted on Bhatkal for the present damage. Pleased with the outcome of the negotiations the Bhatkal chief allowed Soares to load his ships  
26 with all the provisions that were required.

The cause of the unfortunate incident is not known. However, the Portuguese chroniclers note that it was all a matter of an experiment by the natives, particularly by Muslims, to find out the strength of the new Portuguese Governor,

Lopo Soares. If they were to find him week-kneed they would always flout the Portuguese authority and hinder their commerce. The ~~new~~ present experiment was  
not a great success.  
<sup>27</sup>

In the following year, 1517, the Governor ordered João Gonçalves de Castelo Branco, captain of a caravel, to sail along the coast from Cochin to Diu and take Bhatkal and other places on the way. He was instructed to leave at Bhatkal a factor to procure all the saltpetre that was available there. However,  
<sup>28</sup> it is not known to what extent Branco executed this order.

Towards the end of 1518 there was again a skirmish between the Portuguese and the Bhatkal chief who seems to have refused to pay the annual tribute of rice which was agreed upon in 1509. The Governor, Diogo Lopes, sent Afonso de Menezes with three ships ordering him to remain at the bar of the Bhatkal river and prevent the entrance and exit of any ship until the Governor himself joined him with a view to punish the Bhatkal chief for his contumacy. And reaching Bhatkal early in 1519 the Governor brought the rebel back to obedience and obtained from him the payment of tributes due. He also imposed other  
<sup>29</sup> "satisfactions" upon the chief for his rebellious conduct. The other "satisfactions" were probably in the form of one thousand pardaos (Rs. ~~4,000~~ 4,000)  
<sup>30</sup> as compensation for the expences incurred by the Portuguese fleet.

For about two decades after this the Portuguese-Bhatkal relations ~~were~~ seem to have been normal. However, in 1542 there was a major clash between the two, the cause of which was two-fold: non-payment of the annual tribute by the Queen of Bhatkal for some years prior to 1542; and the protection which she gave to pirates who used to cause damage to the Portuguese commerce. The Governor, Martim Afonso de Sousa (1542-5), sailed from Goa with a large fleet and many men. Reaching the Bhatkal river, he sent a message to the Queen demanding the payment of the arrears of tribute and the surrender of all the pirate ships which had taken shelter in her port. The Queen took recourse to delaying tactics, knowing very well that the Governor was in a hurry to go to Cochin

and therefore would not tarry at Bhatkal for long. She responded to his message by saying that she was ready to do all that he required; that she was preparing to pay the tribute; and that she would surrender all pirate ships. On the following day she sent two large boats, old and worn out. Two days later two more ships were sent. All these were purported to have been pirate ships. Seven or eight days lapsed this way by the Queen's subterfuge, and no tribute arrived in the meantime. Fed up with the Queen's dissemblation the Governor decided to punish her by launching an attack. Accordingly, 1,400 soldiers, ~~divided~~ into two equal squadrons, one under the command of Fernão de Souza de Tavora, and the other under the Governor himself, were landed. Tavora led the attack and marching smartly he reached the city which was being guarded by many artillery men who faced the attackers bravely. There was stiff resistance and all the native soldiers fought marvellously well for the defence of their city, women, children and goods. But the Portuguese succeeded in putting them to flight in spite of the latter's spirited and courageous defence efforts. The Portuguese then entered the city. The Governor, who joined the victorious squadron soon after, allowed his men to sack the city. They did so to their satisfaction, putting to death many residents irrespective of their sex and age. After the sack the Portuguese set the city ablaze, cut down palm-trees and destroyed the farms. Finishing these vindictive and cruel punitive measures, the Governor returned with his men to the fleet and sailed away to Cochin. The Portuguese atrocity on Bhatkal and its people caused so much fear among the natives that they began to say: "Beware of Martim Affonso", wherever he anchored along the western coast of India.

Castanheda adds that the Portuguese fleet consisted of forty ships and ~~about~~ 1,500 men. The Governor sailed with it from Goa towards the end of October, 1541. There were seven pirate ships which had taken shelter in the Bhatkal port. Only four of them were surrendered to the Portuguese. In the battle the Portuguese lost ten or twelve of their men; but the enemy suffered

a heavy loss. On withdrawing his men to the fleet the Governor did not sail away immediately. Instead, he waited for four days expecting some response from the Queen. During this period he sent his soldiers each day to cause more and more damage to the city and the surrounding fields and groves. At last the Queen surrendered the remaining three pirate ships, paid the arrears of tribute <sup>32</sup> and begged for peace which was conceded.

Correa's account of the Portuguese-Bhatkal clash of 1542 is interestingly different. There seems to have been only one cause which led to the quarrel. Many corsairs, who bothered the Portuguese, had taken shelter along with their ships in Bhatkal. The Portuguese fleet, comprising seventy ships and 2,000 men of arms, sailed to Bhatkal. On reaching there the Governor sent a message to the administrator of Bhatkal to the effect that he would not burn the port, or wage a war, if the pirate ships were surrendered immediately, and an assurance was given that the pirates would neither be sheltered nor be allowed to arm themselves in Bhatkal in future. The administrator announced his readiness to do the Portuguese bidding, saying, however, that it was subject to the approval of the chief of Bhatkal.

As these negotiations were going on some of the Portuguese seem to have been busy trading in the market. Unfortunately, however, there arose a quarrel there and two of the Portuguese were killed and eight or nine were wounded. Thereupon all the Portuguese who had landed gathered themselves in the Portuguese factory there. They could not return to their fleet owing to the presence of many armed men of Bhatkal who came to the market as soon as the skirmish arose. It was a common practice among the local people to ask for the protection of armed men as soon as any Portuguese fleet arrived at the port, because the Portuguese were known to indulge in malpractices and misdeeds on such occasions, being sure to be protected by the fleet should the natives attack them. From the factory the Portuguese managed to send a message to the fleet, in the present case, seeking the Governor's help. The latter made preparations to land his men immediately.

In the meantime, the administrator sent his own message to the Governor saying that the trouble started when some of the Portuguese forcibly took some cloth from a local merchant; that in the skirmish that followed some Muslim mercenaries joined hands and killed some of the Portuguese; that truly speaking the latter themselves were responsible for the incident; that inspite of all this he held his men answerable; and that he had arrested some of the Muslim mercenaries whom he would hang if the Governor so ordered. He also requested the Governor not to harm Bhatkal by landing his men. The Governor pretended to accept the explanation of the administrator and sent a deceptively good reply. At night he landed his men who placed themselves in the factory which was near the sea. In the morning the Governor himself joined his men with many rifles. There was no resistance, however. The city was deserted as soon as the Portuguese landed. The latter sacked the city and procured much rice, sugar and linen. The royal mansions themselves were not spared. However, there was so much scramble among the Portuguese for sharing the royal belongings that the Governor, annoyed at the behaviour <sup>of</sup> <sub>of</sub> his men, destroyed all the things so that none could have anything.

While the Portuguese were thus fighting over the booty they were attacked by the natives. From a rocky elevation nearby they began to shoot at the Portuguese. The Governor ordered that the enemy be driven away from the strategic position. The nobles and the captains urged their men to attack the enemy; but the soldiers responded: "You who are nobles should go there; for the governor rewards you much and you have horses and silken dress; we wish to go in search of cloth for shirts which we do not have." And none went to fight the native soldiers! The Governor ordered Garcia de Sá with spear-men to go to the hill. The natives fled when Garcia marched against them. But when he returned the natives took their former position and revived their attack with greater vigour. Many Portuguese soldiers were wounded. Again Garcia went to the hill and again

the natives fled. And again they returned when de Sá marched back. Finally, the Portuguese were compelled to return to their fleet. But even while embarking there was so much of disorder and confusion that many were drowned. Every one wanted to be the first to embark, lest he should be the last and be a victim to  
33  
the attacking native soldiers.

The incidents of the day upset the Governor considerably. He declared that his soldiers were not those brave and good ones whom he had known some years before; that he never dreamt of finding so much of traitorousness among the Portuguese; and that he now feared the Rumes should they come, because in India there were so many nobles and honoured men with so much treachery. An experienced and intelligent knight responded: "Sir, the men do not have more bravery than (is warranted by) the favours and rewards that are conferred on them for their good deeds; the king and the governors confer ~~xxx~~ rewards and favours as they please, and not as they ought; the men who fight do not steal, and on account of this they die of hunger; and not only do they endure this evil, but are spiritually <sup>hurt</sup> ~~hurt~~ for being unable to receive (benefits) without pleasing those who never fight." The Governor did not say anything in reply. That night he caught fever and had to be treated by being bled. The following day he could not come out though he wanted to attack the city of Bhatkal again.

Next day, ~~xxxxxxxx~~ however, he sent Garcia de Sá and Tristão de Ataide to the city with orders to destroy it. The men landed and, no doubt, caused much damage to the city; but in the process they were again taken to task by the natives and many a Portuguese soldier were wounded. Yet, the Governor did not give up his attempt at causing the maximum damage to the city. Every day for a period of eight days he sent men to cut trees and set fire to the houses in the city. Finally, the administrator of Bhatkal sought peace which was granted. The Portuguese got the arrears of tribute and the pirate ships. They were promised that no pirate would either be allowed into the port or to arm himself in Bhatkal. The amount of the annual tribute for 1542 was doubled.

These terms were confirmed by the Bhatkal chief and witnessed by his administrators.<sup>34</sup> The Portuguese factory was allowed to function as before.

The Bhatkal chief apparently did not observe these terms for long. In the first quarter of 1547 the Governor, João de Castro (1545-8), sent a captain, Francisco de Siqueira, to Bhatkal to request the Queen to entrust to him the horses and the cloth which were robbed at the port from two Portuguese fustas by thieves who then took shelter in Bhatkal. Should the Queen refuse to oblige, the captain was to recall the Portuguese factor of Bhatkal and then wage war in all her ports. The Queen apparently did not comply with the request. The captain then commenced hostilities against her so vigorously that he got back all that was robbed.<sup>35</sup>

The Queen probably did not pay the tribute also regularly. For a fresh treaty was entered into between her and the Portuguese in 1548 covering both the issues of pirates and tributes. The Queen sent her ambassador, Poka Nayaka, to Goa, with full powers to enter a treaty on her behalf. The Governor, Garcia de Sá (1548-9), received the ambassador well. In the treaty of peace and perpetual friendship that was signed on 17 September, 1548 the Queen agreed: (a) to pay the annual tribute, including the arrears; (b) to prevent the exit, entrance and armament of pirates in the ports within her jurisdiction; (c) to confiscate the robbed Portuguese articles should they be brought to Bhatkal by outside pirates for selling them there, (and probably to restore the articles to the Portuguese); if she did not confiscate the articles she would pay compensation to the Portuguese for all the loss and damage that might be caused to them and their vassals on account of the piracy; and (d) to hand over to the Portuguese all the pirate ships that might be there in her territories. The only obligation on the Portuguese side was apparently not to attack Bhatkal as long as the Queen observed the terms of the treaty.<sup>36</sup>

Simão Botelho notes in 1554 that the amount of the yearly tribute was 2,000

bags of good rice. The ruler allowed in the port of Bhatkal a Portuguese factor who was to issue cartazes (pass ports or permits) to the ships sailing out of the port, as well as to sell there the Portuguese articles of trade. The factor received an annual salary of 100,000 reis (about Rs. 1,100). He had a writer<sup>37</sup> to assist him, with a salary of 30,000 reis (about Rs. 335).

Thus, during the course of about 50 years of the Portuguese-Bhatkal relations from 1510 to 1560 the former dealt with the latter from a position of strength, particularly after the death of Afonso de Albuquerque in 1515. The latter failed to secure a site in Bhatkal for the construction of a fortress there; but he succeeded in damaging the commerce of that port. His successors compelled Bhatkal to pay tributes; and at the slightest provocation attacked her mercilessly with sword and fire.

Foot-notes:

1. História, II, pp. 241, 249.
2. Lendas, I, pt. 2, pp. 618-9.
3. APO-BP, Tomo IV, Vol. I, pt. I, p. 70.
4. Sastri, K. A. N. : A History of South India, p. 266.
5. Documentação, V, p. 399
6. Lendas, I, pt. 1, pp. 238, 289.
7. D-JB, II, p. 112.
8. Commentarios, II, pp. 99, 101-4.
9. Cartas, II, p. 74; Documentação, I, pp. 88-9.
10. Commentarios, III, p. 47.
11. Ibid.

12. Oruganti, R. : Studies on Krishna Deva Raya of Vijayanagara, p. 83.
13. Commentarios, III, p. 49. Barros and Castanheda do not refer to the embassy of Fr. Luis. They (D-JB, II, p. 204 and História, III, pp. 27-8), however, speak of an embassy that was sent by Albuquerque in March 1510, soon after the first occupation of Goa. The ambassador was, according both, Gaspar Chanoca. Castanheda adds that Fr. Luis was sent with this ambassador. These statements, however, do not seem to be correct. The embassy of Chanoca was sent in 1512. Fr. Luis was murdered in 1510 and, therefore, he could not have accompanied Chanoca in 1512.
14. Commentarios, III, 300-1; História, III, p. 230.
15. Lendas, II, pt. 1, p. 376.
16. Commentarios, IV, pp. 156-8.
17. História, III, p. 116.
18. Lendas, I, pt. 1, pp. 238-43.
19. Ibid., pp. 289-91.
20. Supra, p. 18.
21. História, II, p. 441.
22. Commentarios, II, pp. 291-3, 313.
23. História, III, p. 116.
24. Commentarios, III, pp. 50-1; IV, p. 79.
25. Cartas, I, p. 30; História, III, pp. 288-9.
26. Lendas, II, pt. 1, pp. 469-70; D-JB, III, p. 15; História, IV, pp. 384-5.
27. D-JB, III, p. 15; História, IV, p. 384.
28. História, IV, p. 433.
29. D-JB, II, pp. 239-41.
30. História, V, p. 4.
31. RxMx D-DC, Década Quinta, pp. 560-2.
32. História, IX, pp. 575-7.
33. Lendas, IV, pt. 1, pp. 257-60.

34. Ibid., pp. 261-2.
35. Ibid., pt. 2, p. 618.
36. Biker, J. F. J. : Collecção de tratados e concertos de paz, I, pp. 130-1;  
Botelho, Simão : O Tombo do Estado da India, in Subsidios, pp. 242-3.
37. Botelho, Simão : op. cit., p. 243.

## Chapter 5

### THE PORTUGUESE BUILD FORTRESSES ~~ON~~ THE KANARA COAST

As has been pointed out in the first chapter, the Portuguese decided, in 1505, to entrench themselves on the <sup>n</sup> Western Coast of India by erecting forts at various places and by appointing a resident viceroy to look after the Portuguese interests in the East. They began with a fortress in Anjediva. It was built in 1505, but was destroyed in the following year. However, in 1682 they erected another in that island. In Mangalore, Honavar and Basrur they built their fortresses in 1568-9 and possessed them until Shivappa Nayaka of Ikkeri captured them in 1650's. Another was built in Gangolly in 1630-33, but was lost to the same powerful Nayaka.

#### ANJEDIVA

The task of constructing the first Portuguese fortress in Anjediva, off the Kanara coast, was entrusted to the first Viceroy, Francisco de Almeida. He landed in the island on 13 September, 1505 and commenced the work of fortification <sup>1</sup> on the following day.

Gaspar Granadim or Gaspar of India, whom Vasco da Gama had taken prisoner at Anjediva in 1498, and who had been in the service of the Adil Shah of Bijapur, seems to have advised the king of Portugal to fortify the island. Gaspar's argument was that from the fortified Anjediva the Portuguese could easily acquire <sup>2</sup> control over the Goa bar. Further, the island was situated in the middle of the whole ~~sw~~ <sup>2</sup> of the Western Coast of India; it was close to the mainland; the Portuguese ships could find there fresh water for their men; and, above all, it <sup>3</sup> was a good haven for ships in the rainy season. It may also be added that the island was virtually no man's land in those days, though it was within the jurisdiction of the Gersoppa chief who had neglected its development for the reasons <sup>4</sup> already noted. The Portuguese fortification of the island was not challenged by the Gersoppa chief. On the contrary he sought their friendship.

The fort, which was named 'Santa Justina', was constructed in twenty days. Lime, prepared out of burnt shells of mollusces, was secured from the natives who came to sell provisions to the Portuguese. Whatever quantity of lime was needed for preparing mortar was thus procured.<sup>5</sup> The natives, who were treated well by the Portuguese, also supplied them with timber, canes and palm-leaves for building houses within the fort. Stone, of course, was available in the island in plentitude. However, the required quantity was taken from a temple in the island, which the Portuguese razed to the ground.<sup>6</sup>

Houses of canes and palm-leaves, adequate for seventy men, were built inside the fort. Manuel Paçanha was appointed its captain. Rodrigo Rabelo, a noble, was made the commandant of the ship assigned for the defence of the island. Duarte Pereira was installed as factor and chief alcaide. In addition, writers and other necessary officials were appointed. Required pieces of artillery and ammunitions were also provided with. Merchandise was supplied for the payment of the soldiers.<sup>7</sup>

The ~~N~~<sup>W</sup> neighbouring rulers showed a mixed reaction to the construction of the fort. The Muslim governor of Goa became particularly uneasy. He and his co-religionists of Chitakul and Ankola tried to prevent the natives from trusting and helping the Portuguese.<sup>8</sup> The chief of Gersoppa, however, demonstrated friendship towards the Portuguese.

The fortress, nevertheless, was not retained by the Portuguese for long. It was soon discovered that the island was vulnerable to attack and could not be easily and effectively defended. During the rainy season of 1506 the island was besieged by Muslims who put Manuel Paçanha, the captain of the fortress, under great pressure. Nevertheless, he sailed forth several times and attacked the enemy successfully. Sending news of this subsequently to the Viceroy, who was then in Cochin, Paçanha told him that there was no advantage in maintaining the fortress and that he and his advisers had come to the conclusion that the Viceroy should be requested to order to destroy the fortress. The Viceroy received this

message in September, 1506 and, concurring with Paçanha, he instructed his son,  
Dom Lourenço, to effect the destruction.<sup>9</sup> Lourenço seems to have executed this  
order in the same month.

The Portuguese continued to use the island, however, for sheltering their  
ships whenever necessary, in the rainy season or when there was storm, and for  
taking water and other supplies when required. As long as they were sure to  
enjoy these facilities unhindered they did not think of fortifying the island  
again. But in April, 1682 they learnt that Sambhaji, the Maratha ruler, in-  
tended to occupy the island and fortify it. This was considered by the Portu-  
guese as dangerous to their commercial interests, particularly to the rice-supply  
from Kanara. Cargo ships carrying this vital commodity from the ports of Kanara  
had to pass by the island, and Sambhaji, entrenching himself therein, could  
capture these ships. Thus, in a meeting of the Council of State, held in Goa  
on 27 April, 1682 a decision to build forthwith a new fortress in Anjediva was  
taken. The necessary materials were to be sent to the island from Goa. It was  
also decided that the fort should be equipped with six pieces of artillery; that  
a fleet of ships (manchuas and sanguiceis) should guard the island; and that  
food supplies sufficient to last during the rainy season of that year should be  
made to those who were to be sent to the island.<sup>10</sup> On 2 July the fortification  
was commenced and within six months the fortress was ready. Amaro Simões Pereira  
was its first captain who saw through the process of construction.<sup>11</sup>

#### MANGALORE

The first important Portuguese fortress on the mainland coast of Kanara  
was built in Mangalore in 1568. However, before considering the circumstances  
~~under~~ under which the fortress was built it is desirable to review the Portu-  
guese relations with Mangalore.

In 1513 Afonso de Albuquerque sent a ship with soldiers under the command

of Fernão Gomez de Lemos to Mangalore where two vessels belonging to the Zamorin of Calicut, with whom the Portuguese were at war, were anchored. The Governor of Mangalore was to be asked to entrust these vessels to the Portuguese. If the governor were to refuse to oblige the navigation of the port was to be prevented until the Calicut ships were made over. Fernão did not face any obstruction and  
12 the vessels were secured.

In the first quarter of 1525 the Portuguese again arrived at Mangalore with a fleet of four sails and placing themselves at the mouth of the river prevented a hundred or so ships of the Muslims, which were in the river, from coming out. Nevertheless, the Muslims tried to sail forth several times, but in vain. As the Portuguese were guarding the mouth of the river some Calicut ships came there, a few days later, to take goods from the port. When they saw the Portuguese fleet they realised that the Muslim ships were in the river. They gave a fight to the Portuguese in which those in the river also fought against the latter from behind. The Portuguese decided to sail out into the sea to chastise the Calicut ships. As soon as they did so most of the Muslim ships, which were inside the river, also sailed out and reassembled in the sea. The battle was not a great success for the Portuguese. However, some Muslim ships which could  
13 not come out of the river in time were chased farther up the river and destroyed.

Five years later, in 1530, the Portuguese caused great destruction to Mangalore. In that year the Governor, Nuno da Cunha (1529-38), learnt that a rich Hindu merchant of Mangalore, a tenant of the Emperor of Vijayanagara, and popularly known as the Shetty (Chatim) of Mangalore, had clandestine commercial dealings with the Zamorin of Calicut, an enemy of the Portuguese, which caused considerable damage to the Portuguese trade interests. The Shetty was the richest ~~merchant~~ merchant on the whole of the Western Coast of India from Goa to Cape Comorin. He was also a friend of the Portuguese who allowed his merchant ships ply about freely. The Zamorin, finding it impossible to export his spices from his ports to the Strait of the Red Sea on account of the Portuguese vigilance,

sent the spices to Mangalore, probably by land, with an understanding between himself and the Shetty. From Mangalore these spices were exported to the Red Sea Strait in the ships of the Muslim merchants of Mecca who were allowed by the Portuguese to load at Mangalore, the port of a friend. The merchants paid the Zamorin for the spices. The Portuguese were not aware that the spices actually belonged to the Zamorin, until they discovered the fact in 1530. The Zamorin had such great profits that he aided the Shetty to fortify Mangalore, supplied him with artillery, and at his own cost maintained a garrison to defend the city and the fort. Nuno da Cunha decided to punish the Shetty for his league with the Zamorin. Diogo da Silveira, captain-major of the Portuguese fleet of Malabar, was sent with two galleys, one caravel and three bargantines,  
14 with about 400 men, against the Shetty.

The Shetty was forewarned of the Portuguese attack. He, therefore, prepared himself well and awaited the Portuguese fleet with the determination of defending himself. Diogo reached the mouth of the river, perhaps on 26 March, 1530. On the following day he landed 240 men of whom 120 were gunners. The landing was made at a spot which was outside the range of the enemy fire from the stockade. Simultaneously, the remaining men were to sail in bargantines and bombard the fortress, the galleys and the caravel being at the mouth to guard it. It was expected that the bombardment from the river would divide the ~~enemy~~ enemy forces and would minimise the pressure on the Portuguese soldiers attacking by land. Diogo's brother, João da Silveira, led the attack by land with his riflemen. Proceeding ~~to~~ towards the stockade the Portuguese confronted about 2,000 enemy soldiers in a palm-grove. With a loud battle cry the Portuguese fell upon the enemy shooting with rifles as also with bows. Their attack was so vigorous that they killed some of the Shetty's soldiers and compelled the rest to retreat to the stockade. Having retreated, one of their fire-men decided to light the artillery on the stockade. However, as God would have it, one of the Portuguese noticed him in action and quickly killed him with a gun shot. The Portuguese then rushed in before the artillery could go off. The Shetty's forces retreated

further into the fortress. João da Silveira, with about seventy of his men, marched along the river towards the fortress, and on the way he came across a mosque wherein were gathered many of the enemy whom he attacked. The defenders fought so well that many of the Portuguese were wounded. As this fight was going on, a Portuguese noble named Francisco de Sousa placed himself alone at the entrance of the mosque, seized a Muslim by the arm and killed him with a dagger thrust. Seeing this, those who defended the entrance retreated a little inside, which left a little space for the Portuguese to enter. Finally, all the Shetty's forces within the mosque were killed, none escaping. In the meantime, those who had remained with Diogo da Silveira massacred the residents of the city. None was spared. And with great enthusiasm the Portuguese marched to attack the fortress in which they soon faced stiff resistance, because there were many enemy soldiers on the galleries from where they vigorously discharged ~~pot~~ potfuls of explosives, hurled numerous stones and some gun-shots, with which they wounded some of the attackers. However, they did not last long as the Portuguese gunners killed some and forced others to retreat. Thus finding themselves free from pressure from above the Portuguese began to force their way into the fortress. With a few cannon shots they broke open one of its doors and entered, inspite of the defenders within. Soon the Shetty's men fled in great confusion. Some of them plunged themselves into the river in order to reassemble on the other bank. However, many were killed while fleeing, both inside the fortress and in the river, where the Portuguese were in action. In the confusion the Shetty was also killed with a gun-shot. None was killed among the Portuguese. Having thus cleared the fortress of the enemy Diogo da Silveira commanded his brother, João, ~~and~~ and Manuel de Vasconcelos, to guard the entrances of the fortress so that the enemy could not return while the Portuguese robbed and take them by surprise; and entrusted the task of embarking the artillery belonging to the enemy to Jōao de Sousa Lobo, Diegalvarez, Martim Vaz Pacheco, and Francisco

Barros de Paiva, who did so; there were seventy cannons of which many were large ones and three were of quarter size. In the meantime, the fortress was sacked. A lot of copper, coral, mercury, grains, velvet, and many other rich articles of trade from Mecca, and also much explosives and countless provisions were gathered. A major part of these spoils was burnt as the Portuguese did not have sufficient space in their ships to carry all the spoils. After the embarkation of the artillery Diogo ordered to set fire to the fortress which was burnt totally with the exception of the walls on the bank of the river as they were very strong; but they were pulled down to their very foundations. The city was also burnt. Thirteen ships, which were anchored at the port, were sunk. The gardens were ruined and reduced to ashes. All these were done in such a manner that it appeared that there was never a habitation in Mangalore.

In 1538 Alvaro de Noronha, son of the then Viceroy, confronted, off Mangalore, 25 ships belonging to Calicut. On seeing the Portuguese fleet the Calicut ships entered two estuaries. Alvaro chased them and gave them a fight in which some local people helped the enemies of the Portuguese. He defeated and killed many of the enemy and burnt their ships.

Mangalore experienced another devastating fury of the Portuguese in 1555. Alvaro da Silveira burnt the city and killed many residents. A rich temple with its idols was also destroyed. The cause of this wanton cruelty is not indicated.

Again, in 1558 the Portuguese exhibited their brutality to the people of Mangalore. In that year Luiz de Mello da Silva, captain-major of the Portuguese fleet of the Malabar coast, learnt that a ship belonging to the Muslims of Cannanor was anchored at Mangalore. Placing himself at the mouth of the river he sent two of his captains with orders to force the Muslim ship out of the river into the sea. While the captains were engaged in this task they found that some people of Mangalore assisted the crew of the Muslim ship. Luiz de Mello decided to chastise the Mangalorians for aiding the enemy, though Mangalore belonged to

the Emperor of Vijayanagara with whom the Portuguese were at peace. De Mello sailed up the river, landed his men in good order, entered the city and put to sword all those whom he confronted, without discriminating between men and women, old and young. In all these proceedings the Portuguese were akin to bloodthirsty hounds and they thought that these atrocities were necessary to terrorise the enemies. The city was set on fire. The captain-major posted himself, with some of his men, at the entrance of a street. A host of Muslims, fleeing from the fire and destruction caused by the Portuguese, came along the street to break through the line where the captain-major was. An old man, with his hair long and ~~very~~ loose, carrying a dagger two spans long, and an armour of iron which covered his breast to the middle, marched straight up to the captain-major and stabbed him on an arm and engaged him in a hand to fist fight. De Mello seized the old man by his hair and pushed him into the hands of his soldiers, saying: "Take this devil". The old man and others who followed him were captured. The fire was widespread by then and it consumed the city along with its houses and goods of all sorts. A grand and beautiful temple was also burnt. The brass and copper that covered the roof and the tower of the temple, and fine works of gold that were inside, were embarked by De Mello. The Portuguese lost Gonçalo Sanches, one of the captains, who was killed along with some of his men. The Muslim ship, which was the cause of the trouble, was burnt,  
18  
as also some others lying at the port.

In 1568, as has been said, the Portuguese constructed a fortress in Mangalore. At first a site on the southern bank of the river Netravati, at its mouth, was examined. However, it was found that the ground there was not firm and could be eroded by the sea water. Finally, therefore, the Viceroy, Antão de Noronha, decided to erect the fortress on the north bank of the river in Mangalore which region was under the Bangar chief who was an ally of the Portuguese. The chief met the Viceroy off Mangalore and offered to supply all the materials

and services necessary for ~~threw~~ the construction of the fortress and to pay the workers. A treaty was entered ~~intax~~ into between the chief and the Portuguese whereby he declared himself a brother-in-arms to the king of Portugal, binding himself to help defend the fortress with his person and men whenever  
19 necessary.

Paulo da Trinidade gives an interesting account of the cause which made the Bangar chief to concede the site to the Portuguese. There was a market at the site dominated by Muslims who did not obey the chief. They insulted him in several ways. For instance, they insisted that he should walk, and not be carried in a palanquin, whenever he passed by the market. This, of course, he did not do; but he decided to set the Portuguese on them by giving the site to the former, for he knew that there was little love lost between the Portuguese and  
20 the Muslims.

The site was on a high plateau overlooking the river. The Viceroy and his men worked tirelessly and within fifteen days the foundation was ready. The first stone of the edifice was laid by the Viceroy himself on 20 January, 1568, the day of São Sebastião, whose name was given to the fortress, not only in honour of that saint but also in honour of the then reigning king of Portugal whose name also was Sebastião. The fortress was speedily completed with a residence for its captain, a factory, a warehouse, and a church (pagode). Antonio Pereira, the Viceroy's brother-in-law, was appointed <sup>Captain</sup> with three hundred men under three flag commanders. Provisions to last for six months were stocked.  
21 Having arranged all these the Viceroy sailed for Goa on 20 March.

From the ordinance that was issued by the Viceroy it appears that the defence forces of Mangalore fortress consisted of only 200 men and their officers. Out of these 100 were riflemen who were divided into four groups of 25 each with a commandant. The four commandants were under the chief of the whole contingent  
22 of riflemen. The latter were natives who enjoyed the confidence of the authorities.

Describing the fortress of Mangalore in 1582 or thereabout, the unknown

author of the 'Livro das Cidades e Fortalezas' says that the fortress was built on the north bank of the river at its entrance in a region which belonged to the Bangar chief whose city was about one falcon shot from the fortress. The Portuguese built their fortress in the site where there was a Hindu temple. The site was on a spot controlling the port and entrance of the river. The Portuguese secured iron from the lands which belonged to the temple which was retained until 1620, as we shall see later on.  
<sup>23</sup>

Bocarro, writing in 1635 or thereabout, says that the fortress was about a falcon shot from the bar of the Netravati river and was built on a solid ground by the river side. It was a square structure with four bulwarks in the four corners. Each wall of the fortress was 22 metres long, ~~six~~ 8.8 metres high and 6 palms wide. Inside the fort there was a church, a magazine and a residence for the captain and his family hardby the north wall. The bulwarks  
<sup>24</sup> were a little dilapidated and required repairs.

There were 35 Portuguese cazados (house holders) whose habitation was outside but close by the fortress. The habitation consisted of houses built of stone and lime and having tiled roofs. It was surrounded by a wall, 4.4 metres high, with many watch towers and bulwarks of circular shape. The wall was a  
<sup>25</sup> little higher on the side of the mainland and had a small moat.

Within three years of its construction an attempt was made by the Zamorin's forces, in 1571, ~~try~~ to capture the fortress of Mangalore. The Queen of Ullala, who was then hostile to the Portuguese, told Catipocra, probably Kutti Pokre, admiral of the Zamorin's fleet, that the fortress could be taken easily. Without a warning he suddenly attacked the fortress one night. While his men were scaling the wall, a servant of the captain of the fortress was awakened. Seeing the enemy he threw out of the window the first thing that he could seize, which happened to be a chest filled with silver belonging to his master. The chest knocked down the men on the ladder. In the meantime, hearing the noise, the captain and the garrison also woke up, fought the enemy and forced them to

retreat. The chest was carried away by the fleeing enemy to their ships. However, off Cannanor, Kutti Pokre was confronted by another Portuguese fleet which defeated and killed him. The chest, with its silver, was recovered and made  
26 over to its owner.

After this, until the second decade of the 17th century, the Portuguese fortress of Mangalore was free from any attack.

#### HONAVAR

The next fortress that the Portuguese came to possess on the Kanara coast was in Honavar. The relations between the Portuguese and Honavar seem to have been peaceful from the days of Afonso de Albuquerque down to 1538. In that year, however, the Viceroy, Garcia de Noronha, sent his son, Alvaro de Noronha, with a large fleet to Honavar where a ship belonging to Turks was known to have been loading. The Turks had erected a stockade along the river and had well equipped it with artillery. However, as soon as the Portuguese fleet approached the river the Turks fled without a fight. Alvaro took possession of their artillery  
27 and burnt their ship.

A different version of this incident is given by Faria e Sousa. Nuno da Cunha, predecessor of Garcia de Noronha, sent Gonçalo Vaz Coutinho, to Honavar where a ship belonging to Suleiman, king of Sofala, an enemy of the Portuguese, was suspected to be aiding the Queen of Gersoppa who was not constant with regard to the terms of peace which she had agreed to with the Portuguese. The Queen told Coutinho, when he arrived at Honavar, that Suleiman's ship was in her port against her wish; that she could not drive it away; and that she would be glad if the Portuguese captured it. Coutinho then attacked it and in the long drawn fight lost 15 of the 80 men he had brought. One of the dead was his own son, Diogo. The enemy ship slipped away. The Queen was suspected to have aided the enemy of the Portuguese and Coutinho angrily refused to accept certain presents

that were sent by her for the wounded. She, however, justified herself and offered the terms of peace anew which were accepted and sworn. She agreed to allow some of the Portuguese to come and observe how she laboured to expel the  
28  
Turks from her port.

Thirty one years later, Luiz de Ataide, who was the Viceroy then (1568-71), intended to wage a war against the Zamorin of Calicut. Since the latter procured the necessary provisions from Kanara, Luiz determined to deprive him of these provisions by closing the ports of Kanara to his ships. He thought that he could achieve his objective by building several fortresses on the coast of Kanara. Already there was one in Mangalore. He decided to have two more - one  
29  
in Honavar and another in Basrur.

Besides, the Viceroy desired to punish the chiefs of Gersoppa and Barkur, under whose respective jurisdictions were Honavar and Basrur, as they were not paying the due tributes for five or six years prior to his assumption of office. The Portuguese believed that the Malabarese instigated these chiefs to disobey them and not to pay them the tributes. Already, in 1568, Antonio de Noronha, predecessor of Luiz, had gone to Honavar to secure the tributes; but the chief had 'arrogantly' refused to pay. Noronha wanted to chastise the chief for his contumacy. The occasion, however, was improper, for the rainy season was about to begin and, besides, he did not have sufficient forces with him then. He did not forget to tell his successor, Luiz, of the need to punish the chief  
30  
for his arrogant behaviour.

In the beginning of December, 1569 Luis de Ataide set sail from Goa with a large fleet consisting of 113 ships and 3,000 soldiers and reached the Honavar river within a few days. He went up the river towards the fortress built by the Gersoppa chief. The fortress was on the north bank of the river, built on the summit of a hill and surrounded by walls. The Viceroy landed his men who assaulted the fortress. The defenders hurled stones on the attackers, but they could not prevent the latter from forcing their way into the fortress. On entering

the ~~max~~ Portuguese found very little resistance. Some imagined that the Viceroy had an understanding with the captain, Lavarna, who escaped with goods without much of a fight. The Viceroy got the fortress consecrated and named it Santa Catharina. He appointed Jorge de Moura its captain, giving him 200 soldiers and providing him with ammunitions, provisions and funds.

31

According to Antonio Pinto Pereyra it was on 12 November, 1569 that the Viceroy set out from Goa with a fleet of more than 130 sails, 70 of which were war ships, the rest being merchant and other vessels. There were more than 2,500 Portuguese soldiers in the fleet. On reaching Honavar 2,100 to 2,200 men were landed. The fortress of Honavar appeared to be impregnable. It was hard indeed to reach it owing to the height of the hill on which it was located. It was well defended with 400 to 500 soldiers and was well supplied with provisions. Some bullets were poured by the defenders in order to disorganise the attackers as the latter were climbing, but all was in vain. The city, which was rich and had beautiful edifices, but which was now deserted, was sacked and then reduced to ashes. The Portuguese encamped near the fortress and bombarded it incessantly for four days until 24 November. At last the garrison surrendered, losing all hope of being relieved, for the reinforcement that was sent by the Queen would not dare to attack the Portuguese. The garrison, led by Kantappa Naik, was allowed to go out without arms. There was very little to plunder inside the fortress, except 13 pieces of artillery and some other war materials. In the battle the Portuguese lost 20 men. On the day of Santa Catharina, 25 November, 1569, a mass was held in the fortress. Jorge de Moura was appointed captain of the fortress, with a garrison of 400 soldiers, half of whom were Portuguese and the other half, Christians of Goa.

32

The ~~Queen~~ Queen of Gersoppa to whom Honavar belonged was asked to pay the arrears of tributes and bind herself to pay the annual tribute regularly thereafter. She was also asked to give pepper every year, sufficient for a ship, at

the rate of 22 1/2 pardaos (Rs. 90) a khandi. A war compensation of 20,000 cruzados (Rs. 100,000) was also demanded of her forthwith. The Queen hesitated. The Viceroy did not wait until she gave him a definite reply. He proceeded to Basrur in order to take that place also. Ultimately, the Queen refused to accept the conditions.

In the beginning of 1570 the Viceroy had to send urgently a strong fleet to Honavar, for he was informed that the Queen of Gersoppa was planning to attack the Portuguese fortress of Honavar. The Queen ~~had~~ plotted to administer to the Portuguese soldiers in the Honavar fortress the fruit of a plant known as ~~Duturo~~ Duturo, mixing it with their food. The fruit was known to have the power of causing loss of memory to the one who ate it; and one would not know what one was eating and would not sense any pain even if wounded. However, the Queen did not succeed ~~in~~ in her plot. The people who ~~were~~ were to execute her scheme were discovered and hanged. And soon the Portuguese fleet sent by the Viceroy reached Honavar. There were four ships under four captains each with able soldiers.

The Queen had been instigated by the Adil Shah of Bijapur to open war against the Portuguese in Honavar. However, inspite of the great pressure on his limited resources by the combined forces of the Adil Shah, the Nizam Shah and the Zamorin, the Viceroy sent effective relief to Honavar to the great astonishment of the enemy who thought that the Viceroy did not possess enough forces even to defend Goa. Thus, Honavar was saved for the Portuguese for the time being.

The Adil Shah, however, did not give up his effort of setting the Queen against the Portuguese. By July, 1571 he again prevailed upon her to attack the Honavar fortress. He sent her a contingent of 2,000 men, to which she added 3,000 of her own, and with these combined forces she besieged the fortress. The Viceroy received this news in the middle of July and speedily despatched a fleet of ten ships which reached Honavar and gained in a trice a thumping victory against the Queen. She lost many of her forces and fled, leaving behind all her cannons which fell into the Portuguese hands.

The author of the 'Livro das Cidades e Fortalezas' mentions that the Honavar fortress was within the jurisdiction of the Queen of Gersoppa. It was located on the bank of the river of Honavar, a gun-shot from its mouth. The fortress was erected on a hill which was encircled on the sea side by steep rocks, thus making the fortress inaccessible from that side; on the land side, wherever necessary, walls of stone and lime were built, with a bulwark surrounded by a moat overlooking the city of Honavar which was about a gun-shot from the fort.<sup>37</sup>

Bocarro writes that the fortress was a quarter league away from the bar. The circumference of the fortress was 880 metres. In 1635 there lived inside the fortress some cazados and other Portuguese men, who numbered 30 in all. There were 11 bulwarks, which were circular in shape, to protect the habitation of the Portuguese. Some of the bulwarks were roofed.<sup>38</sup>

#### BASRUR

Basrur was known to the Portuguese from the days of Albuquerque. They had peaceful commercial contacts with that region. ~~XXXXXX~~ However, in December, 1569 it was attacked in accordance with the decision of the Viceroy, Luiz de Ataide, to have a fortress there. He entered with his fleet the river on the south bank of which Basrur was situated. He himself led the vanguard sitting in a brocaded chair in his ship. Near him was a musician playing notes on a harp. He grandiloquently addressed his men: "Enter, O Greeks in Troy, three by three and four by four." As the fleet approached the fortress some shots began to fly hissing about the ships. The musician became uneasy, but the Viceroy was undisturbed. He told him to go ahead and bother not. Some nobles and captains approached the Viceroy and urged him not to risk his life proceeding ahead under the bombardment from the enemy; but he was unmoved. However, one of the noblemen, Luiz de Mello da Silva, who was near the Viceroy, said: "Let him go, gentlemen; if he is killed I shall govern India; and if I am also killed you gentlemen shall

39

govern." The Viceroy was pleased with Luiz de Mello's words.

The fortress of Basrur was erected on the summit of a hill about a quarter league inside from the coast, on the south bank of the river. It was surrounded by walls and bulwarks and was equipped with some pieces of artillery. It was maintained by the merchants or Shetties of Basrur. The city was governed like  
40  
a republic. It paid tribute to the Emperor of Vijayanagara.

Arriving at the fortress the Viceroy landed his men. Luiz de Mello was given the command of the vanguard. He marched towards the fortress bravely under the enemy fire and reaching there cleared it of the enemies who fled for life from another side. He sent the message of his victory to the Viceroy who soon joined him. Antonio Botelho, the Viceroy's cousin, was appointed captain of the fortress with 41 300 soldiers. The Viceroy ordered to strengthen the fortress with the help of the workmen and materials that he had brought with him for  
42  
the purpose.

Antonio Pinto Pereyra informs us that Luiz de Ataide had sent Francisco Mascarenhas to Basrur in advance in order to secure the place by a negotiated settlement. But the government of Basrur was not prepared to allow the Portuguese to have a fortress there. There seems to have been prompt exchange of communications between the government of Basrur, on the one hand, and the chiefs of Tolar and Gangolly, on the other. These three had an agreement to aid each other against each other's enemies. The Queen of Gersoppa, whose influence was predominant among these, also consented to provide 3,000 soldiers to defend  
42  
Basrur against the Portuguese.

Faria e Sousa says that the Viceroy, before proceeding there himself, sent to Basrur one of his captains, Pedro da Silva e Menezes, with a fleet of thirteen sails. The reason for the decision to take Basrur was the Tolar chief's disobedience. Probably Faria e Sousa thought that Basrur was within the jurisdiction of the Tolar ruler. The ■■ Viceroy secretly won over the captain of the fortress of Basrur who agreed to surrender it to the Portuguese. Thus, when

Pedro da Silva reached there the fortress was handed over to him as promised. It was a night and the Portuguese, entering the habitation, killed and captured more than 200 residents. However, the chiefs of Tolar and Gangolly speedily collected 1,500 men that night and began to attack the Portuguese. On the following day they gathered 5,000 more. They fought the foreigners bravely, but lost many soldiers. The Portuguese lost five. Pedro da Silva and his captains came to the conclusion that the fortress could not be sustained. They, therefore, abandoned it, but not without causing heavy damage to the fortress and taking 20 cannons, a lot of ammunitions and various other arms.

43

The Viceroy, after capturing the fortress of Honavar, proceeded to Basrur. Its fortress was now being guarded by 11,000 men. He succeeded, after a hard fight in which he lost nine of his men but killed 200 of the enemy, in capturing a stronghold from where he could block the entrance of the fortress. This despirited the defenders so much that they gave up fighting and allowed the Portuguese to enter. However, the chiefs of Tolar and Gangolly collected an army of 6,000 and attacked the Portuguese who were in possession of the fortress now. It was a dark night and the Portuguese captain of the fortress, Pedro Lopes Rebelo, fought back vigorously with his 200 soldiers. The chiefs lost 300 men and the Portuguese, five. At last, losing all hope of success, the

44

chiefs sought peace which was granted. A treaty of peace was signed with the following terms and conditions: (i) The Portuguese could erect a fortress in a site of their choice in Basrur; (ii) The latter would pay a certain quantity of rice tribute every year, probably 500 bags, for the sustenance of the fort; (iii) All the pepper of the land should be supplied to the Portuguese at a 'common' price; and (iv) The signatories should be friends of friends and enemies of enemies.

45

The Viceroy issued an interesting but long ordinance, dated 30 March, 1570, in which there is a reference to the construction of a new fortress by the Portuguese at Basrur. Probably the old fortress which the Portuguese had

just conquered was not strong enough and was open to easy attack. The new  
fortress was at a more secure spot. The Viceroy spent about 40 days in super-  
vising its construction. Father Heras locates the ruins of this new fortress  
in the centre of the modern town of Kundapur.

The captain of the fortress and other officials were instructed to treat  
the people well and commit no offence against them. The Viceroy pointed out  
that it was the surest way of maintaining peace there and carrying on gainful  
trade in the port, from which he expected a considerable income not only to  
maintain the fortress but also to supplement remittances to Portugal.

Writing about the Basrur fortress the author of the 'Livro das Cidades  
~~ex~~<sup>ex</sup> e Fortalezas' indicates that it was 16 leagues south of Honavar.  
It was at the entrance of the river on its south bank. It was built on the  
top of a hill about a gun-shot from the mouth of the river and another shot  
from the city. Basrur bordered the principality of Tolar and that of Gangolly.  
There was a treaty of ~~xix~~ friendship between the people of Basrur, on the one  
hand, and the chiefs of Tolar and Gangolly, on the other, all of whom declared  
themselves to be friends of friends and enemies of enemies. The Portuguese  
got annual tribute of rice from the people of Basrur, with which they sustained  
the fortress.

Bocarro also avers that the Portuguese fortress of Basrur was on the bank  
of the river, built on a hill and half a league from the bar. As one entered  
the river one found the fortress located on the right hand side. It was a  
structure, almost square in shape. Its walls measured 6.6 metres high and 5  
palms thick. There were four circular bulwarks at the ~~xxx~~ corners. It had no  
moat. The circumference of the fortress was 220 metres. Inside, <sup>51</sup> hardly the  
wall, was located the captain's residence.

In 1635 there lived 35 cazados outside the fortress at a distance of a  
gun-shot. Each cazado had a slave (escravo) who accompanied him, carrying the

master's arms. The habitaion of the cazados was surrounded by a mud-wall, 3.3 metres high, with watch towers in the form of bulwarks. The cazados possessed some rice fields and palm-trees outside the habitation. When there was peace they enjoyed the products of their possessions, including about 96 loads of black rice.

Ahead of this fortress of Basrur, a little less than a league, by the side of the river, there was a habitation of the Hindus, whom they called Shetties of Upper Basrur, who paid the Portuguese a customary tribute of 500 loads of rice for allowing the Shetties to carry on their commerce and transport their goods by the fortress.

Subsequent to the fortification of Basrur by the Portuguese foreign merchants stopped trading with its port owing to the cupidity of the Portuguese captains who summoned to the fortress those merchants who entered the river and compelled them to sell their goods at a very low price. Many a time the merchants fought the Portuguese in order to free themselves from this kind of oppression at Basrur. In 1583 Francisco de Mello de Sampayo was the captain of the fortress and he, like his predecessors, worked to enrich himself so much that the native merchants of Basrur, who stood to lose their trade and income by his proceedings, decided to take the fortress by treachery. They negotiated with some Christians, who were in the service of the fortress and who were known to be ~~ready~~ ready to enter into a plot, promising them grand rewards if a way to take the fortress was suggested. Finally, the door keeper of the fortress was won over by the plotters. He told them that the days of Endoença were approaching; that on those days the Portuguese would be occupied in penitential sacrifices; that on the night of Friday there would be a grand procession from the fortress to the ~~habitaion~~ habitation of the Christians; that on that night the plotters could send some of their soldiers to the fortress the door of which would be opened to them by the door keeper from within; and that the remaining soldiers of the plotters could suddenly attack the procession and kill all.

Fortunately for the Portuguese the plotters were disappointed on the day fixed. Gileanes Mascarenhas, a captain, arrived at Basrur with a strong fleet on the very Friday on which the fortress was to be attacked. He remained there the whole day and night and left for Goa only on the following day. The plotters <sup>54</sup>  
~~dared~~ not attack the fortress as long as the fleet was present.

Though the merchants of Basrur lost a golden opportunity they began to plot again as soon as Gileanes sailed away. They approached the very Christians, who had co-operated earlier, and prepared a plan. The men who were in charge of the key of the fortress were bribed and won over. It was agreed that in the night about 50 men should scale the wall by ~~xxxxxxxx~~ ladders to be thrown from the fortress and set fire to the artillery inside. 3,000 men of arms were to be ready to assault. At a suitable time the men who had the key were to open the doors from within. If, however, it were impossible to open the doors, all the soldiers of the plotters were to use the ladder and scale the walls. Once again the merchants were chagrined. As God would have it, the captain of the fortress suspected some treachery on the eve of the Easter when he saw the familiarity with which some of his men, namely, those who were in league with the plotters, moved among the natives. He arrested the suspects and put them to torture whereupon they confessed everything. Afterwards they were hanged publicly. The captain wrote to the Viceroy informing him of the situation and requested for reinforcements. He began in the meantime to be more careful, particularly about the keys of the fortress. The merchants, having thus failed twice in driving away the Portuguese by treachery, decided to fight them openly. They secured aid from the chief of Tolar, their neighbour, and the two allies collected between them 5,000 men of arms. They intended to capture the cazados who were living outside the fortress. However, before they could carry out their intention the cazados were gathered inside the fortress. The Portuguese captain set the cannons ready for defence, informed the Viceroy again of the situation, collected as much provisions as possible and repaired the fortress wherever

necessary. The native soldiers set the habitation of the cazados on fire, though it was already deserted, and encamped near the fortress but outside the range of the enemy fire. From there they launched attacks on the fortress from time to time. The Portuguese found themselves in short supply of ammunitions. The captain requested thereupon the captain of the fortress of Honavar, which was the nearest Portuguese fortress to Basrur, to help him out. The Honavar captain quickly sent a large boat with gun powder, bullets and some soldiers. In the meantime, the Viceroy received the message from Basrur and he also sent relief under the command of André Furtado de Mendonça who hastened to Basrur and reached there within two days from the date of his departure from Goa, i. e., on 15 April. The first thing that he did on reaching Basrur was to supply provisions to the besieged.<sup>siege</sup> The natives raised their siege on learning that substantial relief had arrived. André Furtado sent some ships up the river to launch continuous attacks upon the merchants of Basrur in all the villages along the banks. Finally, the native camp itself was attacked and subjected to much damage. On the following day André Furtado assaulted a temple, Pagode Condansur (the temple of Kodandeshwara ?), inside which some native soldiers were gathered. It was set on fire and those who were inside were burnt. The temple too was reduced to ashes, which caused much sorrow to the natives, as it was greatly venerated. Later on, no doubt, it was rebuilt by the natives at the cost of considerable money and time.

55

On 15 May two more ships arrived from Goa at the request of André Furtado. He then intensified his attacks on Basrur, destroyed and burnt its habitations. The whole of that rainy season was spent by him in these destructive activities. A nearby island, called the Great, in which the natives had erected palisades and had dug ditches, was attacked when the Portuguese came to know that articles of trade were stocked there. After a hard fight the island fell into the hands of the Portuguese who killed everyone alive with sword and fire. Later on Upper

Basrur was attacked twice; its habitations were burnt and palm-trees were cut down. Thus being subjected to continuous onslaughts and atrocities the merchants of Basrur finally sought peace; but André Furtado did not concede it, as he was not prepared to do so without orders from the Viceroy. In August he sailed out into the sea in search of a ship belonging to the merchants of Basrur. It was expected from Mecca. However, the ship seems to have been warned of the trouble at Basrur and was gone to Ormus.<sup>56</sup>

The three fortresses of Mangalore, Basrur and Honavar were considered by the Portuguese as very important. Says the author of the 'Livro das Cidades e Fortalezas': "These fortresses are of great importance and are very necessary for the conservation of those ports from which (being in the possession of the enemies) can ensue very grave damages and losses to the State of India, because in them are loaded every year many ships to the Strait of the Red Sea and many other parts; on account of this region of Kanara having great quantity of pepper, ginger, iron, coir, wood, saltpetre, and other articles, and above all, the grand abundance of foodgrains of all sorts, of which the whole of India is supplied, particularly Malabar, which suffers much scarcity of foodgrains, go out from there the greatest supply of them; and not only this but also explosives, artillery, gun powder, ammunitions, and all other things with which the war is sustained are supplied from here."<sup>57</sup>

"And, at these ports of Honavar, Basrur and Mangalore, the Malabarese had their chief sea-ports where they traded; and some were nests of thieves in which all the ships and pirates of Malabar had some shelter of certainty in which they deposited the plunders they made. From all of which resulted many and great damages to the State of India, very prejudicial to the Portuguese, the Malabarese being their first and major enemies with whom they always had, and have, continuous war from the beginning of the conquest. All these were stopped with these fortresses, which we have at these ports, with which not only were the Malabarese deprived of those shelters, but also were they im-

peded in the commerce of a province so fertile and so near and from where they derived so much profit; and the great commerce and trade, which was extant from them to Mecca, India and many other parts, was impeded".

GANGOLLY

In Gangolly, which the Portuguese called Cambolim, they built their last fortress in Kanara. Its construction was begun probably in early 1630 and was completed in 1633 during the Viceroyalty of Conde de Linhares. It was located in a peninsula formed by the sea and the river Gangolly, and was just opposite to their fortress of Basrur. It distanced a stone-throw from the river and less than a league from the river mouth. In front of the fortress the river was 13.2 metres deep, where all kinds of embarkations, including cargo ships, could sail in. The fortress was a square structure with four bulwarks at the four angles. Each wall of the fortress was 41.8 metres long, 10 palms wide at the base, 6 palms wide at the top, and 25 palms high. The bulwarks were triangular in shape, two of them being large and the other two, small. In 1635 or thereabout the fortress had an artillery consisting of five pieces of bronze of 8 to 12 pounds calibre, ten falcons and many cradles. The <sup>head</sup> ~~head~~ of the fortress was a captain who was also the captain-major of the garrison. He lived in one of the three bulwarks covered with tile, the fourth bulwark having no roof.

The first effect of the construction of this fortress was the control it secured to the Portuguese over the island of Gangolly. The island yielded 30,000 bags of rice with which the fortress could be sustained as also all other fortresses of Kanara. The fortress could receive relief by sea as well as by river any time of the year.

From the minutes of a meeting of the Council of State held in Goa on 22 November, 1629 it is evident that the Portuguese had a desire to possess the



peninsula of Gangolly since long. They intended to transfer the fortress of Basrur to the peninsula and convert the latter into an island by digging a canal between the sea and the river Gangolly. But Venkatappa Nayaka, the powerful ruler of Ikkeri, who was the master of the territories of Kanara, seems to have been in the way of the fulfilment of their desire. The opportunity to gain the place offered itself, however, when he died on 10 November, 1629. All those chiefs whom he had subjugated revolted against his grandson and successor, Virabhadra Nayaka. Under these circumstances the 'possessors and dwellors' of Gangolly, who were also in revolt, offered the peninsula to the Portuguese who were quick to avail this opportunity. They fished successfully in the troubled waters. Towards the end of November the Viceroy sent Diogo de Sousa de Menezes to take possession of the place. Diogo was authorised to negotiate with the Municipality of Upper Basrur to whom the peninsula of Gangolly belonged. He was instructed to secure a legal title for the possession of ~~the~~ the place. After constructing a fortress in Gangolly the establishment of the fortress of Basrur was to be transferred to the new fort.<sup>61</sup>

On 3 January, 1630 Diogo who was in Basrur wrote to the Viceroy that he personally went by night to measure the Gangolly pass which was 80 paces from the river to the sea; that a canal could easily be cut across this pass, the land being sandy; that with 500 workers the canal could be finalised in 8 days; that in order to do this work he would require additional soldiers whom he requested the Viceroy to send.<sup>62</sup> From these statements it is clear that the Portuguese were not yet in possession of the place. But in a letter dated 20 February, written to the king of Portugal, the Viceroy says that Diogo de Sousa "began to fortify with stockades and to open the bar to communicate the river with the sea, a task in which labour at present a thousand spade-men and for which I have ordered much stone and lime, miners, masons and carpenters, and the two engineers - Torral and Fries - with many big and small baskets, much gun powder and ammunitions, seventy or so sea-faring firemen and grumetes...."<sup>63</sup>

From this it can be concluded that the Portuguese took possession of the place by February, 1630 and soon began to fortify it.

The task of converting the peninsula of Gangolly into an island seems to have been beset with difficulties. On 4 November the Viceroy wrote in a letter to the king of Portugal that Diogo had completed digging the Canal but the sea waves deposited sand in it continuously and that Diogo had given up the work. He also changed the site of fortification to the one where finally the fortress, named São Miguel, was erected. The Viceroy remonstrated that the change was made without his orders. Diogo was recalled to Goa soon after, as he fell ill. Francisco de Moura, who was then sent to Gangolly, continued the work of fortification by building two bulwarks and one wall of the fortress and by erecting stockades. In the rainy season the Viceroy sent reinforcements to Gangolly, as the Ikkeri forces used to attack the new fortification. At the time of writing the letter the Viceroy was still ordering stone and lime, with the instruction that the work should not be stopped until the fortress was complete.<sup>64</sup> From this letter it is evident that the Portuguese were in effective possession of Gangolly but its fortification was not complete. Even by March of the following year the fortress does not seem to have been ready inspite of the Viceroy's order that the work should not be stopped before completion. In a treaty of peace entered into between the Portuguese and Virappa Nayaka of Ikkeri on 7 March, 1631 there is a clause which says that the Viceroy and his successors "can order" construction of fortresses in Gangolly.<sup>65</sup> The clause is in future tense and there is no reference to any existing fortress. This implies that the Portuguese completed the construction of their fortress only after this date. Probably they did finish it only in February, 1633, for a letter of the Viceroy dated 2 of the month says: "...the walls and bulwarks, in order to be completed, require a few courses of stones in one of them, which will be finished within this month of February".<sup>66</sup> Thus the Portuguese took more than three years to complete their fortress of Gangolly. The cause of this delay was Virabhadra Nayaka of Ikkeri, as we shall see in due course.

ADMINISTRATIVE AND DEFENCE ARRANGEMENTS  
IN THE FORTRESSES

As soon as a fortress was established the Viceroy (or the Governor) usually issued an ordinance making provisions for the appointment of various officials, their salaries, their functions and the procedure that they should adopt in discharging their functions. The ordinance took into account the defence needs, commercial activities and religion, and included provisions for them.

OFFICIALS:

(1) Captain: Each fortress was in charge of a captain. The choice seems to have been made by the king himself, at least in early days. For instance, Manuel Paçanha, the captain of the Anjediva fortress (1505-6), was sent by the king for the purpose along with the Viceroy.<sup>67</sup> Later on, however, the Viceroy seems to have been given the power to appoint captains. Thus, Antonio Lopes de Sequera, who was captain-cum-factor of Honavar in 1574, was appointed by the Viceroy.<sup>68</sup> Normally, a candidate for the post of captains was a noble who had rendered much service to the king of Portugal and who enjoyed his confidence. Generally the term of office was three years; but it could be extended.

(2) Factor: Every fortress contained a trading centre ~~or~~ factory. To look after it a factor was usually appointed. The Viceroy could fill this post. The factor's term of office was also three years and the candidate was generally one who had rendered valuable service to the king of Portugal. Thus, Bartholomeu Rodrigues de Sora was appointed factor of Basrur for a term of 3 years by the Viceroy in 1585, having regard to the 19 years of service that the former had rendered in India in taking the fortress of Basrur where he had received two wounds from lance-thrusts; in taking the fortress of Honavar; in the <sup>Battle</sup> ~~seige~~ of Chaul where also he was wounded; and in other battles waged by the Portuguese

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in India.

Some times the functions of the alcaide-major and of the inspector of the magazine and food supplies were also <sup>entrusted</sup> 70 intrusted to the factor. By an order of the king of Portugal, Dom Sebastião, who ruled from 1557- to 1578, the posts of captain, factor, inspector of treasury and alcaide-major, came to be combined in one person. This was no doubt an economy measure. Thus, in 1582 or thereabout the captains of Honavar and Mangalore were also factors and inspectors of treasury. The captain of Basrur was also factor, inspector of treasury and alcaide-major. In 1635 or thereabout the captain of Mangalore was factor also; but in Basrur there were two individuals occupying the posts of captain and factor separately. Thus, the captain, who was primarily a military official, looked after civil functions also.

(3) Writer: Every factory had a writer. He was appointed by the Viceroy for a term of three years. The writer was attached to the ~~magazine~~ magazine and food supplies as well. He had also the function of assigning lodging to guests or to those who had the right to such accommodation in the ~~fort~~ 73 fortress.

(4) Judge: One or two judges were appointed in every fortress to administer justice. Thus, there was a judge of the rank of ouvidor and another of the rank of meirinho in the fortress of Basrur in 1570. The ouvidor was perhaps the head of the judicial tribunal in the fortress. The meirinho was inferior in rank to ouvidor. The former was probably in charge of sentinels, summons and conducting of prisoners. The common practice was to appoint a ~~one~~ 74 meirinho only in a fortress. In Basrur the meirinho was assisted by a writer and four footmen in 1570. This writer was different from the writer attached to the factory. The armed peons or footmen were to move about with the meirinho and assist him in discharging his duties. In Honavar the meirinho 75 was also the alcaide of sea in 1582. The judicial officials were appointed by the Viceroy from among those poor soldiers who had rendered good service to the state.

(5) Surgeon: A surgeon was generally appointed in each fortress. Preferably he was to be a physician too. There were such surgeons in Basrur and  
78 Mangalore in early days. Probably surgeons could be appointed by a captain also.

(6) Interpreter: An interpreter, who knew Portuguese and the native tongue, was invariably appointed in each fortress. He served the captain as well as  
79 the factor. He was a man who enjoyed the confidence of the authorities. The captain and the factor dealt with the local authorities, chiefs, merchants and other natives in general, whenever necessary, through the interpreter.

(7) Chief of artillery (condestabre): Among the military officials there was a chief of artillery. He was much inferior in rank to the captain of the  
80 fortress, as their respective salaries would indicate. He commanded the firemen.

(8) Door Keeper: Every fortress had another military official in door keeper.  
81 He was a Portuguese national of much alertness. Perhaps he was in charge of the keys of the doors of the fortress.

(9) Superintendent of Sentinels (sobre-rolada): In Mangalore there was a  
82 special military post known as sobre-rolada or superintendent of sentinels.

(10) Chief of peons (Naik): A number of native peons were appointed in every fortress. They were under the command of a chief or naik who was also  
83 a native. In 1570 the naik in Basrur had 12 peons under him; In 1635 the naik  
84 of Mangalore had 40 peons; and that of Honavar, 33.

(11) Church Officials: A church was generally headed by a vicar under whom there were several other officials. Thus, in the Basrur fortress the church had a vicar, two beneficed clergymen (beneficiados), a choir boy, a treasurer and  
85 some ordinaries (ordenarias). The choir boy was normally a Portuguese. In the  
86 Mangalore fortress also there were churches with vicars at the head in 1635.

SALARIES:

The ordinances provided for the salaries of the various officials. The salary of an official did not remain constant. It varied according to the importance and income of the fortress. In addition to cash payment some officials were allowed residential quarters and provisions.

(1) Captain: The captain's salary was normally 400,000 reis a year (about Rs. 4,400). But the captains of Honavar had 100,000 reis (about Rs. 1,100) a year in 1574, 1582 and 1635, because the fortress did not have much income. The captain of Gangolly had 180,000 reis (about Rs. 2,000) in ~~1635~~<sup>87</sup> 1635. The captain of Mangalore had 400,000 reis (about Rs. 4,400) in 1568, but only 100,000 reis in 1574 and 1582.<sup>90</sup> However, it was raised again to 400,000 reis in 1635.<sup>91</sup> The captain of Basrur alone seems to have enjoyed unvarying salary of 400,000 reis a year. In addition to the salary the captain got residential quarters for himself and his family within the fortress.<sup>92</sup> He was allowed the services of 20 Portuguese servants (criados) who attended upon him.<sup>93</sup> It may be mentioned here that when the captain was factor also he did not get any additional salary for it.

(2) Factor: The factor's salary was invariably 100,000 reis a year. He was allowed two Portuguese servants.

(3) Writer: The writer of Mangalore had a salary of 40,000 reis (about Rs. 440) a year, and that of Basrur, 50,000 (about Rs. 550), and this was the salary of the writer of Honavar also.<sup>95</sup> A writer was allowed one servant.<sup>96</sup>

(4) Judge: The ouvidor of Basrur had an annual salary of 60,000 reis (about Rs. 660) in 1570.<sup>99</sup> The subordinate meirinho usually got 18,000 ries; but in Honavar he got only 12,000 reis (about Rs. 132) in 1574 and 1582.<sup>97</sup> The meirinho was generally assisted by some peons. Thus, in Basrur he had four peons to move with and help him in carrying out his functions.<sup>98</sup> Each of these

peons of Basrur got one pardao (Rs. 4) a month and provisions in 1570, and one  
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~~xerifim~~ xerafim (about Rs. 3) a month in 1635.  
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(5) Surgeon: The surgeon's salary varied according to his qualifications  
and nationality. In 1570 the surgeon-cum-physician of Mangalore got 720 reis  
(about Rs. 8) a month; but if he were a Portuguese he got in addition the salary  
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and provisions due to men of arms. In 1635 he got 720 reis a month and 12,000  
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reis a year if he were a Portuguese. The ~~xerifim~~ surgeon-cum-physician  
of Honavar got 30,000 reis (about Rs. 330) in 1574 and the surgeon-cum-bleeder  
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of the same place got 36,000 reis (about Rs. 400) in 1635. In Basrur, the  
108  
surgeon got 30,000 reis per annum in 1570 and 1635.

(6) Interpreter: usually got 14,400 reis (about Rs. 160) a year; but in  
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Honavar his salary was 12,000 reis a year in 1574.

(7) Chief of artillery: had varying salary. In Mangalore it was 24,000  
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reis (about Rs. 265) a year in 1568 and 1635. In Basrur it was 46,000 reis  
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(about Rs. 510) in 1570. In addition to the salary, the chief got provisions.

(8) Door Keeper: got invariably 600 reis (about Rs. 7) a month for provi-  
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sions. In addition to this he got the salary and provisions due to men of arms,  
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which was probably 12,000 reis a year as in Mangalore in 1635, and in all it  
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came to 19,200 reis (about Rs. 215) a year.

(9) Church Officials: The vicar's salary was 30,000 reis a year, plus  
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provisions, the total coming to 46,320 reis (about Rs. 515) a year. The bene-  
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ficiado got 20,000 reis (about Rs. 220) and provisions. The chairman got 400  
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reis (about Rs. 4) a month. The ordinaries had 20,000 reis a year for wine, oil,  
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meal, etc. The treasurer earned 6,000 reis (about Rs. 66) a year as salary,  
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plus 6,000 reis for provisions, plus salary and provisions due to men of arms.

(10) Other Officials: The Superintendent of Sentinels got 18,000 reis a  
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year in Mangalore in 1568 and 1635. The writer who assisted the meirinho got

12,000 reis a year, including his salary and provisions as a man of arms. The  
firemen had salary and provisions as agreed upon at the time of enrolment. A  
peon's salary was 3,600 reis (about Rs. 40) a year. The naik of peons got  
double the salary of a peon under him.

MODE OF PAYMENT:

The factor was to make quarterly payments to the above officials, includ-  
ing himself. The payments were to be entered in a ~~xg~~ register kept for the pur-  
pose. Only those who resided in the fortress and served therein were to be paid.  
Each one was to receive his salary personally and no one was allowed to receive  
for and on behalf of another. The payee and the writer were to sign each pay-  
ment. As the man in charge of the accommodation in the fortress the writer  
would know who was eligible for receiving payment and, therefore, he was held  
responsible for unauthorised payments and was made liable to pay the government  
double the amount that he paid out illegally. At the end of all quarterly  
payments the factor was to sign the register which was then sent to Goa for  
being scrutinised by the inspector of the royal treasury to see if it conform-  
ed to the Viceroy's ordinance.

MAINTENANCE OF ACCOUNTS, RECORDS and WAREHOUSES:

A book of receipts and despatches was maintained at the factory. It was  
to be certified, numbered and signed by a royal accountant; if it was not possi-  
ble for the accountant to do so for some reason, it was to be done by an  
official of the royal treasury or judicature. In the book all that was received  
by the factor from the royal treasury, or all that was entrusted to him by  
any other mode, was to be entered under the factor's receipt which was to be  
prepared by the writer of the factory and was to be signed by the factor. What  
was received, from which official, by ~~whom~~ whom delivered, and the day, the

month and the year of receipt, were to be declared in the receipt. After thus receiving, an account of it was to be given to the official concered; the account was to be signed by the writer and the official, and was to contain the number of the folio of the book wherein the receipt was written. There were to be different heads of entries in the book, i. e., one concerning all the money spent on royal expences and officials; another relating to articles of trade, foodgrains, ammunitions and goods that might be entrusted to the factor; a third head appertaining to artillery and other materials of the magazine; a fourth title for taxes if the king of Portugal had right for any in the fortress or the port or its lands, to show what was levied or what was received from the levies; a fifth head in respect of expences incurred at the factory; a sixth head was meant for showing receipts by purchase. The factor could purchase whatever was necessary to promote the interests of the king of Portugal and to provide the fortress. But he was to make purchases with the captain's approval, and actually purchase what was approved in the presence of the writer as an eye witness. A seventh and the last head was to pertain to the sales of all royal merchandise and other articles. The selling was to be executed in the presence of the writer who, with the knowledge of the captain, was to prepare a receipt for the money received against sales.

The expences in cash and kind, which the captain incurred from the receipts of the factory, were to be entered by the writer in the book under the appropriate title. The writer was authorised also to verify the expences by collecting information from the receiver of cash or goods. If any excess payment was made the illegal portion of it was not to be taken into account. The book of receipts and despatches was to be kept in a locked box and the factor was not permitted to make any entries in it without the presence of the writer,  
128 both of them having two separate keys to the box.

All the articles of trade, ammunitions, foodsupplies, or any other goods received by the factor from the royal stocks or by way of purchases for provid-

ing the fortress, were to be stored by him in the locked warehouses which were to be opened only in the presence of the writer who also had a key different from that of the factor. The latter was responsible for any damage that might befall the stored goods on account of his ~~negligence~~ negligence, particularly in the rainy season when roofs were likely to leak for want of timely repairs.

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CASH BOX:

A coffer with two separate lockers was to be maintained at the factory. All the money received by the factor from royal treasury was to be deposited in it. The factor and the writer were to have two separate keys for the coffer and thus neither could open it without the knowledge of the other. It was a good arrangement for minimising the incidents of misappropriation of funds.

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FINANCING THE FORTRESS:

Diogo Velho's financial statement of 1574 gives us a good account of the income and the expences of the fortresses of Honavar, Basrur and Mangalore. The unknown author of the 'Livro das Cidades e Fortalezas' also furnishes some useful information for the year 1582 or thereabout. Falcão supplies a statement of income and expences at the turn of the 16th century. Antonio Bocarro provides a similar statement for the year 1635 or thereabout.

In 1574 the fortress of Honavar had no income. The expences incurred therein came to 2,984,980 reis (about Rs. 32,835), the amount being supplied from Goa. The income of the fortress of Basrur was 2,100,000 reis (about Rs. 23,100) and its expences,, 3,132,200 reis (about Rs. 34,452), the deficit being 1,032,200 reis (about Rs. 11,352). The income was from the duties levied on horses of Ormus, which came there (5,000 cruzados or 1,800,000 reis : about Rs. 19,800), and upon the goods exported from the port (1,000 cruzados of silver or 300,000 reis : about Rs. 3,300). The fortress of Mangalore had a small

income of 600,000 reis (about Rs. 6,600); but its expences amounted to 3,383,800 reis (about Rs. 37,224), the deficit being 2,783,800 reis (about Rs. 30,624). The income included revenues from the land belonging to the temple in which the fortress was established. The main items on which expences were incurred in all these fortresses were the salaries of the officials, soldiers and others, and the maintenance of the fortress. The deficits were made good by the government at Goa.

The author of the 'Livro das Cidades e Fortalezas', writing in 1582 or thereabout, makes no reference to any income at Honavar. But at Basrur the Portuguese got tributes in rice with which the fortress there was maintained. Besides this they got supplies of pepper at a reasonable price. At Mangalore they had some income from iron from the land belonging to the temple.

At the opening of the 17th century Mangalore had an income of 930,000 reis (about Rs. 10,230), but its expences came to 1,155,300 reis (about Rs. 12,705) a year. Honavar and Basrur, however, had no income but expences only. The former spent 990,000 reis (about Rs. 10,890) and the latter, 1,386,680 reis (about Rs. 15,257) a year.

In 1635, according to one account, Mangalore had an income of 999,904 reis (about Rs. 11,000) and an expenditure of 238,360 reis (about Rs. 2,618). Thus, there was a credit balance of 761,544 reis (about Rs. 8,382). According to another account, in the same year or thereabout, the fortress of Mangalore earned 750,000 to 900,000 reis (about Rs. 8,250 to Rs. 9900) and spent 620,720 reis (about Rs. 6,831), leaving a credit balance of 129,280 to (about Rs. 1,419 to Rs. 3,069). 279,280 reis only. Both accounts show no income at Honavar, Basrur and Gangolli. They were only sources of expences. According to the former account the expences of these fortresses were 421,980 reis (about Rs. 4,642), 376,900 reis (about Rs. 4,147) and 375,200 reis (about Rs. 4,125), respectively. The other account indicates the corresponding expences as 907,280 reis (about Rs. 9,977), 1,028, 500 reis (about Rs. 11,319) and 2,185,200 reis (about Rs.

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24,035). These expences were met with funds or merchandise sent from Goa.

ADVISORY COUNCIL:

If the captain needed anything which was not provided for in the ordinance he had to write to the Viceroy. However, a lot of time was involved in exchanging communications between a fortress on the Kanara coast and the Viceroy at Goa owing to the distance between the two places. If, therefore, the captain had reason to believe that it was dangerous to await a reply from Goa he was to go ahead doing what was necessary. But before acting he had to consult the factor and the writer of his fortress. A minute of the consultation was to be kept. The reason for not waiting for the Viceroy's instructions 138 was also to be recorded. The factor and the writer, thus, formed the advisory council of the captain. This was, in a way, on the model of the Council of State that existed in Goa to advise the Viceroy.

Foot-notes:

1. História, II, p. 228.
2. Lendas, I, pt. 2, p. 561.
3. D-JB, I, p. 337.
4. Supra, p. 19.
5. Barros, however, writes that lime could not be procured by the Portuguese. The stone walls of the fort, therefore, were erected with the help of clay (D-JB, I, p. 338).
6. Lendas, I, pt. 2, p. 562.
7. Ibid., pp. 562-3. According to Barros the commandant of the ship was João Serrão. (D-JB, I, p. 338). Faria e Sousa notes that the captain was given 80 men for the defence of the fort. (Asia Portuguesa, I, p. 190).

8. D-JB, I, p. 338.
9. História, II, p. 282.
10. Assentos, IV, pp. 388-90.
11. Aragão, A. C. Teixeira de : Descrição geral e histórica das moedas, III, p. 261.
12. Commentarios, IV, p. 79; Cartas, I, p. 242.
13. História, VI, p. 291.
14. Ibid., VIII, pp. 211-2.
15. Ibid., pp. 213-4. Barros agrees with Castanheda in many of these details, but writes that the Shetty threw up bulwarks at the mouth of the river and placed artillery on it to cause damage to the enemy fleet entering the river; and that in the battle more than one thousand of the Shetty's men were killed and thirteen of the Portuguese too. (D-JB, IV, pp. 192-4).  
Correa also gives similar details. He agrees with Barros that thirteen of the Portuguese soldiers were killed. (Lendas, III, pt. 1, pp. 250-3).
16. História, IX, p. 532.
17. Sousa, Manuel de Faria e : Asia Portuguesa, III, p. 267.
18. D-DC, VII, pt. II, pp. 61-3.
19. Ibid., VIII, p. 127.
20. CEO, II, pp. 229-30.
21. D-DC, VIII, pp. 128-30. Bocarro, in his LPFCP, mentions that the fortress was founded in 1569 by Luis de Ataide. This seems to be wrong in view of the ordinance issued by Dom Antão de Noronha who was the Viceroy upto September, 1568 only. (Regimentos, pp. 494-8). Besides, Bocarro was writing about 65 years after the event. (LPFCP, in APO-BP, Tomo IV, Vol. II, pt. I, p. 318).
22. Regimentos, pp. 496, 498.
23. LCF, fl. 42.
24. LPFCP, in APO-BP, op. cit., p. 318.
25. Ibid., p. 320.



26. Sousa, Manuel de Faria e : op. cit., IV, p. 124; Danvers, F. C. : The Portuguese in India, I, pp. 569-70; Moraes, G. M. : Mangalore, pp. 12-3.
27. História, IX, p. 532.
28. Sousa, Manuel de Faria e : op. cit., III, pp. 19-20.
29. D-DC, VIII, p. 272.
30. Pereyra, A. P. : Historia da India no tempo em que a governou o Visorey Dom Luis de A'taide, p. 51.
31. D-DC, VIII, pp. 273-8. According to Bocarro the Honavar fortress was established in 1568. (LPFCP, in APO-BP, op. cit., p. 307).
32. Pereyra, A. P. : op. cit., pp. 55-61. Also see Sousa, Manuel de Faria e : op. cit., IV, pp. 60-2 and Danvers, F. C. : op. cit., I, pp. 546-7.
33. Pereyra, A. P. : op. cit., pp. 63, 65.
34. Ibid., pp. 150-1; Sousa, Manuel de Faria e : op. cit., IV, pp. 66-7.
35. Ibid., p. 151; Ibid., p. 82; Danvers, F. C. : op. cit., I, p. 556.
36. Sousa, Manuel de Faria e : op. cit., IV, pp. 92-3; Danvers, F. C. : op. cit. I, pp. 559-60.
37. LCF, fl. 41.
38. LPFCP, in APO-BP, op. cit., p. 307.
39. D-DC, VIII, pp. 278-9.
40. Ibid., p. 279.
41. Ibid., pp. 279-80.
42. Pereyra, A. P. : op. cit., p. 66.
43. Sousa, Manuel de Faria e : op. cit., IV, pp. 56-7.
44. Ibid., pp. 62-3.
45. Pereyra, A. P. : op. cit., p. 73.
46. Regimentos, pp. 427-8.
47. Pereyra, A. P. : op. cit., p. 75.
48. Heras, Henry : The Portuguese Fortress of Barcelore, p. 3.
49. Regimentos, pp. 428-9.
50. LCF, fls. 41-2.

51. LPFCP, in APO-BP, op. cit., p. 313.
52. Ibid., p. 315.
53. Ibid., p. 316.
54. D-DC, X, pt. I, pp. 381-3.
55. Ibid., pp. 385-9.
56. Ibid., pp. 390, 417-9.
57. LCF, fls. 40-1.
58. LPFCP, in APO-BP, op. cit., pp. 311-2.
59. Ibid., p. 312.
60. Assentos, I, p. 249.
61. Ibid., pp. 249, 257-8.
62. Ibid., p. 257.
63. Ibid., p. 248.
64. Ibid., pp. 513-4.
65. Ibid., p. 537.
66. Ibid., pp. 561-2.
67. Lendas, I, pt. 2, p. 562; D-JB, I, p. 338.
68. Orçamento, p. 95.
69. APO-CR, vol. 5, pt. 3, p. 1103.
70. Regimentos, p. 432.
71. LCF, fls. 41, 42.
72. LPFCP, in APO-BP, op. cit., pp. 313, 314, 319.
73. Regimentos, p. 432.
74. Ibid.
75. Ibid., pp. 432, 433.
76. LCF, fl. 41.
77. Ibid., fls. 41, 42.
78. Regimentos, pp. 433, 495.
79. Ibid., pp. 433, 496.
80. Ibid., 432, 496.

81. Ibid., pp. 433, 496.
82. Ibid., p. 495.
83. Ibid., p. 433.
84. LPFCP, in APO-Bp, op. cit., pp. 320, 308.
85. Regimentos, pp. 433-4; LPFCP, in APO-BP, op. cit., p. 315.
86. LPFCP, in APO-BP, op. cit., pp. 320, 308-9.
87. Orçamento, p. 95; LCF, fl. 41; LPFCP, in APO-BP, op. cit., pp. 307-8. At present 600 reis make a rupee.
88. LPFCP, in APO-BP, op. cit., p. 312.
89. LCF, fl. 42.
90. Ibid.; Orçamento, p. 103.
91. LPFCP in APO-BP, op. cit., p. 319.
92. Ibid., pp. 312, 318.
93. Regimentos, pp. 434, 496; Orçamento, pp. 95, 99, 104.
94. Ibid., pp. 432; Ibid., p. 100; LPFCP in APO-BP, op. cit., p. 314.
95. Ibid., p. 494.
96. Ibid., p. 432.
97. Orçamento, p. 95; LCF, fl. 41; LPFCP in APO-Bp, op. cit., p. 308.
98. Regimentos, p. 434.
99. Ibid., p. 432.
100. Ibid., pp. 432; 494; LCF, fl. 42.
101. Orçamento, p. 96; LCF, fl. 41.
- ~~102.~~ Regimentos, p. 433.
103. Ibid.
104. LPFCP in APO-BP, op. cit., p. 314.
105. Regimentos, pp. 495-6.
106. LPFCP in APO-BP, op. cit., p. 319.
107. Ibid., p. 319; Orçamento, p. 96.
108. Ibid., p. 315; Regimentos, p. 432.

109. Orçamento, p. 95.
110. Regimentos, p. 496.
111. LFFCP in APO-BP, op. cit., p. 319.
112. Regimentos, p. 432.
113. Ibid., pp. 433, 496.
114. LFFCP in APO-BP, op. cit., p. 319.
115. Orçamento, p. 96.
116. LFFCP in APO-BP, op. cit., pp. 308-9.
117. Ibid., p. 315; Regimentos, pp. 433-4.
118. Ibid., p. 315; Ibid., p. 434.
119. Ibid.; Ibid.
120. Ibid.; Ibid.
121. Ibid., p. 319; Ibid., p. 495.  
        <sup>432,</sup>
122. Ibid., pp. <sup>432,</sup> 495.
123. Regimentos, pp. 432-3, 496.
124. LFFCP in APO-BP, ~~upto~~ op. cit., pp. 308, 314; Regimentos, p. 433.
125. Ibid.; Ibid.
126. Regimentos, pp. 434-5, 497-8.
127. Ibid., pp. 429-3.
128. Ibid., pp. 430-1.
129. Ibid., p. 431.
130. Ibid., p. 431.
131. Orçamento, pp. 98, 99, 102, 103, 106.
132. LCF, fls. 41-2.
133. Falcão : Livro de Toda a Fazenda, quoted in Subsídios para a História Militar Marítima da India, (vol. I, pp. 638, 640) by Botelho de Sousa. Falcão does not indicate the precise year to which these figures belong, but Botelho de Sousa suggests, taking into consideration the context of ~~Kakazan~~ Falcão's writings, that the figures might pertain to any one year between 1598 and 1607

134. APO-BP, op. cit., p. V.
135. LPFCP in APO-BP, op. cit., p. 320.
136. APO-BP, op. cit., p. V.
137. LPFCP in APO-BP, op. cit., pp. 309, 312, 315.
138. Regimientos, p. 440.

## Chapter 6

### THE PORTUGUESE AND THE NAYAKAS OF IKKERI - I (1499-1629)

The Portuguese relations with the Keladi chiefs, better known as the Nayakas of Ikkeri, form an interesting chapter in the history of Kanara. The dynasty of these Nayakas was established in 1499. There were in all 18 members of this family who ruled for about 265 years, from 1499 to 1763.

The founder of this ruling house was Chauda Gauda of Keladi, a village in the district of Shimoga. He was a farmer who became rich and influential owing to a treasure that he discovered. Vira Narasimha, the then Emperor of Vijayanagara, bestowed upon him the title of Nayaka in 1499. He thus became Chaudappa Nayaka. Keladi and its neighbourhood were entrusted to his care. He ruled as a feudatory of the Vijayanagara Emperor for fourteen years from 1499 to 1513, though only one inscription of the year 1506 belonging to him has so far been discovered.

Chaudappa was succeeded by his son, Sadashiva Nayaka, who ruled for a long period upto 1565.<sup>3</sup> In 1554 or thereabout Sadashiva was appointed governor of Barkur and Mangalore. Aliya Rama Raja, the de facto ruler of Vijayanagara, conferred on him this award in appreciation of his military services to the Empire. By 1563 Araga, Gutti, Tuluva, Barkur and Mangalore were under Sadashiva.

Dodda Sankanna Nayaka, Sadashiva's elder son, was the next ruler.<sup>4</sup> Sankanna accompanied Vitthala, Aliya Rama Raja's cousin, in a campaign against the Portuguese. It is said that the Portuguese Governor of Goa was captured during the course of this campaign.<sup>5</sup> However, no confirmation of this statement can be found in Portuguese sources.

Chikka Sankanna Nayaka and Rama Raja Nayaka were the next two successive rulers.

During the reign of Venkatappa Nayaka, the sixth ruling member of the dynasty, the kingdom of Keladi was expanded considerably to include the territories from the river Mirjan in North Kanara to the river Chandragiri in Kasa-

ragod. Venkatappa seems to have rejected the suzerainty of the Vijayanagara Emperors; but only to become a tributary of the Adil Shah of Bijapur, as we shall see in due course. His expansion wars naturally attracted the attention of the Portuguese as their position on the Kanara coast was very much affected by his conquests.

7

In a letter to the Viceroy, dated 21 November, 1598, the king of Portugal instructed the former to watch carefully the doings of Venkatappa Nayaka and to countermine his designs. Wrote the king: "You say that the Queen of Bhatkal (who was also the Queen of Gersoppa) has not paid for many years the tribute which she owes, because a Nayaka (Venkatappa), who was a vassal of the king of Vijayanagara, but who is now in revolt, demonstrating his intention to subjugate the neighbouring kings, has placed her in a difficult situation; and this being a matter of great danger for the fortress of Honavar, you shall keep yourself informed of all his doings, countermining his designs." However, neither Francisco da Gama, the Viceroy to whom the letter was addressed, nor his successors could do anything to prevent Venkatappa from becoming the master of practically the whole of Kanara and other territories.

It seems that Venkatappa and Bhaira Devi, Queen of Gersoppa, were already at war by 1595. The Queen seems to have solicited help not only from the Portuguese but also from the Adil Shah, to both of whom she was paying tributes. Wrote the king of Portugal to the Viceroy on 28 January, 1596: "You also say that the Adil Shah sent some of his captains against the kings and lords of Kanara at the instance of the Queen of Bhatkal (also of Gersoppa) and that the captains would have taken two fortresses at the Ghat had not the revolt of the  
8  
Adil Shah's brother obliged (the former) to recall them." The Adil Shah's preoccupation with his own affairs gave a free hand to Venkatappa to carry on his expansion wars in North Kanara.

Pietro Della Valle gives an interesting account of what Venkatappa did

to Bhaira Devi and to her kingdom: "The last Queen of Garsopa fell in Love with a mean Man and a stranger, into whose power she resign'd herself, together with her whole kingdom. In which act, setting aside her choosing a Lover of base blood, upon which account she was blam'd and hated by the Indians (who are most rigorous observers of Nobility and maintainers of the dignity of their ancestors in all points) as to giving herself up as prey to her Lover, she committed no fault against her honour; for in these Countries 'tis lawful for such Queens to choose to themselves Lovers or Husbands, one or more, according as they please. But this Man who was so favor'd by the Queen of Garsopa, having thoughts as ignoble as his blood, instead of corresponding with gratitude to the Queen's courtesie, design'd to rebel against her and take the kingdom from her; which design for a while he executed, having in process of time gain'd the affection of most of her most eminent vassals. The Queen, seeing her self oppress'd by the Traytor, had recourse to the Portugals, offering them her whole State on condition they would free her from imminent ruine, But the Portugals, according as they had always in India done by their friends (whereby they have been many times the ruine of others and themselves too) did not succour her till it was too late and then very coldly. On the other side the Traytor (as his ill fate, or rather God's just anger, would have it) call'd to his assistance Venktapa against the Queen and the Portugals his Neighbour ~~Venkappa~~ Naieka, now Master of those Countries. Venktapa Naieka, ~~now~~ taking advantage of the occasion, enter'd suddenly into the kingdom of Garsopa with great diligence and force, so that, shortly becoming Master of the whole country and the City Royal, and having driven out the Portugals who came to defend it, he took the Queen Prisoner and carry'd her to his own Court; where being kept, although honourably, she ended her days in an honourable prison. But the Traytor under-went the punishment of his crime, for Venktapa Naieka caus'd him to be slain; and, for more secure keeping that State in his power, caus'd the City and Royal Palace of Garsopa to be destroy'd, so that at this day that lately flourishing City is become nothing but a Wood, Trees being already grown above the ruines of the

Houses, and the place scarcely inhabited by four Cottages of Peasants."<sup>9</sup>

This decisive war between Venkatappa and Bhaira Devi might have taken place early in 1606 or late in 1605, for a letter dated 16 January, 1607, written by the king of Portugal to the Viceroy, Martim Affonso de Castro, refers to the kingdom of Gersoppa as already in the possession of Venkatappa.<sup>10</sup> The Portuguese policy at this time was to dissemble with those who sought their assistance. Venkatappa himself asked for their help when he was attacked by the Adil Shah in 1606 or thereabout, soon after ~~the~~ the fall of Gersoppa; so also did the Adil Shah. The Portuguese, however, merely pretended to be responsive but concealed their real intention of not giving actual help to any. In the letter of 16 January, just referred to, the king of Portugal approved the Viceroy's policy of dissemblation saying that it did not suit the Portuguese interests to declare in favour of any of the belligerents.

Now that the kingdom of Gersoppa, which extended from Bhatkal to Mirjan, fell to Venkatappa, the Adil Shah became hostile to the Nayaka, particularly because Bhaira Devi was a vassal of the Adil Shah and was paying tributes to him. Venkatappa was not ready to continue to pay this tribute for the territories of Gersoppa, which was a definite loss to the Adil Shah. Besides, the borders of the kingdom of Venkatappa and the Adil Shah became coterminous now <sup>that of</sup> along the coast. The two, therefore, were drawn into a conflict which lasted until 1612 when Venkatappa was compelled to acknowledge the Adil Shah's overlordship and pay tribute, as we shall ~~see~~ see in due course. Though the Portuguese did not want to involve themselves in the conflict they desired Venkatappa's friendship, for pepper and foodgrains which they needed so much came from his territories.<sup>11</sup> Thus, from a letter of the king of Portugal we learn that the captain of Basrur, Luiz de Mendonça, met Venkatappa and offered him whatever assistance possible, pointing out "how convenient it would be for his (Venkatappa's) conservation" to be obedient to the king of Portugal. Venkatappa was urged to confirm his friendship towards the Portuguese by issuing a declaration, to be proclaimed all along the coast within his jurisdiction, to the effect that

the captains of his fortresses should neither allow provisions to pirates, nor admit pirate ships into his ports, and that even if the pirates happened to possess passports, they should be captured and put to death.

Though nothing concrete seems to have been agreed upon, Venkatappa demonstrated friendship towards the Portuguese. However, the latter found it difficult to carry on their pepper trade in Kanara with much profit, as Venkatappa began to demand for himself gratifications from the contractors whereby the price of pepper went up. He impeded embarkation of that commodity if his demands were not met with. Learning of this the king of Portugal commanded the Viceroy to consider how best he could remedy the situation without breaking peace with Venkatappa. If the Viceroy found it impossible to have a solution by himself and get pepper at the old rate, he was instructed to approach either the Emperor of Vijayanagara, whose vassal Venkatappa was still considered to be, to bring pressure on him, or the Adil Shah of Bijapur, who might be persuaded to wage a war against him. But in approaching the Adil Shah the Viceroy was to be careful so as not to be discovered in the act.  
<sup>12</sup>

Whether it was owing to the Portuguese instigation or otherwise, there actually seems to have been an encounter between the forces of the Adil Shah and Venkatappa Nayaka in 1608 and the Viceroy was instructed not to do anything that would bring about peace between the belligerents. But in 1611 or thereabout Venkatappa and the Adil Shah entered into a treaty of peace to the great chagrin of the Portuguese. The Viceroy was ordered to continue his efforts to bring the two to the battle field again.  
<sup>13</sup> It suited the Portuguese to keep the native powers at war with each other.  
<sup>14</sup>

Being free from anxiety from the north as a result of peace with the Adil Shah, Venkatappa planned to extend his territories in the south. Luckily for him an opportunity offered itself when the Bangar chief invoked his assistance against the 'king of mountain', probably the king of Cannanor, who was waging a war against the chief. Venkatappa eagerly extended his help, but in such a manner that the Bangar chief was made his feudatory. He also built a fortress

at Bolar, not very far from the Portuguese fortress of Mangalore. This happened  
15 probably in 1612. The Bangar chief then turned towards the Portuguese for help.

At this stage it is desirable to review the Portuguese relations with the Bangar chief and the relations of both of these with the Chautar chiefs of Ullala. The Portuguese established friendship with the Bangar chief as early as 1568, as already shown in the preceding chapter. They obtained from him not only the site where they built their fortress of Mangalore but also cultivable lands in  
16 the neighbourhood of the fortress. These fields seem to have extended in the north upto a rivulet at the distance of a musket-shot from the fortress and the  
17 rivulet was considered as the boundary of the Portuguese jurisdiction. The Bangar chief gave them certain trade privileges also, such as non-payment of  
18 tolls for articles carried by boats in the rivers within his jurisdiction. The annual  
temple, which was within their jurisdiction, seems to have had an income of  
19 5,000 pagodas (Rs. 20,000), which went to them. The Portuguese documents refer to the Bangar chief as always a loyal friend and brother-in-arms to the king of Portugal. Frequently the chief sought Portuguese assistance against his enemies and obtained it, though in varying degrees.

Before the Bangar chief's offer of the Mangalore site for the construction of the fortress the Portuguese had intended to build one within the territories of the kingdom of Ullala. It was a means of safeguarding their own interests against the Queen who was not only irregular in paying tributes to the Portuguese but also helped their enemies in Malabar. With these factors in mind the Viceroy, Antão de Noronha, had sailed thither with a strong fleet with 3,000 soldiers. At the mouth of the river Netravati, on its south bank, the Queen had erected a wall, ten or eleven spans wide, with some watch-towers in which she had placed a few small pieces of cannon. She had stationed 500 soldiers to guard the wall. All along the river as far as the city of Ullala she had deployed ten or eleven  
20 thousand soldiers for defence.

The attack was commenced on 4 January, 1568. Antonio Pereira, the Viceroy's brother-in-law, was entrusted with the task of attacking the city. He was given 500 soldiers. The rest were divided into six contingents. The landing was effected late that evening. The captains and their soldiers took up positions. However, there was no order or discipline among the Portuguese. In the night, which was very dark indeed, Francisco Mascarenhas, one of the commandants, and his soldiers took supper and indulged in revelry, lighting the tent with torches and candles. The enemy, observing this carelessness of the Portuguese, decided to fall upon them suddenly. Two thousand soldiers of Ullala gathered together. 1,500 of them remained at the stockades and 500 descended like an avalanche upon Mascarenha's camp which was a little more than 100 ~~steps~~ paces from the wall. The surprise was complete and the Portuguese did not have time even to arm themselves. More than 50 of those who were outside the tent were killed in a trice. However, recovering from the shock, the Portuguese fought back bravely, including Mascarenhas who received five wounds. There was much confusion and chaos. The soldiers commanded by other captains ran helter skelter in the darkness, being unable to distinguish between friend and foe. Mascarenhas lost most of the 600 men whom he commanded. The Viceroy quickly sent 70 men under a captain to relieve Mascarenhas. During the course of this disastrous fight a noble suggested to the Viceroy that all should retreat to the fleet, because everything was lost and the enemy was triumphant. The Viceroy was not taken in. Instead, he rallied his men and marched towards the centre of the battle field. On hearing the trumpets the enemy retreated. In order to prevent the foe from surprising for a second time the Viceroy caused ditches to be dug up, which were completed by 1 o'clock in the morning.  
<sup>21</sup>

At first the Viceroy decided to attack the city of Ullala on the very next day and made arrangements for it. But later on he decided to postpone the attack to the second day, which caused disappointment to those who were eager to avenge the previous night's insult and disaster. These enthusiastic captains

and soldiers, who numbered more than 200, commenced the assault without his orders. Finally, therefore, the Viceroy was compelled to involve the whole army in attacking Ullala on 5 January itself. The Portuguese entered the city and the bazaar, killing many of the 6,000 soldiers of the Queen who fought in defence, and putting the rest to flight. The palace was set on fire, as also some parts of the city. Many trees and palm-groves were cut down and destroyed. All this lasted only a little over half the day. However, as the Portuguese were returning to the ship, with the wounded, a fresh attack was ~~done~~ made upon them by the soldiers of Ullala; but no considerable damage befell the Portuguese except the death of one of their brave nobles. The battle of this day cost the Portuguese 35 or 36 lives, but the Queen lost more than 300 of her men.  
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After this successful attack the Viceroy examined the ground on the south bank at the entrance of the river with a view to construct a fortress there. But being dissatisfied, as <sup>we</sup> have seen in the previous chapter, he crossed over to the north bank to Mangalore, where finally the fortress was erected with the co-operation of the Bangar chief.

Soon after the Portuguese fortress of Mangalore was constructed the Bangar chief and the Queen of Ullala found themselves in hostility. A situation of war did not suit the Portuguese trade interests in the region. Therefore, the Viceroy, Luiz de Ataide, went personally to Mangalore in 1569 to establish peace between the two parties. Ataide found the belligerents ready to accept his mediation and his efforts were crowned with success. Father Heras suggests that the marriage, which was spoken of by Pietro Della Valle, between the Queen of Ullala and the Bangar chief, might have taken place after this incident in order to establish the friendship and peace on a firm basis. However, the Queen referred to in 1569 seems to have been a different person from the one whom Della Valle met in 1623. If both the Queens were one person, then Della Valle should have found an old woman of about 70 as the Queen of Ullala; but Bukka Devi Chautar  
23                   24  
25

whom he met was about 40. In fact, between the Queens of 1569 and 1623 the king-  
dom of Ullala seems to have been ruled by a king.<sup>26</sup> Besides, there were some more  
occasions after 1569 when the chiefs of Ullala and Bangar quarrelled, as we shall  
presently see.

Though the Queen of Ullala agreed in 1569 to be on friendly terms with the  
Bangar chief she remained secretly hostile towards the Portuguese. She sought  
for an opportunity to free herself from the tribute which the Portuguese had  
imposed upon her. That is why she took advantage of the troubles in which the  
Portuguese were placed in 1570-4, as a result of the confederacy organised against  
them by the Adil Shah. We have already seen how she instigated the Zamorin's  
admiral to attack the Portuguese fortress of Mangalore and with what success.<sup>27</sup>

By 1589 the Bangar chief and the ruler of Ullala, who was now a king, fell  
out again. The latter gained an upper hand. From a letter dated 12 January,  
1591, written by the king of Portugal to the Governor, we learn that the king  
of Ullala had deprived the Bangar chief of almost the whole of his kingdom. The  
Portuguese made some intrusions into the territories of Ullala, probably on be-  
half of the Bangar chief. The king of Ullala professed to be a friend and vassal  
of the Portuguese. However, he built a fortress, probably in the rainy season  
of 1589, not far from the Portuguese fortress of Mangalore, on the opposite bank  
of the river. The Portuguese could not block the construction owing to the rains.  
For its defence the king of Ullala employed 30,000 men. The Governor ordered  
the captain-major of the Malabar fleet to go personally to Mangalore and endeav-  
our to make peace between the ruler of Ullala and the Bangar chief. The new  
fortress was to be destroyed. If the king of Ullala did not come to terms the  
<sup>28</sup>  
captain-major was to wage a war on him.

An account of what the captain-major, Thome de Souza Coutinho, did to the  
king of Ullala is given in a document dated 22 August, 1591 and signed by the  
captain-major himself. He departed from Goa on 1 December, 1589, with three

galleys and thirty ships. Arriving at Mangalore he informed the king of Ullala that he had come there at the instance of the Governor in order to bring the belligerents to peace on the basis of just terms, particularly the restitution of territories captured from each other. He invited the king for a talk. After a delay of many days the king met the captain-major off the fortress of Ullala. He promised that he would destroy the fortress the following day and would enter into a just peace. However, he did not keep up the promise. Thereupon the major declared war against him on behalf of the Bangar chief. Many palm-trees in Ullala were cut down. A temple, much venerated and well defended, was captured and entrusted to the Bangar chief who compensated the Portuguese with 1,000 pagodas (Rs. 4,000) and a piece of cannon. The major then set sail along the coast and captured Bedrette and other places. All together more than a thousand palm-trees were cut down during the course of these attacks. Many people were put to death. Later on, he provided the fortress of Mangalore with  
29  
whatever it needed, including 90 soldiers.

However, the fortress of Ullala escaped destruction on this occasion. For in a letter of 15 February, 1593 the king of Portugal was still expressing his displeasure at the existence of the fortress, inspite of his orders of 1590 and  
30  
1591 to his Governor to get it destroyed. The Viceroy continued to endeavour to make friends the ruler of Ullala (now a Queen) and the Bangar chief; but he was instructed by the king of Portugal, by a letter dated 1 March, 1594, that no  
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peace should be concluded without a provision for the destruction of the fortress. In case the Queen were not to agree to such a term the Viceroy was instructed to  
32  
capture the fortress whenever an opportunity offered itself. However, it seems that the fortress was at last demolished by the Queen in 1594. This was probably because she was involved in a war against the 'king of mountain'. Yet the king of Portugal was informed that the destruction of the fortress was not effective, because the foundations were ~~intact~~ intact and that with a few days' labour and very little material it could be reconstructed. The Viceroy, therefore, was

ordered to secure complete destruction of the foundations also. After the destruction of the fortress there was peace not only between Ullala and the Portuguese but also between the former and the ~~Bangar~~ Bangar chief. But there was a severe conflict between the Queen of Ullala and the 'king of mountain'. The latter was at peace with the Portuguese. The Governor requested the Bangar chief to compose the differences between the belligerents; but not to help the king of mountain at any rate against the Queen.

When the Bangar chief asked for Portuguese assistance in 1612 against Venkatappa they were not ready to extend it. They hesitated because Venkatappa was a powerful chief, unlike the rulers of Ullala against whom they rarely hesitated in aiding the chief. In the territories of Venkatappa they had commercial interests; they had several fortresses there; food supplies required for their ~~Kanara~~ Kanara fortresses and for Goa, Ormus and Mascat came from his regions; above all those were the days when they had European rivals in India and elsewhere. Considering these they were not willing to help the chief openly; but they were ready to encourage and advise him and generally aid him in an indirect manner. Thus, they endeavoured to form a confederacy against Venkatappa. The Bangar chief, the 'king of mountain' and the Queen of Karnad were to be allied. The Portuguese themselves were to be out of it. The Viceroy sent Henrique de Noronha, captain-major of the Portuguese fleet of Malabar, to forge this alliance. Henrique, on reaching Mangalore, invited these three chiefs to the fortress of Mangalore where tried he to impress upon them the necessity of a united front against the common foe. He assured them whatever help the Portuguese could give. His effort was rewarded with success. The three chiefs declared themselves allied and swore to help each other. The captain-major received thanks from them for his labour.

This alliance was joined later on by three more chiefs, namely, of Ajilar, Condegare and Ullala. The Bangar chief, acting on behalf of the allies, wrote to the Viceroy seeking Portuguese aid in the form of a fleet to take the fortresses

of Mombalão (?) and the Bazaar of Ullala, which were apparently in the possession of Venkatappa. He also informed the Viceroy that the Queen of Ullala would pay an annual tribute of 3,000 loads of rice if she was allowed 30 Portuguese soldiers for her fortress at Torotale (?). The Portuguese were caught in a dilemma. ~~Now~~ On the one hand, Venkatappa was becoming more and more powerful and should the allies be defeated by him the Portuguese fortresses in Kanara would all the more be in danger; and the Bangar chief, leader of the allies, and the chief of Karnad were always loyal, paying the Portuguese regularly the tribute they owed; and it would be a discredit to the Portuguese not to help them in their need. On the other hand, the territories of Venkatappa provided the Portuguese 2,850 quintals of pepper which might not be available to them if he was antagonised by their help to his enemies; besides, he would attack their fortresses at Honavar, Basrur and Mangalore. The whole matter was considered by the Viceroy-in-Council and it was finally decided that the allies should be helped, but in such a way that there was no risk with regard to pro-curation of pepper in Venkatappa's territories; that pepper should be gathered on the arrival of the fleet from Portugal; that the allies should be entreated and encouraged, help being offered when time permitted; that it was undesirable, as long as there was professed friendship between the Portuguese and Venkatappa, to write and urge him not to wage war against the allies, because it was well known that he would not desist from attacking the allies merely because the  
36  
Portuguese did not want to find them in a helpless position. In short, no open aid was to be given to the allies, but encouragement, lest the pepper supplies and the fortresses of Kanara be endangered.

In 1615 the Bangar chief wrote directly to the king of Portugal informing him how Venkatappa and other enemies had leagued themselves to oust the chief from his kingdom. Inspite of the Portuguese efforts to the contrary Venkatappa was becoming the master of Kanara. Now the Viceroy was instructed by his king to help the chief in such a way that Venkatappa did not prevail against the

chief. The king of Portugal also sent a reply to the chief urging him to go  
37 ahead against his enemies. The Portuguese realised that if Venkatappa wanted to attack their fortresses he could do so, causing them considerable damage. The king therefore ordered the Viceroy to adopt a cautious policy to see that  
38 Venkatappa did not become all powerful in Kanara.

Early in 1616 Bernardo, a Portuguese captain on his way to Malabar, anchored his fleet at Mangalore for a brief time. The Bangar chief immediately met him and sought aid against Venkatappa. The captain merely offered to come with his fleet precisely when it was necessary. The Bangar chief pleaded that it was the proper time to aid, but Bernardo excused himself saying that he had to proceed to Cochin urgently and that other Portuguese fleets of the coast might help him. The chief understood very well that the Portuguese intention was to contemporise with everyone; but did not give up all hope of getting assistance  
39 from the Portuguese.

In the same year the chief and the Queen of Ullala seem to have fallen out once again and the latter allied herself with Venkatappa. The chief, with the assistance of the king of Cannanor, deprived the Queen of her territories until at last she was left with only one fortress which he boasted he could take easily. Writing of these to the Viceroy the chief urged the former to aid him with a fleet to defend and maintain his newly acquired position, fearing, no doubt, that Venkatappa would soon come to the rescue of the Queen. He also approached the captain of the Portuguese fortress of Mangalore requesting him to send men to enable him to build a fortress in Ullala. The captain responded by saying that he could do nothing without the Viceroy's orders. At the same time the former wrote to the Viceroy who ordered the captain not to commit himself to any help, pointing out that though the Bangar chief was a brother-in-arms to the king of Portugal, the Queen of Ullala was on friendly terms with the Portuguese. To the Bangar chief the Viceroy wrote encouraging him against his enemies and promising him all help, should the time and occasion arise. The chief was,

however, urged not to build the fortress which he planned to erect in Ullala. The chief was extremely disappointed with these replies. Soon the scales of fortune turned against him in the war, for Venkatappa joined hands against him.

On 29 November, 1616 the chief once again wrote to the Viceroy complaining of the little help given by the Portuguese, but this letter also had no effect. The Viceroy did not send any assistance. By this time he had lost most of his kingdom to Venkatappa. Early in 1617 the latter demanded the Bangher fortress itself which was located at Codial Bail. He also declared his intention of erecting a fortress there nearby. The chief cleverly handed over the keys of the fortress to the captain of the Portuguese fortress of Mangalore and replied Venkatappa saying that he should ask the Bangher fortress from the Portuguese. Being informed of these developments from the chief as well as the captain of Mangalore, the Viceroy-in-Council decided that the Bangar chief ought to be aided for enabling him to defend and sustain and also for not allowing Venkatappa to become all powerful; that the aid must, however, be given by dissimulation so as not to break with Venkatappa completely; that the Viceroy should send to Mangalore 70 soldiers under two captains, all to obey the captain of Mangalore; that these should defend the fortress of Bangher, but ~~shaky~~ only if Venkatappa began to attack it and if the Queen of Ullala, his ally, proceeded to rebuild her fortress which had been destroyed in 1594; that as long as Venkatappa and the Queen did not do so the Portuguese should continue their friendship; that in the meantime no open war should be declared against Venkatappa, but that the Viceroy should send to the chief some pieces of cannon, as the latter had lost all of his; and that a letter should be sent to Venkatappa requesting him to desist from molesting the Bangar chief. The Viceroy actually sent the men and the pieces of cannon decided upon, together with gunpowder, ammunitions and also 500 xerafins (about Rs. 1,500) to construct a bulwark. A letter was sent to Venkatappa as decided.

It seems that the Bangar chief was not without successes against his power-

ful enemy, Venkatappa. We learn from a letter of February, 1619, written by the Viceroy to the king of Portugal that the Bangar chief 'took' from Venkatappa the fortress of Bangher on 20 February, 1618, after a <sup>Siege</sup> ~~seige~~ of two months. It is probable that Venkatappa had taken the fortress some time in 1617 and that the Bangar chief, with the aid of the Portuguese, succeeded in regaining it. The Portuguese had in fact kept on sending assistance to Mangalore. Towards the end of 1617 they had dispatched ten soldiers under the command of Antonio de Saldanha with gunpowder and explosives. Later, on 16 March, 1618, they had sent Gaspar Pita de Almeida with 93 soldiers. On regaining his fortress the Bangar chief once again desired to entrust it to the care of the Portuguese, no doubt, being fully aware that Venkatappa would soon attack the fortress with greater vigour. The Portuguese seem to have realised by now that it was impossible for them to defend the fortress against Venkatappa. Accordingly, Antonio de Saldanha to whom the keys of the fortress were offered by the chief, refused to accept them. Instead, he advised the chief to dismantle and pull down the fortress. If it was not possible to do so within a month, then it was to be defended until the rains set in.<sup>42</sup> In the rainy season it was, of course, easier to demolish it, particularly because Venkatappa would not be in a position to attack it effectively then.

However, Venkatappa seems to have returned to the attack much earlier than expected. By April or May, 1618 he pressed upon the Bangar chief so much that the latter was obliged to leave the fortress entirely to the care of the Portuguese who could not avoid the responsibility now. The chief retired to Kasaragod from where he wanted to approach the king of Cannanor and other royolets ~~\*\*\*~~ in order to get assistance from them and then to return to the attack once more. However, he did not get any aid from those quarters and did not venture to attack Venkatappa again.<sup>43</sup>

After the departure of the chief the fortress of Bangher was assaulted several times by Venkatappa's men. Besides, the latter began to build a fort in Mangalore. The Queen of Ullala openly assisted Venkatappa's men. Receiving

information regarding these developments the Viceroy "was forced to deploy 500 soldiers, rather more than less," who were led from Goa by Francisco de Menezes, who had just come from Bassein, probably to live in Goa in retirement. He was an experienced but aged noble who had participated, with credit, in many a battle at Bassein. In the meantime Venkatappa's men launched many attacks upon the fortress of Bangher; but were repulsed vigorously every time. During the course of these assaults the Portuguese lost only ten or eleven men, but caused  
44  
more loss to the enemy.

Nevertheless, Venkatappa's men seem to have gained an upper hand. For in July, 1618 Francisco de Menezes repeatedly sought relief from Goa, informing the Viceroy that Venkatappa was investigating every means of investing more effectively men and money in the <sup>Siege</sup> of the Bangher fortress in order to take it before the Bangar chief returned from Kasaragod. The Viceroy despatched Francisco  
45  
de Miranda Henriques with a fleet of eight ships.

From Kasaragod the Bangar chief wrote to the Viceroy complaining that the king of Cannanor was delaying in giving help, either because he had no means to extend the actual help or because he had no intention of keeping his promise. However, Adda Raja, probably a feudatory of Cannanor, explained in another letter to the Viceroy that the king of Cannanor was not in a position to help the chief at the moment as he was engaged in settling some domestic troubles. The chief at any rate seems to have lost all hope of receiving help and therefore requested the Viceroy to intervene as a third party between him and Venkatappa and reconcile them as best as he could. So also Kamanna, the chief's minister or adigar, who was in the Bangher fortress along with the Portuguese, wrote to the Viceroy in similar terms. The Portuguese captains in Mangalore suggested that a peace treaty might be arranged between Venkatappa and the Bangar chief in which the latter would pay an annual tribute to the former. Taking into account these matters the Viceroy-in-Council decided that the Viceroy should forge an understanding between the belligerents, but with the caution that Venkatappa did not

come to know that the Viceroy had initiated the negotiations. It was, therefore, decided to use João Fernandez Leitão, captain of Honavar, who seems to have written to the Viceroy already concerning the possibility of establishing peace with Venkatappa. Diogo Lobo, captain of the city of Goa and member of the Council of State, who was also a relative of Leitão, was asked to write to the latter to find out an opportunity to begin peace talks.

46  
Salvador Ribeiro Marinho, captain of Mangalore, reported that the Portuguese fortress was without artillery as the eight pieces that were there were destroyed, no doubt, by Venkatappa. All the Portuguese commandants who were in Mangalore agreed that under no circumstances should the Bangher fortress be allowed to be taken by Venkatappa, because being its master he would attack the Portuguese fortress of Mangalore, since the latter contained a temple. Better defence and offence arrangements, therefore, were to be made at Mangalore. The palm-groves and other trees around the fortress were to be cut down so that explosives could be discharged from the fortress unobstructed to cause greater damage if the enemies besieged it. The owners of the trees were to be paid the value of their property. The expences on this count were calculated to be less than 35,000 xerafins (about Rs. 105,000). Six pieces of cannon were to be sent. Both the fortresses of Mangalore and Bangher were to be staunchly defended. The construction of the fortress at Mangalore by Venkatappa was also to be obstructed.

47

There seems to have been much disorder and lack of discipline in the Portuguese camp at Mangalore. The captain general of ~~the~~ the war of Mangalore, Francisco de Menezes, fired thrice at his own men led by Francisco de Miranda Henriques, captain-major of the Portuguese fleet of Malabar, creating a scandal. The mistake seems to have happened partly owing to the old age and infirmity of the captain general. He himself realised this and wrote to the Viceroy requesting him to relieve him of his position. The request was granted and Luiz de Brito de Mello was appointed his successor.

58 48

On 26 December, 1618 Luiz de Brito sailed forth from Goa in a ship with

thirty soldiers and six pieces of cannon. Soon after his arrival at Mangalore he and Francisco de Miranda Henriques decided to take the fortress which Venkatappa had erected by now between the Grand Tank and the Portuguese fortress. An attack was launched upon on 7 January, 1619, with unfortunate results for the Portuguese. Luiz de Brito and Francisco de Miranda were killed, together with 20 other captains and nobles. Among their soldiers more than 200 were killed, 20 or so were taken prisoners and more than 30 took to flight. The disaster occurred because Luiz de Brito and Francisco de Miranda proceeded without the Viceroy's orders and contrary to his instructions which he had given them at the time of their departure from Goa. Francisco, who had been to Malabar before the arrival of Luiz de Brito at Mangalore, was unwilling to stay at Kasaragod for a day or two for the Bangar chief who would have been then ready with his forces to come with Francisco to fight Venkatappa. Besides, the Portuguese commanders at Mangalore were known for their mutual distrust and lack of co-operation. Luiz de Brito and another captain ~~xxxxxx~~ quarrelled over the issue as to who should carry the flag. This led to the delay of one day in commencing the attack and the enemy was not only informed of the imminent attack but also got time to prepare for the defence. Further, Christovão de Brito, captain of Bangher, and Adigar, captain-major of the forces of the Bangar chief there, had warned that the Portuguese should not come out of their fortess of Mangalore.

49

After this disastrous defeat the Portuguese position in Mangalore became very precarious. To send substantial relief the Viceroy did not have sufficient money. Gomes da Silva, who was escaping from Mangalore with merchandise valued at 8,000 pagodas (Rs. 32,000) was robbed on the way to Goa. However, some generous nobles and captains offered their services and to sail forth at their own cost to defend Mangalore. The Viceroy accepted the services of three of these generous ones: Francisco de Manuel, Manuel da Andrade Berenguer and Francisco Pinto Pimenta. <sup>50</sup> Salvador Ribeiro Marinho, who was sincere and able, continued to be the captain of the Mangalore fortess. Gaspar de Mello de

Sampaio was appointed captain-major of the war of Mangalore.

While this difficult situation continued at Mangalore, Venkatappa approached the English for selling them his pepper. In February, 1619 he sent his messengers to Swally where the English were. The latter were told that Venkatappa could provide pepper enough for two 'good' ships. The English decided to send to Ikkeri two representatives to see the commodity and fix the price. Venkatappa's messengers left at Swally some of their companions as hostages and returned with the English representatives.<sup>51</sup> It is not possible to say what happened to this negotiation. Probably the English procured pepper from Venkatappa that year. But in March, 1620, by which time a peace treaty between the Portuguese and Venkatappa was signed, as we shall see in due course, we find Venkatappa approaching the Portuguese and the latter agreeing to purchase the commodity from him.<sup>52</sup> Besides, elsewhere we are told that in October of the same year four English ships were moving about along the coast of Kanara with a view to secure pepper, but that Venkatappa did not want to receive them.<sup>53</sup>

In the meantime the Portuguese desired to reconcile Venkatappa with the Bangar chief and to free themselves from the fruitless expences ~~involved~~ involved in the defence of the Bangher fortress. But the chief does not seem to have been so eager to accept peace, though he had written to the Viceroy requesting him to intercede as a peace maker. In March, 1619 the Portuguese sent a fleet to Kasaragod to take the Bangar chief from there to Cannanor where he still hoped to get succour with which he intended to recover his lost kingdom from Venkatappa. The fleet was to be at his disposal only upto the middle of May. There was, however, no sign of any assistance coming to him as he was poor and was not in a position to pay even to a few soldiers who were with him. His neighbouring rulers were not eager to come to his rescue. Considering all these the Viceroy-in-Council came to the conclusion on 5 April that the Portuguese should disentangle themselves from the conflict between Venkatappa and the

Bangar chief; that instead of spending money ungainfully in assisting the chief it should be employed to strengthen the fortress of Mangalore and to pay the soldiers; that at the end of the rainy season an effort should be made to reconcile the belligerents; and that the Bangher fortress should be given up,  
but in such a way that the Portuguese ~~xxxifited~~ benefited by doing so.  
54

Gaspar Afonso de Mello de Sampaio, captain-major of the war of Mangalore, wrote to the Viceroy on 2 April, 1619, giving him an account of his meeting with the Bangar chief who was brought to Mangalore from Kasaragod. The chief seems to have insisted upon the formalities and honours due to a king, which the Portuguese captains seem to have extended, though not whole heartedly. He did not wish to land at Mangalore, but remain in the ship in which he was brought; nor did he consent to go to the Portuguese fortress. Finally, he agreed to go to Gaspar's house. At night he desired to return, but was ultimately prevailed upon to go to Bangher to enthuse his men there, though he had declared that he would not set his feet in Bangher until he became its ruler again. Next morning there was a meeting between him and the Portuguese captains in Gaspar's house. Gaspar pointed out that the Portuguese had always extended to him whatever assistance was possible for them right from the beginning of the hostilities between the chief and Venkatappa; that the Portuguese continued to extend this favour in the form of men and money as before, trusting in the chief's promises that he would attack Kumbala today, Manjeshwara tomorrow and Ullala thereafter; that the chief, however, was inactive and unenthusiastic; and that he did not trust the Portuguese who were his loyal supporters, but had repugnance towards them. He was asked to say what was his plan which he would really execute. He was urged to pay the three years' arrears of tribute to Venkatappa who was too powerful for him. At the same time the Viceroy might send him 500 native soldiers of Goa, as those 500 who were already at Bangher were tired. The only response that came from the chief was a question whether the Viceroy had sent him the 20,000 xerafins (about Rs. 60,000) which he had asked for or a pittance of five or six thousand. The chief apparently had said before that if the Portuguese

would send him a fleet he would secure the services of the Nairs of Malabar; but when a fleet was actually sent to be at his disposal for two months not a single Nair or any other soldier came with him. Any way, he was now urged to stay at Bangher and enthuse his people. It was better, he was told, to live in his own fortress rather than in a cottage in Kasaragod. However, his female relatives would not allow him to do what he wanted to do. Apparently, the temple within the Portuguese fortress had an annual endowment of 5,000 pagodas (Rs. 20,000) which the chief asked for his own maintenance. Concerning peace terms with Venkatappa, the chief said that he could go only to the Portuguese for help, as all were friends to Venkatappa who was very powerful, whereas he himself was poor and disgraced, unfit to be favoured by anyone. Gaspar, however,  
promised him all friendly co-operation by the Portuguese.  
<sup>55</sup>

Gaspar suggested to the Viceroy that there was no alternative but to negotiate for peace, more on Venkatappa's terms than on the terms of the Bangar chief; and that the Adil Shah, to whom Venkatappa paid an annual tribute of 36,000 pagodas (Rs. 144,000), could be requested to instruct the latter to raise the <sup>56</sup>  
siege <sup>56</sup> siege of Bangher and to conclude a treaty with the chief. Meanwhile, Puttappa, one of the ministers of Venkatappa, had sent an envoy with letters to Goa. Therefore, on receiving Gaspar's letter, the Viceroy-in-Council, who were disillusioned with the Bangar chief, decided to give up the cause of Bangher and to go ahead with Puttappa's envoy. However, the Portuguese fortress of Mangalore,  
which needed money and materials, ~~was~~  
<sup>57</sup> was to be strengthened at the same time.

The negotiations for peace were initiated by the captain of Honavar, João Fernandez Leitão, at the instance of the Viceroy. Leitão sent Simão Leal with a letter to Puttappa who was the most favourite administrator whom Venkatappa trusted. Puttappa was told that if he were to send a man of good understanding to Goa the Viceroy would negotiate for peace and friendship. Puttappa reacted favourably and requested Leitão, through Simão, that the Viceroy be informed

that he would send a messenger to Goa. Later on, he actually sent Nagoji Pandita with a letter to the Viceroy. He pointed out that the Portuguese were not justified in sheltering the Bangar chief against Venkatappa because the latter was merely bringing a rebel to the right path by chastising him. The Viceroy was requested to withdraw the assistance which was still being extended to the chief, so that one obstacle on the path of ~~fix~~ friendship between the Portuguese and Venkatappa would be removed. Nagoji was commissioned to say that the fortress of Bangher, which belonged to the Bangar chief, and not to the Portuguese, should be ceded to Venkatappa, overlord of the chief; that the Portuguese should withdraw their succour which they had sent to Bangher; that Puttappa was aware that Bangher was virtually in the hands of the Portuguese, who had paid for it with men and money, and therefore they might not find it easy to give it up; but that Puttappa was helpless, it being the wish of his master, Venkatappa, that he should get the fortress; and that the latter could be induced to begin peace talks if the Bangar chief was made to give ~~me~~ him 58 money, good elephants and other things.

On studying these statements the Viceroy-in-Council decided to respond amicably to Puttappa's mission. He was told clearly that the Portuguese had no intention to wage any war against Venkatappa, but only to defend their less powerful neighbour and friend, the Bangar chief, from his enemies; and that the Viceroy would rejoice to mediate between their two friends, Venkatappa and the chief, and bring about an honest settlement in which Venkatappa would not lose what was his and the chief would not remain shorn of his kingdom. João Fernandez Leitão, who had initiated the negotiations with Puttappa, was chosen to continue the peace talks. He and Puttappa were to settle mutually where they should meet. Leitão was instructed to endeavour to secure restoration of the kingdom of Bangher to its chief, who would pay Venkatappa his due, after which the two would resume friendly relations which they had before. If these terms were not

acceptable either to Venkatappa or to the Bangar chief, Leitão was to negotiate then for getting Venkatappa's consent for the chief to dismantle the Bangher fortress, as it was not in the interests of the Portuguese to allow the fortress to be. The Viceroy-in-Council decided upon a third alternative of which Leitão was not informed at the moment. If neither of the first two alternatives was acceptable to the belligerents, the Portuguese were to hand over the keys of the Bangher fortress either to the chief himself or to his minister and then withdraw their troops and artillery, telling the chief to defend his fortress as best as he could. The chief was to be informed of their intention to hand over the keys some days in advance. Finally, it was decided that Gaspar de Mello de Sampaio should be kept informed of the developments in peace negotiations so that he could consult the Bangar chief from time to time in order to obtain the latter's views in the matter.

Leitão found Venkatappa rather unenthusiastic about peace talks. Puttappa did not come down for a meeting, though he was expected to. Leitão then sent Rama Krishna, interpreter of the fortress of Honavar, who was a practical Brahmin of good qualities, to Ikkeri, with a letter addressed to Venkatappa. Rama Krishna reached Ikkeri, presented the letter to Venkatappa and awaited for days for an answer. Ultimately, Venkatappa told him curtly that time was not yet ripe for negotiations. The envoy, however, learnt from Puttappa that the Nayaka expected a war compensation of 100,000 pagodas (Rs. 400,000) from the Bangar chief if he wanted to be restored. Nevertheless, Puttappa suggested that Venkatappa might agree to any one of the following alternatives: (1) The fortress of Bangher should be ceded to him and he would compensate the chief with some lands; or (2) The fortress should be destroyed in which case also the chief would be compensated; or (3) If neither of these was acceptable the Portuguese should give up Bangher fortress and Venkatappa would be friendly towards them. At any rate, Venkatappa was not prepared to restore the kingdom of Bangher to its chief. However, he was willing to provide the chief with the means of livelihood if he agreed peacefully to cede the fortress of Bangher. On being

reported of these by the envoy, Leitão made them known to the Bangar chief, his minister and Gaspar de Mello. Of course, he informed the Viceroy also vide a letter dated 15 June. The latter, in consultation with his Council, decided that Leitão should continue to negotiate with Venkatappa on the basis of the latter's offer to compensate the chief if he consented to dismantle the fortress of Bangher. Besides, Venkatappa was to be told that the soldiers of Bangher should not be subjected to any damage; instead they should be given freedom to go wherever they wanted to go in order to earn their livelihood. In the meantime the chief seems to have gone to Kasaragod once again. Venkatappa tried to pressurise the Portuguese by hindering their trade at Honavar where Leitão was not permitted ~~them~~<sup>60</sup> to transport the timber sold to him.

The second series of negotiations showed signs of better results. Venkatappa agreed to give the Bangar chief the territories of Nandavara and Mogarnar (?), both together yielding 2,400 pagodas and 8 fanams (about Rs. 9,602); of Sazapú (?), yielding 764 pagodas and 8 fanams (about Rs. 3,058); and of Beluir (?), yielding 473 pagodas and 2 fanams (a little over Rs. 1,892). These lands fetched additional income in the form of customs. All together the lands were worth 4,925 pagodas and 7 fanams (about Rs. 19,702) a year. The chief was to destroy the Bangher fortress at Codial Bail. This was to be followed by the destruction of two more fortresses which Venkatappa had newly erected at Nandavara and Parangary (Uppinangady) within the territories to be given to the chief. So also all the stockades that were erected during the course of the war were to be pulled down. Finally, the chief was to give to Venkatappa an elephant by name Padmanabha. Rama Krishna secured these terms which were soon made known to the Viceroy. Venkatappa wrote to Leitão appreciating his untiring labours in the negotiations. He also asked Rama Krishna to write in Kannada to the Bangher chief informing him of the terms, which was done. The Viceroy-in-Council commanded Leitão to accept the terms offered by Venkatappa even if the Bangar chief was not prepared to consent to them. The Portuguese contention was that they were

not obliged to defend Bangher which was abandoned by its chief who was away in Kasaragod and was doing nothing to relieve it ~~was~~ inspite of repeated requests  
61 by them.

The chief was disappointed when he saw the terms offered by Venkatappa. He considered the territories and their income to be given to him as inadequate to his station and insufficient for even one month's expences. He became bitter when he learnt that the terms were accepted without his consent. He was also informed to his great chagrin that the Portuguese garrison, which was defending Bangher, was required for services elsewhere. He complained to the Viceroy that he was kept out of the process of arriving at the decision, particularly with regard to the destruction of his fortress, though the subject of negotiations was his. However, he told the Viceroy that he was helpless and therefore would accept the terms offered, emphasising that he did so because the Viceroy wanted him to do so. He lamented that he had lost his kingdom and had no place to set his feet. Yet, as long as the Portuguese had means to support him he could remain without his kingdom, because he was sure that the Viceroy would restore him his kingdom one day, as his brother-in-arms, king of Portugal, would require the Viceroy to do. In reply to all these the latter told him curtly that there was nothing more to be done and that the chief need not write to him any more  
62 on the subject.

Ishwara Shenoy, the Bangar chief's envoy at Ikkeri, wrote to Leitão complaining that he was not informed, when he was in Honavar, that the destruction of the Bangher fortress was one of the conditions of the peace treaty with Venkatappa. He contended that peace negotiations were not only Leitão's business but also his, since he was also to participate in them actively, talking face to  
63 face with Venkatappa, as per his master, the Bangar chief's orders.

Though the chief wrote to the Viceroy as well as to Leitão, expressing his readiness to accept the terms offered by Venkatappa and to abide by what the Viceroy commanded him, he seems to have endeavoured to secure better terms by sending independent instructions to Ishwara Shenoy. He seems to have desired

particularly to secure more compensation than what was offered. Learning of this Leitão began to censure the chief's communications to Shenoy. He did not allow the chief's messengers free movements until the chief was compelled to desist from his course. Besides, the latter was very slow in responding the communications from the Portuguese. Gaspar de Mello had to employ a ship with 90 men in order to find out where he was and to bring him to Mangalore for negotiations. Leitão feared that such delays might enrage Venkatappa who might withdraw from peace talks. The Viceroy wrote to Gaspar saying that the chief was out with fresh excuses to delay the execution of the treaty, since he had instructed his man at Ikkeri in terms which did not conform to what he had written to Leitão; that Gaspar should complain of this to the chief who should clearly be told not to expect any aid from the Portuguese with regard to the restoration of his lost kingdom.

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Leitão also wrote curtly to the chief saying that if the latter was not satisfied with what he was doing he should look after the fortress alone as best as he could. Nevertheless, the Portuguese successfully tried to secure more concession to the chief. At this stage it was felt necessary that the Queen of Ullala, who had sided with Venkatappa, should also be a partner in the final treaty. Simão Leah, Leitão's envoy to the court of Venkatappa, was instructed on this matter.

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After his further audiences with Venkatappa, Simão Leah gave Leitão an account of the talks and the results thereof. Of course, Simão had tried to proceed about his work speedily. Thus, as soon as he had received fresh instructions he had sent a messenger to the camp of Venkatappa, who was at Belur waging a war against its chief, in ~~order~~ order to find out whether it was possible to have an audience with Venkatappa there. The messenger returned with the intelligence that it was of no use to go to Belur, since Venkatappa was too busy dealing with the Belur chief. Instead, it was suggested to him that he should proceed to the fortress of Durga where Venkatappa was expected to go soon.

Accordingly, Simão went to Durga where he reached on 3 November. Venkatappa came there on 8; but as he arrived late and tired Simão did not talk to him on that day. On the following day a messenger came from Mangalore carrying two letters - one from Gaspar de Mello and the other from the Bangar chief. Gaspar probably urged that the peace treaty should be concluded as speedily as possible in order to have regular supply of food grains from the territories of Venkatappa who had prevented such supply to pressurise the Portuguese. The Bangar chief seems to have indicated his readiness to accept the terms offered by Venkatappa, provided additional monetary concessions were obtained for him. On being presented Leitão's letter Venkatappa responded, after reading it, that nothing more ought to be given to the chief than what he had already agreed to give. With this answer he sent Simão away. The latter, however, sought the intervention of Puttappa who took him to the palace where Venkatappa was pleaded to concede 3,000 pagodas (Rs. 12,000) more to the chief. Finally, Venkatappa consented to give an additional sum of about 2,000 pagodas (Rs. 8,000), thus making the total about 7,000 pagodas (Rs. 28,000), with the conditions that the Bangher fortress should be destroyed, though the inner circle was to be left in tact if the population desired so; that the Bangar chief should come to live in the fortress of Nandavara or any other place in the territories of Venkatappa; that the latter would never erect a fortress at Bangher nor would he raise an army there to wage war against the Bangar chief; and that Venkatappa as well as the Queen of Ullala would destroy the fortresses and stockades erected during the course of the war. Simão urged that the site of the Bangher fortress be left to the chief. Venkatappa flared up at this suggestion and ordered Simão to leave forthwith. With great difficulty Simão managed to secure another audience with him and urged him to grant 6 ~~days~~ days' time to let Leitão know of the term in dispute. The king refused to grant even half an hour. Whereupon Simão begged for a quarter of an hour to consult the interpreter. This was conceded. Simão and the interpreter decided to signify acceptance of the terms, fearing that if they were rejected the Portuguese as well as the Bangar chief might land in

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trouble and risk war with Venkatappa. On hearing the decision Venkatappa agreed that Leitão be informed of these terms. At first it was decided that the interpreter should carry the message to Leitão; but finally Venkatappa sent one of his amaldars along with one of Simão's men. Answer was to be brought within six days. Venkatappa also agreed that the fields near the Portuguese fortress of Mangalore should be left to the Portuguese; that the embarkations belonging to the cazados and the residents of Mangalore should be permitted as before; and that Puttappa should go to Gersoppa to sign the treaty of peace and friendship. The revenue of the cultivable lands conceded to the Portuguese was to be deducted from the sum to be given to the Bangar chief. Simão wrote to Gaspar de Mello and the Bangar chief  
66 informing them of these developments.

On 11 November Venkatappa himself wrote to Leitão, saying that he had decided in the beginning not to give anything to the Bangar cheif, taking into account what the latter had done against him; but subsequently he changed his mind and conceded lands yielding a total income of about 5,000 pagodas (Rs. 20,000). However, the chief was not satisfied with this sum and Leitão had written on behalf of the chief asking for more. Knowing that the latter and his ancestors were loyal formerly,  
*an additional sum of*  
Venkatappa decided to grant him 2,000 pagodas (Rs. 8,000), with the following conditions: 1. The fortress of Bangher should be destroyed. 2. The chief should give to Venkatappa the elephant named Padmanabha. 3. Venkatappa would destroy the two fortresses erected in Nandavara and Uparangary (Uppinangady). 4. He would also instruct his administrator in Codial Bail to destroy all his stockades. 5. If the Bangar chief was not prepared to accept these terms Venkatappa would no more deal with him for peace and Leitão also should no more write about it. 6. The Portuguese garrison in the Bangher fortress should then be withdrawn. Venkatappa also specified in his letter the various territories and the yields thereof, which he proposed to give the chief. Leitão was asked to send a reply within four days, because  
67 Venkatappa was tired of the delays which were caused so far.

Leitão saw no objection to the terms offered by Venkatappa since they were in

keeping with the Viceroy's instructions. However, he had some doubt regarding Venkatappa's demand that the land and the habitation of the Bangher fortress, after its destruction, should ~~belong~~ belong to him. It was a new matter upon which the Viceroy had given no instruction. Accordingly, he decided to inform the Viceroy about it before writing to Venkatappa concerning the acceptance of the terms. At the same time he feared that Venkatappa might come down upon Mangalore since no answer was sent to him within the specified time and cautioned the Viceroy to this effect.

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The Viceroy-in-Council decided to instruct Leitão to accept Venkatappa's terms. If the Bangar chief did not care to accept them Gaspar de Mello was instructed to hand over the keys of the Bangher fortress to the chief or his minister and to withdraw from it the Portuguese soldiers and artillery. After all, it was of great importance for the Portuguese to be on friendly terms with Venkatappa in whose territories they had fortresses at Basrur, Honavar and Mangalore and from whose regions they secured supplies of food grains to sustain not only these fortresses but also Goa, Ormus and Mascat. They had done by the chief whatever was possible for them to do during the course of his war with Venkatappa and they had lost, fighting on his behalf, many captains, nobles and soldiers. They had also spent much money for him. Now the chief was doing virtually nothing to defend his fortress, but was staying away. There was no objection in allowing Venkatappa the land and the habitation of Bangher after razing the fortress to the ground. Leitão was ordered to conclude the treaty as speedily as possible so that the Portuguese  
69  
would be relieved of the anxiety and expences.

However, there were still some more hurdles to be overcome. Either because of the Bangar chief or because of the Queen of Ullala, the Portuguese and Venkatappa were not in a position to conclude the treaty as early as they wished. Concerning the Queen, Simão secured Venkatappa's consent to include her as a party to the treaty; she was to resume her former friendly relations with the Portuguese. However, if she were required to destroy the stockades, which she had constructed, the ship that had been taken from her by the Portuguese during the conflict was

to be returned to her along with the cargo; and the Portuguese were to destroy those which they had in their habitation in the neighbourhood of their fortress of Mangalore. On the other hand, the latter were to retain their stockades and were not to return the ship if the Queen were allowed to retain hers. Ultimately, the second alternative of retaining their respective stockades was accepted by the signatories of the  
70  
treaty.

In the meantime the situation in Mangalore was becoming unbearable for the Portuguese. On 24 November, 1619 Gaspar de Mello wrote to the Governor explaining this situation. The Portuguese were dying at the rate of 6 a day, because Venkatappa's general, Basavappa Naik, would not allow any food supplies. Gaspar and his captains were without shirts and collars, for they had sold or mortgaged them. What used to cost 4 formerly cost 10 now and yet one did not find anything to purchase. The fleet was desperate, for there was neither a coin of copper nor a grain of rice. The soldiers wanted to flee along with Gaspar. The captains and the priests impeded them and yet some soldiers were gone. If those one thousand Christian souls among the cazados, soldiers and women were not succoured by the Governor in time a great disaster was certain to follow. The Governor was warned not to be complacent thinking that peace negotiations were afoot. The enemy knew the condition in which the Portuguese were in Mangalore. Gaspar pointed out that he should not be blamed if any disaster occurred after this report was sent to the Governor. The soldiers had been paid only upto 5 September, though money was sent to Gaspar for paying them upto 5 November. Out of the 4,000 xerafins (about Rs. 12,000) that were sent to  
71  
him he had given 2,000 to the merchants of Basrur for sending him additional fleet.  
enemies

Gaspar proceeded to say that the greatest ~~enemy~~ that the Portuguese then had were the Bangar chief and his adigar. The peace talks could have been speeded up, but for the Bangar chief who ran to Kasaragod every now and then, thus necessitating 20 days to consult him and send a reply to the Governor or to Venkatappa. Gaspar  
72  
concluded by saying that he feared the enemy to begin a war in two days.

This precarious situation in Mangalore forced ~~the~~ the Portuguese to accept the terms offered and hasten the conclusion of the treaty with Venkatappa. The latter

had written by now to the Governor through Leitão. The substance of the letter was that he had no intention of accommodating the Bangar chief or to negotiate with him, considering what the chief had done against his interests; that he had ultimately negotiated because the Portuguese had interceded on behalf of the chief; and that the Governor should soon signify his acceptance and arrange for signing the treaty of peace and friendship, the terms of which he sent along with the letter by a  
73  
separate note.

These terms included the names of the territories and the yields thereof, which were the same **that** Venkatappa had already agreed to give. The rest of the terms and conditions were: (1) On receiving the sum the Bangar chief should order the destruction of the Bangher fortress. This article referred also to the places where the chief was to live; but the document is unfortunately unreadable here. (2) The ground and the habitation of Bangher should belong to Venkatappa who would neither erect in it a fortress at any time nor raise any wall nor have men of arms there; (3) The chief should give the elephant named Padmanabha to Venkatappa. (4) The latter would order the destruction of the fortresses erected in Nandavara and Uppinangady. (5) He would also order his administrator at Bangher to destroy all the stockades that were erected during the course of the war and also those which existed near the Portuguese fortress of Mangalore. (6) The cazados of Mangalore should pay Venkatappa customs and other duties for the rice which they brought to the fortress from his territories, except for 500 bags a year meant for their own consumption. (7) The possessions at the river and the temple Ossadual (?), which the Bangar chief had given the Portuguese, would remain with them, the income from the cultivable fields near the river being discounted from the sum to be given to the chief. (8) The Queen of Ullala should be associated with the treaty and Venkatappa would declare for himself and on behalf of the Queen that both would be on friendly terms with the Portuguese as before and that the Queen would begin to pay the annual tribute to the Portuguese which she used to pay formerly. The Queen should be allowed to retain the stockades which had been built in her territories. There was a condition to this which is not clear as the document is damaged here. (9) If

the Bangar chief was not prepared to conform to these terms the Portuguese should no more favour him and the Governor should withdraw the Portuguese soldiers and artillery, which were in the Bangher fortress, the keys of which should be handed over to the chief; doing this there would be friendly relations between the Portuguese, on the one hand, and Venkatappa and the Queen of Ullala, on the other, on  
74  
the basis of the terms except those pertaining to the chief.

Considering the above terms and conditions the Viceroy-in-council decided that they should be accepted for the following reasons: (a) Venkatappa was sure to continue to prevent food supplies from his territories if the terms were not accepted. Already there was a great scarcity of rice at the Portuguese fortress of Mangalore. Mascat, Ormus and other Portuguese fortresses also were experiencing shortage of this commodity. (b) Accepting the terms would release the Portuguese from the burden of expences on the Bangher fortress. The captains, the soldiers and the artillery employed in the defence of Bangher could be used for other and more advantageous purposes. (c) Refusal to accept the terms was most likely to endanger the security of the Portuguese fortresses within the territories of Venkatappa who might attack them any time. (d) Pepper, the principal article of trade, could also be secured in large quantity from Venkatappa's territories after concluding the treaty. (e) The Bangar chief, with his illusions and tactics of delay, was now more an enemy than a friend to the Portuguese. He was doing nothing to defend his fortress. He did not even want to stay at Bangher, but by compulsion. He virtually deserved nothing considering his inactivity. The terms offered were good enough to him, though he had asked for more. (f) From the Portuguese point of view the terms of the proposed treaty were in keeping with their own interests and requirements. The cazados were to be allowed 500 bags of duty free rice a year, which was not bad, though the quantity was not as large as the Portuguese wished it to be; they were not called upon to return to the Queen of Ullala the ship which they had taken from her, nor were they expected to destroy their own stockades, provided the Queen was  
75  
allowed to retain hers; and that the latter was to begin to pay tributes as before.

Leitão was to sign the treaty on behalf of the Bangar chief as well as the

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Portuguese. It seems to have been signed by January, 1620. Gaspar de Mello wrote to the Governor on 8 January that he had completed the withdrawal of soldiers and artillery from the fortress of Bangher; that the treaty had been signed; and that since he had nothing more to do at Mangalore he might be permitted to go to Goa. On considering the letter the Governor-in-Council came to the conclusion that Gaspar should be allowed to leave Mangalore only after (a) the conditions of the treaty were actually carried out, and (b) Venkatappa withdrew all his troops from Mangalore. At the ~~xx~~ time of his departure from Mangalore Gaspar was to leave behind 40 or 50 soldiers for the defence of the fortress under the command of its captain.

77

Soon after the conclusion of the treaty Venkatappa began peaceful commercial dealings with the Portuguese. Thus, his ambassador in Goa was instructed to find out whether the Governor was prepared to take from him every year 1,000 quintals of pepper which was customarily taken from him by the Portuguese contractors according to the price fixed by agreement, the contractors being free to purchase as much additional quantities of pepper from his subjects as was needed. The Governor-in-Council readily agreed on 7 March, 1620 to send their contractor for the pepper offered for sale, with the condition that the contractor be permitted to purchase 78 more pepper in Venkatappa's territories, as suggested by the latter himself.

The Bangar chief was unfortunate. After the conclusion of the treaty fresh obstacles cropped up and the chief did not get the promised sum of 7,000 pagodas a year. He seems to have insisted upon residing in Kasaragod, whereas Venkatappa commanded that he should come and live either in a place within Venkatappa's territories, but which did not belong to the chief formerly, or in Goa. The chief feared that he might be murdered at the instance of Venkatappa if he were to obey the latter. Venkatappa was apprehensive that the chief, living outside his control, might foment trouble against him once again. The chief wrote to the Viceroy complaining of the non-fulfilment of the terms on the part of Venkatappa and urging the Viceroy to get the payment of the sum from the Nayaka. The Viceroy-in-Council decided on 30 January, 1623 that an embassy should be sent to Venkatappa for secur-

ing the compliance of the treaty. Even though he might cause certain amount of discredit to the Portuguese by not responding favourably to the embassy, the Council thought of satisfying their friend and ally, the Bangar chief, by sending an embassy to Ikkeri. João Fernandez Leitão, who had played such an important role at the peace negotiations and who had access to Venkatappa, was chosen to lead the embassy.

The decision to send the embassy was not executed until October. In the middle of that month Leitão, with his entourage, sailed forth from Goa to Honavar from where the land route to Ikkeri was taken. Vittala Shenoy, who was Venkatappa's ambassador to Goa, and who spoke Portuguese very well, was also with the embassy. And, it was this embassy led by Leitão that Pietro Della Valle, the well known Italian traveller, accompanied to Ikkeri. Della Valle gives an excellent account of the proceedings of this embassy.

While receiving advance news from Vittala regarding the Portuguese embassy Venkatappa did not react to it with any enthusiasm, knowing the purpose for which it was being sent. There was another cause for his coldness. He knew very well that the Portuguese had no money to pay for the pepper which they had to take from him that year and for a great part of the quantity of the commodity taken in the previous year. As a result, the reception accorded to the embassy, which reached

Ikkeri on 6 November, was rather poor.

Della Valle regarded Venkatappa as more a royolet than a king, because he paid an annual tribute to the Adil Shah who himself was a feudatory of the great Mughals. Besides, the conditions at the court of Ikkeri also were such that they did not befit a real king. However, he noted that the people in India as well as the Portuguese considered Venkatappa a king. The Portuguese did so for their own glorification, he thought.

Della Valle did not approve some of the proceedings of the embassy. Leitão sought Vittala Shenoy's intervention to secure a letter from Venkatappa to the king of Portugal to the effect that he might get additional remuneration. Della Valle laughed in his sleeves at this ~~behavior~~ behaviour of the ambassador seeking the recommendation of an alien prince, who was virtually regarded as an enemy by

the Portuguese, to secure favour from the ambassador's own master. So also, Della Valle's impression regarding the competence of the embassy was poor. The Portuguese were generally ignorant of what was happening around them. They often indulged in rumours. For instance, Venkatappa was told that England was made Catholic by the  
83  
public command of its king.

During the course of 15 days after his arrival at Ikkeri, Leitão had several audiences with Venkatappa. On one occasion a letter from the king of Portugal was presented to him. The former thanked the latter for refusing to sell pepper to the English and the Dutch who had approached him to buy the commodity. He also expressed hope in the continued friendship between the Portuguese and Venkatappa. Concerning the affairs of the Bangar chief the king of Portugal merely said that the ambassador would present the case on behalf of the chief. Venkatappa's answer regarding the last particular was that he would pay 7,000 pagodas (Rs. 28,000) a year to the chief only if he came to live in the Nayaka's territories or in Goa and that it was his final verdict. He gave a letter of promise to this effect. Venkatappa pointed out that the chief was not reliable because once he had written repenting for what he had done owing to evil counsel and saying that he would come to live in Venkatappa's kingdom and be obedient, receiving the annual sum from him; but that later  
84  
on the chief had changed his mind.

The king of Portugal seems to have written to the Viceroy ordering him to wage a war on Venkatappa, if necessary, in order to restore the kingdom of Bangher to its chief. However, the Viceroy was to do so only if the circumstances permitted such a course of action. In fact, the Portuguese position in India and elsewhere was not sound in those years. Their European rivals, particularly the Dutch, were creating troubles for them in different parts of the world. Therefore, the Viceroy had to satisfy himself with the answer given by Venkatappa. At the same time it was contended that the embassy would show the Bangar chief that the Portuguese did whatever was possible for them to do to secure the fulfilment of the terms of the  
85  
treaty on the part of Venkatappa.

The chief wrote to the Viceroy, a couple of months after the result of the

embassy was made known to him, saying that he had been to the king of Cannanor who had received and treated him well and had again promised to help him in retaking his lost kingdom. He sought similar favour from the Viceroy also whom he requested to provide him with 20 sanguiceis, 10 ships, one big barque and one galley. If he was not to have these immediately the Viceroy was urged to provide him with money for maintenance; to give him the land of old Mangalore; and to grant him four passes ports every year for free sea trade. Recalling what the Portuguese had done to the chief with such great damage to themselves the Viceroy-in-Council decided on 22 March, 1624 merely to tell him to come to the territories which Venkatappa had affirmed to give him. If the chief did not consent to do this and went ahead with his ~~new~~<sup>86</sup> novelties and agitations instead, the Portuguese were to have nothing to do with him anymore.

The king of Portugal was always interested in restoring the Bangar chief to his former kingdom. He wrote to the latter towards the end of 1625, apparently assuring him help to this effect, and sent the letter to the Viceroy to ~~be~~ forward it to the chief. The Viceroy-in-Council decided on 20 January, 1626 not to send it to him. Instead, the Viceroy himself was to write a few consoling words to the chief.<sup>87</sup> Ultimately, the latter derived no benefit from the peace treaty of 1620. He seems to have remained without his kingdom, a fugitive in Kasaragod, until the death of Venkatappa on 10 November, 1629.

Before closing this chapter the conquests of Venkatappa and the extent of his territories as evidenced by Portuguese documents may be noted. We have seen already how he annexed the territories of (1) Gersoppa and (2) Bangher. The kingdom of Gersoppa comprised the regions from Bhatkal to Mirjan. The total yields of this kingdom were 25,000 pagodas (Rs. 100,000) from Gersoppa and 300,000 pagodas (Rs. ~~new~~<sup>88</sup> 1,200,000) from Ankola. The kingdom of Bangher yielded 125,000 pagodas (Rs. 500,000). The following were the other conquests and annexations made by

\*Venkatappa:-



(3) The kingdom of Basavapattana ruled by Amappa Nayaka, son of Kenge Gauda. Venkatappa attacked Basavappattana probably in 1620 and took territories worth 50,000 pagodas (Rs. 200,000). These territories were perhaps Lakkuhalli, Gajanur  
89 and Shimoga.

(4) Bellare, located in Puttur taluka in South Kanara district. Venkatadri,  
king<sup>89</sup> king of Bellare, had given his sister in marriage to Venkatappa's son, Bhadrappa. However, this marriage does not seem to have been a happy one, but forced by Venkatappa who also secured territories worth 40,000 pagodas (Rs. 160,000) from Venkatadri. Bhadrappa died soon after the marriage. At the death of Venkatappa the king of Bellare tried to regain his territories from the successor of Venkatappa,  
90 namely, Virabhadra Nayaka.

(5) From the kingdom of Sonda, ruled by Ranganatha, territories worth 12,000  
91 pagodas (Rs. 48,000) were extracted by Venkatappa.

(6) Gantaorer (?), king of Bilgi, ceded territories worth 100,000 pagodas  
92 (Rs. 400,000).

(7) The Queen of Ullala was yet another ruler in South Kanara whom Venkatappa brought under his control. She had joined the league formed against Venkatappa at the instance of the Portuguese in 1612. However, by 1616 she fell out with the Bangar chief, her husband and leader of the league. In the battles they fought against each other the husband began to gain an upper hand. Under this circumstance she seems to have sought Venkatappa's help. The latter did give it in the form of a large army which attacked the Bangar chief who sought Portuguese aid. As we have seen the combined forces of the Portuguese and the Bangar chief could not withstand Venkatappa to whom the chief ultimately lost every thing. The Queen of Ullala, to whose aid Venkatappa had gone, was compelled to acknowledge his overlordship and cede a considerable part of her territories, including Bedrette, the best  
93 of her cities, all worth about 10,000 pagodas (Rs. 40,000).  
94

(8) The Queen of Karnad in South Kanara district was also subjugated by Venkatappa. She too was a member of the league formed against Venkatappa in 1612. The latter, however, brought her under his control and imposed an annual tribute ~~on~~ on

her. This he did in 1618 or thereabout. The Portuguese were not in a position to help her against Venkatappa. As Della Valle says, her defeat was due not only to her own weakness but also due to "the bad fortune and weakness of the Portuguese, her defenders, to whom she had always been a faithful friend."<sup>95</sup>

(9) The chief merchants of Basrur were forced to cede territories worth 50,000 pagodas (Rs. 200,000).<sup>96</sup>

(10) King Honna of Gangolly ceded territories worth 100,000 pagodas (Rs. 400,000).<sup>97</sup>

In addition to the above, a number of minor chiefs were also subjugated by Venkatappa. They were: the king of Palpare in South Coorg; Ramanatha Hari, chief of Kumbala; the king of Nerenki, in Puttukaluka; the king of Ajilara near Mulki in Udipi taluka; the king of Vamanjur in Mangalore taluka, who paid an annual tribute of 800 pagodas (Rs. 3,200); the Ballalas of Guedumardady, Manipary, Doltady, Kulur, Panambur, Pedanar, Mudibidri, Yerumal, Kapu, Katpady, Nidambur, Chittupadi, Belor, Konnara, Mudradi, Hebri, Hiretor, Tomboso, Anaji, Tagrette, Herar, Gololer, Agumbe, Muttur, Malor, Modicar, Adolly, Muloly and Vitala; the queen of Saura; and the people of Baguanor, Kelenar and Kanduli.<sup>98</sup><sup>99</sup>

Foot-notes:

1. KNV, p. 28.
2. Rao, N. L. : The Nayakas of Keladi, in VSCV, p. 256.
3. Ibid., p. 257. But according to KNV (p. 42) Sadashiva Nayaka ruled for about 32 years from 1513 to 1545.
4. KNV, p. 64, mentions 1545-1558, about 13 years as the reign period for Dodda Sankanna Nayaka; whereas an inscription, dated 1566, belonging to him has been discovered (Rao, N. L., op. cit., p. 259).
5. Rao, N. L. ; op. cit., p. 260.

6. KNV, (p. 90), assigns nearly 47-year reign for Venkatappa Nayaka, from 1582 to 1629; but inscriptions belonging to him are available only for the period from 1592 to 1629 (Rao, N. L., op. cit., pp. 261-2).
7. APO-CR, Vol. 3, p. 916. Father Heras (The Aravidu Dynasty of Vijayanagara, I, p. 423) refers to this letter; but he wrongly identifies the Keladi chief referred to in the letter as Chikka Sankanna. Father Heras, no doubt, is aware that Venkatappa began to rule at least from 1592, as he himself mentions. Since the Portuguese letter in question is of 1598 it can not be considered as referring to Chikka Sankanna but to Venkatappa.
8. APO-CR, Vol. 3, p. 591.
9. Valle, Pietro Della : The Travells of, ed. Edward Grey, II, pp. 218-220.
10. DRI, I, p. 74.
11. Ibid., pp. 167-8. Letter dated 2.1.1608, addressed to Viceroy.
12. Ibid., p. 254; II, pp. 159-60. Letters from King to Viceroy, dated 29.10.1609 and 13.2.1612.
13. Ibid., II, pp. 89-90. Letter from King to Viceroy, dated 11.3.1611.
14. Ibid., pp. 160, 350-1. Letters from King to Viceroy, dated 13.2.1612 and ~~13.3.1613~~ 1.3.1613.
15. Ibid., p. 294. Letter from King to Viceroy, dated 16.1.1613.
16. Assentos, I, pp. 97, 109.
17. Valle, Pietro Della, op. cit., p. 302.
18. Assentos, I, p. 97.
19. Ibid., p. 35.
20. D-DC, VIII, pp. 111-2.
21. Ibid., pp. 113-22.
22. Ibid., pp. 123-6.
23. Sousa, Manuel de Faria e : Asia Portuguesa, IV, pp. 64-5.
24. Heras, Henry : op. cit., p. 298.  
Pietro
25. Valle, Della, op. cit., p. 313.

26. Coutinho, Thome de Souza : Certidão, 22.8.1591 (PSSP ~~MSS~~ MSS), p. 1; APO-CR, Vol. 3, p. 244.
27. Supra, pp. 94-5.
28. APO-CR, Vol. 3, pp. 243-4.
29. Coutinho, Thome de Souza, op. cit., pp. 1-3.
30. APO-CR, Vol. 3, pp. 370-1.
31. Ibid., p. 427.
32. Ibid., p. 426.
33. Ibid., p. 503.
34. Ibid., p. 677.
35. D-AB, I, pp. 40-1.
36. Ibid., pp. 182-3; DRI, III, pp. 229-30.
37. DRI, III, p. 478.
38. Ibid., IV, p. 132.
39. D-AB, II, p. 471.
40. Ibid., p. 701.
41. DRI, IV, pp. 196-8. Letter of the Viceroy to King, dated 28.3.1617. This date seems to be erroneous.. The letter seems to have been written by João de Coutinho (Conde de Redondo) who became Viceroy with effect from 18.11.1617. Probably the letter was written soon after his assumption of office.
42. Ibid., V, pp. 236-7.
43. Ibid., p. 237.
44. Ibid., pp. 238-9.
45. Ibid., p. 241.
46. Assentos, I, pp. 15, 16, 18-9.
47. Ibid., pp. 17-9.
48. Ibid., pp. 17-8; DRI, V, p. 244.
49. DRI, V, pp. 244-6; CEO, II, pp. 240-1.
50. Assentos, I, p. 20.
51. EF, 1618-1621, pp. ~~68~~ 69-70.

52. Assentos, I, p. 115.
53. Sousa, Alfredo Botelho de : Subsidios para a História Militar Marítima da India, III, p. 145.
54. Assentos, I, pp. 30-1.
55. Ibid., pp. 33-5.
56. Ibid., pp. 35-6.
57. Ibid., p. 32.
58. Ibid., pp. 37-9.
59. Ibid., pp. 39-40.
60. Ibid., pp. 45-8.
61. Ibid., pp. 61-4.
62. Ibid., pp. 65-6.
63. Ibid., p. 99.
64. Ibid., pp. 66-7, 68, 70.
65. Ibid., pp. 92-3.
66. Ibid., pp. 95-7.
67. Ibid., pp. 97-9.
68. Ibid., p. 94.
69. Ibid., pp. 99-100.
70. Ibid., p. 102.
71. Ibid., pp. 104-5.
72. Ibid., pp. 105-6.
73. Ibid., p. 107.
74. Ibid., pp. 107-110.
75. Ibid., pp. 101-3, 110.
76. Ibid., p. 110.
77. Ibid., pp. 111-2.
78. Ibid., p. 115.
79. Ibid., pp. 146-7.
80. Valle, Pietro Della, op. cit., I, p. 191; II, pp. 202-89.

81. Ibid., II, pp. 212-3.
82. Ibid., pp. 243-4.
83. Ibid., p. 255.
84. ~~One~~ Ibid., pp. 285-7.
85. Ibid., pp. 287-8.
86. Assentos, I, p. 201.
87. Ibid., III, p. 639.
88. Heras, Henry : The Expansion Wars of Venkatappa Nayaka, an article, pp. 1-2.
89. Ibid., pp. 1, 10-11.
90. Ibid., p. 1.
91. Ibid.
92. Ibid.
93. Valle, Pietro Della : op. cit., II, pp. 314-5.
94. Heras, Henry : op. cit., p. 1.
95. Valle, Pietro Della : op. cit., p. 353.
96. Heras, Henry : op. cit., pp. 1-2.
97. Ibid., p. 2.
98. Valle, Pietro Della : op. cit., pp. 305-6.
99. Heras, Henry : op. cit., the identification of names is on the basis of  
that of Heras.

## Chapter 7.

### THE PORTUGUESE AND THE NAYAKAS OF IKKERI - II (1629-1645)

Venkatappa Nayaka was succeeded by his grandson, Virabhadra Nayaka, who ruled from 1629 to 1645.<sup>1</sup> Virabhadra had to face a threefold danger at his accession. In the first instance, the Adil Shah and other neighbouring rulers showed hostility towards him. Secondly, all those chiefs of Kanara, whom Venkatappa had subdued and had made vassals, revolted as soon as they heard the news of his death. Thirdly, a kinsman of Virabhadra, Virappa Nayaka, necessitated a war of succession to the throne of Ikkeri. He confronted all these troubles bravely.

The Adil Shah demanded from Virabhadra 9,000,000 gold pieces, valued at 2,700,000 pagodas (Rs. 10,800,000), 5 elephants and 200 Arab horses. In addition, an arrear of 2 years' tribute, calculated at 80,000 pagodas (Rs. 320,000) was also claimed. Further, Virabhadra was told to evacuate all the territories taken from kings, queens and ballalas on the Kanara coast. These, no doubt, were impossible demands. Virabhadra responded by saying that he would pay in all 300,000 pagodas (Rs. 1,200,000), provided the Adil Shah would aid him against those chiefs who were already in revolt. The Adil Shah was not satisfied with this reply and the hostility continued until October, 1630, when the two came to terms.<sup>2</sup> Vira-

Bhadra paid 500,000 pagodas (Rs. 2,000,000) to the former.<sup>3</sup>

The king of Sonda invaded the territories of Virabhadra who sent his army to defend. Both sides lost heavily ~~in~~ in men. The chief of Bilgi allied himself with Sonda. So also the rulers of Basavapattana and Belur jointly invaded his territories and took one of his fortresses. The 'king of mountain', probably king of Cannanor, who was a distinguished captain, marched personally against Virabhadra and defeated and wounded the latter's general, Virappa Naik, killing many of his men and capturing one elephant and 30 horses. Virappa fled from the battlefield and took shelter in a fortress at Baguanor. Virabhadra sent another army under the command of Siddhalinga Naik against the 'king of mountain'. But the latter

defeated the former too. These setbacks damaged the strength of Virabhadra considerably. The Bangar chief, the Queens of Ullala and Karnad, as well as all those subjugated kings, ballalas and peoples rose in arms in South Kanara. Thus, practically the whole of Kanara was in revolt against the authority of the new king of Ikkeri. However, the latter was able to withstand all, since he was rich and could afford to wait until an opportune moment offered itself to strike against his enemies effectually, particularly when the latter might be divided owing to internal differences.<sup>4</sup>

The Portuguese decided to fish in the troubled waters. They particularly desired to take the peninsula of Gangolly and build a fortress there. Of course, already they had a fortress in Basrur nearby. But as decades rolled by the force of winds had filled the river on the side of the fortress with sand. Thus, the bar at the fortress became shallow; but at the same time the river became deep on the side of the peninsula. Large and heavy ships could not reach the fortress except in the high tide. Some times it so happened that their ships carrying merchandise had to take shelter at the peninsula of Gangolly awaiting the high tide in order to go to the fortress. While at ~~the~~ Gangolly the ships used to be attacked by pirates of Malabar and the Portuguese captain of the fortress was not in a position to send effective relief to such ships. This situation of loss and danger led the Portuguese to covet the peninsula itself, where they thought of building a fortress. The suggestion to fortify Gangolly was made to the king of Portugal as early as 1617, for in his letter of 5 February, 1618 to the Viceroy, the king refers to this suggestion and commands the Viceroy to consult the Council of State on this matter and report to him.<sup>5</sup> However, the Portuguese did not get an opportunity to take the peninsula as long as Venkata-<sup>6</sup> ppa lived.

Not only Gangolly but also other lands of Kanara were coveted by the Portuguese. Francisco de Sousa Alcoforado, captain of Honavar, writing to the Viceroy on 18 November, 1629, proposed that the fortress of Honavar should be

strengthened and that certain islands nearby, which yielded 3,000 cruzados (Rs. 15,000) or more, might be captured. In fact, an attempt seems to have already been made to capture these islands. Nuno da Gunha, a Portuguese captain, had sailed forth with his fleet in order to occupy the islands; but he could do nothing "by reason of the great power which the king of those territories (namely, Venkatappa Nayaka) had". Now that the latter was dead and every one was in revolt against his successor, Alcoforado suggested that the Viceroy should authorise him and send assistance to occupy these islands. He further pointed out that everyone was trying to grab at whatever was possible; that the Adil Shah intended to occupy some lands of Kanara; and that he would be more dangerous than a Hindu ruler as a neighbour. Deliberating upon the suggestions of Alcoforado, the Viceroy-in-Council decided on 22 November, 1629 to order repairing and strengthening of the fortress of Honavar and to send 30 soldiers. So also 50 soldiers were to be dispatched to Basrur and 30 to Mangalore for the defence of the fortresses there. Regarding the occupation of the islands near Honavar,<sup>7</sup> more information was to be collected before taking a decision. In fact, the Portuguese do not seem to have occupied the islands at all.

In the same Council meeting the question of Gangolly was also considered. It was recalled that since several years the king of Portugal had intended to change the fortress from Basrur to Gangolly and to convert the latter peninsula into an island by digging a canal between the sea and the river. As soon as Venkatappa died the merchants of Upper Basrur, to whom the peninsula had probably belonged formerly, seem to have offered it to the Portuguese. The merchants apparently needed Portuguese protection in view of the prevailing disturbances. The Portuguese also thought that the peninsula, fortified and made an island, would be a safer place than Basrur for themselves. They could defend themselves better and at the same time carry on offensive action against Virabhadra by encouraging and animating his enemies. They had another anxiety too. The Adil Shah was trying to dominate at least some of the territories which be-

longed to Ikkeri and the Portuguese did not want this to happen. The Viceroy-in-Council chose Diogo de Sousa de Menezes, experienced soldier and member of the Council, as Captain General of the armed forces of land and sea of Kanara, who was to visit the various fortresses and communicate with the local chiefs promising them assistance against Virabhadra. He was to start from Goa with 4 ships (manchuas), 2 meant for Honavar and 2 for Basrur. All the captains of the Kanara fortresses were to be under his command; so also the captain-major<sup>8</sup> of the fleets of Malabar and Kanara. He was to pay particular attention to the Basrur fortress and study the peninsula of Gangolly. He was to see that the Adil Shah did not become master of any territory in Kanara.

On reaching the Basrur fortress, Diogo found it in disorder. The soldiers disobeyed their captains. A vicar had been murdered and many other offences had been committed. The culprits were mostly unpunished and even those who were awarded with sentences like exile were still residing in the fortress. Reporting of these to the Viceroy on 22 December, Diogo sought judicial powers to clean the fortress of its offenders, homicides and exiles. The Viceroy-in-Council empowered Diogo to do so.<sup>9</sup>

Diogo also visualised shortage of rice, should Virabhadra prevent its supply from his lands as a result of hostility. Provision to secure rice worth 50,000 xerafins (Rs. 57,143) from the North was therefore to be made. The Municipality of Upper Basrur was to be requested not to revolt until the necessary supply of rice was taken out.<sup>10</sup>

On 3 January, 1630 Virabhadra declared the Portuguese his enemy and ordered the blockade of rice supplies from Basrur as expected. Diogo suggested in his letter of the same date to the Viceroy that the latter too should reciprocate by a similar declaration. The Municipality of Upper Basrur and all the people within the boundaries of Basrur were now in revolt in league with other kings and ballalas of the Kanara coast. Diogo considered it a golden opportunity to secure the peninsula of Gangolly. He personally measured by one night the

width of the land between the sea and the river at the north end of the peninsula. It was 80 paces and a canal could easily be dug up as the land was sandy. After the conversion of the peninsula into an island, he thought, ten manchus were sufficient to defend it at times of war. The fortress of Basrur also needed explosives and firemen. He urged the Viceroy to send him all these in 8 manchus as quickly as possible, warning that delayed relief would be of no avail. The Viceroy-in-Council decided that Diogo should arrive at a settlement with the Municipality of Upper Basrur by which the latter would give the Portuguese the peninsula of Gangolly as a gift, thus providing a legal right to possess the place. It seems that Venkatappa had imposed on the Portuguese, in order to maintain two temples at Basrur, a tax in the form of 200 bags of rice every year on the rice supplies they took from ~~Basrur~~ Basrur. Diogo was instructed to secure the discontinuation of this provision in the new settlement with the Municipality. On the contrary, the latter was to be induced to give the Portuguese a good quantity of rice, in addition to the customary tribute, for the sustenance of the Basrur fortress. So also the Municipality was to be urged to agree to give the Portuguese every year an appreciable quantity of pepper at 56 xerfins (Rs. 64) a khandi. Besides, Diogo was to endeavour to secure as much other useful concessions from the Municipality as possible. The latter's reward was to be Portuguese assistance against Virabhadra and later on the protection of the Portuguese fortress to be built in the peninsula. A fleet with men of arms and mariners to dig the canal was sent to Diogo. 4,000 xerfins (Rs. 4,571) were also furnished for his expences. In addition, he was authorised to spend the income of the Basrur fortress in rice trade.  
11

By February, Diogo took possession of the peninsula, as a letter from the Viceroy to the king of Portugal, dated 20 February, indicates. Regarding the utility of the place wrote Diogo to the Viceroy: "This island of Cambolim (Gangolly) is two leagues in length and one-third of a league in breadth. It has lovely paddy-fields which certainly yield a yearly crop of 20,000 bags of rice, as also many beautiful palm-groves. It will be of great use to the State if this island

comes into the possession of His Majesty, that thither might be transferred this fortress which is not quite safe, for in case the enemy sets up a bulwark at the point where this river is narrowest, it will be impossible for anything to enter it, or to bring reinforcements to this fortress, except by very light and small boats, whereas, in case this fortress stands on this island it will be possible at any moment to send it aid by the deserted coast. By this step it will also be possible better to secure the provisions that go from this harbour to that city (Goa) - a thing very essential to it - and also it will be possible to take from this harbour a yearly load of 1,500 khandis of pepper at a moderate price, as formerly; and besides this, many .... of all classes, with much nitre, iron and steel, and ....all things with which the State cannot dispense.

"And also there will be found in this island many sailors for the royal fleets of the State, which will make it possible to dispense with those of the metropolis; this will prevent the Malabarlis from having these sailors for their ships, for it is well known that they come here to take them.

"And if from this harbour there should sally forth, in September, twelve armed Sanguiceis, and scour the seas between Cannanor and this fort, till the month of May, it will be the best kind of war that could be waged against the whole Malabar, by cutting off from it the provisions that go to it from these places, as also by preventing them from securing the said sailors.

"His Majesty will have from this island an income of 10,000 being proceeds of the quit-rent and other sources sufficient for the maintenance of the said <sup>and,</sup> fortress, <sup>12</sup> in future, this income will be greatly increased, especially if the custom house is transferred there."

Soon after taking possession of the peninsula Diogo began to fortify the place with stockades and to dig the canal to link the river with sea. At the ~~same~~ time of writing the letter of 20 February, 1630 the work was in progress with a thousand workers. The Viceroy sent stone and lime together with skilled carpenters, masons and engineers. The peninsula was in fact converted into an <sup>13</sup>

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island by March, when Diogo fell ill and was permitted to go to Goa. But the canal was filled with sand. And the dream of converting the place into an effective island never seems to have been fulfilled. However, the place was ~~fortified~~<sup>15</sup>  
fortified by February, 1633, as has been pointed out.<sup>16</sup>

As the work of fortification was in progress the forces of Virabhadra seem to have attacked the Portuguese at Gangolly as well as at Basrur. He ~~had~~<sup>17</sup> caused a stockade to be erected near those of the Portuguese at Gangolly and endeavoured to take the half completed fortress, with 2 bulwarks, one wall and some stockades, from the Portuguese. The latter, however, defended well and killed many of the Ikkeri forces. The Viceroy sent reinforcements. And the work continued until the end of the rainy season without much trouble. In August, the captain-major of Kanara, with a fleet of 16 ships, approached Basrur. Virabhadra's men were dismayed at the sight of the powerful fleet. In the meantime, Virabhadra had to face a civil war. His uncle, Virappa Nayaka, who was in prison for thirty three years, escaped and declared himself king of Ikkeri. The nobles and the feudatories of Ikkeri were now divided, some supporting Virabhadra and others, Virappa. Both sides came to have more or less equal strength. The Viceroy decided to favour Virappa, thinking that he was the just heir and that Virabhadra was already hostile towards the Portuguese. Virappa seems to have soon gained successes at Basrur against his rival. It resulted, at any rate, in regular rice supplies to the Portuguese from Upper Basrur. Besides, the stockade that was built by Virabhadra's men in front of the Portuguese fortress of Gangolly was destroyed at the instance of Virappa. The latter also made overtures of peace through Vittala Shenoy who had been for some time the envoy of Ikkeri to Goa. The Viceroy was not satisfied with the terms proposed and therefore he sent his own ambassador with Vittala Shenoy, with new and modified proposals,  
<sup>18</sup>  
to Virappa.

Finally, a treaty of peace and friendship was actually signed between the  
<sup>19</sup>  
Portuguese and Virappa Nayaka on 7 March, 1631. Its terms and conditions were

20

as follows: (1) Virappa and his successors should always be loyal and faithful friends of the Portuguese, being friends of their friends and enemies of their enemies. They should give all the assistance and favour to the Portuguese in their wars, whenever requested. The Portuguese also should give similar assistance and favour to Virappa and his successors. (2) Virappa should cede to the Portuguese the peninsula of Gangolly, extending from point to point upto the small temple of Marsamy (Kumaraswamy ?), the Portuguese being allowed to possess and enjoy the place for ever with its customary privileges. But the income of the temple of Gufaçar (Guheshwara ?) and that of Marsamy should belong to these temples as before. The people of the peninsula should be allowed to live according to their law and customs. The Viceroy and his successors should be permitted to erect fortresses in the island. (3) Virappa and his successors should allow the Portuguese every year to cut and take away timber from the lands of Ikkeri. No duty should be imposed upon such timber. The Ikkeri rulers should instruct their administrators to give necessary guards to the timber, the guards being paid by the Portuguese. (4) The Ikkeri rulers should not admit into their ports the two Babeas (probably pirates of Malabar), nor any other embarkations of the Malabarese which did not possess Portuguese passports; nor should they allow the Malabarese to take sailors or food-grains from their ports and lands. (5) The navigation (taurim) of Honavar should be free as before. (6) The rulers of Ikkeri should pay a tribute of 500 loads of rice with all punctuality in the future, as well as that which was due. (7) The taxes, imposed on articles sold and purchased by the Portuguese and which were in force during the course of the previous eight years, should be discontinued. So also no duty should be imposed upon the ships from Mascat. (8) The lands and palm-groves belonging to the cazados and other Portuguese residents near the fortress of Basrur should be ceded to Virappa. In return for these the latter should give, to the greater advantage of the former, land and income in Gangolly. Assessors should be appointed for settling the value of the four villages promised; and if it was insufficient additional income should be given to the cazados and residents. (9) All

the pepper of Gersoppa and other places belonging to the Ikkeri rulers should be sold freely without any obstruction to the purchasers or to the sellers. The Viceroy should have no obligation to ~~the purchasers or to the sellers.~~ The Viceroy should have no obligation to purchase any pepper from Virappa; so also the latter should not be obliged to sell any to the former. However, if the Viceroy wished to purchase pepper and Virappa wished to sell it, it should be done according to the price fixed by free agreement between the two parties. (10) Virappa and his successors should refer to the Viceroy for his decision any dispute with any of the allies of the Portuguese and should abide by the decision given.

The above clauses referred to the terms and conditions applicable to Virappa. The following applied to the Portuguese: (1) The Viceroy, Conde de Linhares, and his successors should be friends of Virappa and his successors and vassals, friends of friends and enemies of enemies. If any of the allies disobeyed the sentence given by the Viceroy with regard to a dispute referred to him by Virappa, the Viceroy should declare the disobedient ally an enemy, and the obedient, a friend. (2) Virappa and his successors should be allowed to take from Goa every year ten horses, free of all duties, as long as the treaty of peace was maintained. (3) The Viceroy should hand over to Virappa two ships that were captured from Virabhadra during the course of the hostility between the latter and the Portuguese.

A fine of 10,000 pagodas (Rs. 40,000), equivalent to the Goan currency of 35,000 xerafins, should be paid by the party that failed to fulfil the terms and conditions of the treaty in full or in part, to the other party which abided by them. The treaty should not be renewed unless the violating party paid the prescribed fine to the other.

The treaty was signed at Basrur by the Viceroy and by Vittala Shenoy and Tirumalayya, ambassadors of Virappa. The latter, who was pleased with the treaty, rewarded the captains of the Portuguese fleet with 21,450 xerafins (Rs. 24,514), which were distributed among those who had taken out ships at their own cost.

He also issued a notice to the people of Gangolly on 18 April, that he had given the land to the Viceroy whom they should obey and to whom they should pay the customary revenues. If they were offended by the Portuguese, complaints were to be sent to Virappa. He assured them to request the Viceroy not to offend any

<sup>21</sup>

more. In virtue of the treaty and the notice, a deed of possession was drawn

<sup>22</sup>

on 12 May, whereupon the Portuguese took actual possession of Gangolly.

A couple of months after the conclusion of the above transactions Virappa

<sup>23</sup>

died and Virabhadra, his nephew, became the unrivalled king of Ikkeri. Simultaneously with Virappa, Virabhadra too had made his own proposals for a treaty of peace and friendship with the Portuguese. However, the Viceroy had preferred

<sup>24</sup>

to deal with Virappa.

Virabhadra renewed his negotiations with the Portuguese in October or thereabout. Vittala Shenoy, who was also Virappa's ambassador, presented the proposals which were substantially different from the terms and conditions of the treaty with Virappa. Virabhadra wished that the Portuguese should purchase pepper from him at the old rate and that they should destroy their fortress of Gangolly. These terms were not acceptable to the Portuguese and Vittala was told that Virabhadra should agree to a treaty with the same terms and conditions of the treaty with Virappa. Vittala reported this to Virabhadra. Though about a fortnight passed by, no response came from the latter. Thereupon the Viceroy-in-Council

<sup>25</sup>

deliberated upon the matter anew on 18 November.

In the meantime, the rulers of Bangher, Karnad and the 'mountain' requested the Portuguese, their ally, to assist them against Virabhadra. In return for the help the Portuguese were promised substantial supplies of pepper, wood, iron and rice, and also carpenters, blacksmiths and other skilled workers for the fortification of Gangolly. The captain-major of the fleet of Kanara, Domingos Fereira Beliago, suggested to the Viceroy in a letter of 13 November, that a quick resolution should be taken regarding the negotiations with Virabhadra who was

being attacked anew by the Adil Shah, as Virabhadra had not paid the latter the customary tribute which a vassal, at his succession and coronation, paid to his lord. Domingos further mentioned that the Muslim captain of Ponda also had sent his forces to the frontier of the kingdom of Ikkeri; that in addition to the rulers of Bangher, Karnad and the 'mountain', the merchants of Basrur also sought Portuguese aid against Virabhadra; and that if the latter tried to postpone the conclusion of a treaty, in terms of the ~~the~~ previous treaty with Virappa, until he came to terms with the Adil Shah, so as to be able to impose his own terms upon the Portuguese, the Viceroy should decide in favour of the allies against him. Taking all these into account the Viceroy-in-Council came to the conclusion  
26  
that their allies should openly be assisted against Virabhadra.

It seems that Virabhadra had to fight against his enemies at several points at ~~one~~ once. He led his army personally against Kenge Gauda of Basavapattana. He sent a troop against the revolting merchants of Upper Basrur. By March, 1632 he settled terms with Kenge Gauda and prepared to send reinforcements to Basrur. By this time the Mughals also appeared in the Deccan. This was a common danger for all - the Portuguese, the Adil Shah and Virabhadra. The Viceroy thought of negotiating for a truce between Virabhadra and his revolting feudatories who were being aided by the Portuguese. Further, if Virabhadra was found willing to aid the Adil Shah against the Mughals, the Viceroy thought of favouring Virabhadra. Accordingly, Baltazar Marinho, who was experienced and well-versed with the  
27  
affairs of Kanara, was dispatched as ambassador to Virabhadra. Baltazar was instructed to congratulate Virabhadra on his succession to the throne of Ikkeri: to secure his permission for the fortification of Gangolly at the site of the  
28  
'Pao'; to agree upon reasonable prices for rice and pepper; and to prepare a survey of the peninsula of Gangolly on his return journey. At Ikkeri Baltazar found Virabhadra firm in not allowing the Portuguese to fortify Gangolly. Being informed of this, the Viceroy-in-Council, meeting on 25 May, decided to dissemble. Baltazar was instructed to demonstrate friendship towards Virabhadra by saying that the Portuguese would erect a fortress at the 'Pao' only when Virabhadra

permitted it, though they were certain that he would never allow this. He was also instructed not to decide anything regarding the prices of rice and pepper, as the price of rice was very high, and as pepper trade could be carried on in  
the manner provided for in the treaty with Virappa. Meanwhile, the Portuguese  
strengthened the defences of their fortresses in Kanara and favoured and animated  
Virabhadra's enemies, the Tuluvas, under the sly. On the surface they appeared  
to be neutral. Writing of this to the king of Portugal on 4 November, 1632  
the Viceroy said, "It appeared to me convenient to send Baltazar Marinho as  
ambassador with instructions.....and meanwhile I provided and furnished with  
doubled garrison and arms all the fortresses which Your Majesty possesses in Kang-  
ra, and, under the sly, I animated the Tuluvas, who offered me grand advantages,  
with the condition that aid be given them, and as the said king, Virabhadra  
Nayaka, is so powerful in these parts, I was happy to make myself conveniently  
neutral in appearance, so that I am more free to choose for agreement of friend-  
ship one who emerges victorious, without falling out with the other party."  
<sup>30</sup>

Virabhadra emerged victorious. He gained Upper Basrur in due course. He did not permit the Portuguese to be complete masters of Gangolly. The Viceroy, however, thought of dominating the whole of Gangolly by erecting another fort-  
ress at the point where the peninsula was separated from the mainland; but did not get an opportunity to do so. Virabhadra offered fresh terms of peace; but the Viceroy considered them unbecoming of the Portuguese to accept. One of the conditions was that the Portuguese should give up or dismantle their fortress of Basrur. Prima facie the condition was harmless, for the fortress in question had virtually become useless. But this condition could be accepted only if Gan-  
golly was given to the Portuguese with permission to fortify it. Gangolly had an income of 5,000 xerafins (Rs. 5,714) a year and the Viceroy hoped to increase it to 50,000 (Rs. 57,140) in due course. He also visualised the day when the peninsula could be populated with Christians from Goa. Further, 20,000 loads of rice of the giraçal variety, which the people of Gangolly sold every year, could always be secured for Goa. But Gangolly was not offered by Virabhadra.  
<sup>31</sup>

As the Viceroy was considering the above, news reached Goa towards the middle of November, that Virabhadra was erecting a fortress in Gangolly, about a cannon-shot from the Portuguese fortress there. By this time he had already finished 2 walls, each 6 to 7 spans wide and 2.2 metres high, with 4 bulwarks of the same height, all of stone. Many armed <sup>men</sup> and 400 labourers were being employed and the work was being carried on with great speed so that the fortress could be completed before the Viceroy sent a fleet from Goa to hinder the work. Antonio de Azevedo, captain of Gangolly, and Mallasena, general of the 'king of the mountain', who reported this development to the Viceroy, opined that Virabhadra would violate peace as soon as the fortress was completed half-way. Mallasena offered the Portuguese 1,000 men of arms to obstruct the fortification. Deliberating upon this development the Viceroy-in-Council decided to demand the destruction of the fortress under construction. Accordingly, Domingos Fereira Beliago, captain-major of Kanara, who was on his way to Cochin with a fleet of 16 ships and who was to stop at Honavar for wood, was instructed to meet Vittala Shenoy at Honavar and say that if Virabhadra wanted war before peace the Portuguese were prepared for it; but that if he wanted peace, the fortress must be demolished forthwith and soldiers be withdrawn from Gangolly. If Vittala agreed to secure the destruction of the fortress, Domingos was to see it done and then proceed to Cochin. If Vittala refused to do so, the captain-major was to suspend his voyage to Cochin and to communicate instead with Mallasena, the king of Karnad and the ruler of Bangher in order to induce them to send their soldiers to Gangolly, which they always wished to do in order to capture Upper Basrur from Virabhadra, and to allow which they had requested the Viceroy several times with the offer that they would secure Gangolly for the Portuguese. The major was to leave 6 ships at Honavar to fetch wood and with the remaining 10 ships he was to attack the vessels ~~now~~ at the ports of Kanara. He was also to keep on encouraging and favouring the enemies of Virabhadra. If Vittala was to say, as a third alternative possibility, that he would proceed to Goa for peace talks, the major was to ensure that he actually sailed for Goa, and then proceed

32  
on his own voyage to Cochin.

The Portuguese wondered why Virabhadra insisted upon preventing them from entrenching themselves in Gangolly which they had secured by two 'good' titles : one, by way of gift from the Municipality of Upper Basrur to whom the peninsula originally belonged; and second, by the treaty between them and Virappa Nayaka. They were surprised also to be asked to destroy their fortress of Basrur, without compensation in the form of Gangolly. The king of Portugal ordered the Viceroy not to give up the Basrur fortress, without his express command, even if Gangolly was secured and fortified.  
33

Vittala Shenoy came to Goa with the following proposals of peace and friendship: (1) The Portuguese should destroy their fortress at Basrur and cede all their lands there to Virabhadra who would then cede to them the whole of the peninsula of Gangolly, with the condition that the Portuguese would never erect a fortress in Gangolly in addition to the one which they had there already. (2) Virabhadra would grant the cazados as much other lands in Gangolly as they had in Basrur. (3) The Portuguese could collect the customary land revenues from the subjects of Gangolly; but the lands belonging to the temple Gufeçar should be free. (4) The price of pepper could be decided largely by the Viceroy. (5) There should be a perpetual treaty of peace between the Portuguese and Virabhadra, as friends of friends and enemies of enemies. (6) The Portuguese should assist Virabhadra against the Tuluvas, whenever necessary. (7) Virabhadra should be allowed every year 12 horses, or as many more as possible, without taxes. (8) He should be given three passports every year for three embarkations to the Strait of Mecca, to Mascat and to Kishin. (9) He would release rice and wood from his territories, as before, for the Portuguese. (10) He would not admit any pirates into his lands. (11) He would not impose more taxes upon the Portuguese than was customary. (12) The Portuguese should return the two ships captured from him. Vittala was not empowered to agree to any modification in these terms.  
34

The Viceroy-in-Council, in a meeting on 21 December, considered the first

provision the most offensive to the prestige and reputation of the Portuguese. Virabhadra himself "did not inherit fortresses from his forefathers to give them up." The Portuguese, therefore, would not dismantle their fortress of Basrur, not even by agreement, and not even though they knew very well that it was of no use once the island of Gangolly was fortified, unless the king of Portugal wished to dismantle it on his free will. Finally, it was decided to tell the ambassador that the question ~~whether~~ of dismantling the fortress would be left to the king of Portugal; and that the terms regarding pepper and other matters were acceptable to the Viceroy, on the basis of which negotiations could be continued.

Nothing concrete was concluded until 31 March, 1633, by which time Virabhadra completed the construction of the fortress in Gangolly. Vittala, however, was back for peace talks. The Viceroy-in-Council considered whether they should conclude a treaty with Virabhadra even though the latter had completed the fortress and had collected the revenues of Gangolly. Their conclusion was that they should purchase from him every year 350 khandis of pepper, but 500 khandis in the first or current year, at the rate of 22 pagodas (Rs. 88) a khandi, provided that Gangolly was left by him in the same condition in which it was at the time of commencing peace talks, and also provided that its revenues were left to them.

At last, on 5 April, 1633 a treaty of peace and perpetual friendship was signed in Goa between the Portuguese and Virabhadra. Its terms and conditions were as follows: (1) No change or modification should be made with regard to the Portuguese fortresses of Gangolly and Basrur, everything being left in the state in which it was when Virabhadra wrote to the Viceroy through Vittala to conclude the treaty, until the Viceroy received further orders from the king of Portugal. This meant that the Portuguese and Virabhadra were to retain their respective fortresses in Gangolly and Basrur, until the king of Portugal agreed to dismantle the Basrur fortress. (2) There should be perpetual friendship between the Portuguese and Virabhadra, both being friends of friends and enemies of enemies, and

helping each other against each other's enemies to whatever extent possible. Virabhadra should not admit pirates or Malabarese into his ports. (3) Virabhadra and his successors should release all the rice and other food-grains from the lands of Ikkeri and its ports to Goa and other Portuguese fortresses, as was always the custom. He should instruct his tanadar at Upper Basrur that the rice should of right be released for the Portuguese. (4) He should command the merchants of Upper Basrur to pay the customary annual tribute of 500 loads of rice to the Portuguese. (5) The latter should compulsorily purchase from Virabhadra every year 350 khandis of pepper at the rate of 22 pagodas (Rs. 88) a khandi. In payment for this pepper he should accept the exchange rate of 102 old Sāotomēs for 100 pagodas of Ikkeri. If the Portuguese wished to purchase more pepper it should be at a price fixed by agreement between them and Virabhadra as between merchant and merchant. (6) Virabhadra should be allowed to take from Goa, every year, 12 horses of Arabia free of duties; in return he should release every year 24 masts by the river of Gersoppa or by the waters of Sangari (?) for the Portuguese ships. (7) The Portuguese should give Virabhadra three pass-ports every year for his three embarkations to Mecca, **Mascat** and Kishin, as was the custom before. (8) The Portuguese should be allowed to cut down and bring all the necessary wood from his territories, without any payment, for their shipyards; and he should aid them in the process of cutting and transporting the wood. (9) He should instruct his tax-collectors of the Kanara coast not to collect from the Portuguese more taxes than those imposed by ~~his~~ his grandfather, Venkatappa, at the commencement of the latter's reign. (10) The Portuguese should return the two ships captured from Virabhadra. (11) If either party violated any of the terms and conditions of the treaty, the violating party should pay the other all the losses and damages caused.

Virabhadra wrote to the Viceroy after the conclusion of this treaty and assured him of the supply of iron and saltpetre at a reasonable price. He thanked the Viceroy for the latter's present consisting of a horse and the saddle, and

a sword and a spear, saying: "I did not expect these things from Your Excellency except pure friendship, but as Your Excellency sent them with love, I accepted them with great pleasure." No doubt, he also had sent a present of 300 loads of fine rice to the Viceroy before the treaty was signed. In the letter of credentials given to his ambassador, Virabhadra had sought a gunner, a master of horses, a physician and a cook from the Viceroy. It is not indicated whether these were supplied or not.

With all these, Virabhadra was accused of violating the terms and conditions of the treaty. We learn from the minutes of the Council of State held on 18 November, 1634 that he demanded 28 pagodas (Rs. 112) for a khandi of pepper, whereas the treaty provided for 22 pagodas (Rs. 88). However, 28 pagodas was the price charged formerly by Venkatappa. It seems that the Viceroy had deliberately included the low rate of 22 pagodas, taking advantage of the proposal of Virabhadra that the price of pepper should largely be decided by the former. Virabhadra prohibited the supply of even a single load of rice to the Portuguese so that they should be compelled to pay the raised price for pepper. The Viceroy-in-Council decided to insist upon the terms of the treaty and to warn Virabhadra not to force new hostilities by violating the treaty. Baltazar Marinho, procurator, who had been sent to secure the pepper, was instructed accordingly. If the Nayaka refused to abide by the treaty, Baltazar was to withdraw quickly from his kingdom. Hostility was then to be commenced by hindering Virabhadra's <sup>40</sup> embarkations.

By February, 1635 Virabhadra subdued all the rebels. Wrote the Viceroy to the king of Portugal on 6 February: "King Virabhadra Nayaka has overpowered all the kingdoms which, at the death of his grandfather, Venkatappa Nayaka, had rebelled, because he (Venkatappa) conquered them tyrannically, and the lands under his (Virabhadra's) control border upon those of the king of Cannanor". However, Virabhadra did not lack in enemies, particularly his neighbours in the hinterland, against whom he sent several armies, some of which he led personally.

The Viceroy considered him "arrogant by inclination and deficient in (keeping) promise." This, no doubt, was a reference to Virabhadra's demand for more than the contracted price for pepper. The Viceroy's threat of war seems to have resulted in Virabhadra's retreat from the position he had taken. The Portuguese were given pepper at 22 pagodas (Rs. 88) a khandi as per the treaty. They were also allowed to take rice as before.  
<sup>41</sup>

In the following year Virabhadra again demanded a higher price for pepper. He also seems to have hinted that the Portuguese should dismantle their fortress of Basrur. In order to pressurise the Portuguese he blockaded rice supplies to them from his territories as in the previous year. Considering these factors in a meeting of 17 January, 1636 the Viceroy-in-Council came to the conclusion that under no circumstances should a higher price be conceded and that the Basrur fortress be not destroyed. They decided to purchase food-grains from the ports of Manjeshwara and Kumbala. Though these ports belonged to Virabhadra,  
<sup>42</sup> the people there sold their rice to anyone who paid for it. By April, Virabhadra sent an ambassador, Devarasa Shenoy, to Goa with certain proposals of general character. During the course of the discussions in the Council meeting concerning the embassy, some members suggested that the embassy should be taken advantage of to negotiate for the destruction of the fortress built by Virabhadra in Gangolly. They also opined that if this was agreed to and if Gangolly was given to the Portuguese with the right to fortify it, they might consent to dismantle their fortress of Basrur. However, the last mentioned issue was to be mooted only if Devarasa expressly referred to it. So also they thought that the issue of the price of pepper should come first from Devarasa. The Viceroy, however, decided to respond to the embassy by merely saying that the Portuguese were prepared to abide by the treaty already concluded and that certain complaints made by Virabhadra against the previous Viceroy, Conde de Linhares, would be referred  
<sup>43</sup> to the king of Portugal.

The document that Devarasa submitted to the Viceroy is of considerable interest. It traces the relations between the Portuguese and Ikkeri from the

days of Venkatappa, saying that there was always friendship between the two, and that Venkatappa, at his death, had advised Virabhadra to continue friendly relations with the Portuguese. But, "Conde de Linhares, Viceroy, sent a fleet of which Diogo de Sousa de Menezes was the captain-major, in order to negotiate with the merchants and ballalas, vassals of the king my lord, and on the other hand sent .... Baltazar de ~~Albuquerque~~ Araujo to king Virabhadra Nayaka my lord to say that the fleet which the Conde sent was in his favour," thus deceiving Virabhadra who intended to be on friendly terms with the Portuguese in keeping with his grandfather's ~~wise~~ advice. The document continued to say that when the Viceroy began to fortify Gangolly Virabhadra told him that it belonged to the kingdom of Ikkeri and therefore he should not fortify it. But the fortification was continued. While Virabhadra was absent from Ikkeri, being engaged in a battle against the 'king of the mountain', some captains revolted and proclaimed Virappa as king of Ikkeri. Virabhadra fought against the latter for six months at the end of which Virappa was defeated and his supporters were punished. The kingdoms of Sonda and Bilgi, two important supporters of Virappa, were captured. While Virabhadra and Virappa were at war the Conde de Linhares went to fortify Gangolly. The Viceroy was told that Virappa was only a figurehead, and not the rightful king; but the Conde concluded a treaty with him, setting aside the peace proposals of Virabhadra, from whom only the presents were ~~ever~~ accepted. Virappa gave the Conde 10,000 pagodas (Rs. 40,000) of gold and agreed to whatever the latter told him. In concluding, the document pointed out that it was found impossible to have friendship with the Portuguese, inspite of the treaty of 1633, as long as the Conde de Linhares remained the Viceroy; but hope was expressed that the new Viceroy, Pero da Silva, would be amenable to friendly relations. As this document was considered as containing no concrete proposals, Devarasa made another statement in which he declared that Virabhadra did not wish to allow the Portuguese both the fortresses of Basrur and Gangolly, but only one, and that the rest of the terms and conditions could be settled after the

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destruction of one of the two fortresses.

46

A special meeting of the Council of State was held on 25 April to consider the clarifying declaration of Devarasa. Three former captain-majors of Kanara were invited and asked to give their opinions. The proposition before them was: What advantages the Portuguese could get by having the fortress of Gangolly or by not having it; and which of the two fortresses of Gangolly and Basrur was of more utility than the other. One of the captain-majors opined as follows:

(1) At <sup>the</sup> time of war the fortress of Basrur could be better defended with less number of soldiers, because it was small, well constructed and more amenable to defence than that of Gangolly. (2) The fortress of Basrur was the gateway of Upper Basrur from where nothing could go out, and to which nothing could come, except by way of the fortress by the river. That was why the merchants of Upper Basrur paid an annual tribute. (3) Whenever the Ikkeri rulers blocked rice supplies the cazados of Basrur could go to the city by night in order to purchase the commodity which the local merchants sold them. This facility would not be available at Gangolly which was encircled by water. (4) Even if Virabhadra gave the peninsula to the Portuguese on his own free will, or it was gained by force, the existing fortress was of no use for defence as it was far away from the pass from the mainland. A wall with a bulwark would have to be built at the 'Pao', guarding the pass, and then alone the Portuguese could gain by the products of Gangolly and its population could be converted to Christianity as in Goa. (5) Notwithstanding the impediment that the Basrur fortress depended heavily upon succour by the river in times of war, and that heavy and large embarkations could not reach the fortress at low tide, the fortress could always be relieved with the help of small fast moving ships and sanguiceis. This defence had always been provided with great effect. In fact, Andre Furtado, the then captain-major of Kanara, sailed up the river and caused much damage to the enemy whom he compelled to seek peace.

For these reasons he thought that the Portuguese should retain the Basrur

fortress on a permanent basis. The existing fortress of Gangolly should be destroyed, as it was nothing but a source of expences and vexations. The Christians, who were at Gangolly, were being insulted by the natives with impunity. They broke, for instance, a cross that was placed at the distance of a stone-throw from the fortress. He also pointed out that if the Basrur fortress was given up, Virabhadra would certainly entrench himself there and thus gain control over the river and Upper Basrur, which would result in the loss of the tribute to the Portuguese from the latter city. Besides, the advantages from Gangolly depended much upon Upper Basrur which was a centre of much trade.

The second captain-major had a different opinion. It was true that the Basrur fortress was of better build, was on a better and more elevated site, and was more convenient to defend than the fortress São Miguel of Gangolly; but there were many difficulties in relieving it in times of war, because it was away from the mouth of the river and the enemies, placing themselves along the bank, could bombard the Portuguese ships navigating the river. Besides, cargo-ships and other heavy vessels could not reach the Basrur fortress except at high tide. It was also known that the current was depositing more and more sand at the bar of the Basrur fortress. Further, it was impossible to aid the fortress by land. Defence and security of a fortress were always important, but the position of the Basrur fortress ~~www~~ was very weak indeed from this point of view. On the other hand, Gangolly could be relieved any time by landing soldiers by the sea shore. If Virabhadra gave Gangolly to the Portuguese, a fortress could be erected at the 'Pao' and the place could become impregnable to the enemy. However, with the existing fortress of São Miguel alone Gangolly could not be controlled effectively, particularly because of the existence of an enemy fortress at the distance of a gun-shot. If Virabhadra destroyed this fortress first and gave Gangolly to the Portuguese, the Basrur fortress could be destroyed.

The third captain-major agreed with the second, but pointed out that São Miguel too was away from the bar and aid by land was not easy.

The concensus therefore appeared to be that Gangolly was better than Basrur, provided the former was given wholly to the Portuguese and a fortress was erected at the 'Pao'. Accordingly, the Viceroy-in-Council came to the conclusion that the Basrur fortress could be destroyed provided Virabhadra destroyed his fortress in Gangolly first, and gave the whole of the peninsula to the Portuguese with the permission to erect their fortress at the 'Pao'. The destruction of the Basrur fortress was to be effected only after fortifying Gangolly at the 'Pao' and other necessary points, and not before. This resolution was made known to Devarasa who, however, said that he was not commissioned to agree to the cession of additional territories in Gangolly. He therefore sought permission to return to Ikkeri to present the case before Virabhadra for his further orders. The Viceroy-in-Council was not prepared to permit him to go immediately, fearing that Virabhadra might create fresh troubles. They decided to wait until news was received from the captain-major of Kanara concerning the situation there,  
47 and then send their own ambassador to Ikkeri along with Devarasa.

By the latter half of October, Devarasa was back with practically the same proposals from Virabhadra. The latter was not prepared to undo his fortress of Gangolly, nor was he prepared to allow the Portuguese to erect another of theirs at the 'Pao'. But he insisted that one of the Portuguese fortresses of Basrur and Gangolly must be destroyed. The Portuguese could not take any  
48 decision in the face of this firmness.

Virabhadra did not give up trade relations with the Portuguese. In March, 1637 he wrote to the Viceroy demanding again 28 pagodas (Rs. 112) a khandi of pepper. He said that the English had offered him 30 pagodas (Rs. 120) and that they would make him the payment in the form of lead at the rate of 22 1/2 pagodas (Rs. 90) a khandi. The Viceroy decided to respond by saying that the English were deceiving the Nayaka; that the former sold the very lead to the Portuguese at the rate of 20 patacas a khandi, which came to about 12 pagodas (Rs. 48); and that if Virabhadra was prepared to purchase lead from the Portuguese at the rate quoted to him by the English, he would pay Virabhadra 30 pagodas (Rs. 120) for

a khandi of pepper. This was a good commercial trick of the Portuguese. They decided to keep Virabhadra in good mood so that he would not block rice supplies. At the same time they made an arrangement to purchase additional pepper in Cochin.

Martim Teixeira de Azavedo, captain-major of Kanara, was sent as ambassador to Virabhadra. Martim was to be assisted by Sancara da Gama, probably a Hindu converted to Christianity, who was apparently a good merchant. Martim was instructed to complete his mission as speedily as possible and be at Cannanor by the beginning of July. He was to secure as much pepper as possible in Virabhadra's territories, paying a higher price than 22 pagodas (Rs. 88) a khandi if absolutely necessary, but under the condition that an additional quantity should be given at a cheaper rate, so that on the whole the price paid for all the pepper would be equivalent to the current price. This shows that the market rate of pepper was higher than the contracted price; but the Portuguese were reluctant to pay it; yet they did not hesitate to accuse Virabhadra of violating the terms of treaty. There was another matter to be settled with Virabhadra. One of his ships was captured by the Portuguese off Mascat. The Viceroy learnt from Sancara da Gama that the cargo was worth about 2,500 pagodas (Rs. 10,000). Virabhadra demanded satisfaction. In response, the Viceroy wrote to him saying that he was prepared to give satisfaction provided wood was supplied to the Portuguese. Martim was now instructed to see that this affair was settled on the line indicated and that the satisfaction given did not go much beyond 2,000 pagodas (Rs. 8,000). Further, Martim was to urge Virabhadra to throw out of his ports and lands all the English merchants who had gone there. The commercial activities of the rival merchants were highly disadvantageous to the Portuguese and the Viceroy told Martim that if the English were permanently debarred from the territories of Virabhadra it would be the greatest of the services of Martim to the king of Portugal. He was to endeavour to get a written promise from Virabhadra regarding the exclusion of the English as well as regarding continued sale of pepper to the Portuguese. The Viceroy visualised that before conceding

these requests of the Portuguese Virabhadra would ask for the destruction of the Basrur fortress. However, Martim was to say that he had no instruction in this respect; but that he would urge the Viceroy to agree to it if Virabhadra consented to destroy his fortress of Gangolly first, and not to erect there any other in the future.

By June, 1637 Bangher, allied with others, revolted against Virabhadra again. So also the king of Sonda fought against the latter. Virabhadra's administrator of Upper Basrur and other territories in the neighbourhood sought permission from the captain of the Basrur fortress to allow the residents of these territories to take shelter in the fortress whenever necessary. The captain wrote to the Viceroy on 24 June, seeking his orders in this respect. The Viceroy-in-Council, meeting on 29 July, came to the conclusion that the Portuguese should be neutral, not favouring any of the belligerents openly; and that the request of Virabhadra's administrator should be conceded to a certain extent in view of the existing friendship between the Portuguese and Virabhadra, the people being allowed to gather outside the fortress, but not inside, so that the security of the fortress would remain unimpaired.

The Queen of Bangher wrote to the Viceroy on 25 January, 1638, recalling the good old friendship between Bangher and the Portuguese, and seeking Portuguese aid against Virabhadra. She also complained that the former captain of Mangalore, Diogo Tavares, had taken two pieces of artillery belonging to her. The Viceroy decided to return the artillery and reprimand the captain. As for assistance against Virabhadra, nothing concrete was to be given.

The Portuguese were well disposed towards Virabhadra Nayaka in those months. In February, 1638 Vasudeva, Virabhadra's administrator-in-chief in Barkur, sought explosives from the Portuguese who agreed to send the war material readily under the pretext that it was being carried to Basrur for the defence of their own fortress there. Further, Martim Teixeira de Azavedo, captain-major of Kanara and ambassador to Virabhadra, was instructed to write to the latter that the Portuguese had no intention of putting pressure upon him or of meddling

in his affairs; and that they did not want Gangolly unless it was given freely  
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after peace was established.

By this time, the Adil Shah also had entered the fray against Virabhadra. The latter wrote to the Viceroy in February informing him that the Adil Shah had already taken some of his fortresses and his very capital, Ikkeri, where all his war provisions were also lost. He, therefore, required the Viceroy to send him some explosives, guns and gunpowder. He also dispatched to Basrur two envoys, Devarasa Shenoy and Rama Pai. The latter was empowered to concede to the Portuguese whatever they wished regarding Gangolly. In fact, in the beginning of February, Vasudeva, chief administrator of Barkur, had suggested to the captain of Basrur, Manoel Rois (Rodrigues) Bravo, that the Portuguese should quickly send 2,000 men of arms, who were natives of Goa, and some workers to fortify the peninsula of Gangolly, if the Portuguese wanted to ensure the place for themselves before the forces of the Adil Shah occupied it. Taking these factors into account the Viceroy-in-Council decided as follows in a meeting of 2 March, 1638: (1) To send 50 barrels of explosives, though in an earlier meeting of 20 February, the Council had decided to send only 30 barrels on the request of Vasudeva; and to send, in addition, 100 cans of gunpowder and some guns. A responsible man like Martim Teixeira de Azavedo was to carry these war materials to Basrur to be delivered there to Virabhadra. Utmost secrecy was to be maintained regarding the real destination of the materials, for the Adil Shah also had sought similar favour from the Portuguese through the Havaldar of Ponda, Mahamad Razak, but was refused. The materials, therefore, were to be carried with the declared purpose of providing the Portuguese fortress of Basrur. (2) Not to send 2,000 native soldiers of Goa to Gangolly, as it was not possible to assemble so many. The captain of Basrur was to say merely that the Portuguese would fortify Gangolly after it was given to them by Virabhadra of his  
54  
own accord.

Some secret letters seem to have been ~~xx~~ exchanged between the Viceroy and Virabhadra. One was written by the former on 14 December, 1638. Probably, Vira-

bhadra had sought the mediation of the Viceroy between him and the Adil Shah. The Viceroy agreed to do the office. He wrote in the letter just mentioned: "And to my ambassador to the court of the Adil Shah I have written, and I have to write anew that he should co-operate (corra com amizade) with the ambassador of Your Highness and that he should help in the negotiations which have been ordered by Your Highness to the very Adil Shah; and in all other matters I shall always do the office of a good friend...."  
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Antonio Borges de Costa, cazado of Basrur, who was sent as the new ambassador to Virabhadra, wrote to the Viceroy on 24 February, 1639, giving an account of his proceedings with Virabhadra. The latter's father-in-law seems to have been obstructing the transfer of Gangolly to the Portuguese; but Virabhadra was now ready to cede the ~~max~~ place, though he complained that Conde de Linhares had written to him saying that the king of Portugal would soon order the abandonment of the Basrur fortress, but nothing had actually been done in this respect until Rama Pai was authorised to conclude matters concerning the cession of the peninsula. Antonio found Virabhadra ready to sell pepper as merchant to merchant. The former was also hopeful in excluding the rival merchants, the English, from Bhatkal, with the assistance of Siddha Lingappa, a general of Virabhadra, who preferred the Portuguese to the English. Already, in December, 1638, Virabhadra had refused entrance to an English ship into the  
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Bhatkal port. Siddha considered the Portuguese better friends as they had helped Virabhadra with war materials. He convinced the advisors of Virabhadra of this and Antonio was determined to leave the court only after achieving the destruction of the English factory of Bhatkal. However, he noticed that the English were doing their best to retain their trading centre by spending a lot on presents and bribes to important men in Virabhadra's court. They had solicited personages like Pramodji Baniame to plead their case before Virabhadra. Antonio discovered that ~~Mirumman~~ Vasudeva, chief administrator of Barkur, was a great enemy of the Portuguese, because he had once told Virabhadra that

he would take one of the two fortresses of the Portuguese in Basrur and Gangolly. Besides, Vasudeva allowed the Dutch to disembark at Basrur where they remained nearby the Portuguese fortress for four or five days. He even urged Virabhadra to permit the Dutch to establish their factory in an island named Bogapatão (?)  
57 near Barkur.

The English factory of Bhatkal was destroyed soon, as we learn from a  
58 letter written by Virabhadra to the Viceroy on 6 March, 1639. However, in 1642 the English were again settled in the same place. And they were also  
59 allowed to trade at Basrur.

Virabhadra awaited a reply from the king of Portugal concerning Gangolly. The reply came by November, 1639. The king of Portugal was not ready to destroy his fortress of Gangolly; instead he commanded it to be strengthened as it was (1) more secure than Basrur for sheltering war ships as well as cargo ships which went there for rice and other goods; and (2) open to ships throughout the year, and thus capable of being relieved any time in case the enemies in Kanara  
*besiege* should ~~take~~ the place. However, he agreed to dismantle the Basrur fortress and transfer the materials to Gangolly, provided the whole of the peninsula of Gangolly, or at least that much part of it which was equivalent to the lands possessed by the Portuguese in Basrur, was ceded to him. Virabhadra's ambassador was, of course, informed that the whole of Gangolly should be ceded. It was  
60 in keeping with the usual trick of asking for more so that the lesser was secured.

In the meantime, the Adil Shah seems to have put Virabhadra under greater stress. Antonio da Costa informed the Viceroy-in-Council on 12 November, that Virabhadra sought to be sheltered along with his family in any of the fortresses of the Portuguese in Kanara, in case he should have the worst success against  
61 the Adil Shah. He also sought additional guns and ammunitions. It is not known what decision the Viceroy took in this respect.

Virabhadra and the Portuguese did not come to any decision regarding Gangolly even by the beginning of 1640. The Portuguese in fact were not prepared to take

any decision until after fresh instructions came from the king of Portugal in September of that year. Virabhadra was not prepared to cede the whole of Gangolly. He was also not agreeable to the condition that he should destroy his fortress

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in Gangolly first. Pero da Silva (1635-39), successor of Conde de Linhares, was not very much impressed by Gangolly. In a letter to the king of Portugal, dated 10 September, 1638, he pointed out that it cost the royal treasure 14,000 pardaos (Rs. 56,000) a year, but had no income of its own; and that Virabhadra was retaining even the revenues of the temple. He in fact was in favour of giving up the fortress of Gangolly. The king of Portugal, in his letter of 18 February, 1640, instructed Antonio Telles de Menezes, successor of Pero da Silva, to consult the Council of State and let him know the different opinions of its members in this

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connection.

From the same letter of the king of Portugal we also learn that the Adil Shah demanded exorbitant tributes from Virabhadra and that the latter complained to the Mughal Emperor, overlord of the Adil Shah, offering him to pay the very tribute which he was paying to the Adil Shah. Virabhadra probably thought that the Emperor would protect him against the Adil Shah if he became the direct feudatory of the Emperor. Virabhadra's own vassals adopted the same strategem. The Queens of Ullala and Bangher and the king of Gersoppa approached the Adil Shah for protection, offering him to pay the tribute which they owed to Virabhadra. In these circumstances the Viceroy was instructed to follow a cautious policy of aiding some with ammunitions in utmost secrecy so that none would be extinguished completely and none became too powerful in Kanara. Outwardly he was to be neutral,

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"encouraging and entertaining" the belligerents.

By the end of November, 1643 Virabhadra recovered Ikkeri and much of other territories lost to the Adil Shah. He remained friendly towards the Portuguese. However, his war with the Adil Shah was not yet over. By 20 December of the same year the latter again marched against Virabhadra. The Queen of Bangher apparently aided his enemy. The Portuguese favoured Virabhadra, since they thought that a

Hindu king was a better neighbour than a Muslim ruler.

Towards the middle of 1644 Virabhadra's affairs took another unfortunate turn. His uncle, Shivappa Nayaka, turned against him. In June Manoel Viera, captain of Basrur, informed the Viceroy that Shivappa had encircled the fortress of Canarcota (Konnara in Karkal taluka ?) with seven or eight thousand men of whom 1,000 were cavalrymen; that Virabhadra had taken shelter inside; that he was being attacked by land as well as by sea; that Shivappa had come with the pretext of asking for money which was promised by Virabhadra to the Mouro, namely, the Adil Shah; that Virabhadra, however, knew that he had actually come to take the very kingdom from him; and that Shivappa was also known to be planning to attack Gangolly. Manoel requested the Viceroy to send reinforcements to Gangolly and also send him instructions what he should do in case Virabhadra desired to take shelter in any of the Portuguese fortresses. The Viceroy-in-Council met on 20 June and decided as follows: (1) Since it was the rainy season no ammunitions and explosives could be sent to Gangolly immediately. (2) The Portuguese should give shelter to Virabhadra in any of their fortresses, if he sought such a favour. He should not be charged, as he was a friendly neighbour. (3) However, it would be of convenience in avoiding dissensions with Shivappa, if Virabhadra left, as soon as possible, the fortress where he might be given shelter.  
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What befell Virabhadra thereafter cannot be gathered from the extant Portuguese documents. Probably Shivappa defeated and killed Virabhadra in 1645 as indicated in Chikkadevarayavamshavali.  
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Foot-notes:

1. At his accession Virabhadra was a young man of 20 or 24, addicted to luxury and bad habits. (Heras, Henry : The Expansion Wars of Venkatappa Nayaka, an article, of Ikkeri,  
pp. 1, 2, 3, 5.)
2. Heras, Henry : op. cit., p. 5.

3. Assentos, I, p. 303.
4. Heras, Henry : op. cit., pp. 5-7.
5. CEO, II, p. 234.
6. DRI, IV, pp. 305-6.
7. Assentos, I, pp. 245-8.
8. Ibid., pp. 249-50.
9. Ibid., p. 253.
10. Ibid., pp. 252-3, 254.
11. Ibid., pp. 256-8.
12. Heras, Henry : op. cit., p. 7.
13. Assentos, I, p. 248.
14. Ibid., p. 264.
15. Ibid., p. 513.
16. Supra, Chapter 5.
17. Assentos, I, pp. 513-4.
18. Ibid., pp. 389-90.
19. Virappa Nayaka, son of Ramaraja Nayaka, was a rival of Virabhadra for the throne of Ikkeri, and not a joint ruler with ~~Virappa~~ Virabhadra as suggested by N. L. Rao (The Nayakas of Keladi, in VSCV, p. 263.)
20. Assentos, I, pp. 536-41. In clause (5) of the treaty the word 'taurim' means a local boat. From this I have interpreted it to mean the navigation of such boats.
21. Biker, J. F. J. : Collecção de tratados e concertos de paz, I, p. 276.
22. Ibid., pp. 277-9.
23. Virappa might have died early in August, 1631, for the Viceroy wrote about the death to the king of Portugal on 11 August (Assentos, III, p. 641.)
24. Assentos, I, p. 390.
25. Ibid., pp. 390-1.
26. Ibid., pp. 391-3.

27. Ibid., p. 411.
28. 'Pao' or 'pau' means wood. The site of 'pao', therefore, may be taken to imply a site where there was wood.
29. Assentos, I, pp. 426-7.
30. Ibid., pp. 554-5.
31. Ibid., pp. 555-6.
32. Ibid., pp. 448-50, 559-60.
33. Ibid., p. 449.
34. Ibid., pp. 456-7.
35. Ibid., pp. 458-9.
36. Ibid., pp. 469-70.
37. Ibid., pp. 569-71.
38. Ibid., p. 571.
39. Baker, J. F. J. : op. cit., I, pp. 302-3.
40. Assentos, II, pp. 12-3.
41. Ibid., pp. 528-9.
42. Ibid., pp. 54-6.
43. Ibid., p. 73.
44. Ibid., pp. 75-8.
45. Ibid., pp. 78-9.
46. Ibid., pp. 79-83.
47. Ibid., p. 84.
48. Ibid., pp. 116-7.
49. Ibid., pp. 167-9.
50. Ibid., pp. 543-5.
51. Ibid., pp. 173-4.
52. Ibid., p. 202.
53. Ibid., p. 202.
54. Ibid., pp. 202-4.
55. Ibid., pp. 555-6.



56. EF, 1637-1641, p. 115.
57. Assentos, III, pp. 650-3.
58. Ibid., pp. 654-5.
59. EF, 1642-1645, p. 109.
60. Assentos, II, pp. 271-2.
61. Ibid., p. 270.
62. Ibid., p. 277.
63. Ibid., p. 562.
64. Ibid., pp. 561-2.
65. Ibid., III, p. 657.
66. Ibid., p. 658.
67. Ibid., pp. 24-5.
68. Rao, N. L. : op. cit., p. 263. Writes Rao: "The Chikkadevarayavamsavali, however, informs us that Shivappa Nayaka murdered his chief Virabhadra Nayaka and ascended the throne and hence ~~Chikkadevaraja~~ Chikka-devaraja the ~~Mysore~~ Yuvaraja of Mysore rejected the presents offered to him by such a traitor. Though there is no apparent reason for doubting the veracity of this statement, no other evidence in support of it is available from any other source." (Underlining is mine.) The Portuguese document just referred to, namely, the minutes of the meeting of the Council of State, containing the substance (foot-note 67 above), of Manoel's letter and the decision thereof, may be considered as supporting the statement of the ~~Chikkadevarayavamsavali~~ Chikkadevarayavamshavali.

### Chapter 8

#### THE PORTUGUESE AND THE NAYAKAS OF IKKERI - III (1645-1660)

Shivappa Nayaka (1645-60),<sup>1</sup> the greatest of the Nayakas of Ikkeri, proved to be the destroyer of the political power of the Portuguese in Kanara. In 1650's he captured from them all of their fortresses on the Kanara coast. He promised afterwards to allow them to establish their factories in some of his ports; but nothing definite was concluded in this respect until his death. No doubt, circumstances were favourable to Shivappa in his wars against the Portuguese. The latter were hard pressed by the Dutch who waged wars against them all around and obstructed their trade and commerce so much that Portugal suffered considerably in wealth and power. The king of Portugal was not in a position to send sufficient succour to India in order to fight Shivappa. Nature too was unkind to the Portuguese. In May, 1652, just before Shivappa commenced hostilities against them, they lost many ships in a storm. This does not mean that Shivappa's successes were due only to these circumstances. To be sure, he was a very enterprising and energetic king who achieved successes not only against the Portuguese but also against several of his powerful neighbours. The Portuguese did have opportunities to gain his friendship which would have been of great help to them in their war efforts against their greatest enemy, the Dutch; but they were too slow in appreciating his strength and power. They sought his friendship when it was too late to seek, as we shall see in the following pages.

At his accession Shivappa faced grave difficulties. The Adil Shah, who had captured many lands belonging to the kingdom of Ikkeri, continued to be hostile. In this circumstance he began with peaceful relations with the Portuguese. He indicated his willingness, through an envoy, to negotiate a settlement with them regarding the peninsula of Gangolli. The Viceroy-in-Council, meeting on 12 February, 1646, and recalling that Gangolli was always considered important to promote Portuguese interests in Kanara, particularly to prevent the Adil Shah from mastering the Kanara coast, decided to negotiate so as to secure the 'island' with

the right to erect a fort at the site of the 'Pao' or any other better spot. At the same time they were not to consent to destroy the Basrur fortress, if Shivappa proposed such a course. The usual tactic of delay was to be taken recourse to by saying that the destruction would depend upon the will of the king of Portugal<sup>2</sup> to whom the proposal would be reported.

In keeping with this decision, the Viceroy sent a letter to Shivappa through the latter's envoy. Shivappa was told that it would be in his own interest to give Gangolly to the Portuguese. He was urged to erect ~~in~~<sup>3</sup> a new fortress at the site of the 'Pao' and allow the Portuguese to station their soldiers and artillery therein, so that Gangolly would be safe from Shivappa's enemies. He was assured that he could come into this fortress with his men whenever necessary and from there endeavour to recover his lost lands. The Viceroy cited the example of the Bangar chief and others who always trusted the Portuguese and received their protection. The Viceroy disclosed that the Adil Shah, who always desired to capture Kanara, had requested the Portuguese several times in the past to permit him to take his army through Portuguese territories in Kanara, but was not granted this permission. The Viceroy continued to say that the fortress of Basrur could be destroyed after the erection of a fortress at the site of the 'Pao'. Shivappa was assured that the Portuguese had no pretensions over his lands, but expected only what was necessary to shelter themselves. The letter was thus polite in tone, though the Portuguese might have been aware that Shivappa was not strong enough then to have his own way. However, it was in their own interest that he was not discouraged and weakened vis-a-vis the Adil Shah. Nevertheless, they were anxious to secure Gangolly for themselves, as the Viceroy's letter of 14 February to the king of Portugal would indicate. Wrote the Viceroy: "What suits us better is to fortify Gangolly well, and with this the fortress of Basrur, which has inherent drawbacks, can be given up...." But the Viceroy pointed out that His Majesty had not given any decisive order in the past as to what should be done to get Gangolly. The prevailing opportunity in Kanara, he continued, should not be lost by delays.<sup>4</sup>

In response to the Viceroy's letter, Shivappa seems to have sent an ambassador to Goa; but no agreement was arrived at until the beginning of 1647. Writing to the king of Portugal on 7 February, the Viceroy said that he could not consent to destroy the Basrur fortress as Shivappa's offer to give only a part of Gangolly was not satisfactory. The Viceroy thought that the whole of Gangolly alone would be of any use to the Portuguese and accordingly he sent another envoy to Shivappa. The latter was not willing to cede that part of Gangolly where there were temples. The Viceroy expressed his inability to use force in acquiring Gangolly, because he knew that Shivappa would send his army to occupy the Portuguese fortresses of Kanara if provoked; and because the supply of food grains from his territories would be stopped. Besides, the Dutch were already in contact with Shivappa and were ever ready to set him against the Portuguese. The Dutch were also trying to secure his favour for allowing them to trade at his ports and establish their factories at suitable places belonging to him.

It is not possible to say what transpired between the Portuguese and Shivappa during the course of the next four years. Towards the middle of 1651 the Portuguese sent Father Antonio Correa as ambassador to him. From the instructions given to him on 6 May of that year we learn that there was some disturbance in Gangolly, though what exactly the disturbance was, is not clear. Apparently, the Portuguese received some damage at the hands of Shivappa's officials, for the instruction asked the ambassador to urge Shivappa to punish "the Tanadar or who-soever was guilty". Shivappa, like his predecessor, seems to have quoted a higher price for pepper; but the ambassador was instructed to agree to purchase only 200 khandis at the rate of 25 pagodas (Rs. 100) a khandi; more was to be purchased only if it was offered at a lower price. Again, Shivappa had apparently sought Portuguese assistance against Muslims and in this respect the ambassador was commanded to say that the Viceroy was always ready to extend it, provided it was not against the king of Cannanor who was a friend of the Portuguese; but if the king of Cannanor brought pirate ships, the Portuguese would aid against such ships.

Another interesting development that can be deduced to have taken place during 1647-51 was Shivappa's offer to give the Portuguese lands in Kasaragod or in those territories conquered by him from the Nairs of Malabar, in lieu of Gangolly. But the ambassador was to turn a deaf year, if the offer was repeated, pointing out to Shivappa that the Portuguese were not conquerors in Kanara, but had fortresses there from olden days. Of course, the Viceroy conveniently forgot that the fortresses had been established by conquest. The ambassador was to point out that rice and pepper, which were secured in Gangolly, were not available in Kasaragod; and that the Portuguese had spent much in building and garrisoning the fortress of Gangolly. The ambassador was next instructed to impress upon Shivappa's envoy, who was in Goa and with whom he was to proceed to Kanara, how ill advised Shivappa was not to secure Portuguese friendship, particularly when he was surrounded by enemies - the Nairs, the Mysoreans and the Adil Shah. Antonio was also instructed to get Shivappa's permission for the captain of Honavar to cut some timber for masts. On his way back the ambassador was to tell the captain to have timber yards (bangaæas) at Honavar. Further, the captain was to be told not to trust Shivappa, for the latter might cause much loss to the Portuguese who were friendly with the king of Cannanor, <sup>6</sup> Shivappa's enemy.

From a letter of the Viceroy to the king of Portugal, dated 27 December, 1651, we learn that Shivappa gained some victories against his enemies and thus became more powerful and animated. However, the Adil Shah restrained his ambition. And, yet, the Portuguese were apprehensive that he might attack their ill defended <sup>7</sup> fortresses of Kanara.

The embassy of Father Antonio Correa seems to have achieved nothing and another ambassador, Duarte de Figueireido de Mello, was apparently sent. The latter too returned empty handed by June, 1652. In the meantime the Portuguese were involved in a war in Kanara as noted in the minutes of the Council of State, which met on 3 June. <sup>8</sup> However, it is not clear from the minutes who their enemy was. It was, in fact, Shivappa himself who commenced hostilities against them in May. The main cause of his hostilities was the Portuguese refusal to purchase pepper

and pearls from him. The Portuguese believed that the Dutch instigated him against  
9 them. Their fortresses of Kanara needed much relief, but it was rainy season.  
However, the Viceroy-in-Council decided to send at once almadias with as many  
soldiers as possible and with explosives and ammunitions. This was to be followed  
10 by additional relief in August, which was actually done on 8 of the month by send-  
ing additional soldiers, ammunitions and explosives. On 11 a fleet of five ships  
11 was sent and again another of five in September. In due course 70 ships were  
engaged to send regular supplies of soldiers, money, explosives and food grains  
12 to the defence of the four fortresses in Kanara.

The month of May was an unlucky one for the Portuguese. On the very first  
day of that month they lost their fleet of Kanara, consisting of 14 war ships, in  
a storm off Gangolly. About 140 embarkations carrying people and merchandise were  
also lost along with the fleet at the very place. It was the gravest of the  
losses suffered by them in that month owing to storm. A barque and a galley alone  
were salvaged. The Viceroy believed that this ~~shipwreck~~ shipwreck, which took place  
in Shivappa's jurisdiction, benefitted the latter greatly and that it induced him  
to begin hostilities against the Portuguese. At Goa bar also some ships were  
lost. The Viceroy, writing of these losses, urged the king of Portugal to send  
13 reinforcements to India.

In August Shivappa sent Vittala Maló as ambassador to the Portuguese. Vittala  
despatched, before reaching Goa, a letter to the Viceroy through Father Ignacio  
de Arcamone, J. S., who was in Bednur. The letter was written at the instance  
of Venkatappa, Shivappa's younger brother (Rei pequeno), with the consent of the  
former. Its essence was that the Portuguese should purchase pepper from Shivappa,  
probably at a higher rate than that proposed by the Portuguese, and also perhaps  
more quantity than what the latter were prepared to purchase. The Viceroy-in-  
Council, meeting on 14 August, decided to purchase 250 khandis at the rate of 28  
paqodas (Rs. 112); if Shivappa was not satisfied with this, 25 khandis more were  
to be purchased - 20 in honour of Venkatappa and 5 in honour of the prince, Bhadra-  
ppa. The Portuguese came to this decision so as to avoid greater hostilities from

14

Shivappa. However, it was not substantial enough to satisfy the latter.

On the same day Father Ignacio was sent back as ambassador to Bednur with instructions regarding his mission there: (1) He was to complain of Shivappa's hostility under the guise of friendship. (2) Before peace talks proper were begun, the Father was to propose cessation of all hostilities and fighting on the part of Shivappa whose soldiers were to be withdrawn to a reasonable distance from the Portuguese fortresses. If this was agreed to, the Father was to inform the captains of the fortresses and captain-majors of the fleets to suspend hostilities on their part. (3) The Father was to agree to purchase 250 khandis of pepper at the rate of 28 pagodas (Rs. 112) a khandi. This quantity, and no more, was to be purchased every year. Probably, he was instructed to increase the quantity by 25 khandis as per the decision of the Viceroy-in-Council, though it is not indicated in the instructions proper. (4) If Shivappa talked of Gangolly, the ambassador was to say that the matter was under consideration by the king of Portugal who was then at war with Castile. A decision was to be assured within three years. (5) It seems that the Portuguese had captured a ship belonging to Shivappa, probably as soon as the hostilities commenced. In this connection the ambassador was to say that Antonio Carneiro Salema, who had taken the ship, had died in prison before he was tried. However, the ambassador was to agree upon the satisfaction to be given if Shivappa consented to restore to the Portuguese the wood, which came from Cannanor, but which apparently had been captured by him as a retaliation. The satisfaction to ~~be~~ be agreed upon was to be low, not because the Portuguese would gain by it, but because the captured ship was small and had very little on board. (6) If Shivappa were to propose that a treaty of peace be concluded, the ambassador was to insist that the terms and conditions should be similar to those agreed to during the Viceroyalty of Pero da Silva. (7) The ambassador was not to negotiate with Shivappa without the Viceroy's express orders, if Shivappa happened to have taken any of the Portuguese fortresses of Kanara by the time the ambassador reached Bednur. This anticipation of the

Viceroy was what actually happened, as we shall presently see.

In September a good deal of relief was sent from Goa to the fortresses of Kanara. Three fleets - two of 6 ships each and the third of 10 ships - were dispatched with soldiers, mariners, money and provisions. Two hundred native soldiers  
16  
of Goa, who were mercenaries, were also recruited. In October the Viceroy-in-  
17  
Council decided to send the fleets of the North and Mascat to Kanara.

However, all these were too late. On 28 October the Viceroy received the news that the fortress of Basrur had been abandoned on 29 August. Father Antonio Correa, who returned from Kanara, explained to the Viceroy-in-Council that the Portuguese garrison was compelled to give up when Shivappa's men besieged the fortress, launched frequent assaults, mined and destroyed a part of the fortress, entered the Portuguese settlement and caused shortage of food grains and ammunitions. He also disclosed that the relief sent from Goa in August went mostly to Mangalore, and not to Basrur, and that the garrison of Basrur crossed over to Gangolly which was also being besieged vigorously by the enemy. He added that the fortresses of Honavar and Mangalore too were experiencing similar distress at the hands of Shivappa's men. The Viceroy-in-Council were surprisingly late in receiving the news of the loss of Basrur. They decided to do their best to preserve the remaining fortresses by dispatching as much reinforcements as possible and as  
18  
quickly as permissible. The Father was also sent back to Kanara.

The captain of Basrur, Miguel de Figueiroa, was accused of negligence and of having surrendered the fortress even though he was in a position to defend it. The charge sheet drawn against him on 15 December states the case as follows: Shivappa began to attack the fortress on 14 June, 1652. He had with him six or seven pieces of artillery and many soldiers. He mined and destroyed a bulwark and two earthworks attached to it but all were repaired. Shivappa's battery did not do much damage to the walls of the fortress. Yet the captain proposed to his assistants and others that the fortress be dismantled and abandoned, and all of them begone to the Gangolly fortress, which was done on the night of 29 August. During the course of the fight from June to August, only eight of the Portuguese

soldiers, black and white, were killed. The captain pretended to have no explosives, though in one of the bulwarks thirteen cans of the material were abandoned. The captain of Gangolly, hearing of Shivappa's attack, offered the captain of Basrur four embarkations with mariners, saying that he would pay for two and Miguel should pay for the remaining; but the latter pretended that he did not have money for the payment. Francisco de Lux, who had been sent from Goa with four vessels to relieve Basrur, was also accused of not providing the relief, though he could have in fact provided it. However, having reached the bar on 9 or 11 August, and finding it undesirable to enter ~~the river~~ the river owing to strong winds, he probably proceeded to Mangalore, though he could have awaited at St. Mary Islands for an opportune moment to go to Basrur when the winds subsided.

The Portuguese endeavoured to weaken Shivappa by setting the king of Cannanor against him. The Viceroy instructed the captain of the Portuguese fortress of Cannanor to induce the king to march against Shivappa. The captain was provided with some ~~summons~~ money to pay the Nair soldiers, if necessary. He succeeded in the mission assigned to him. Soon the king of Cannanor wrote to the Viceroy expressing his desire to fight Shivappa and seeking Portuguese assistance in the form of a fleet, ammunitions and gunpowder, and also some Portuguese soldiers to accompany his men by land. The Viceroy-in-Council met on 30 October, 1652, and decided to respond positively.

The situation in Gangolly was now very precarious. The Viceroy learnt that Shivappa, after gaining Basrur, had sent more men to capture Gangolly which was very weak. Shivappa employed many diggers and miners, whom the Portuguese feared most. Francisco de Castel Branco, who had been in Basrur, advised the Viceroy-in-Council to send relief, substantially and quickly. He also felt it desirable to accept peace offers, if made by Shivappa. He opined that it was not feasible to be at war with the neighbouring kings in India, particularly because the Dutch had declared war against the Portuguese. The Viceroy-in-Council, who met on 5 November, decided to send some boats full of food grains of all available sorts, 100 barrels of explosives, 200 ~~maxxess~~ morrões of Portugal, cotton and herbs,

100 fire arms (arcabuzas) with their shots, 200 tins of gunpowder, a cannon with 200 appropriate grenades, 20 boxes of explosives for fire arms and muskets, and 100 shots (lanças) of fire. Carpenters and masons were also to be dispatched.

All these were to be carried in the fleet of the North, which the Viceroy-in-  
<sup>21</sup>

Council had already decided to send to Kanara. In another meeting of 9 December the Viceroy sought the opinion of the Councillors whether it was advisable to enter into peace negotiations with Shivappa before the rainy season, as the three

Kanara fortresses were very weak and the Dutch were waging war at Manar and Jafanapatão. As the ~~minis~~ advice sought was on an important matter the Councillors  
<sup>22</sup>

asked for time to consider. The ultimate decision of the Viceroy-in-Council in this matter seems to have been to open peace negotiations. For towards the middle of the month Father Miguel de Almeida, J. S., was sent as envoy to Gangolly to initiate peace talks. The following instructions were given to him on 13

<sup>23</sup>  
December:

(1) Shivappa might be expected to complain that the Portuguese (a) did not purchase pepper from him; (b) did not destroy either the fortress of Basrur or that of Gangolly; and (c) did not restore the galley taken from him by Antonio Carneiro Sallema. Regarding (a), Father Miguel was to say that the Portuguese did not purchase pepper because the fleet did not come from Portugal for it; and because Shivappa demanded exorbitant price. Concerning (b), the envoy was to point out that the Portuguese possessed Gangolly legitimately by virtue of the treaty with Virappa Nayaka, who gave it as a gift; that inspite of this gift of the whole place, the Portuguese possessed there nothing but the ground on which their fortress was erected, the rest of the territory being always in Shivappa's hands; and that the king of Portugal did not take a quick decision regarding the destruction of the Basrur fortress or that of Gangolly, because he was engaged in wars, and also because he thought that Shivappa would be ~~fin~~ friendly and, therefore, there was no need of any hasty decision. In respect of (c), the Father was to submit respectfully that Shivappa ought not to speak of so small an embarkation with such an insignificant cargo; that Antonio was a rebel and was arrested and

imprisoned for his crimes; and that he died in prison.

(2) If Shivappa was satisfied and was prepared to treat of peace, the envoy was to insist upon a truce as a precondition for negotiations. If the truce was agreed upon, talks were to be commenced on the basis of the terms and conditions proposed by the former Viceroy, Pero da Silva (1635-39), with some modifications suggested by the Conde de Obidios, author of the instructions under consideration.

(3) The envoy was to say that the Portuguese were ready to purchase every year 300 khandis of pepper from Shivappa at the rate of 28 pagodas (Rs. 112) a khandi. However, the ambassador was empowered to vary the quantity to the extent of 350 khandis if necessary.

(4) On the question of abandoning the fortress of Gangolly, the ambassador was to point out that it was a matter which required consideration, especially (a) because of the changed condition in which the Portuguese were; (b) because the king of Portugal should be informed of it for his orders; and (c) because Shivappa himself had asked on previous occasions for the abandonment of only one of the two fortresses of Basrur and Gangolly. In view of these the ambassador was to suggest that the fortress of Basrur be returned to the Portuguese who would then certainly destroy one of the fortresses in question, preferably that of Basrur itself, in return for the gift of Gangolly from Shivappa.

(5) Settlement of the value of the loaded embarkation taken from Shivappa was to be offered provided the latter agreed to release the wood that he had blocked.

(6) Shivappa had demanded, through Father Ignacio Arcamone, that the Portuguese should give up all the articles that were washed ashore to his territories as a result of the shipwreck of the Portuguese fleet off Gangolly in May. He also demanded the galley and the ship that were salvaged by the Portuguese. The ambassador was instructed to admit Shivappa's right to have the articles, as the shipwreck had taken place within his jurisdiction; but regarding the <sup>a</sup>slavaged vessels, he was to point out that the demand was unjustified, because they were saved by the grace of God and the efforts of the Portuguese.

(7) In conformity with the above the ambassador was commissioned to conclude a treaty. The Viceroy's ratification was to follow, with the declaration that both the parties to the treaty ought to exchange the soldiers, ships and embarkations captured during the war.

The ambassador was instructed to fulfil his mission as quickly as possible. He was to take with him Father Ignacio Arcamone who had Shivappa's permission to return to Kanara and who was expected to be of great assistance to the ambassador.

Fearing that Shivappa might not agree to some of the above terms and conditions, and being in acute need of peace in Kanara, the Viceroy gave another set of instructions, to the ambassador to be utilised in case the latter's effort at peace settlement on the above basis did not succeed. The second document was deliberately undated and unsigned. For greater security against leakage, it was prepared in Latin. There were many Kannadigas and other Indians, who knew Portuguese, but very few who knew Latin in those days. It was most probably issued on the very day on which the first document of instructions was given to the ambassador. The following were its important instructions:

(1) If Shivappa insisted that the Gangolly fortress should be destroyed and if he was found unprepared to change his stand, the ambassador was instructed to agree to the condition. However, no written contract or agreement was to be entered into in this respect, so that total damage was not done to the prestige of the Portuguese; but assurance was to be given that the destruction would be effected. In return Shivappa was to be urged to allow the Portuguese to re-edify the Basrur or to erect a new fortress on the same side of the river, where they were to be given lands equal in area to those possessed by them at Basrur. (2) Again, if Shivappa insisted that the offer to purchase every year 300 or 350 khandis of pepper was inadequate, the ambassador was authorised to offer to purchase 400 khandis at the rate of 28 pagodas (Rs. 112) a khandi.

The rest of the terms were to be in accordance with the first set of instructions. The ambassador was instructed to speak to Venkatappa, Shivappa's younger brother, who was known to be well disposed towards the Portuguese and was fighting

against them rather reluctantly. So also the ambassador was to meet Vittala Maló who was also amicable. These two were to be urged to help the Portuguese to get favourable terms from Shivappa.

Nothing concrete seems to have resulted from this embassy. In the latter half of December Shivappa sent Rama Pai to Goa to fathom the Portuguese attitude towards a peace treaty with him. Rama Pai did not have powers to conclude anything specific. In fact, he came under the guise of being the envoy of the people of Bednur rather than of Shivappa. After listening to him, the Viceroy-in-Council, meeting on 26 December, decided as follows: (a) The Portuguese would purchase 500 khandis of pepper immediately, and 300 khandis every year, in both cases at the rate of 28 pagodas (Rs. 112), provided Basrur was restored. (b) If Shivappa agreed to this condition, a peace treaty was to be negotiated. (c) Andre de Lima, well informed of the Kanarese situation, should be sent as ambassador with Rama Pai. He should be instructed to begin peace talks after obtaining a cease-fire. (d) A letter should be addressed to Shivappa. The substance of the letter, which was subsequently written, was that Shivappa as well as the Portuguese should suspend fighting so as to create a proper atmosphere for peace talks. The Portuguese were so eager for a peace treaty with Shivappa that the Viceroy considered the arrival of Rama Pai at Goa as a godsend; it was "not a small mercy from the heaven."<sup>25</sup>

However, all these were not helpful to the Portuguese. In January, 1653 they abandoned the fortress of Gangolly after taking out the artillery and mining the fortress to destruction. Writing of this to the king of Portugal on 26 January, the Viceroy pointed out that the Gangolly fortress was a source of expences and that to defend it he had to divide his limited armed forces at the cost of lesser defence for the more important and useful fortresses of Honavar and Mangalore.<sup>26</sup>

Having captured the Basrur and the Gangolly fortresses from the Portuguese, Shivappa sent an ambassador again. Vittala Maló, the ambassador, went to Honavar and from there sent a letter to the Viceroy, saying that he would be there for eight days and that the Viceroy should send an envoy with powers to conclude peace.<sup>27</sup>

Taking into account the war against the Dutch in Ceylon, which needed all concentration, the Viceroy-in-Council, meeting on 19 February, decided that peace talks should ~~be~~ be continued; that Father Gonçalo Martins should be sent as ambassador with clear instructions and powers to conclude peace, provided Basrur and Gangolly were restored; that the offer to purchase 500 khandis of pepper immediately at 28 pagodas (Rs. 112) a khandi and 300 khandis every year at the same rate, should be repeated. To assist the Father, two more men of experience were sent with him. They were Ramoji Sinai Cothari, a dealer in horses, who had gone to Kanara often, and who was the trusted interpreter of the Portuguese; and João Roiz (Rodrigues) 29 Viegas.

Father Gonçalo Martins was given more or less similar instructions which had been given to former ambassadors to Shivappa. Regarding pepper, Gonçalo was to say that the Portuguese offer to purchase immediately 500 khandis of pepper and 300 khandis every year thereafter at 28 pagodas a khandi was still valid. Gonçalo was made aware that this offer was being made inspite of the fact that the king of Portugal was not in a position, unlike former years, to send capital to India and that the price offered was much higher than that which existed in Cochin and Ceylon, thus being of great loss to the royal treasury. Yet the offer stood in order to secure peace, which was so necessary in Kanara. The ambassador was to insist upon the restoration of Basrur and Gangolly. Compensation for the losses and damages thereof were also to be demanded. Permission to erect a new fortress at a convenient place at the bar, where Shivappa was to give lands equivalent to the lands possessed by the Portuguese at Basrur formerly, was to be secured. Shivappa was to be asked to destroy the fortresses which he had erected in the meantime at Basrur and Gangolly. After all these, Shivappa was to be asked to agree that the Portuguese be free to decide whether they should destroy their fortress of Gangolly or not. However, if Shivappa were not to agree to restore Gangolly, the ambassador was to get an assurance from him that he would destroy the new fortress which he had started constructing in Gangolly at the mouth of the river. Regarding

the embarkation which had been captured by Antonio Carneiro Salemma, the ambassador was to endeavour to pass it off, so that Shivappa did not ask for any satisfaction; but if he insisted on satisfaction being given, the ambassador was to agree to it, provided that Shivappa consented to release the timber which he had suppressed while the Portuguese were bringing it from Cannanor and provided also that he agreed not to admit into his ports the embarkations of Malabar and of their native enemies of the Portuguese. Further, Shivappa was to be urged to agree not to admit nor to have any trade dealings with the Arabs, nor to send his ships to Arabia, the Portuguese being permitted to seize the contraband. Next, Shivappa was to be asked to allow the Portuguese to cut and take away whatever wood they needed for their shipyards and for repairing fortresses and houses. Of course, all these negotiations were to be preceeded by a cease-fire.

Father Gonçalo's mission was a failure. On reaching Honavar he found Vittala Malo making excessive demands. He was invited to go to Bednur to meet Shivappa. However, Gonçalo had no order to proceed to Bednur; and besides Shivappa was reported to be ill and, therefore, was not in a position to treat of peace. Gonçalo was commanded to return to Goa with Rama Pai. The Portuguese decided in the meantime to strengthen the defences of Mangalore and Honavar. On 28 April, 1653 the Viceroy-in-Council decided to send Constanço Fialho Ferreira as captain-general of war with four regiments to Mangalore. These soldiers were to go by two or three ships as far as Honavar where they were to change to small embankments and proceed to Mangalore. From Honavar the ships were to return to Goa.

Constanço was not in a position to prevent Shivappa from causing damage to the Portuguese fortress of Mangalore. On 28 July Shivappa's men mined two walls of the Portuguese settlement of Mangalore, entered the settlement, killed many of the residents and soldiers, captured some and forced the remaining to retreat into the fortress. Constanço wrote to the Viceroy saying that there were hardly hundred soldiers left for defence, and asking for speedy relief. In this desperate condition the king of Cannanor extended great help to the Portuguese. He not only allowed them to take food grains, fish and meat from his territories, but

sent 5,000 Nair soldiers to Kumbala in an attempt to divert Shivappa's attention and thus mitigate pressure on Mangalore. The king of Cannanor, however, wrote to the Viceroy to pay the Nairs who were in fact disobedient owing to non-payment. The financial condition of the Portuguese was really pitiable owing to their war expenses in Ceylon against the Dutch, coupled with the reduced income from trade which was being hindered by the European rival. Nevertheless, the Viceroy-in-Council decided on 27 August to send whatever money that was possible to the king of Cannanor and to thank him for his invaluable assistance. They also decided to send immediately to Mangalore four almadias, with a captain and four soldiers each, with ammunitions, explosives and food supplies, drugs and sweets for the wounded and the sick, and materials required for repairing the fortress.  
33 Six warships were also to be dispatched as quickly as possible.

The decision to send the relief was too late. Seven days earlier, on 20 August, Shivappa had taken the fortress of Mangalore. The Portuguese garrison abandoned the fortress, leaving behind the artillery. Only the fortress of Honavar remained now. Shivappa stepped up his attacks on this fortress and by January, 1654 took control of the main entrance to the fortress and encircled it, the Portuguese being left with only one entrance from the river to a bulwark which  
34 they defended. The Viceroy kept on sending relief; but Shivappa was too powerful for the Portuguese. As Leonerdo Pais says, Shivappa was rich with territories extending from Mirjan to Kasaragod, and possessed 40,000 to 50,000 excellent  
35 men of arms.

By January the king of Sonda offered to assist the Portuguese. He himself was of little strength, but he proposed to urge the Adil Shah, his suzerain, to march against Shivappa. The Governor, Bras de Castro, welcomed the proposal, but  
36 nothing concrete seems to have followed. So also Vitoji Vishwasa Rao, Nayaka Varymor (?) of Ankola, probably an official of the king of Sonda, offered to mediate between the Portuguese and Shivappa. Vitoji was a friend of the Portuguese and was providing food supplies to their fortress of Honavar. The Governor-in-Council decided on 19 February, to accept the offer and to send an envoy to Ankola

38  
to meet Vitoji.

The Portuguese tried to hinder the commerce of Shivappa. They did not issue passports to the merchants of the kingdom of the Zamorin, who used to go to the ports of Kanara for securing food supplies. The Zamorin, however, did not appreciate this policy and wrote to the Governor demanding passports for his merchants. The Portuguese, of course, were not in a position to have another enemy and therefore decided to issue four passports a year.  
<sup>39</sup>

In February Francisco de Sousa Alcoforado, captain of the Honavar fortress, held peace talks at Honavar with Mallappa Maló, son of Vittala Maló, whom Shivappa sent for the purpose. The talks were a failure. Shivappa demanded that the Portuguese should purchase from ~~him~~ immediately 1,000 khandis of pepper at 28 pagodas (Rs. 112) a khandi, and thereafter 500 khandis every year at the same rate. Francisco could not accept this. However, he secured a truce of 15 days with effect from 22 February, promising to obtain in the meantime orders from Goa concerning Shivappa's demand. On being informed of these, the Governor-in-council, meeting on 27 February, decided to adhere to the former offer to purchase 500 khandis immediately and 300 khandis every year, provided all the fortresses captured by Shivappa were restored. No envoy was to be sent, but Mallappa Maló was to be informed by means of a letter that Shivappa should send his envoy to Goa if he really wanted to conclude peace. The Portuguese had sent several ambassadors before; but as the negotiations were being held Shivappa had captured the fortresses.  
<sup>40</sup>

Nevertheless, by a resolution of the Governor-in-Council, dated 5 March, ~~Fr~~ Father Antonio Nunes, J. S., Francisco de Sousa Alcoforado, captain of Honavar, and Pero Pinto de Mello, captain-major of the fleet of Kanara, were authorised to continue negotiations on the basis of the decision of 27 February. They were given the following instructions by means of a document dated 6 March:- (1) Concerning pepper, talks should be commenced with an offer to purchase only 200 khandis at 24 to 25 pagodas (Rs. 96 to Rs. 100) a khandi, pointing out that even when the Portuguese had all their Kanarese fortresses, they were willing to purchase only this much from Ikkeri rulers. If an offer to purchase more had been

made in the past it was because of the insistence on the part of the latter. Now that only one fortress was left in their hands, they were not in a position to offer more. However, the envoys were to increase the quantity to 250 khandis at 26 pagodas (Rs. 104) a khandi, after the first offer was rejected. Further, increases were similarly to be made, always with a show of great reluctance. At any rate, the quantity specified in the decision of 27 February was not to be exceeded. (2) Restoration of the captured fortresses was to be insisted upon; but peace talks were not to be abandoned even if this demand was not accepted by Shivappa. He was to be told, however, that he would not gain much even if he captured the Honavar fortress as well, for ~~he~~ he would lose their commercial dealings with him and besides, they might hinder his dealings with other nations through his sea ports. (3) The captain of Honavar was authorised to go to Bed-nur, if necessary, for negotiating a treaty; but Shivappa was to be told that the finalisation of the treaty would be done in Goa where he should send his ambassador with the commission to conclude the treaty.

On 13 March the Adil Shah wrote to the Governor informing him that he had sent an order to Shivappa, commanding the latter to raise the siege of Honavar and to restore the three fortresses to the Portuguese. The Adil Shah promised to take punitive action against Shivappa if he did not obey the order. The Adil Shah apparently acted on his own accord, though the king of Sonda, who had offered to urge him to march against Shivappa, might have played some role in making him to issue the order. The Governor sent Father Gonçalo Martins to Bijapur with a present to the Adil Shah, "as the Muslims do not act and do favours, except for gain." Gonçalo was not sent as an ambassador, but because the Adil Shah had expressed a desire in his letter just mentioned that he be sent to his court.<sup>42</sup> However, Gonçalo was given certain instructions on 16 April to guide him in his audiences with the Adil Shah. The latter was to be thanked for the order that he had sent to Shivappa and for his promise to punish the latter should ~~he~~ disregard the command. The Father was made aware that the Adil Shah might find

it easy to send his army against Shivappa, for the king of Mysore had also sought the Adil Shah's intervention against Shivappa. Should the Adil Shah offer to mediate for peace between Shivappa and the Portuguese, the Father was instructed to urge him to make Shivappa to reduce the quantity of pepper, which he insisted that they should purchase from him.

On 28 April Pero Pinto de Mello, captain-major of the men of war at Honavar, reached Goa and reported to the Governor that Shivappa had insisted upon his own terms regarding the quantity of pepper to be purchased from him; and that on the rejection of his terms he had stepped up assaults on the Honavar fortress. The Governor-in-Council decided on the same day to send Pero Pinto back to Honavar with relief consisting of soldiers, food supplies and medicine, so that the fortress could be defended until the rainy season. Regarding the future action, decision was to be taken in keeping with the help that was expected from Portugal in September. It was hoped that in the rainy season Shivappa would not be able to cause much damage to the fortress. However, this hope of holding on upto September was soon shattered. News reached that it was impossible to defend the fortress that rainy season, for the soldiers were worn out and a great part of the walls and bulwarks of the fortress was already destroyed by the enemy. Besides, the only defence wall that was left was in a precarious condition. In order to avoid the loss of 1,000 soldiers, 300 white and 700 black, who were defending the fortress, and a considerable amount of artillery therein, and also to avoid diversion in Kanara in September, when it was expected that there would be severe fight with the Dutch, the Governor-in-Council decided on 4 May to accept the terms offered by Shivappa. Effort, no doubt, was to be made to induce him to lower the quantity of pepper and its price as ~~much~~ much as possible. They were to offer to purchase 700 khandis in September or October and 300 khandis every year thereafter, at 28 pagodas (Rs. 112) a khandi, if not at 27 pagodas (Rs. 108). In the meantime the fortress was to be repaired and some 'honest' excuses were to be found to impress upon Shivappa their inability to purchase all the quantity agreed upon.

In fact, all were eager in Goa by the middle of May to conclude peace with Shivappa at any cost. The Municipality of Goa submitted a memorandum on 9 May, urging the Governor to conclude peace "with the greatest speed that is possible". The document expressed the awareness of the Municipality that Shivappa was guilty of violating peace and that the Portuguese were justified in defending. However, the document pointed out that the food supplies of his territories were important for the sustenance of Goa and for the Portuguese soldiers waging war against the Dutch at Ceylon and other places, and, therefore, peace with Shivappa was of great significance. Gilianes de Noronha, a respected member of the Council of State, but who was not attending its meetings on account of illness, expressed himself in favour of peace. He wrote to the Governor on 12 May, in response to the decision of the Governor-in-Council of 4 May, which was referred to him for opinion, saying that he always considered peace with Kanara as desirable owing to its food supplies and particularly desirable now because the Dutch were obstructing food supplies from the North. Apropos the Adil Shah's order to Shivappa, Gilianes opined that it was vain to expect much from the Muslim. Therefore, he suggested that peace should be concluded with Shivappa immediately by accepting his demand concerning pepper, promising him to purchase 1,000 khandis in September or October and 500 khandis every year thereafter. During the truce that would prevail between the date of this agreement and October, the Honavar fortress could be repaired. Gilianes proceeded to say that during the truce an attempt should be made to convince Shivappa by sincere efforts of the inability of the Portuguese to purchase that much quantity of pepper. Gilianes was sure that Shivappa would then be considerate. He also pointed out that peace with Shivappa would save the men and artillery of the Honavar fortress and these could be employed against the Dutch.

Finally, the Governor-in-Council appointed Francisco de Sousa Alcoforado, captain of Honavar, to conduct negotiations. On 16 May a set of instructions was sent to him. He was authorised to agree to purchase 700 khandis of pepper immediately and 300 khandis every year, both at 28 pagodas (Rs. 112) a khandi.

Of course, he was to begin with an offer to purchase at the rate of 27 pagodas ~~100~~ (Rs. 108) a khandi, one more pagoda being offered only if absolutely necessary. Further, he was instructed to insist upon the restitution of the fortresses, at least, of Mangalore and Basrur. Gangolly too was to be demanded, pleading the right of possession granted by Virappa Nayaka. Even if Shivappa refused to return these fortresses, the negotiations were to be continued to ensure peace.

Francisco achieved nothing. Shivappa refused to talk unless the Portuguese agreed unconditionally to purchase from him 800 khandis of pepper at once and 300 khandis every year thereafter. Francisco and Pero Pinto sent the factor of Honavar, Gonçalo Vas de Moraes, to Goa to report to the Government there the miserable condition in which Honavar was. Gonçalo reached Goa on 9 August and spoke to the Council on the very day; many soldiers were dead, more by hunger than by wounds; the sufferings of those who survived were immense; the bare necessities for the sick were exhausted; the greater part of the wall, the fortifications that were erected within and a great part of the cuirass were destroyed with mines; in front of the cuirass the enemy had constructed a fortress from where he attacked the anchorage, thus rendering it difficult for the fleets to enter and succour the place; and if the succour was attempted, there was manifest danger as was experienced in reality in the rainy season; the fortress, in fact, had no defence and no repair was possible; Shivappa's besieging army was 11,000 to 12,000 strong and was incapable of being repulsed except by a strong Portuguese army which should be prepared to attack his camp; the Governor-in-Council should either issue orders to dismantle the fortress after removing the artillery or send forthwith 1,000 Portuguese soldiers, together with some black men of arms.

Francisco, in his letter of 2 August, informed the Governor that more than 70 soldiers had died of hunger during the course of two months; that there was such a shortage of food supplies in the fortress during the rainy season that "rats and cats" were eaten; that more than 100 soldiers were sick; that there was no money with him, nor rice; that the Dutch were in league with Shivappa; and

that the latter had erected a fortress at the entrance of the river. Pero Pinto  
added that no soldier, Portuguese or native, was in a condition to fight the enemy.  
<sup>49</sup>

Meanwhile, rumour was rife that the Adil Shah, instead of sending a punitive  
expedition against Shivappa as he had boastfully declared, was planning to commence  
hostilities against the Portuguese themselves. Taking into account all these  
developments, the Governor-in-Council decided to send as much provisions as possi-  
ble immediately, and to take the final decision to dismantle the fortress as soon  
<sup>50</sup>  
as ships arrived from Portugal.

In the second half of August the Adil Shah actually sent his troops into Goa.  
The Portuguese believed that the Dutch were behind this hostility of the Bijapur  
ruler. The Governor also received the news that Shivappa's men had further damaged  
the Honavar fortress by mining on 24 August. Under these circumstances the Gover-  
nor-in-Council decided on 5 September to issue orders forthwith to dismantle the  
fortress of Honavar, so that the men and the artillery of that fortress would be  
<sup>51</sup>  
available for the defence of Goa against the Adil Shah. The Portuguese had to  
muster all their available forces in India as no ships as yet arrived from Portu-  
gal. The decision to dismantle the fortress was probably carried out in the  
month of September itself. They took out almost all the pieces of artillery and  
<sup>52</sup>  
destroyed the fortress by means of explosives.

After the loss of their fortresses of Kanara the Portuguese naturally contin-  
ued to consider Shivappa their enemy and stopped trade relations with him and  
his subjects. We learn from the minutes of the Council of State, which met on 6  
October, 1655, that two parangues of Kanarese merchants, carrying rice, had entered  
the Goa bar on the previous day, under the plea that they were being permitted  
to come formerly and therefore they had come again. This was a surprise for the  
new Viceroy, Rodrigo Lobo da Silveira, who thought it abominable that enemy mer-  
chants should enter the Portuguese port as if they were friends. The Viceroy-in-  
Council, however, decided that the two parangues should not be seized as the mer-  
chants seemed to be innocent, but that they should be allowed to go away after

selling the rice at the port. It was also decided that in future any embarkation that came from Kanara should be captured with the cargo and the men. It may be noted that the merchants of Goa too were eager to proceed to the ports of Kanara in order to secure food supplies. The Viceroy-in-Council decided against them, announcing that if any embarkation of theirs was found dealing with Kanara, it would be confiscated with its cargo.

53  
However, within two days the decision regarding the paranques from Kanara was altered. On 7 October twelve more such boats came to Goa with food-grains. Considering the matter again on the following day it was decided that all these boats be allowed to go back after selling the cargo at Goa. It was pointed out by some members of the Council that Goa was experiencing shortage of food supplies; that it was difficult to secure supplies from the North owing to the Adil Shah's hostilities; and that there was no harm in carrying on trade with the merchants from enemy territories, as was being done formerly when Venkatappa was at war with the Portuguese in Mangalore, and it was being done now in Portugal where 54  
the Dutch merchants came to the port of Lisbon for trade.

In November, the prince of Cannanor sought Portuguese assistance against his own enemies. In return, he promised to fight against Shivappa by land, paying his soldiers from his own treasury. The Viceroy-in-Council decided on 11 December not to assist the prince, since he was not powerful enough to wage war against 55  
Shivappa, nor was he always reliable as far as his promises were concerned.

We are not in a position to know what transpired between the Portuguese and Shivappa for nearly three years afterwards. However, from a letter written by the Governors of Goa to the king of Portugal on 17 December, 1658 we learn that Shivappa had promised the Portuguese in the meantime to allow them to establish factories at Basrur and Mangalore. The letter further informs that the Portuguese fleets and cafилас were allowed to enter and come out freely at these ports; that merchant ships were permitted at Honavar also; that these movements were allowed by toleration, and not by any specific agreement; that the Christians, who lived

in Shivappa's territories, were being treated well; that some Portuguese nationals had become residents therein; and that food supplies from his territories came to  
56  
Goa. Thus, Shivappa and the Portuguese were in good terms by the year 1658.

However, in September or a little earlier, 1659, Shivappa detained at Basrur a fleet of seven periches. The efforts of its captain-major, Luis da Costa, did not succeed in getting the fleet released. Being informed of this, the Governor-in-Council decided to send a present worth upto 500 xerafins (Rs. 571) to Shivappa  
57  
and urge him to free the fleet. In accordance with this decision, instructions were sent on 3 October to Father Francisco de Espinola who was already at Bednur. A beautiful ~~mm~~ mirror valued at 250 xerafins (Rs. 286) and a piece of damask valued at 200 xerafins (Rs. 229) were sent as presents to Shivappa, the Father being instructed to give them as from himself, and not as from the Governor, for the presents ~~were~~ too small to be given as from the latter. A silken carpet of Persia valued at 100 xerafins (Rs. 115) was also sent as a present to Venkatappa, Shivappa's younger brother. The Father was instructed to say that the fleet had entered the port of Basrur in good faith, as Shivappa had always permitted the Portuguese ships into his ports; and, therefore, the detained fleet should be released. If Shivappa were to say that the Portuguese had captured at Cochin one of his ships with three horses and they should give satisfaction for it, the ambassador was to respond by pointing out that it was captured at a time when Shivappa was waging war against them; and that it was, therefore, unfair to ask for ~~satisfaction~~ <sup>satisfaction</sup>. Besides, the Father was also to point out that the value of the ship and its cargo was not even 3,000 xerafins (Rs. 3,429), whereas Shivappa had taken 12,000 xerafins (Rs. 13,713) from the factor of Jafanapatão who was proceeding from Cochin to Goa. Thus, the ship was more than well paid by means of ~~this~~ this sum of 12,000 xerafins as well as by means of the goods and artillery that he had captured along with the fortresses. If Shivappa inquired whether the Father had commission to negotiate for peace, the latter was to present the letter of credence that was sent along with the instructions; but it was to be presented, not readily, but as a last resort. Apparently, the Portuguese were not ready as yet to enter into

a treaty with Shivappa. The Father was instructed to talk on general peace, exchange of articles of trade, mutual liberty of entrance for merchants, ships and fleets into the ports of Kanara and Goa, and issuance of passports for Shivappa's ships. If he were to talk of pepper, the Father was merely to say that the Portuguese would purchase the commodity from him when things improved and when there was unhindered voyage between India and Portugal. In case he were to inquire why the Portuguese did not send an ambassador to him before, if they really desired peace, the Father was to respond that the authorities were too busy dealing with the Dutch who were creating trouble at the Goa bar. It Shivappa was not satisfied with any of the above clarifications and refused to release the fleet, the Father was to urge him to permit the captain-major, the captains and the soldiers of the fleet to leave for Goa or Cannanor.

58

Two days later, on 5 October, the Governors-in-council decided to send an ambassador, Father Pero da Costa, with greater powers to negotiate with Shivappa. This was as a result of a letter written by Luis da Costa, captain-major of the interned fleet. Probably, Luis indicated in his letter that Shivappa was entertaining the Dutch. Father Pero's task was therefore to wean Shivappa away from the Dutch. To please Shivappa, presents worth three to four thousand xerafins (Rs. 3,429 to Rs. 4,571) were to be sent to him through Father Pero. So also presents worth 500 xerafins (Rs. 571) were to be given to Venkatappa. Father Pero was to endeavour to get the interned fleet released from Basrur and also ensure food supplies to Goa.

59

Shivappa's reign came to an end in 1660. It is not possible to say when Father Pero reached Bednur and to what extent he succeeded in his mission of weaning away Shivappa from the Dutch. As far as the interned fleet was concerned, it remained in that condition until after Shivappa's rule.

The Portuguese thus lost whatever hold they had over Kanara, never to recover it any ~~time~~ time, though attempts were made subsequently to re-establish themselves as a political power in the region. Perhaps, they could have retained some

of their Kanarese fortresses. They had only to concede in the beginning itself what they conceded when it was too late, namely to purchase from Shivappa a substantial quantity of pepper every year. Instead, they followed a childish policy, offering to purchase 200 khandis in the beginning and then slowly raising the quantity by 50's and 100's until they reached the figure of 700 for the current year and 300 for year to year thereafter. It is true that their position was tight financially. However, they would have gained much more in the long run by conceding his demands regarding pepper as well as regarding the destruction of either of the fortresses of Basrur and Gangolly in the very beginning. They would have earned thereby his friendship and could have retained the remaining fortresses. There would have been peace in Kanara. This peace would have been of great value in their troubles against the Dutch.

Foot-notes:

1. KNV (p. 116) assigns this reign period of nearly 15 years. This period is accepted by N. L. Rao (The Nayakas of Keladi, in VSCV, p. 264).
2. Assentos, III, pp. 100-1.
3. Ibid., pp. 101-2.
4. Ibid., p. 478.
5. Ibid., p. 481.
6. Ibid., p. 522. K. D. Swaminathan (The Nayakas of Ikkeri, pp. 261-2) refers to this document in Appendix No. 6 of his book. However, he gives no date.

Though the translation gives the impression that it is of the whole document, it is not so. Many sentences are omitted. The arrangement of paragraphs also is not in accordance with the original. The translation of the last para is incorrect. There is no ~~reference~~ reference in the original to "ships made out of the wood that would not be bought by the



aforesaid king nor by that of Cannanor".

7. Assentos, III, pp. 526-7.

8. Ibid., pp. 197-8.

9. Letter of Father Antonio da Canceição, quoted by M. A. H. Fitzler in O Cerco de Columbo, p. 135.

10. Assentos, III, pp. 197-8.

11. Ibid., pp. 202-3.

12. Letter of Father Antonio da Conceição, quoted by M. A. H. Fitzler, op. cit., p. 135.

13. Assentos, III, pp. 543-4.

14. Ibid., pp. 199-200.

15. Ibid., pp. 523-5.

16. Ibid., pp. 206-7.

17. Ibid., pp. 208-9.

18. Ibid., pp. 211-2.

19. Ibid., pp. 541-2.

20. Ibid., pp. 212-3.

21. Ibid., pp. 213-5.

22. Ibid., p. 218.

23. Ibid., pp. 530-3.

24. Ibid., pp. 533-5.

25. Ibid., pp. 219-21.

26. Ibid., pp. 540-1. Viceroy's letter to king of Portugal, 20.1.1653.

27. Ibid., pp. 544-5.

28. Ibid., pp. 229-30.

29. Ibid., pp. 230-1.

30. Ibid., pp. 546-9.

31. Ibid., p. 239.

32. Ibid., p. 249.

33. Ibid., pp. 270-1.

34. Sousa, Francisco de : Oriente Conquistado, pt. II, conquista I, divição I, p. 32. K. D. Swaminathan's account (*op. cit.*, pp. 96-9) of the series of the wars that led to the fall of the Portuguese fortresses in Kanara is not chronological; it is confused and unconnected. His difficulty is understandable, though. With the few Portuguese documents, badly translated for him, he could not give a clear picture of the events that took place one after another. Speaking of Mangalore, he says that the Portuguese abandoned it in August. True enough. However, what is not true is that it "was the only fort left to the Portuguese". The fortress of Honavar was still in their hands and it was given up by them only in September, 1654. He says about this fort of Honavar that it was the "only fort that had not surrendered" and does not say whether the fort was surrendered to Shivappa at all. Further, he writes (p. 97) that Shivappa "concentrated his forces on Cambolim with reinforcements amounting to 80,000 men." If reinforcements alone amounted to 80,000, Shivappa must have had many thousands more of soldiers employed elsewhere. This fantastic figure does not appear to be correct. In the first instance, Swaminathan does not quote any source from which he secured this figure. Secondly, Leonerdo Pais, whom Swaminathan himself quotes (p. 98), says that Shivappa's whole army consisted of 40,000 to 50,000. Thirdly, even in the siege of the important fortress of Honavar, Shivappa seems to have employed only 11,000 to 12,000 men according to the Portuguese themselves (*Assentos*, III, p. 350).

35. *Assentos*, III, pp. 558-9.

36. Pais, Leonerdo : quoted in *Assentos*, III, p. 559.

37. *Assentos*, III, p. 559. Letter of Viceroy to king of Portugal, 20.1.1654.

38. *Ibid.*, pp. 307-8, 559.

39. *Ibid.*, p. 311

40. Ibid., pp. 319-22.
41. Ibid., pp. 565-7.
42. Ibid., pp. 326-8.
43. Ibid., pp. 569-70.
44. Ibid., pp. 329-30.
45. Ibid., pp. 331-3.
46. Ibid., pp. 333-7.
47. Ibid., pp. 571-3.
48. Ibid., pp. 350-1.
49. Ibid., pp. 355-7.
50. Ibid., pp. 351-5.
51. Ibid., pp. 357-60.
52. Ibid., pp. 581-2. Governor's letter to king of Portugal, 7.2.1655.
53. Ibid., pp. 395-7.
54. Ibid., pp. 397-8.
55. Ibid., pp. 419-20.
56. Ibid., p. 624.
57. Ibid., IV, p. 10.
58. Ibid., pp. 510-2.
59. Ibid., pp. 11-2.



Chapter 9.

THE PORTUGUESE AND THE NAYAKAS OF IKKERI - IV (1660-1763)

Shivappa Nayaka's brother, Venkatappa Nayaka II, became the next ruler. His reign was short (1660-61). The Portuguese followed an unwise policy in their relations with him, though they could have taken advantage of the new king, who was favourable to them as their own records show, to gain definite trade and other concessions. Instead, in December, 1660 they annoyed him by capturing one of his ships along with its equipment and crew. Some of the crew were converted to Christianity. Coming to know of this, Venkatappa detained a European priest proceeding from Cochin to Goa and decided not to release their fleet of seven periches that had been detained at Basnur during Shivappa's rule. This compelled the Portuguese to renew their negotiations with Bednur. In January, 1661 they sent Ramoji Sinai Cothari with a present and a letter to Bednur. Ramoji had two audiences with Venkatappa on 5 and 10 February, respectively. On the second occasion he was told to carry on negotiations with four ministers of Venkatappa's council. In accordance with the instructions <sup>1</sup> he was given in Goa, Ramoji negotiated regarding the release of the fleet detained at Basrur and regarding the money taken from Manoel da Costa, in return for Venkatappa's ship. The ministers were ready to urge their king to release the fleet, but were unprepared to talk of the money. Ramoji bribed them with 40 pagodas (Rs. 160), whereupon they agreed to place before Venkatappa the question of the money also. <sup>2</sup> Besides, he probably succeeded in getting the European priest released. Writing of these matters to the Governors on 20 February, Ramoji disclosed that without monetary or other promises the authorities in Bednur did not do anything. The Governors-in-Council, meeting on 4 March, decided to authorise Ramoji to promise the ministers further bribes to the extent of 500 to 1,000 xerafins (Rs. 571 to Rs. 1,142), provided they secured Venkatappa's order for restoration of the money. Concerning the fleet, its restitution was to be accepted only if its artillery and arms were also returned. If only the skeletons of the ships were offered, Ramoji was to

inform the Governors for further instructions.

Unfortunately, no further records are available to know the final outcome of the embassy. Probably, the fleet and the money remained with Venkatappa. The Portuguese themselves were to be blamed for their ill success and Venkatappa's subsequent inclination towards the Dutch who had approached him towards the end of 1660.<sup>4</sup>

Bhadrappa Nayaka (1662-64), son of Shivappa Nayaka, succeeded Venkatappa.

In September, 1663 the Adil Shah invaded the territories of Bhadrappa. Soon, the latter lost a major part of his dominions, including the capital, Bednur,

which the Adil Shah destroyed.<sup>5</sup> Bhadrappa sought aid from the Dutch and the Portuguese. The Dutch, probably promised help but did not give it in time. The Portuguese sent word saying that they were willing to succour him secretly. However, what assistance they actually gave is not indicated. In fact, it was a hypocrisy, as we shall see later on. In the meantime, Bhadrappa and the Adil Shah came to terms. The former bought peace by paying more than three million,<sup>6</sup> probably xerafins (Rs. 3,428,571).

While Bhadrappa was being hard pressed by the Adil Shah, the Portuguese decided to pressurise the former and try to regain at least some of the lost grounds in Kanara. Accordingly, the Viceroy instructed all those Portuguese nationals, who were in his territories, to assemble at a place from where they could be gathered to security. This was a show of threat to Bhadrappa who was anxious to get their assistance against the Adil Shah. The Nayaka sent messengers, proposing to compose his differences with the Portuguese. The Viceroy was requested to send his ambassador for this purpose. Recalling how former Portuguese ambassadors had returned empty-handed and disappointed on several occasions, the Viceroy responded insultingly that if Bhadrappa had anything to negotiate he should send his ambassador to Goa. At the same time the Viceroy sent a fleet of ten ships, under the command of Simão Gomes da Silva, to procure rice from Kanara. Simão was instructed to demonstrate lack of confidence in Bhadrappa by

not entering the ports of Kanara. The fleet was also a threat to him, for it could be used to fight him, if necessary. It could also be used to block the sea trade at his ports. Apparently, the Viceroy's policy brought about the desired result.

7 Bhadrappa sent Mallappa Malo as his ambassador to Goa in February, 1664. A present of 6,000 bags of rice was also sent. Bhadrappa proposed to

restore to the Portuguese their former fortresses of Honavar, Basrur and Mangalore.

8 As Mallappa was engaged in the negotiations in Goa, Bhadrappa was probably

murdered by some Brahmins, and his young brother, Somashekha Nayaka (1664-71),

ascended the throne.

9 There was confusion in Bednur, but Narayana Malo, Mallappa's brother,

10 took control of the situation and normalcy was established. Mallappa's embassy began to show results by October.

11 A navy comprising 11 ships, 2 galliots and one pataxo carrying ammunitions and arms, was sent from Goa. Manuel Lobo da

Silveira was its captain-major. He was to take possession of Gangolly which was

apparently to be returned to the Portuguese. At Basrur the fortress was to be

dismantled and its materials were to be transferred to Gangolly.

12 The Portuguese were to get Mangalore also. However, no agreement was as yet finalised.

Manuel Lobo reached Honavar on 26 October and sent a message to Narayana Malo. The latter

asked Manuel to go to Basrur where the two could conclude the negotiations.

On 29 the two actually met in Manuel's galliot off Basrur. Apparently, Narayana had

expected certain presents from the Portuguese. He expressed his hope to get

presents for king Somashekha, for the king's brother-in-law and for others. He

required 500 barrels of explosives also. Manuel excused himself saying that the

expected explosives and other things could not be brought in the pataxo which was

sufficient to carry only those things which were necessary for his fleet. Regarding the fortresses to be ceded, Narayana, who seems to have been absent from Bed-

nur for some time, said that nothing definite could be concluded unless he once

again ~~consulted~~ consulted the king. He took this stand probably because the Portuguese did not give what was expected of them in the form of presents and explosives.

th»

He also disclosed that Somashekha was prepared to cede a site on the southern bank of the river Netravati, and not the former Portuguese fortress of Mangalore itself. He and a representative of the Portuguese, Domingos da Guerra, went to Bednur, promising to return in 5 days. Writing of these to the Viceroy on 30 October, Manuel Lobo opined that he could easily take Gangolly by force if Somashekha refused to cede it. He also boasted that he was <sup>13</sup> with his fleet just in front of Narayana's house, ready to capture him and his uncle, should Narayana indulge in delaying tactics. He requested the Viceroy to authorise him to do so, pointing out that if the two were captured, all the Portuguese demands would be conceded. <sup>14</sup> Apparently, Narayana was so eminent and powerful in Kanara.

A few more interesting events are referred to in the same letter. Some time before Manuel's arrival at Honavar there was great danger for the very existence of the kingdom of Ikkeri. Two powerful men of the kingdom, namely, the brother-in-law of the king and Govayya, the king's secretary, were so hostile towards each other that the one desired to get rid of the other. The governor of Mangalore, who was Govayya's brother, was taken in chains to Bednur. The Queen of Bangher and the Chautar chief of Ullala besieged the fortress of Mangalore. The Queen was reported to have secured the services of 2,000 Nairs for the purpose. Sheriza Khan and Badulkhan, two generals of the Adil Shah, were marching triumphantly against Somashekha who fled from Bednur and took shelter in a strong fort called 'Andrug', that is, Anedurga. As the king was a child, all the feudatories were in revolt. These wars and revolts continued and Manuel Lobo thought it was a <sup>15</sup> good occasion to knock out concessions from Somashekha.

On 10 November Narayana returned to Basrur with a positive answer. The Portuguese were to get the fortresses of Basrur, Gangolly and Mangalore. The ships, which had been taken from the Portuguese during the rule of Shivappa and Bhadrappa, were to be returned with all the artillery and ammunitions. The Portuguese were to be free from the obligation of compulsory purchases of pepper from the Ikkeri kings. <sup>16</sup> They were to get regular supplies of rice. On 13 November Manuel took possession of Gangolly. However, on the following day, while pre-

paration was being made to take possession of Basrur, two Dutch ships appeared on the scene and surrounded the Portuguese pataxo. In order to discover their real intention, Manuel ordered the pataxo to be removed from the place where it was. While this order was being executed, the Dutch captain sent a message saying that the treaty between the Portuguese and the Dutch entered into on 12 November, 1663, laid down that wherever the Dutch had a factory the Portuguese should neither have a fortress nor a factory; and that the Dutch were permitted by Somashekara to have a factory at Basrur and therefore the Portuguese should not take possession of the fortress of Gangolly or Basrur. Manuel responded saying that the Viceroy alone knew what the provisions of the treaty were and that the fortresses which were being taken possession of by him were those which the Portuguese had in Kanara formerly and which Somashekara had agreed to return. The Dutch captain pointed out that the Portuguese had lost these fortresses in a 'clean' battle, and after the loss, the Dutch were the first to have been given the right to establish a factory at Basrur. He, therefore, informed Manuel to leave the fortresses as they were and also the pataxo where it was, until his superior, who was expected there in three or four days, decided the issue. Manuel dared not to disregard this suggestion. The Viceroy was informed of this development,

Manuel thought that Narayana Maló and others, who feared both the Portuguese and the Dutch, had invited both of them, so that the Kanarese would be free from oppression from either, for the European rivals were bound to be busy opposing each other there. This suspicion, however, was not well founded, for English sources tell us that the Dutch had already warned Narayana that he should not deliver the fortresses unless his master intended to fight the Dutch; but Narayana had responded that he would be failing in his duty if he did not deliver the fortresses to the Portuguese, for his master had ordered him to do so.<sup>18</sup> Manuel feared also that the Dutch were looking out for excuses to wage a fresh war on the Portuguese. He pointed out further that Somashekara had a net gain of 200

barrels of explosives which the Viceroy had sent in the meantime and which was  
entrusted to Narayana a day or two before the arrival of the Dutch.  
<sup>19</sup>

The Dutch were bent upon preventing the cession of the Mangalore fortress  
<sup>20</sup> too. They placed four ships there for the purpose. Manuel was helpless; he  
dared not divide his fleet and send relief to Mangalore. Besides, he was aware  
that Somashekha's garrison of Mangalore would not cede the fortress unless it  
received the king's order to that effect. In the meantime, Narayana went away  
from Basrur. In his absence, Manuel saw the end of negotiations for getting  
<sup>21</sup>  
back the lost fortresses.

On 25 November, 1664 Narayana addressed a letter to the Viceroy informing  
him that the Dutch were threatening to invade the kingdom of Ikkeri with 20,000  
Nairs, together with the rebel feudatories of Somashekha, if Mangalore was not  
ceded to them. Narayana had urged that what was done could not be undone, where<sup>22</sup>  
upon Rickloff, the Dutch commander, had sent his factor to the court of  
Somashekha. Narayana had ordered his men to delay the factor's affairs until  
the Viceroy's response to the letter arrived. The Viceroy was told that the  
fortress of Mangalore was besieged by the rebel feudatories encouraged by the  
Dutch and that the family of Locayya, an important man at Bednur and relative  
of Govayya, was within the fortress. The Viceroy was, therefore, urged to  
send a fleet to Mangalore and take possession of the fortress and rescue  
<sup>23</sup>  
Locayya's family.

The Viceroy and Narayana exchanged several letters. The latter always  
emphasised that he had done for the Portuguese whatever he had promised. particularly regarding the return of the Kanarese fortresses; and that he was always  
a friend of the Portuguese. In one letter he wrote that he considered the  
Dutch as 'women', whereas the Portuguese were 'men'. In another he said that  
Somashekha had agreed to return the fortress to the Portuguese "because, I had  
told him that you, the Portuguese, were powerful, and that without your help  
<sup>24</sup> and of your excellency (the Viceroy), we would not be able to live." Manuel

Lobo also wrote to the Viceroy on 12 December, 1664, informing him of Narayana's visit to him at Gangolly a couple of days earlier. Narayana once again mentioned how he had spent money and had laboured hard for the sake of the Portuguese, and how sorry he was not to see the fulfilment of his efforts on account of the Dutch. He told Manuel that the Dutch had sent their representative, a factor, to Bednur along with Babusa Pai and Ishwara Kamath, both Brahmins and influential at the court of Somashekhar; that the two Brahmins solicited on behalf of the Dutch, urging the king to give them Mangalore and grant other requests of theirs; that the representative had threatened that the Dutch would take Somashekhar's territories from Mangalore to Mirjan, within eight days, with the help of 20,000 to 40,000 Nairs, the Queen of Bangher and the Chautar chief of Ullala, if Mangalore was not given; that if, on the other hand, the Dutch request was granted, they promised to protect his kingdom from the rebel feudatories and to purchase all the pepper and rice available in his territories; that Narayana himself was considered a traitor for having sided with the Portuguese and thus being the probable cause of the ruin of the kingdom of Somashekhar; that on ~~being~~ summoned to the court, Narayana found every one turned against him and he, therefore, decided to run away to the coast; that he was allowed to get away when he pretended to go to warn the Portuguese not to meddle in Somashekhar's affairs; that he was in fact a fugitive and might be arrested any time; and that as long as the Dutch continued to influence the court with threats and promises, there was no hope of anything being gained for the Portuguese. However, the fortress of Gangolly, which was virtually in the hands of the Portuguese, could continue to remain with them. Manuel concluded that it would be better to sail away to Goa, leaving João Pereira de Vasconcelos in charge of the Gangolly fortress. The Portuguese were not willing to break with the Dutch and invite a fresh war.

Writing of these developments to the king of Portugal on 29 January, 1666, the Viceroy suggested that the king should take up the question with the government of Holland, protesting that the Dutch hindered the Portuguese from taking possession of the fortresses which were willingly given by a local ruler.

In the meantime, the execution of the agreement between the Portuguese and Somashekara regarding the restoration of the fortresses was suspended and Manuel Lobo was permitted to return to Goa.

In November, 1666 the question of taking possession of the fortresses of Kanara was reconsidered. On 17 November the Viceroy-in-Council appointed João de Sousa Freire, captain-major of the fleet of Malabar<sup>26</sup> and dispatched him to the south with the instruction to open negotiations with Somashekara.<sup>27</sup> The fortress of Gangolly, as already indicated, was in Portuguese possession. However, its garrison was not paid for the previous seven months. Arrangement was now made to pay through João de Sousa who was ordered also to procure pepper, rice and other provisions from Basrur through João Pereira de Vasconcelos, captain of the Gangolly fortress.<sup>28</sup> He was further instructed to secure the whole of the 'island'<sup>29</sup> of Gangolly for the Portuguese and hinder the Arab trade with Basrur. However, from two letters of the Viceroy, Conde de S. Vicente written to King of Portugal on 26 and 27 January, 1667, respectively, we learn that Somashekara did not consent to cede the fortresses.<sup>30</sup> He was prepared only to allow the Portuguese to trade in his territories. The Viceroy then instructed João de Sousa to open hostilities against Somashekara in August. While this order was being carried out, Shivaji invaded Goa towards the end of November and the Viceroy recalled João de Sousa to Goa where he reached in January, 1668.<sup>31</sup> As soon as the Portuguese fleet withdrew from Kanara, Somashekara captured all the Portuguese nationals and Christians, who resided in his territories, and took possession of the fortress of Gangolly.<sup>32</sup> Narayana, who was so favourable to the Portuguese, now took up the cause of the Dutch.

In 1671 Somashekara re-opened peace negotiations. On 14 February he wrote to the Governors of Goa offering the following terms and conditions: (1) The Portuguese would be given sites for establishing factories and timber yards at Mangalore, Basrur and Honavar. Each factory would be assigned surrounding lands to the extent of a hand-gun shot. No stone wall, single or double, should be constructed at the site; nor were there to be bulwarks, perapets and ditches.

The Portuguese should not try to secure more than the specified area. (2) The Portuguese should not establish oil mills at the sites. (3) They should use weights and measures of his kingdom. (4) They should not convert anyone to Christianity by force; they should neither take orphans nor kill cows and Brahmins. (5) The fugitive slaves of the Portuguese could be taken back freely by the latter. (6) Necessary explosives and gun-powder could be kept by the Portuguese at each factory for defence against thieves and enemies. (7) He would order the merchants to pay the Portuguese factors the customary dues of anchorage and import & export duties. He would also order his customs-officers to give the Portuguese the rice tributes. (8) The loading and unloading at the ports should be without unnecessary delay. The loading should be done in the presence of his customs-officers. The relations between his officials and the Portuguese factors should be orderly and peaceful. The Portuguese merchants, who sold goods at the ports, should pay him taxes. (9) The articles, which might be taken from his lands and which were meant for consumption at the factory, would be exempt from taxes. (10) The boats, ships and manchuas of the merchants of the Portuguese lands, which came into his ports and sold their goods there, would be given free passage to go back, provided the sales tax was paid to him. (11) The ships carrying Portuguese passports should not be searched but be allowed free navigation. (12) The boats and ships belonging to pirates, who oppressed the Portuguese merchants, would be expelled from his territories. (13) The embarkations of his territories would take passports from the Portuguese and pay them due taxes. His own ships, carrying pepper, should be given passports as of old days. (14) The Portuguese should assist him with their fleet, ammunitions and shots against his enemies - Muslims, Nairs and others. The Portuguese should not aid his enemies. (15) The embarkations of his lands should have free access into Portuguese ports, giving the embarkations good passage, but collecting due taxes from them. In case of storms, the embarkations should be allowed shelter in their ports without any molestation. (16) His own ships carrying rice should not be subjected to pay any Portuguese taxes.

Narayana Maló and, later, Vittala Maló were entrusted with the task of carrying on negotiations with the Portuguese on the basis of the above proposals. The Viceroy-in-Council, meeting on 20 April, 1671, decided to accept the terms, provided Somashekha gave 70 khandis of pepper in satisfaction of the periches that were captured by Shivappa Nayaka but never returned. There was another suggestion in the Council that Somashekha should be asked also to compensate for the money taken from Manoel da Costa Botelho. However, the final decision in this respect was to take up the matter with Somashekha after the conclusion  
34  
of the treaty.

The treaty was signed on the same day, namely, 20 April, 1671. With some modifications, all the proposals contained in Somashekha's letter were incorporated in the treaty. The following were the changes made: (1) A single wall could be built around the factory for defence. (2) Somashekha's ships carrying pepper were not to go to the ports of the enemies of the Portuguese. (3) The latter would assist him against his enemies, provided they were not the friends of the Portuguese. (4) He was to pay 70 khandis of pepper as a compensation for the captured periches. (5) If either of the parties to the treaty violated its terms and conditions, the violating party should pay all the losses and damages  
35  
caused thereby to the other party.

In December Somashekha was murdered. His wife, Chennammaji (1671-1696), succeeded him, though an unsuccessful attempt was made to enthrone one Shivappa  
37  
Nayaka, son of Andhaka Venkatappayya, and also another kinsman. The supporters of Shivappa Nayaka seem to have tried to secure Portuguese aid by offering them some more ports in Kanara. Though no fortress was offered, it is interesting to note that this alternative possibility was taken into account in a meeting of the Council of State on 29 December. However, the Council felt that it would be undesirable to accept a fortress since the question of succession to the throne of Ikkeri was still unsettled, and such a fortress given to them was bound to be attacked by the rival party, i. e., by Chennammaji, in whose eyes they would be  
38  
enemies.

Apparently, nothing came of this negotiation and Shivappa was soon suppressed by Chennammaji.

In 1674 the Portuguese captured at the Red Sea Strait two ships belonging to Chennammaji and sold the cargo, thus inviting trouble upon themselves. As a measure of retaliation, the Portuguese fleet, which had gone to Kanara to fetch food grains, was interned. The Portuguese talked of commencing hostilities, but ultimately agreed to give satisfaction.  
39

Towards the end of 1677 another friction arose between the Portuguese and Chennammaji. The latter allowed the Arabs to take rice supplies and to establish factories at Basrur, Honavar and Mangalore. The Portuguese considered this a violation of the treaty of 1671, as they were deprived of the taxes in the form of anchorage and customs. They sent a fleet to Kanara to suppress the Arab trade and drive them away. However, at Basrur the fleet was held up by the ingenuity of the officials of Bednur, who professed friendship. The delay enabled two Arab vessels, which had left the Basrur port a day or two earlier with rice supplies, to slip away unchased. When the Portuguese asked for rice supplies at Basrur, a high rate of 14 pagodas (Rs. 56) a korji was quoted, though rice of the same quality had been sold to the Arabs at 8 pagodas (Rs. 32) or even less. The Portuguese realised that the price was raised in order to prevent them from purchasing the commodity which the Kanarese wanted to store up for the Arabs who were expected at the port again. Considering these matters on 16 December, the Viceroy-in-Council decided that the Kanarese should be persuaded to give rice at a reasonable price; but hostilities should be commenced if they insisted upon supplying the commodity to the Arabs. Ships and houses at the Kanarese ports were to be burned. However, before launching the attack, the factors and their families were to be taken into safety. The Arab ships, which might be at the ports, were not to be allowed to sail out; and those which wished to enter were to be prevented from doing so. If the Bednur ruler desired, after the war, to resume commercial relations according to the treaty of 1671, compensation for damages and losses was to be demanded as per the very treaty.  
40 Hostilities were

actually begun soon after.

In March, 1678 the prince of Kanara, Virabhadra Nayaka, probably the son of Basavappa Nayaka, adopted son of Chennammaji, and the prince's captain-general, Timmanna Nayaka of Kasaragod, wrote to the government of Goa, soliciting aid from the Portuguese against Chennammaji. Virabhadra stated that the kingdom of Bednur belonged to him by right and that he intended to take possession of it. He requested the Portuguese to attack by sea, while he marched by land. In return for their help, he assured them their former possessions in Kanara. Virabhadra and Timmanna sent their letters to Goa through two envoys who were commissioned also to secure 400 soldiers from Ankola and Caroalle (?). The envoys were to take these men by sea in seven vessels. The Portuguese were requested to allow these vessels free passage, thus enabling the men to land at a convenient point in Kanara. The Governors-in-Council, who met on 30 March to consider these matters, decided to respond favourably. Their main aim was to embarrass Chennammaji as much as possible. Virabhadra must have been a mere child and he might have been a tool in the hands of Timmanna who probably was in revolt against the Queen. Virabhadra's claim was rather flimsy and uncommon, as his father, Basavappa, was alive and was the rightful heir after his adoptive mother, Chennammaji. It cannot be said that the Portuguese were not aware of all these. Yet any weapon was good enough for them to beat the Queen with for having admitted the Arabs into her ports and depriving Goa of rice supplies.

Nothing came of this negotiation. Perhaps, Virabhadra and Timmanna were quickly suppressed. By December Basavappa himself began to negotiate with the Portuguese for peace. Probably acting on behalf of the Queen he sent an ambassador, Krishna Nayaka, with a letter and a present to the Governor. Basavappa emphasised the 'ancient' friendship that existed between the Keladi rulers and the Portuguese and pointed out that though he had been maintaining peace the Portuguese generally inconvenienced the navigation of his ships and repressed some of them. He demanded their restitution. Krishna was empowered to conclude a treaty on the basis of the terms and conditions of which he was given a list.

Mallioipa, probably Mallappa Mal<sup>o</sup>, who was known well to the Portuguese; also  
wrote to the Governor on the above lines. After several meetings between Krishna  
and the Governor, and a meeting of the Council of State on 10 December to con-  
sider the proposals of Basavappa, a treaty of perpetual peace, alliance and  
commerce was signed in Goa on 15 December, 1678.

The first part of the treaty contained conditions on the part of the Portuguese, in 19 clauses, and the second part had 10 clauses of conditions on the part of Basavappa. The Portuguese conditions were: (1) The 'King of Kanara' should give a compensation of 30,000 xeralfins (Rs. 34,285). He should not demand satisfaction for his ships which were captured by the Portuguese until then, justly or unjustly. The latter on their part would not demand the arrears of tribute and customs duties and also other losses caused by the king. (2) The king should give tributes as of old in Mangalore and Basrur. (3) The king should give the Portuguese a factory, together with surrounding grounds, at the port of Mangalore. He should supply at the site stone, lime and wood, free of cost, to construct the factory. The Portuguese, however, would pay the officials employed in the construction of the factory. (4) In addition to the tribute under clause 2, the king should pay another tribute of 1,500 bags of clean and good rice every year at the factory of Mangalore. (5) The factory or the timber yard of the Arabs should be razed to the ground. Henceforth the king should not allow the Arabs to trade at his ports and lands. If any Arab ship was found at his ports, the Portuguese should be free to attack and capture it. The present treaty should not be considered as violated because of such an attack on the Arabs. (6) Ships belonging to the king or to his vassals should not sail into the ports of the enemies of the Portuguese, particularly the Arab ports. A ship violating this provision would be subject to confiscation by the Portuguese. (7) None of the ships of the king or of his vassals should navigate without a Portuguese passport. A fee would be charged while issuing a passport, except for two passports for two royal ships of Basavappa. A passport issued by the factor of Mangalore was sufficient for ships navigating between Kanya Kumari and Diu;

but for ships sailing for Bengal or the east coast of India or the Red Sea Strait or the Persian Gulf, passports should be obtained from the secretary of state in Goa. Even those ships which sailed to Goa in the company of Portuguese ships should possess passports issued by the factor of Mangalore. Any ship violating these provisions would be seized by the Portuguese. (8) The factory of Mangalore should have all the privileges as if it were a fortress and former customs duties, anchorage and other customary taxes should be paid to the factor. Basavappa's officials should assist the Portuguese in this respect. (9) Within the factory compound the Portuguese should be allowed to have shops for tobacco, food-grains, liquors and other customary articles. Five cargoes of provisions a day should be allowed to be taken to these shops free of tolls imposed by Basavappa. (10) The Portuguese should be allowed to erect a church within their factory compound. The Fathers should be allowed to punish rebels, probably those Christians who did not live according to the dictates of the church. The king's tanadars and manegars should assist the Portuguese in this connection. (11) Disputes among Christians, even if the latter were residents in the territories of the king, should be subject to settlement by the factor along with the Fathers. (12) Fathers, missionaries and other Portuguese nationals, who travelled through Basavappa's kingdom on the way to others, should be allowed free passage. No tolls should be collected for their baggage and other paraphernalia, save for merchandise. (13) The king should give land and licence to establish churches in his territories, particularly in Mirjan, Chandrapura, Honavar, Bhatkal and Kalyanpur. (14) If any pirates, being subjects of the king, took Portuguese ships, the king should undertake to restore the ships with the cargoes and punish the pirates. (15) The Portuguese should be allowed to have warehouses for food-grains within the factory compound. They should be allowed to have a fence around the factory and possess guns, bacamartes, arquebuses and muskets for defence against thieves. (16) Slaves, who might run away from their Portuguese masters to the king's territories, should be returned without any payment being charged. (17) The

king's officials should treat the factor with respect. If they desired to meet him they should seek his permission first. They should not have any gallows and other means of violent punishment within the factory compound. (18) Portuguese merchants should be free to store their articles of trade within the factory compound. They should be required to pay taxes only on those articles which they sold. (19) The factor should be allowed to bring, free of imposts, whatever was necessary, from the king's territories for consumption in the factory.

The following were the conditions on the part of Basavappa: (1) The Portuguese should aid him with their war-ships against his enemies, provided the latter were not their friends. They should not ally themselves with his enemies. (2) Aid should be given against the Arabs, if the latter attacked his lands. (3) The Portuguese should not establish oil mills in the factory. (4) In case of storm, free passage should be given to the king's ships, no taxes being imposed, save on what was sold. (5) Kanarese ships sailing into the ports of Goa should be subjected to nothing more than the customary dues. (6) The Fathers residing within the king's territories should neither convert any one by force, nor take orphans, nor kill cows. (7) The Portuguese captains and captain-majors of the fleets, convoying the ships of rice, should not compel the proprietors to give them loads of rice or any other bribe. (8) Basavappa should be given licence to fetch horses from Congo or Ormus. (9) Those of his ships, which sailed into the ports of Arabia, could be captured by the Portuguese. (10) If a Portuguese subject committed any offence against a subject of Basavappa, the latter's officials would complain to the factor who should do justice, and if he failed, a complaint would be made to the Viceroy or Governor who should order justice done. Similarly, if a Kanarese subject committed offence against a Portuguese subject, the factor should complain to the king's officials who would do justice, failing which a complaint should be taken to the king who would order justice done.

By February, 1679 Chennammaji arranged to pay 30,000 xerafins (Rs. 34,285)

to the Portuguese, as we learn from a letter, dated 21 of the month, written by  
46  
Krishna Nayaka to the Governor. Regarding the yearly tribute of 1,500 bags of  
rice, she issued an order on 1 August, commanding Mallappa, in whose jurisdiction  
were the revenues of Honavar and Kundapur, to remit the tribute every year through  
Krishna Nayaka. In June or July, 1680 the first tribute of 1,500 bags seems to  
have been collected through Father Manoel Themudo whom the Governor sent to Kanara  
47  
for the purpose.

Portuguese relations with Chennammaji seem to have been cordial after the  
conclusion of the treaty of 1678 until 1695. However, in the first half of the  
year 1695 an occasion arose for hostility. An Arab fleet attacked a Portuguese  
fleet off Mangalore and burnt some sanguichos and damaged some parangues. The  
Portuguese believed that the Queen had betrayed them by informing the Arabs of  
the weakness of the Portuguese fleet and that the governor of Mangalore, vassal  
of the Queen, had assisted the Arabs. The factor of Mangalore was sent to Bed-  
nur to protest and demand satisfaction. He was also to countermine the negotia-  
48  
tions of the Arabs with the Queen. It is not known whether the protest was  
fruitful.

Under the treaty of 1678 the Portuguese were entitled to capture Kanarese  
ships, if the latter traded with enemy ports, particularly with Arab ports. In  
November, 1695 there was acute shortage of rice in Mascat. Knowing this, many  
a Kanarese merchant desired to take shiploads of rice to that region. The Portu-  
guese decided to intercept these ships on the high seas and bring them to Goa  
where their future was to be determined subsequently. The Kanarese merchants  
desired to trade with Congo also and sought Portuguese passports. Though under  
clause 9 of the treaty the Portuguese were expected to grant such passports, they  
decided neither to issue nor to say no, but to delay the issuance until Chennamma-  
ji sent her envoys specially for the purpose. It was expected that if no rice  
supplies were allowed to Mascat for one year, the Arabs would be weakened.  
49

The minutes of the meeting of the Council of State held on 29 March, 1697

show that Chennammaji died a little before this date. The Portuguese decided to send a present to Basavappa Nayaka, the new king, and congratulate him on his accession to the throne of Ikkeri.

During the reign of Basavappa and thereafter in the first half of the 18th century, the Portuguese were pre-occupied in excluding the Arabs from Kanara. In August, 1698 the factor of Mangalore reported to the Viceroy that what seemed to be Arab ships were anchored at the port of Mangalore and that the Arabs not only purchased rice at the port, but appeared to have the intention of establishing a fortification there. The authorities at Goa decided to write to Basavappa, probably to protest against his encouragement to the Arabs. At the same time they despatched two frigates to Mangalore with orders to destroy the Arab ships if found at the port. Besides, the frigates were to procure rice from Mangalore for being sent to Mombasa.<sup>51</sup> It is not possible to say what exactly ensued, though it may be inferred from a letter dated 18 May, 1699 written by the Viceroy to Basavappa, that some kind of understanding was arrived at between the two, for Basavappa sought Portuguese aid against the Marathas who occupied an island, off Honavar. The Viceroy assured assistance, not immediately, but in September, by which time, however, the Marathas gave up the island and the Portuguese aid, which was sent in November, became unnecessary. In the same letter the Viceroy took opportunity to complain of the non-payment of import and export duties due to the factory of Mangalore, of the detention of a Portuguese, and of the non-co-operative attitude of the administrator of Mangalore.<sup>52</sup> Basavappa readily removed the causes of these complaints of the Viceroy, as we learn from another of the latter's communications to him on 29 January, 1700. The Viceroy assured him all the possible aid against his enemies, provided he and his vassals did not have dealings with the Arabs. In order to show that he had no ill will towards Basavappa, the Viceroy blamed the Nayaka's ministers for the past violations of the provisions of the treaty of 1678.<sup>53</sup>

In February, 1701 Basavappa sent an ambassador with a present to the Viceroy

and sought Portuguese passports for his merchant ships. The Viceroy granted the passports, taking the opportunity, however, to complain again of Basavappa's inconstancy and non-conformity to his promises and of his favour to the Arabs. The Viceroy emphasised that Basavappa should allow free passage to the Portuguese navy and merchant fleet, as also to the factor of Mangalore, missionary fathers and vicars of churches; that the king should order punctual payment of customs dues and the yearly tribute of rice as per the treaty of 1678; and that he should not admit Arabs, enemies of the Portuguese, into his ports. The Viceroy sent a reciprocal present and assured the king all assistance against his enemies, provided he did "what ought to be done", no doubt, referring to the king's obligations under the treaty.

Basavappa did not heed the Viceroy's request not to admit Arabs into his ports. From a letter of 7 January, 1702, written by the Governors to the king of Portugal, we learn that their predecessor had warned Basavappa that warships would be sent to the ports of Kanara if the Arabs were allowed any trading centre there. Inspite of this, Basavappa seems to have continued to favour the Arabs, whereupon the Governors decided to order the warship, Nossa Senhora de Valle, to sail unto the Kanarese ports and prevent the Arabs from establishing their trading centre. In reply to this letter, the king of Portugal, writing on 5 March, approved of the Governors' intention of hindering the Arabs in Kanara, but pointed out that the most effective way of all the possible means to be used against the Arabs would be to procure rice supplies from Kanara, for the Arabs depended upon the rice from that region for their sustenance.

In April or thereabout, 1702, the Portuguese captured a barque belonging to Basavappa though it possessed a Portuguese passport. Their excuse was that the ship carried some Arabs and certain prohibited articles like iron, antenna and bamboo intended to be taken to Mascat. The ship was brought to Goa and its cargo of rice, etc. was sold to the credit of the royal treasury. The Arabs, of course, had escaped. Basavappa seized the Vicar of Honavar who was suspected to have given the information to the Portuguese authorities that the ship

Arabs and that it was to sail to Mascat. The factor and the Vicar of Mangalore, as also the Vicar of Basrur, were interned. On receiving the news of Basavappa's action, the Governors-in-Council, meeting on 22 May, decided to 'chastise' him for his 'insolence', but after the rainy season. In the meantime, those merchants of Kanara, who were found in Portuguese territories, were to be interned as an immediate retaliation.<sup>57</sup> Basavappa relented. In July, or perhaps earlier, he released the Vicar of Honavar and removed the guard on the factor of Mangalore and others. After this gesture of good will he sent an envoy to Goa to seek the release of the ship. By this time Basavappa seems to have been engaged in a war against the Nairs of Malabar and, therefore, he apparently desired no additional hostility with the Portuguese. He required their assistance, instead. The Portuguese, however, decided to demand satisfaction for his action against the factor and the vicars. If he were to refuse, hostilities were to be commenced against him. Besides, all Kanarese ships, which did not have Portuguese passports or which carried goods prohibited under the passports issued, were to be seized.<sup>58</sup>

Some sort of understanding seems to have followed between the Portuguese and Basavappa, for the Council of Finance passed a resolution on 10 October, 1703, authorising the factor of Mangalore to spend a sum of 300 xerafins (Rs. 343) a year on presents to 'the king of Canara'.<sup>59</sup> Further, from a letter dated 11 December, written by the Viceroy to the king of Portugal, we learn that the Portuguese aided Basavappa against the Malabarese whose embarkations and pirate ships were expelled by the captain-major of the fleet of the south.<sup>60</sup> Basavappa thanked the Portuguese for the relief given.

However, trouble started again. The merchants of Kanara, who always followed a course which was in their own interests, traded with the Arabs. In fact, the Kanarese ports were closed to the Portuguese and their merchant fleet was refused rice supplies, as we learn from a letter dated 1 May, 1704, written by the Vice-roy to the Nawab of Konkan.<sup>61</sup> By June there was scarcity of food-grains in Goa. The Portuguese decided to secure supplies from the north and hoped that Basavappa

would feel the loss of more than one million in gold, rupees and patacas, which  
they used to invest in his territories for provisions every year. At any rate,  
<sup>62</sup>  
Basavappa sent messengers in August, proposing settlement of mutual differences.  
The Portuguese believed that he relented because of the show of force in the  
form of four frigates, which the Viceroy had sent to hinder his sea trade and  
to do other acts of hostility. Nevertheless, the Viceroy-in-Council, meeting  
on 12 August, decided to negotiate for a peace settlement.  
<sup>63</sup>

The Dutch, with whom the Portuguese were at peace by then, offered to  
supply food-grains from Basrur where they had a factory. The Viceroy thanked  
them saying that he had procured sufficient rice from the north and, therefore,  
did not need any more. He assured them however, that he would willingly accept  
their offer in case of need.  
<sup>64</sup>

From a letter of 4 December, 1704, written by the Viceroy to the king of  
Portugal, we get details concerning the causes that led to the hostilities of  
the year. The Arabs persuaded Basavappa to deny food supplies to the Portuguese.  
Fearing the powerful Arab navy, which was believed to be on the way from Arabia,  
Basavappa obliged. He told the Portuguese that he would not allow them any rice  
supplies unless the ship captured during the Viceroyalty of Almotace Mor was  
restored; and with this he closed his ports to their ships. The Portuguese re-  
taliated by detaining one of his patacos loaded with areca, whereupon he seized  
two of their captains, 16 or 18 soldiers and some mariners who were found in his  
territories. Besides, he withheld payments to their merchants. Some Portuguese  
parangues, which could not slip away in time, were also detained. The Portuguese  
not only sent four frigates to Kanara in August to hinder the Kanarese sea trade,  
but defeated the Arab navy off Surat. These developments, and the fear of more  
war-ships being sent to Kanara by the Portuguese, compelled Basavappa to release  
some of the Portuguese prisoners and all their parangues, and send an ambassador  
to Goa. The Viceroy refused to deal with the ambassador until all the prisoners  
were released and the Portuguese merchants were paid their dues. Basavappa obli-

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65

ged and hostilities were suspended. Soon, the Viceroy's hope of getting rice supplies from Kanara seems to have been fulfilled, for in another letter which the Viceroy wrote on 15 January, 1707 to the king of Portugal, he refers to Basavappa's observation of the "many conditions which I imposed upon him anew in the provisions of ratification of the peace which I adjusted with him." This new treaty was concluded in February, 1705. The treaty as a whole is not traceable, but a few of its clauses are found mentioned in the 'Livro da Correspondencia do Canará'. These clauses are: (1) Basavappa should supply stone, lime, etc. for erecting a factory in Mangalore at a site most ~~convenient~~ convenient to the Portuguese. (2) He should pay an annual tribute of 1,500 bags of "clean and white" rice. (3) Both Kanarese and Goan merchants should be permitted to take rice from Kanara for sale in Goa. (4) The import and export duties levied at the ports of Mulky and Manjeshwara should belong to the Portuguese. (5) An embarkation belonging to Basavappa, but which had been repressed by the Portuguese, should be returned to its master. It may be noted that the treaty of 1678 was not considered null and void on the conclusion of this treaty of 1705.  
67

Towards the end of 1707 a Portuguese fleet of merchant ships, with convoys, went to Kanara to secure food supplies; but the work was found difficult on account of the Arabs who also came there with a strong navy of fourteen ships.  
68 The Arabs apparently desired to take possession of Honavar, Basrur and Mangalore. At Honavar they landed more than 2,000 men with a view to take the place; but Basavappa's men repulsed the attack, causing them much loss in men and arms. From there the Arabs proceeded to Mangalore where they confronted the Portuguese who, having been re-inforced in the meantime, engaged them in many a battle and drove them away from there too. At Basrur also they ~~were worsted~~ were worsted by the Portuguese. These battles between the Portuguese and the Arabs, off the Kanarese ports, took  
69 place in the first few months of 1708.

In 1712 the Portuguese seized a ship belonging to Basavappa with horses on board, for it did not have a passport and was carrying some articles of trade prohibited under previous treaties. Basavappa was also accused of quoting ex-

orbitant price for rice and ill treating Portuguese officials and soldiers who went for securing supplies. An ambassador was sent to Goa to secure the restitution of the ship, but the Viceroy justified its capture. Basavappa insisted upon restitution and ordered his men, upon the pain of death, that no rice should be supplied to the Portuguese. The Viceroy retaliated by sending a fleet of thirteen war ships with orders to open all possible hostilities against Basavappa: repress his embarkations, take his ports and prevent any rice from being exported. The fleet carried 350 men of war with Joseph Pereira de Brito as captain-major. It departed from Goa on 15 January, 1713 and three days later reached Kumta where it confronted eleven of Basavappa's embarkations which were burnt. From Kumta the fleet proceeded to Honavar whose fortress the captain-major intended to capture. However, the fortress was well garrisoned. The defenders, perceiving the impending attack, were ready to withstand. The captain-major thought it inopportune to attack and sailed ahead to Basrur where he reached on 21. The fortress of Basrur was attacked so vigorously from the river that a wall came down pretty soon and the Portuguese soldiers landed. Until the midnight they engaged themselves in burning the inhabitants' dwellings and setting fire to ten parangues, one galleon and a ship which were anchored in the river. A nearby battery, which was being guarded with men and artillery, was invested on the following morning and taken. A rich habitation near the battery was burnt; so also another set of ten embarkations, small and <sup>big,</sup> ~~big,~~ was turned into ashes. The greatest loss was caused there when a store house of food-grains, sufficient to fill several ships, was burnt down. The captain-major removed to his fleet nothing but the pieces of artillery which he found in the fortress and the battery. The fortress itself was demolished. On 23 the fleet arrived at Kalyanpur where there was a fortress with seven bulwarks. Inspite of incessant fire from the fortress, some small ships of the fleet entered the river and burnt the Kanarese ships anchored within. On the following morning the fortress was taken by assault. It was demolished after its artillery was removed to the

fleet. On 25 the fleet reached Catapally (Katpadi ?) where the soldiers were landed in three divisions. No edifice remained unburnt within the range of more than three leagues from the port. The Kanarese embarkations at the port were also set on fire. Next, the fleet proceeded to Mulky where it reached on 27. The local chief offered to negotiate peace terms with the captain-major. However, the latter thought that it was a cunning device to delay matters until the chief received re-inforcements. Therefore, an attack was commenced forthwith. On the following morning the Portuguese found themselves at the foot of a fortress where 1,500 Kanarese soldiers were ready to defend. There ensued a keen contest, but ultimately the Kanarese were put to flight. After burning and devastating the habitations, the Portuguese sailed down to Mangalore where they arrived on 30. The defence force of that place consisted of 4,000 foot-soldiers and 1,500 cavalry-men. The entire fleet of the Portuguese entered the river and commenced a battle. After two days of furious fighting, the governor of Mangalore sought a cease-fire, saying that he would get Basavappa's instructions. The captain-major granted the request, but continued to prevent embarkations from sailing out of the ports of Kanara. However, even by the middle of April Basavappa did not show any sign of coming to terms and the rainy season was about to set in. The Viceroy, therefore, instructed the captain-major to return to Anjediva. On the way he was <sup>commanded</sup> ~~commanded~~ to destroy Kumta, Gokarna and Mirjan. The major faithfully carried out this command. The temple of Gokarna was burnt on this occasion. Thus, a fleet of 13 ships with a small force of 350 men laid waste the coast of Kanara from Mirjan to Mangalore. Four fortresses were destroyed, eighty-two ships were burnt, many habitations were set on fire, and 600 or so of the Kanarese soldiers and others were killed. The material loss caused to Basavappa was calculated at five million pagodas (Rs. 20,000,000). Among the Portuguese soldiers, only 12 were killed and 30 were wounded. The captain-major too died, but owing to sea sickness. From another of the Viceroy's letters to the king of Portugal, we learn that the Portuguese enriched themselves during the course of these hostilities by capturing two galleons of Basavappa - one loaded with rice and the other with arecanuts.

At last, Basavappa wrote to the Viceroy on 28 December, 1713 and sent Kaddase Damarasa Prabhu with the letter to Goa for peace negotiations. Damarasa was em-  
powered to conclude a treaty, which was done on 19 February, 1714. The treaty was divided into two parts, the first part containing 25 clauses of Portuguese conditions and the second part comprising Basavappa's conditions in 13 clauses. The Portuguese conditions were: (1) Basavappa and his successors should be loyal friends of the Portuguese, friends of their friends and enemies of their enemies. He should assist them against their enemies. (2) to (7) These clauses related to Christians and missionaries. The factor of Mangalore and its vicar were to be judges in respect of disputes between Christians or between Christians and Hindus. Wherever the factor's jurisdiction did not extend, the priests were to be judges. Provision was made to appeal to the government of Goa, if decisions were unsatisfactory. The Christian women, who led an unchaste life, were to be handed over to the factor. Christian children were neither to be purchased nor to be enslaved. So also, wives and children of Christian soldiers were not to be purchased or enslaved. A Christian of Goa or any other part of the Portuguese possessions, who embraced any of the Hindu castes, should be taken by the church officials and sent to Goa; in doing this the church officials were not to be obstructed. Clauses 6 and 7 provided for the construction of churches and free movement of missionaries, like clauses 10 and 11 of the first part of the treaty of 1678. (8) Basavappa should give the Portuguese a war compensation of 30,000 xerafins (Rs. 34,285). (9) The arrears of the rice tributes amounting to 3,150 bags, or whatever was actually due, and the arrears of customs dues, should be cleared. (10) The annual rice tribute should be raised from 1,500 to 1,900 bags. (11) The import and export duties (lagimas) should be paid to the Portuguese at Mangalore as before. (12) This clause, like clause 3 and 15 of the treaty of 1678, provided for the supply of materials on the part of Basavappa to construct a factory, or to repair the existing one, at Mangalore and for the equipment of the factory with arms. (13) This clause was similar to clause 17 of the previous treaty. The factory was to be treated as if it were a fortress. (14) The Portuguese should be allowed to

establish warehouses inside the factory compound. (15) Basavappa should not have any dealings with the Arabs. If the latter were found at his ports, the Portuguese were to be free to attack the Arabs. The treaty was not to be considered violated on account of such an attack. (16), (17) and (18) were similar to clauses 6 and 7 of the previous treaty. (19) This provision related to run-away slaves and was similar to clause 16 of the previous treaty. (20) The Portuguese should be given preference, vis-a-vis other powers, in giving rice supplies; the Portuguese should never be denied such supplies; Kanarese and Portuguese merchants and their ships carrying rice should be allowed free passage between Goa and Kanara. (21) Each of the rice bags taken by the merchants of Mangalore to Goa should measure 2 mãos of 7 curós, each curó being 8 measures. If the bags measured less, the Portuguese were to be free to confiscate them. (22) Basavappa should pay the value of a vessel (palla) taken by the Marathas in 1711 off Honavar, if it was adjudged that the tanadar of Honavar had given aid to the Marathas in this respect. (23) He should order Upendra Kamath, former customs officer of Mangalore, to pay the dues of import and export duties to the factor of Mangalore. (24) The latter should be free to purchase wood and send it to Goa unhampered. (25) Kaddase Damarasa Prabhu, ambassador of Basavappa, should maintain a saraf (xeraffo) at Goa to weigh and test the gold to be taken to Kanara.

The second part of the treaty contained the following conditions on the part of Basavappa: (1) The Portuguese should aid him with their fleets against his Asiatic enemies who were not their friends. They should defend his ports, particularly against the Arabs. (2) This clause was identical with clause 4 of the previous treaty. (3) The Portuguese should issue, free of charge, ~~two~~ two passports a year to two ships belonging to him to bring horses from Ormuz or Congo; but such ships were to be subject to confiscation by the Portuguese if they carried on board horses from any of the ports of Imam of Mascat or brought Arabs. In order to be free from suspicion, the captains of such ships should obtain certificates showing that the horses were taken from Congo from the Portuguese factor of Congo, or Ormus. (4), (5) and (6) were similar

to clauses 5, 6 and 7 of the previous treaty. (7) Even those of Basavappa's ships, which possessed passports, were subject to confiscation if they were found at the ports of Arabia. (8) Basavappa's subjects were not to pay tolls at the fortresses and lands of the Portuguese. (9) The Portuguese should return, with the cargo, two ships seized from him in the previous year. If the ships were already sold, the Portuguese should give the cash gained from the sale. (10) Both parties to the treaty should forget the mutual offences that might have been committed and should not demand any compensation. (11) No oil mill should be established in the factory. (12) Kanarese ships, which went to Goa with the cargo of rice, should not be maltreated there. The rice taken from such ships should be paid for promptly; if not, the proprietors of the cargo were to seek justice by complaining to the Portuguese authorities. (13) Whenever there were disputes or differences between the two parties to the treaty, no hostilities should be committed by the one against the other while an ambassador was sent for negotiations.

Sending a copy of the treaty to the king of Portugal, the Viceroy commented that the Oriental kings respected the Portuguese as long as the scars of the wounds caused by the Portuguese arms lasted.<sup>75</sup> The king of Portugal thanked for the Viceroy's iron policy towards Basavappa and for securing a treaty with such favourable terms.<sup>76</sup> However, in November, 1714 there occurred an incident which was about to cause trouble. A ship belonging to "a man of importance" in the court of Somashekha Nayaka II (1714-39), who had succeeded Basavappa in the meantime, entered the port of Marmugão to take shelter there against a storm, no doubt with Portuguese concurrence. On examining the passport it was found that the period of its validity had already expired. The ship was interned for the time being.<sup>77</sup> On 19 November the Viceroy-in-Council decided that the ship should be allowed to sail away, for it was not considered worthwhile to incur the hostility of the new ruler of Bednur by confiscating a ship which contained a small cargo worth only Rs. 40 and which had entered the port in good faith. This kind of detention and release of Kanarese ships took place occasionally. Towards the end

of 1722 a galley of Mangalore was detained, because it brought horses which were prohibited under the passport given. However, the galley was released, because the Kanarese intended to raise exorbitantly the price of rice, which was necessary for the sustenance of Goa, and also because the Portuguese relations with the English were uneasy in those days. The Viceroy wrote to the regent of Keladi,  
78  
saying that the vessel was released in order to preserve peace with Kanara. Again,  
79  
in January, 1727 a Kanarese ship, named Ishwari Mahamai, entered the river Mandovi and was detained, for its passport was found illegitimate and it carried horses without permission. The Viceroy-in-Council decided on 20 January that the ship should be restored, but after ensuring cargoes for the southern fleet. Besides, at the time of returning the ship, a declaration was to be made that the restitution should not be cited as a favourable precedent, implying thereby that detained ships might not be returned in the future. The ship in question belonged to the Regent of the kingdom of Keladi, Nirvanayya, who wrote to the Viceroy seeking the restoration of the ship. The Viceroy responded on 31 January, saying that it would be restored without the cargo. At the same time he also wrote to the factor of Mangalore that the latter should promptly inform him if the Regent refused to accept the vessel without the cargo and denied rice supplies to the Portuguese, so that the Viceroy would be able to ~~make~~ 80 81 decide upon the measure of a suitable reprisal.  
82

The Regent was apparently bent upon securing horses and delaying the payment of tributes to the Portuguese in order to bring pressure upon them. The Viceroy wrote on 27 January to the factor of Mangalore instructing him to make it clear to the Regent that the Portuguese had a just right to suppress ships carrying unlicensed horses and that if the due tributes were refused, the Portuguese would consider the peace treaty as violated. At the same time the Viceroy proposed to strengthen the fleet at Mangalore by despatching a few more frigates in order to prevent the Kanarese ships entering or leaving the port until the question of the payment of the tribute was settled. However, from another letter written by the  
83

Viceroy on 8 March to the captain-major of Kanara and the Southern Coast, we learn that the Portuguese were not eager to clash with Somashekara. The captain-major, not doubt, was instructed to make persistent efforts to secure the due rice tributes, if he found Somashekara hesitating to give; but at the same time, he was authorised to sell explosives and shots to Somashekara or to his Regent, if the war materials were sought by either of them for defence against the Marathas who were then invading the territories of Karnataka.

In the meantime, Somashekara became displeased with the Christians and kept under custody the vicar of the church of 'Our Lady of Miracles' of Mangalore. On 14 May, 1727 the Viceroy wrote to Somashekara a threatening letter demanding the punishment of the governor of Mangalore and the release of the vicar: "I cannot pursue myself that the governor of Mangalore had order from Your Highness to violate the treaty concluded with this State, as I do not suppose that Your Highness have forgotten the price which it cost you, and much less the oath which ought to be observed; and thus I expect that Your Highness would soon order to punish him as he deserves for having insolently violated it, without reason, when on my part nothing of what was stipulated (in the treaty of 1714) has been unfulfilled." The Viceroy continued to say that he would declare war if "nothing suffices to pursue Your Highness to moderation, which ought to prevail in these proceedings." Regarding the detained ship, he ~~said~~ expressed his disbelief that it was Somashekara's (assuming that the Regent would act in the name of the king), for he could not imagine that "having permission, as you have, to obtain the passport free of charge, (the ship) should have sailed without it, risking detention by virtue of the very conditions of the treaty."

Writing on 4 June to Father Agostinho Machado, who was probably endeavouring to reconcile Somashekara with the Christians of Kanara, the Viceroy assured him that he would not give in to hostilities and dis-graceful acts on the part of Somashekara. Agostinho was authorised to tell the latter "that should a war break out, I shall not consent another peace treaty to be concluded with him with

those advantages; and that he can rest assured that he will not have an opportunity to request the restitution of the carcass of a ship on similar occasions." Regarding rice, which Somashekara could prevent from being supplied to the Portuguese, Agostinho was to point out "that I am in good peace with Sahu Raja", the Maratha ruler, who would provide all his rice supplies to Goa. The Father was also authorised to assure Somashekara that the latter's complaint that the Portuguese navy had committed excesses against him would be considered and the guilty officials  
86 would be punished. We are not told what these excesses were.

Father Agostinho wrote to the Viceroy on 6 June, remitting a statement of offences committed by the Portuguese as listed by the Regent. Agostinho could not convince Somashekara that the detention of the ship was justified under the treaty of 1714. Responding to the Father on 30 June, the Viceroy told him to point out that the Portuguese always desired peace with Somashekara and that that is why  
the latter was aided against the Marathas <sup>who</sup> ~~she~~ in fact could have been invoked to attack his territories instead. The Father was also to say that the detained ship not only did not possess a legitimate passport, but did not have even a letter from Somashekara declaring that it was his. Nevertheless, the Father was instructed to agree to restore the ship, without its cargo, which was of very little value,  
87 if Somashekara was found prepared to stop demonstrations of war.

On the same day, namely, 30 June, the Viceroy wrote to the factor of Mangalore also appreciating his persistent efforts to secure peace for the Christians and to restore priests to their offices. He remitted to him the letters from Bednur, together with his own replies, so as to facilitate the factor's further efforts. The latter was to protest against the governor of Mangalore who refused to give sandal wood and customs dues. If these were given, the factor was authorised to give the customary presents to the Regent. The detained ship was not to be restored, because restitution would mean indirect approval of the violation of the treaty on the part of Somashekara and it would damage the reputation of the Portuguese  
88 arms.

However, before the Viceroy's letters could reach Father Agostinho and the factor, Somashekara wrote to the Viceroy on 27 June, informing him that he had ordered cessation of offences against the missionaries and other Christians. Responding to this letter on 1 July, the Viceroy hoped that Somashekara would "desist from the motive which you have given me to complain, and being so, as I hope, Your Highness will observe the effects of the desire which I have of <sup>89</sup> serving your friendship." Simultaneously, some doubtful points in respect of the treaty of 1714 were clarified. Clause 13 had provided that the Portuguese could maintain guns, bacamartes, arquebuses and muskets of trilon and other arms which were necessary. The Regent, Nirvanayya, complained that the factor placed pieces of artillery before licence was obtained. The Viceroy urged that this should not become a cause of violation of the treaty since most of the arms were of small capacity. So also, the treaty did not specify the time of the arrival of the Portuguese fleet at Mangalore. However, it always came in November or December and this practice was to be considered regular. Next, it was confirmed that even the royal ships of Bednur would be subject to confiscation, if they did not carry passports issued free by the secretary of state in Goa. Portuguese obligation to aid Somashekara against his enemies, if the latter were not their friends, was also confirmed, and the example of the aid offered in the previous year against <sup>on</sup> the Marathas, in case the latter were to descend <sup>A</sup> the coast of Kanara, was cited. Promise to punish Portuguese officials and soldiers, who were legitimately accused of excesses against the Kanarese, was made. However, the ship which was detained <sup>90</sup> legally, was not to be restored.

Yet, on 2 July the factor of Mangalore complained that Somashekara continued his prohibition on arms, customs dues and cargo of sandal. Replying on 24 July, the Viceroy sent a letter to the Regent through the factor. The following complaints were included in the letter to the Regent: (1) Arabs were permitted into the Kanarese ports from where they took rice supplies and other necessities. (2) Somashekara sent his ships with cargoes of food-grains and ammunitions to Arab

ports from where he brought horses. (3) He did not restore fugitive slaves and soldiers. (4) Melondin, enemy of the Portuguese, was allowed food supplies and permitted to sail out from the Kanarese ports to rob Portuguese embarkations. (5) Missionary fathers were arrested and Christians were ordered out of Kanara. (6) Sandal supplies, customs dues, and arms were prohibited, contrary to the terms  
91  
of peace.

In the beginning of August, or more probably towards the end of July, some Portuguese soldiers robbed a temple in Kanara and killed a yogi therein. It is not clear which was the temple attacked and where exactly it was located. Somashekha apparently demanded satisfaction. Father Agostinho was instructed by a letter of the Viceroy on 9 September to assure Somashekha that the culprit would be punished. He was also told to offer Portuguese fire-men to assist Somashekha  
92  
against Mysorians. A soldier, who was guilty of attacking the temple, had escaped. The Viceroy instructed the factor of Mangalore to get him arrested either by himself or with the assistance of the governor of Mangalore. The latter, however, was to be required to assure the factor that he would not punish the culprit. The  
93  
factor was to punish him on receiving further order from the Viceroy. In the guilty atmosphere in which the Portuguese found themselves, caution was taken by them not to offend Somashekha any more. Thus, the Viceroy desired to attack Arab ships if they were found in the Kanarese ports; but before doing so the governor of Mangalore was to be informed by the factor. The attack was to be  
94  
deffered if the governor hesitated to permit it.

Though Somashekha had ordered the release of missionaries and the Viceroy had been cautious in his relations with him, there was no sign of the rice tribute. The Viceroy became anxious and wrote to Father Agostinho on 20 March, 1728: "I have to await always whether the fleet would return and whether they would pay the tribute; but the news from the factor and from Your Majesty only confirms the doubt (of securing the tribute); which ought to necessitate much force, it (the payment

of tribute) being the principal part of the friendship; and on it depends not only the glory of this tribute, but the conservation of Anjediva." Further, the Viceroy said that if the tribute was paid he had "no hesitation to order the (detained) ship to the king, nor to write to Lisbon (to the king of Portugal), concerning the (restoration of the) cargo, nor to show other gallantries to the Regent." Father Agostinho was commissioned to agree to negotiate a new treaty, if Somashekara were to suggest such a course. Supplies of rice at a fixed price was to be ensured for every year in the new treaty. In return, more liberal passports and supplies of salt at a fixed price were to be promised. On 5 April the Viceroy forwarded three concrete terms to be proposed to Somashekara:

(1) The Portuguese would purchase 70,000 bags of rice every year at the rate of 12 or 14 pagodas (Rs. 48 to Rs. 56), whether the prevailing market rate was cheap or dear. If more rice was to be purchased, prevailing market rate would be paid for the additional bags. The Portuguese would supply in return 60,000 bags of salt every year at a fixed price proportionate to the fixed rate of rice. (2) If Somashekara was prepared to pay more than 5,000 loads of rice every year as tribute, the Portuguese would issue passports free of charge to all ships, royal or others. However, failure to possess a passport should make a ship liable to confiscation. Those ships which brought horses should give two horses to the Portuguese. (3) Somashekara should not allow Melondin into the Kanarese ports. If the latter's ships were found in any of them, the Portuguese should be free to attack and destroy the ships. In return, the Portuguese would aid Somashekara against his enemies.

Nothing concrete followed until the latter half of October. In fact, the Viceroy seems to have expected hostilities to ensue, for on 10 November he wrote to the General of the North to secure rice from the north, in case war should break out in Kanara.

Open hostilities did not follow, however. At this stage Sundardas Vishnudas, resident of Mangalore, owner of four ships and procurator of the Portuguese in Kanara, took over negotiations for peace side by side Father Agostinho Machado.

The Regent, Nirvanayya, was apparently a partner of Ramdas in business. Clarifying the policy of issuing passports and detaining ships which navigated without them, the Viceroy wrote to Ramdas on 22 November, 1728 that the king of Portugal was the lord of the sea and as such he confiscated those ships which did not gain the liberty of navigation by obtaining passports from his servants. Ramdas himself was assured of Portuguese protection under the system of pass-ports and the Viceroy hoped that he would send shiploads of rice to Goa. Ramdas, who desired to send his ship to Persia, was offered not only passports, but the protection of the Portuguese navy proceeding to Mombasa and Patte in December. The Viceroy asserted that he always desired peace with Somashekara. He requested Ramdas to get released the ship of Simão Dias and two Christians, who were apparently detained in Kanara in the meantime as an act of reprisal. In return the Viceroy assured Somashekara a new ship worth 30,000 pardaos (Rs. 120,000), for the detained one had become unserviceable by then. Writing of this to Father Agostinho, the Viceroy said that the sale price of the ship of Simão Dias was also to be negotiated and settled at Goa. If the Father was authorised by Somashekara for this purpose, the Viceroy required that the Father should come with the king's letter. The Father was requested also to labour for sending some rice to Goa where the price was as high as five xerafins (about Rs. 6) a bag of two māos. Somashekara sent one of his men to examine the new ship offered by the Viceroy. The ship was considered small and the Viceroy offered to give a better one. Somashekara also desired that passports should be issued to his ships, but the Viceroy wanted to know if the former actually possessed the ships for which passports were sought; if so, he assured the passports at the secretariat in Goa. As for Somashekara's proposal that he should be free to bring the cargo of horses, the Viceroy expressed his inability to give a general licence; but if a new treaty was concluded with the terms proposed by the Viceroy, such a freedom was assured. The promised new and better ship was sent in March, 1729. No new treaty was concluded; but relations between Somashekara and the Portuguese became cordial. In 1731 an additional

factory site was offered to the Portuguese who, however, did not accept it. The  
103 reason for the rejection is not indicated.

On 15 January, 1732 Father Agostinho informed the Governors of Goa that Soma-  
shekhara was hard pressed by his enemies, probably the Malabarese. In response,  
the Governors said that they would instruct the captain-major of the Southern fleet  
104 to extend necessary assistance to Somashekara. The latter seems to have made his  
own proposals regarding the exchange of rice and salt at a fixed rate, offering  
to pay an additional tribute of 600 bags of rice, making the total 2,500, on con-  
dition that two war ships be sent to him in September. The Governors of Goa expr-  
105 essed their inability to take a decision then on these proposals. Conde de Sandomil,  
106 who succeeded them as Viceroy, wrote to Agostinho on 29 November, informing him  
that he had just dispatched a frigate with explosives and shots to assist Somashe-  
khara against his enemies. This was, in fact, the first help sent to Somashekara,  
107 though additional help was sent later with two chiefs of artillery. No assistance  
could be sent from Goa before November, as the Viceroy explained in his letter of  
12 May, 1733 to Raghunatha Odeyar, governor of Mangalore, for the fleets of North  
and South came to Goa very late and it was undesirable to send any ships in the  
108 rainy season.

The factor of Mangalore was instructed to place a Portuguese flag at the high  
plateau at the bar of Mangalore so that it would not be occupied by the forces of  
109 Somashekara. The latter paid the rice tribute of 1,900 bags for the year 1732  
and he seems to have been regular for some years past in paying this tribute, for  
we do not hear of any complaint being made by the Portuguese in this respect.  
110 Generally, this rice was assigned to the sustenance of the fortress of Anjediva  
which was the only fort left to the Portuguese off the Kanara coast.

The Portuguese took advantage of Somashekara's occupation with the Malabares  
to fortify the high plateau at the bar of Mangalore. Wrote the Viceroy to the  
Secretary of State, Portugal, on 13 December, 1733: "The king of Kanara requested  
me to assist with embarkations of war to convoy his (embarkations) carrying provi-

sions to the army which he has in the lands that he has just conquered from the Nairs, in which lands he is continuing the war against Cannanor which has vigorously resisted him; I have, on account of the dependence which the State has on the provisions which are customarily taken from his ports, as also to facilitate myself with the work which is actually in progress to fortify the elevated place at the mouth of the river near the Factory, which we possess in the port of Mangalore, assisted him with the embarkations sought."<sup>111</sup>

The factor of Mangalore was instructed to do his best to conclude ~~new~~ an agreement with Somashekara, providing for regular rice supplies from Kanara, at the rate of 13 to 14 pagodas (Rs. 52 to Rs. 56) a korji in return for salt supplies <sup>112</sup> at a mutually agreed rate. It seems that a contract was in fact concluded in this respect, for the Viceroy wrote to the captain-major of the fleet of Kanara on 22 March, 1734, "I understand that Your Majesty fulfilled with prudence what I expected of you, which has satisfied me greatly; and not less (satisfaction) the form of the agreement of prices for rice and salt (concluded) at the factory (of Mangalore) in your presence." From the same letter we understand that the Portuguese had almost completed the fortification of Mangalore by the time their assistance facilitated Somashekara's occupation of the fortress of Karlai in the kingdom of Cannanor. The Viceroy authorised the captain-major to hand over to the factor of Mangalore four pieces of artillery to be mounted "on the fortress" of Mangalore.<sup>113</sup>

It seems that the governor of Mangalore, Raghunatha Odeyar, had given clear permission to the Portuguese to construct the 'small fortification'. After his victories in Malabar, Somashekara changed his mind and ordered that the work should be discontinued. Perhaps, he feared that the Portuguese might use it against himself one day. The factor of Mangalore was induced to go to Raghunatha's house where he was detained for some days and at the same time Kanarese soldiers were placed in the fortification. However, Somashekara changed his attitude again, apologised for ill treating the factor, restored the fortification and permitted

its completion "in a form that it should not look like a fortress, but a strongly  
114 built house." The reason was Somashekara's intention to continue the war of  
conquest in Malabar; but the ruler of Cannanor and the English at Tellichery were  
115 inviting the Portuguese to ally with them against him. The Portuguese, however,  
preferred to come to terms with him, because they depended very ~~much~~ much upon the  
116 rice supplies from his territories. Yet, it may be pointed out that the Viceroy  
had half a mind to wage war against Somashekara, for the latter did not satisfy  
all that was expected of him. However, the Portuguese military position was not  
strong enough then. The Viceroy, therefore, instructed the factor of Mangalore to  
dissemble with Somashekara, give the latter customary presents and procure rice  
supplies of which Goa was in dire need. Simultaneously, he wrote to the English  
and the king of Cannanor that he would join them against Somashekara, if he did  
117 not give full satisfaction for maltreating the factor. At last, towards the end  
of 1736 the differences between the Portuguese and Somashekara were settled to  
the entire satisfaction of the former. Somashekara expected their aid against  
118 Cannanor, though they were not in a position to extend it.

In 1737, the Marathas began to invade Portuguese territories. Somashekara  
seems to have remained faithful towards the latter. In May, 1738 he informed them  
119 that the Marathas planned to invade the island of Goa (Ilhas) by land and sea.

Somashekara Nayaka II died in 1739 and his nephew, Basavappa Nayaka II  
(1739-55), succeeded him. The new king's relations with the Portuguese were cord-  
ial, on the whole, throughout his reign. However, the Portuguese did not have a  
high opinion about him. "The king of Canara is more rich than powerful. The traffi-  
in rice with the whole of Malabar and part of Muscat is the cause of a great influx  
of money into his kingdom. We have in his dominions a factory at Mangalor. We  
have been at peace for some time with this Prince, and it is of the utmost importa-  
nce to us that this peace and friendship should be preserved inviolate. It may  
seem absurd to say that this potentate is much more rich than powerful, but such  
is the case, for the money, as fast as it comes into his kingdom, is hoarded up in

his treasure, and no use is made of it at all. He will not permit any fortification to be erected in his dominions, in case they should at any time be invaded and the enemy establish himself in them

"Nor has he a large army, so that his expenses are not heavy. During the last two years the Angria has ~~twice~~ invaded Mangalor and Onor and sacking these ports has carried off some valuable booty. To prevent a third invasion he has informed me that he proposed to build a fleet."<sup>120</sup>

Basavappa sought Portuguese assistance not only against Tulaji Angria but also against the French. In neither case did he receive any effective aid. Tulaji frequently attacked the ports of Kanara, sacking and damaging them. In January, 1747 he carried away from Mangalore a considerable amount of booty which he secured from the Portuguese factory there and from the palace of the local governor of Basavappa. The Portuguese found themselves helpless at Mangalore as most of their forces were engaged against the Bhonsles. Basavappa too had sent a palla under the command of Tricamdas, probably Trivikrama Das, to aid the Portuguese against the Bhonsles. Trivikrama did well in the battle and Basavappa received written thanks from the Viceroy, Marquês de Castelo Novo.<sup>121</sup>

In order to prevent future assaults on Mangalore by Tulaji, the Viceroy decided to secure Basavappa's permission to fortify the factory. Accordingly, he instructed the factor to study the condition of the factory consequent to Tulaji's attack and to endeavour to convince Basavappa and his governor of the desirability and necessity to strengthen the factory.<sup>122</sup> Basavappa, however, hesitated to allow the fortification. Probably he feared that the fortress might be used by the Portuguese against himself one day, as the Portuguese were not known to be lovers of peace as far as their relations with Ikkeri were concerned.

In the meantime, Tulaji opened peace negotiations with the Portuguese,<sup>124</sup> which, however, were not satisfactory to the Portuguese who continued to consider him an enemy throughout the year 1747 and the first half of 1748. As a result, the captains of Portuguese fleets had instructions to attack his fleets, if possible,<sup>125</sup> whenever and wherever found.

When time came for the next possible attack on the Kanarese ports by Tulaji in the winter of 1747-48, Basavappa sought Portuguese aid against him. The Viceroy responded in his letter of 26 December, 1747 that he had already despatched two ships and an embarkation to the coast of Kanara, not for its defence but to suppress it. For the governor of Honavar had allowed the Bhonsle's ships into the port there and Ismail Khan, captain of a Portuguese fleet, who wanted to take into task the Bhonsle's fleet, had been prevented from doing so. The Viceroy requested Basavappa to punish the governor. He also pointed out that if Tulaji had successfully attacked Mangalore in the previous year the fault lay in Basavappa himself and that Tulaji might not attack again if the factory there be fortified.  
126  
fied. He instructed the factor of Mangalore also to complain of the governor's proceedings, expressing surprise that Basavappa should beseech Portuguese aid against his enemy while assisting theirs. The factor was told also to ascertain the truth of the news that Tulaji was erecting a fortress in Ramataly (?), probably  
127  
a place on the coast of Kanara. Further, the factor was commanded to continue his  
128  
efforts to get Basavappa's permission to fortify the factory.

In the summer of 1748 Basavappa came down to Mangalore personally, probably with a view to better defend the place from Tulaji's possible attack. While in Mangalore, Basavappa wished to witness a Portuguese company of grenadiers in exercise. The Viceroy reluctantly agreed that such a company be landed from the South-  
129  
ern Fleet for one day for the benefit of Basavappa. Ultimately, however, no such  
130  
exercise was arranged. It might not have been a mere curiosity on the part of Basavappa, as the Portuguese thought. He might have intended to introduce reforms in his own army after witnessing the Portuguese methods of organisation.

There arose certain points of difference between Basavappa and the Portuguese during the latter half of the year 1748. The Nayaka withheld the payment of certain dues to the Portuguese and did not permit the erection of new churches. He also complained that the factor which enabled Tulaji Angria to enter Mangalore and sack  
main  
it was the easy access at the Portuguese factory. The Viceroy wrote back on 4

November that if ten or twelve galliots were sufficient to enter and damage Mangalore, it was Basavappa's fault; and that the Portuguese had pointed out several times the necessity to fortify the factory, but in vain. He concluded by saying that he might be compelled to send a Portuguese fleet to Kanara, not to defend the coast but to attack it in order to make good the injustice of the Nayaka in refusing to pay off the dues and to allow the due privileges to the Christians as per  
131  
the treaty of peace of 1714.

In the meantime, peace negotiations between Tulaji Angria and the Portuguese  
132  
were not discontinued. In the latter half of 1748 the negotiations entered a satisfactory stage and the captains of Portuguese fleets were instructed to treat his  
133  
fleet as of a friend. However, before a definite treaty was concluded Tulaji  
attacked Mangalore again in November, 1749. He sacked not only the port of Mangalore, but robbed there two vessels belonging to the Portuguese. The latter threatened Basavappa that they might abandon the factory in view of Tulaji's continued attacks and Basavappa's refusal to allow the fortification of the factory. However, in reality they did not intend to give up the factory, for they feared that the English or the French might occupy the port. This eventuality was heartily detested  
134  
by the Portuguese. Writing to Basavappa on 27 November, the Viceroy pointed out that Tulaji would continue to attack Mangalore as long as he found it open and unfortified, for he was a "thief by profession". The Viceroy had no objection in  
135  
fortifying the factory, but at Basavappa's cost. In the letter of protest which the Viceroy wrote to Tulaji, the former required that the latter should return all that was taken from the two vessels of the Portuguese at Mangalore so that peace negotiations could become fruitful. It is noteworthy that not a word of protest  
136  
was uttered by the Viceroy on behalf of Basavappa.

Basavappa complained that the factor of Mangalore did not do his best to prevent Tulaji's incursion into the port. In response, the Viceroy alleged that the governor of Mangalore and others did not defend well and that they ran away from their posts instead. He warned Basavappa that the Marathas were planning to

capture Mangalore, inter alia, and therefore he should pay more attention to its  
137 defence.

In March, 1750 Tulaji attacked and captured the fortress of Honavar. Though he abandoned it soon, he took away with him not only a large amount of booty but also about 1,500 eminent men from Honavar with a view to extract a huge ransom for  
138 their liberty. Gokarna was another place which he attacked and sacked. The Viceroy expressed his surprise that 'a pirate like Angria' should have attacked the territories of Kanara with impunity, whereas he dared not to attack the lands of less powerful kings. Basavappa proposed that the Portuguese and the Kanarese fleets should join hands against Tulaji. The Viceroy thought that this alone would not suffice. He proposed that the Portuguese should be allowed to have factories at the ports of Honavar and Basrur also, with the permission to fortify the factories,  
139 including that of Mangalore. Basavappa seems to have indicated his intention to have new ships built. The Viceroy instructed the factor of Mangalore to find out if the intention was implemented and let him know before Basavappa's reply to his  
140 proposals came.

In the latter half of October, news reached Goa that Tulaji Angria was preparing a strong fleet and was collecting considerable amount of war materials. The Portuguese thought that his intention was to capture some part of the Kanarese coast  
141 and to fortify it. Basavappa was informed accordingly.

Towards the end of October or early in November Basavappa wrote to the Viceroy, but did not care to respond to the latter's proposals referring to factory sites at Honavar and Basrur, and the fortification of the factories. However, he repeated  
142 his request for Portuguese aid against Tulaji. The Viceroy responded by expressing his willingness to aid, but emphasised that an agreement regarding the Portuguese  
143 proposals was important. However, such an agreement never came into existence

Early in 1751, the Marathas and Basavappa seem to have come to an understanding for from a letter written by the Viceroy to the factor of Mangalore on 15 January, we learn that a Maratha fleet of six galliots sailed to the Kanarese coast with

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letters and presents to Basavappa. After his attack on Kanara in March 1750, Tulaji did not attack its ports any more. In the meantime, peace was established between him and the Portuguese also.

In October, 1751 Basavappa opened war against Cochin. He requested the Viceroy not to permit the merchants, subject to Portuguese jurisdiction, to sell the rice which they took from Mangalore at the ports of Malabar. The Viceroy readily agreed and issued instructions to the factor of Mangalore to this effect. Basavappa also sought aid from the Portuguese, probably in the form of ammunitions, which was sent towards the end of December.

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By December the French at Mahe joined hands with the Malabarese against Basavappa. They urged the Portuguese to aid them with arms and men, and open hostilities against him at his ports. Though the Portuguese were on friendly terms with the French, the former did not wish to oblige the latter in this respect. The Viceroy instructed the factor of Mangalore that any European nation that tried to attack the port of Mangalore be opposed. In the meantime, Basavappa suffered a defeat at the hands of the forces of Cochin. He sought further aid from the Portuguese. In response, the Viceroy informed him that he could not but be neutral, for the French had also sought aid, and on being denied, they had requested the Portuguese to deny it to Basavappa also. The Viceroy pointed out that the treaties of peace between the Nayakas of Ikkeri and the Portuguese expressly declared that the latter should aid the former only against Asiatic enemies who were not allied with the Portuguese. Since the aid sought now was against a European power, an ally of the Portuguese, they were not bound to aid Basavappa.

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However, the Viceroy decided to be neutral as both the belligerents were his allies.

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In January, 1752 Basavappa was defeated again, with greater damage than before. In the latter half of February the Viceroy began negotiations with the French in order to bring about peace between them and Basavappa. Writing to the renowned French Governor-General at Pondicherry, Marquis de Dupleix, the Viceroy offered to mediate between the belligerents and requested Dupleix to let him know

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his terms of peace. Basavappa was informed of this movement. By September the French and Basavappa were ready to negotiate for peace. The former informed the Viceroy that their main requirement of a proposed treaty of peace was to be allowed to retain the fortresses that they were in possession of by then in Malabar. Informing Basavappa of this, the Viceroy requested him to indicate his terms of peace. The Nayaka, however, did not respond to this letter. Instead, he began direct negotiations with the French and sent his ambassadors to Pondicherry in the beginning of 1753.

In the meantime, Basavappa was repeatedly defeated by the Malabarese who took from him the fort of Chandragiri. He requested the Portuguese to convoy his ships, carrying provisions, to the fortress of Decla (?) and that of Hosadurga. The Portuguese excused themselves, though they used to give such convoys to the French and the English. The factor of Mangalore, through whom the request was made, was instructed to say that he had the Viceroy's permission to grant the request, provided there was no delay involved. The factor was to show great eagerness to execute this conditional order, but in fact he was not to implement it. However, Basavappa's request for ~~war~~ war materials from the Portuguese met with better success. In January, 1754 he sought 500 bambas and 500 grenades against payment. The Portuguese supplied 500 grenades, but only 300 bambas, for the stock of the latter was inadequate. Ultimately, the war of Malabar ended in losses to Basavappa. His territories did not go beyond Chandragiri which he retook from the Malabarese.

Basavappa was succeeded by Chenna Basavappa Nayaka (1755-57), who was followed by the last ruler of the dynasty, Rani Virammaji (1757-63). In both the reigns the Portuguese generally had good relations with Kanara but for occasional minor complaints that the Portuguese officials were not treated well or that Portuguese ships were detained without cause. On every occasion the complaint was heard and justice done.

In January, 1763 Hyder Ali, de facto ruler of Mysore, defeated Virammaji and occupied Bednur, thus bringing the Keladi dynasty to an end. Portuguese records

do not show any aid sought by the Queen from the Portuguese. Probably, she had no time to seek and obtain it as Hyder's attack was sudden and well planned. Immediately after his victory, Hyder wrote to the Portuguese and established friendly relations with them. The Portuguese proudly record that he "was the first who wrote to the Most Illustrious and the Most Excellent Lord, Count of Ega, Viceroy and Captain General of India."<sup>157</sup> A new chapter was thus opened in respect of the Portuguese relations with Kanara.

Foot-notes:

1. Pissurlencar, P. S. S. : Agentes da Diplomacia Portuguesa na India, pp. 57-9.
2. Assentos, IV, pp. 32-3.
3. Ibid., p. 33.
4. Swaminathan, K. D. : The Nayakas of Ikkeri, pp. 102-3.
5. English records refer to this invasion of the Bednur kingdom by the Adil Shah, saying that Bhadrappa fled to the woods for protection. Later on, the Adil Shah extracted seven lakhs of pagodas (Rs. 2,800,000) from him (EF, 1661-1664, pp. 260-1, 237, 239).
6. Assentos, IV, p. 527.
7. Ibid., pp. 530-1.
8. EF, 1661-1664, p. 342.
9. Ibid., p. 343.
10. ~~HRM~~ Ibid., p. 349.
11. Assentos, IV, p. 553.
12. Ibid., pp. 534-5.
13. Ibid., pp. 535-6.
14. Ibid., p. 537.

15. Ibid., pp. 537-8.
16. Ibid., pp. 552-3.
17. Ibid., pp. 540-1.
18. EF, 1661-1664, p. 349.
19. Assentos, IV, p. 542.
20. They seem to have tried to possess it themselves by placing their flag on its walls. But this act was so much resented by the Kanarese that they took down the flag and tore it asunder. The Portuguese, coming to know of this incident, laughed in their sleeves. (EF, 1661-1664, p. 350).
21. Assentos, IV, p. 543.
22. Ibid., pp. 545-7. Letters of 25 and 26 November, 1664.
23. Ibid., p. 546. Letter of 25 November, 1664.
24. Ibid., p. 548. Letter of 11 December, 1664.
25. Ibid., pp. 549-52.
26. Ibid., p. 555.
27. Ibid., p. 171.
28. Ibid., p. 175.
29. Ibid., p. 176.
30. Ibid., p. 169.
31. Ibid., pp. 564-5.
32. EF, 1668-1669, p. 111.
33. Biker, J. F. J. : Collecção de tratados e concertos de pazes, IV, pp. 192-4.
34. Assentos, IV, pp. 216-7.
35. Biker, J. F. J. : op. cit., pp. 189-92.
36. Carré, Abbé : Travellis of, Tr. Fawcett & Fawcett, Vol. III, p. 699; EF, 1670-1677, p. 308.
37. KNV, pp. 128-9; EF, 1670-1677, pp. 308-9.
38. Assentos, IV, pp. 226-7.
39. Ibid., pp. 233-4, 236, 240.
40. Ibid., pp. 274-5, 278-80.

41. Ibid., pp. 314-5. Neither N. L. Rao nor K. D. Swaminathan refers to this revolt of the young prince in 1678. KNV also does not throw any light on this event. The revolt was probably nipped in the bud and therefore it did not attract anybody's attention.
42. Biker, J. F. J. : op. cit., Vol. IV, pp. 212-3.
43. Ibid., pp. 213-4.
44. Ibid., pp. 205-6; Assentos, IV, pp. 338-9.
45. Ibid., pp. 207-12.
46. Ibid., p. 214.
47. Ibid., p. 215.
48. Assentos, IV, pp. 487-8.
49. Ibid., p. 499.
50. Ibid., V, p. 42. Swaminathan (op. cit., p. 125) mentions that the Queen "seems to have died in 1698". This is obviously incorrect in view of the clear indication given by this document, which says: "the Queen being dead", Basavappa Nayaka should, on his accession, be complimented in the manner indicated.
51. Assentos, V, pp. 57-8.
52. Appendix - I. See also LCC, I, 1698-1720, fl. 5, Viceroy's letter to Basavappa, 31.10.1699.
53. Appendix - II.
54. LRV, No. 5, fl. 44; APO-BP, tomo I, vol. III, pt. I, pp. 94-5. K. D. Swaminathan (op. cit., p. 275) includes a translation of this letter at Appendix 13 of his book. The translation is full of errors. The Viceroy did not order "that the price of rice should be promptly paid" to Basavappa, but told ~~him~~ the latter to pay "all the quantity of rice of tribute in accordance with the provisions" of the treaty. The "previous dues" or arrears were not on the part of the Portuguese, as the translation indicates, but on the part of Basavappa, who was requested to clear them up with the Portuguese. There is no reference in the original to "our not receiving remittance". So also,

the original does not refer to the "traditions" of the Arabs, but to their treacheries. The Viceroy did not remit "letters", but cartazes or passports.

55. Monções, No. 65, fl. 253; APO-BP, op. cit., pp. 136-7.

56. Ibid., No. 67, fl. 71; ibid., pp. 143-4. K. D. Swaminathan (op. cit., p. 127) refers to this letter, but wrongly says that it was written by the Portuguese to Basavappa. <sup>foot-note 9</sup>

57. Assentos, V, pp. 134-6.

58. Ibid., pp. 136-9.

59. APO-BP, op. cit., p. 204.

60. Monções, No. 67, fl. 12; APO-BP, op. cit., p. 223.

61. LRV, No. 5, fl. 83; Ibid., pp. 238-9.

62. Assentos, V, pp. 163, 164.

63. Ibid., pp. 166-7.

64. LRV, No. 5, fl. 87; APO-BP, op. cit., p. 260. Viceroy's letter to the Dutch ~~factor~~ factor of Basrur, 13.10.1704.

65. Monções, No. 68, fl. 195; APO-BP, op. cit., pp. 266-8. K. D. Swaminathan (op. cit., p. 128) refers to this letter, but inaccurately says that there was a skirmish in December, 1704. The letter actually recounts the past skirmish and the events that led to a settlement of the differences before the date of the letter.

66. Monções, No. 69, fl. 108; APO-BP, op. cit., pp. 393, 394.

67. LCC, I, fls. 42, 96, 97.

68. LRV, No. 7, fl. 12; APO-BP, op. cit., p. 435.

69. Monções, No. 73, fl. 1; APO-BP, op. cit., pp. 453-6. K. D. Swaminathan (op. cit., p. 128) says that "In 1707 the Portuguese invaded the territories of Basavappa Nayaka and attacked the port of Mangalore. But the forces of Basavappa were able to put up a stiff resistance and the Portuguese were compelled to suspend hostilities. Basavappa Nayaka deputed Damarasa Prabhu as his ambassador to Goa with a letter to conclude peace with them." These are

baseless statements. It was the Arabs, and not the Portuguese, who invaded the territories of Basavappa. The latter resisted the Arabs stiffly and the Portuguese were glad to fight the Arabs on the occasion, though more for their own sake than for Basavappa. As has been shown elsewhere, Damarasa Prabhu was sent to Goa towards the end of December, 1713, and his embassy had nothing to do with the events of 1707-8.

70. Monções, No. 78, fl. 124; APO-BP, tomo, I, vol. III, pt. II, pp. 79-80.

Viceroy's letter to king of Portugal, January, 1713.

71. Ibid., No. 79, fl. 254; Ibid., pp. 90-4. Viceroy's letter to king of Portugal, 17.1.1714. Swaminathan (op. cit., pp. 278-80) includes a translation of this letter. However, to say the least, the translation is concocted and, at many places, makes no sense at all.

72. Ibid., fl. 248; Ibid., pp. 88-9. Letter of 15.1.1714.

73. APO-BP, op. cit., p. 83.

74. Ibid., pp. 97-106; Biker, J. F. J. : op. cit., vol. V, pp. 280-8.

75. Monções, No. 80, fl. 160; APO-BP, op. cit., p. 151. Viceroy's letter, 5.1.1715.

76. Ibid., No. 82, fl. 106; Ibid., pp. 187-8. King's letter, 17.10.1715. K. D. Swaminathan (op. cit., p. 139, foot-note 20) makes baseless statements referring to this letter and that of 5.1.1715.

77. Assentos, V, pp. 289-92. There was no plan to send an expedition against Somashekara, as K. D. Swaminathan (op. cit., p. 139, foot-note 21) would like us to believe. The document which he refers to in this respect is simply an order of the Viceroy to the general of Bardê (Goa) to recruit sixty mariners to serve in the fleet of Kanara.

78. Assentos, V, pp. 369-72.

79. LRV, No. 7, fl. 26. Letter dated 9.12.1722.

80. Assentos, V, pp. 372-3. The Regent is referred to as minister also.

81. Ibid., p. 370.

82. Appendix - III and also IV.

83. LRV, No. 7, fl. 41; APO-BP, tomo I, vol. III, pt. IV, pp. 39-40.
84. Ibid., fl. 43; Ibid., pp. 41-2.
85. Ibid., fl. 45; Ibid., pp. 48-9.
86. Ibid., fl. 46; Ibid., pp. 49-51.
87. Ibid., fl. 47; Ibid., pp. 58-60.
88. Ibid., fl. 46; Ibid., pp. 60-62.
89. Ibid., fl. 47; Ibid., pp. 62-3.
90. Ibid., fl. 48; Ibid., pp. 63-4.
91. Ibid., fl. 49; Ibid., pp. 65-6.
92. Ibid., fl. 53; Ibid., pp. 69, 71.
93. Ibid., fl. 51; Ibid., p. 70.
94. Ibid., fl. 55; Ibid., pp. 71-2. Viceroy's letter to the factor of Mangalore,  
2.10.1727.
95. Ibid., fl. 60; Ibid., pp. 91-2.
96. Ibid., fl. 64; Ibid., pp. 94-5. Swaminathan (op. cit., pp. 139-40) includes  
a translation of the first proposal. The translation is singularly inaccurate.
97. Ibid., fl. 70; Ibid., p. 124.
98. APO-BP, op. cit., p. 125.
99. LRV, No. 7, fl. 73; APO-BP, op. cit., pp. 126-7.
100. Ibid., fl. 74; Ibid., pp. 129-30. Viceroy's letter to Agostinho Machado,  
29.11.1728.
101. Ibid., fl. 75; Ibid., pp. 130-1. Viceroy's letter to Sundardas, 17.12.1728.
102. Ibid., fl. 77; Viceroy's letter to Sundardas, 16.3.1729.
103. Ibid., fl. 94, Viceroy's letter to factor of Mangalore, 3.4.1731; fls. 95-6,  
Viceroy's letter to Agostinho Machado, 2.5.1731.
104. Ibid., fl. 101; APO-BP, op. cit., p. 287. Viceroy's letter to Agostinho Machado  
29.1.1732.
105. Ibid., fl. 102; Ibid., p. 288. Governors' letter to Agostinho, 1.3.1732.
106. Ibid., fl. 105; Ibid., pp. 289-90.  
*Viceroy's Governor's*
107. Ibid., fl. 132; Ibid., p. 321. *Viceroy's* letter to Somashekara, 23.3.1734.
108. Ibid., fl. 121; Ibid., pp. 303, 304.

109. Ibid., fl. 105; Ibid., pp. 289-90.
110. APO-BP, op. cit., pp. 92, 297, 351. Of course, 1,900 bags of rice alone were insufficient. 1,100 bags more were provided.
111. Monções, No. 102-B, fl. 780; APO-BP, op. cit., pp. 307, 308. Also see Viceroy's letter to the factor of Mangalore, 27.2.1733, in which the factor was ordered to carry out the work of fortification (LRV, No. 7, fl. 108; APO-BP, op. cit., p. 299).
112. LRV, No. 7, fl. 108; APO-BP, op. cit., p. 299.
113. Ibid., fl. 130; Ibid., p. 320.
114. Monções, No. 103, fl. 911; APO-BP, op. cit., pp. 343, 345-6. Viceroy's letter to king of Portugal, 25.1.1735.
115. LRV, No. 7, fl. 132; APO-BP, op. cit., pp. 326, 328. Viceroy's letter to factor of Mangalore, 26.10.1734.
116. Monções, No. 103, fl. 911; APO-BP, op. cit., pp. 345-6.
117. LRV, No. 7, fl. 147; Ibid., pp. 350-1. Viceroy's letter to factor of Mangalore, 9.2.1735.
118. Monções, No. 106, fl. 9; APO-BP, op. cit., pp. 428-9. Viceroy's letter to king of Portugal, 22.12.1736.
119. Assentos, V, p. 471.
120. Danvers, F. C. : The Portuguese in India, II, p. 423.
121. LCC, II, 1747-1769, fl. 1, Viceroy's letter to Basavappa, 31.1.1747.
122. Ibid., fl. 2, Viceroy's letter to Basavappa, 2.2.1747.
123. LRI, No. 14, fls. 6-7, Viceroy's instructions to José Antunes Branco, factor of Mangalore; LCC, II, fl. 8, Viceroy's letter to the same factor, 2.10.1747.
124. LRV, No. 12, fl. 65, Viceroy's letter to João de Souza Fernandez, 13.2.1747; and fl. 89, Viceroy's letter to Tulaji, 22.8.1747; LCC, III, fl. 9, Viceroy's letter to factor of Mangalore, 14.10.1747.
125. LRI, No. 14, fls. 12, 15, 50, Viceroy's instructions of 2.2.1747, 27.3.1747 and 20.3.1748, respectively.

126. Appendices V and VI.

127. Appendix VI.

128. LCC, II, fl. 13, Viceroy's letter to factor, 16.2.1748.

129. Ibid., fl. 15, Viceroy's letters to Commandant of the Southern Fleet, 14.3.1748 and to factor, 26.3.1748, respectively; also fl. 18, Viceroy's letter to factor, 8.4.1748.

130. Ibid., fl. 18, Viceroy's letter to factor, 24.4.1748.

131. APPENDIX - VII; and also LCC, II, fls. 23-4, Viceroy's letter to factor, 3.11.1748.

132. LRV, No. 12, fls. 136-7, 147, 163-4, Viceroy's letters to Tulaji, 30.3.1748, 6.5.1748 and 19.7.1748, respectively.

133. LRI, No. 14, fls. 66, 116; Viceroy's instructions, 24.10.1748 and 9.3.1749, respectively; also LCC, II, fl. 28, Viceroy's letter to commandant of the Southern Fleet, Francisco da Cunha de Araujo, 9.3.1749.

134. LCC, II, fl. 38, Viceroy's letter to factor, 21.11.1749.

135. Appendix VIII.

136. Appendix IX.

137. Appendix X.

138. Appendix XI.

139. Appendix XII.

140. LCC, II, fl. 52, Viceroy's letter to factor, 20.8.1750.

141. Ibid., fl. 53, Letter of Luis A. Dantas, Secretary of State, 24.10.1750, written at the instance of the Viceroy, Marquês de Tavora.

142. Assentos, V, pp. 688-9.

143. LCC, II, fl. 55, Viceroy's letter to Basavappa, 9 (?) 11.1750.

144. Ibid., fl. 59, Viceroy's letter to factor, 15.1.1751.

145. Ibid., fls. 72-4, Viceroy's letters to Ayyappayya, governor of Mangalore, and to José Antunes Branco, factor of the same place, 15.11.1751 and 15/16.11.1751, respectively.

146. Ibid., fls. 75-6, Viceroy's letter to ministers of Basavappa, 28.12.1751.

147. Ibid., fls. 76-7, Viceroy's letter to factor, 31.12.1751.
148. Ibid.
149. Appendix XIII.
150. LCC, II, fl. 78, Viceroy's letter to factor, 18.1.1752.
151. Ibid., fl. 80, Viceroy's letter to factor, 21.2.1752.
152. Ibid., fl. 82, Viceroy's letter to Basavappa, 13.3.1752.
153. Appendix XIV. Also LCC, II, fls. 91-2, Viceroy's letter to factor, 28.9.1752.
154. LCC, II, fls. 93, 96, Viceroy's letters to factor, 23.11.1752 and 25.2.1753, respectively.
155. Ibid., fls. 98-9, Viceroy's letter to factor, 23.3.1753.
156. Ibid., fl. 107.
157. Ibid., fl. 155.

## Chapter 10

### THE PORTUGUESE AND CHRISTIANITY IN KANARA

Christianity was not unknown in Kanara before the Portuguese arrival. About 1493 a cross was caught in the net by some fishermen, off Mangalore. It was of olive wood, well finished, and one span and a half in length. The fishermen thought that the cross was a venerable object, for they caught abundant fishes of various sorts at the same spot, thus enriching themselves. They handed over the cross to the Bangar chief from whom it was obtained by Miguel de Almeida in 1611 and taken to Goa.<sup>1</sup> In fact, it is said that there might have been a Christian community in Mangalore. For on 19 November, 1502 some Christians of Mangalore "and other interior places" went with presents to Vasco da Gama who was in Cochin. They also presented a letter from the "lord of all those territories, who has about 30,000 people within his jurisdiction" and who offered to become a vassal of the king of Portugal. These Christian ambassadors told da Gama that "they had their bishops and all of them said the mass."<sup>2</sup> They also told him, among other things, that they "undertook grand pilgrimages to the sepulchre of the blessed St. Thomas."<sup>2</sup> One may not find it easy to believe that the chief of Mangalore should have offered vassallage to Portugal on his own and should have sent his "Christian" ambassadors to Cochin to meet the Portuguese admiral for the purpose. It may be noted here that the first of the Portuguese who arrived in India mistook non-Muslims to Christians. They were virtually ignorant of the existence of the Hindu community, though within a few years they became aware of their mistake.

Further, some crosses, painted black and red, were discovered by the Portuguese while digging up for laying down the foundation of the fortress built in Anjediva in 1505. Commenting upon these findings, Friar Paulo da Trinidade says that they appeared to have belonged formerly to a "chapel or church of Christians." He continues to say: "This is not difficult to believe, because the glorious St. Thomas travelled all these parts of the orient, propagating the Christian Faith and converting many unbelievers."<sup>3</sup> However, it is difficult to say whether the

findings were in fact Christian crosses or some other objects which looked like crosses but were actually some instruments prepared by Hindus for astronomical ob-  
<sup>4</sup>servations. Even if it is granted that there were Christians in Kanara before the Portuguese arrived, the community of the former must have disappeared by 1498. It did not matter, however, for the Christian missionaries from Portugal if there was no such community, for they never hesitated to establish a new com-  
unity of Christians by converting the people of Kanara whenever an opportunity offered itself.

The first Portuguese missionaries, who began their propagation activities in Kanara, were Franciscans. In 1500 eight friars under the leadership of Henrique  
<sup>5</sup>of Coimbra landed in Anjediva, in the company of Pedro Alvares Cabral. The friars endeavoured to convert the natives of Anjediva. Friar Trinidade says that the natives went to the friars without any fear and "participated in the mass which they said and in the propagation which they preached, demonstrating happiness in seeing their ceremonies. And, though they (the friars) did not know their language and thus could not declare to them the mysteries of our holy Faith, they did it in the manner which was possible for them, telling them by signs that they should give up the idols which they had in their houses, and showed to them the sacred sign of the cross and other images which they (the natives) gladly kissed and revered." The friars had great desire to continue to be at Anjediva in order to convert all the people there. However, Cabral had to proceed to Calicut and they too had to go along with him. Though they desired to return to the place  
<sup>6</sup>later on, God willed otherwise. None of them ever landed in any of the territories of Kanara, though Luis do Salvador played an important role as Afonso de Albu-  
querque's envoy to Vijayanagara. It is claimed that the Vijayanagara Emperor,  
Vira Narasimha, not only listened to the preachings of Luis, but allowed the latter  
<sup>7</sup>to propagate the "holy faith" in his territories and construct churches. Inspite of this permission, Luis does not seem to have indulged in propagation in Kanara.

In 1505 Francisco de Almeida destroyed a temple that he came across in the

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island of Anjediva and used the stone of the edifice for constructing the fortress. Some Franciscans had accompanied the Viceroy. A chapel might have been built for the benefit of the garrison, though no specific reference is made to such a building. However, the chapel might have disappeared along with the fortress, when the latter was destroyed in 1506.

In 1683 a church dedicated to 'Our Lady of the Blossoms' (Nossa Senhora das  
9 Brotas) was established in the island. The church was meant for the garrison of  
the fortress, which was built in the island in the previous year, and "to administer  
administer the Sacraments to other Catholics who might take up residence there or  
10 on the mainland." In 1733 there were 505 Catholics in the island. Most of them  
were "old Catholics belonging to the garrison or its followers and dependents, but  
it might be that the Friars made some conversions either on the island or on the  
11 mainland."  
12

Mangalore and its neighbourhood became another centre of early missionary  
13 activities. In 1526 the Franciscans established a regular mission in Mangalore.  
In due course they built three churches - one in Mangalore dedicated to 'Our Lady  
of the Rosary', another in Ullala for 'Our Lady of Mercy' and the third in Farangi-  
pet dedicated to St. Francis of Assissi.  
14

In 1533 the diocese of Goa was created by a Bull of Pope Clement VII, confirmed  
in 1534 by Pope Paul III. The diocese included all the lands from Cape of Good  
Hope to China, including, no doubt, India. Kanara thus came under the charge of  
the Bishop of Goa. However, nothing worth noting was done by the Bishop to propa-  
gate Christianity in Kanara. Even the great missionary, St. Francis Xavier, who  
worked zealously in India and other parts of the Orient from 1542 to 1552, did not  
visit Kanara, though he did not fail to see the possibilities of conversion in  
this coastal region. For he wrote on 18 September, 1542, "We have great hope that  
15 many Christians will be made here" in Kanara. It is possible that he sent his  
assistants to Kanara for propaganda there and the rectory of Basrur, which Nazareth  
16 refers to, might have been established some time during this period.

The Catholics of Kanara take pride in the fact that the ship, carrying the

body of St. Francis Xavier, touched the port of Bhatkal in 1554 while the body was being taken to Goa. A miracle occurred in Bhatkal. The wife of Antonio Rodrigues, factor of Bhatkal, was seriously ill. She was taken to the ship to see the body. She recovered health the moment she saw the body. Already, in 1552,  
<sup>17</sup>  
an attempt was made to convert some people in Bhatkal, but no concrete success  
<sup>18</sup>  
attended the effort.

In the latter half of the 16th century the Portuguese entrenched themselves in Kanara by building fortresses in Mangalore, Basrur and Honavar, as we have seen already. In each of these fortresses a church was built. A vicar, with several assistants, was put in charge of each church. The primary purpose of these churches was to serve the spiritual needs of the Portuguese soldiers. It is probable that whenever there was a zealous vicar in charge of a church he might have endeavoured to convert the local people. The number of conversions, however, must have been very small.

A few Catholic families of converts of Goa might have migrated to Kanara as a result of the activities of the Inquisition which was established in Goa in 1560. The converts could not give up completely their pre-conversion customs and habits, which the Inquisition would not tolerate. In the process of enforcing conformity the Inquisition created a sense of insecurity among the converts who found scarce protection for their life and property. Some of them, therefore,  
<sup>19</sup>  
left Goa and settled down in Kanara.

Prof. G. M. Moraes says that the majority of the Kanara Christians came from Goa owing to the troublous and scarcity conditions in the latter place caused by enemy attacks and natural calamities like famines and epidemic diseases. 1553 was a year of famine. In 1570 and 1683 Goa was subjected to enemy attacks. In 1570 and 1635 there were epidemic diseases. Besides, in general, the agricultural products of Goa were not adequate enough to sustain the Goans. All these are said to have forced many Goans - Christians and Hindus - to leave their homelands for  
<sup>20</sup>  
Kanara.

It is true that the majority of the Kanara Christians were immigrants from Goa. However, migration until the middle of the 17th century seems to have been negligible. Or, even if many might have migrated, most of them might have returned to Goa when conditions became normal in the latter region. For Pietro Della Valle, who visited Kanara in 1623, found churches and priests in Kanara, but he makes no reference to any Christian settlement or community as such in any of the towns and ports that he visited. In Mangalore he came across three churches, "namely, the See or Cathedral of Our Lady Del Rosario, within the Fort, La Misericordia and San Francisco without." He adds: "Yet in Mangalore there are but three Ecclesiastical Persons in all; two Franciscan Freyers in San Francisco and one Vicar Priest, to whose charge, with small revenues, belong all the other churches."<sup>21</sup> Della Valle roamed about in Mangalore, but apparently did not find any Christian settlement. Writing about Honavar, again, he mentions two churches, but no Christian community.<sup>22</sup> Antonio Bocarro, writing in 1635, says positively that there was no Christianity in the kingdom of Ikkeri, including, no doubt, Kanara. Wrote he: "We do not have any Christianity in the lands of this king of Kanara and as all are Hindus, the aversion they have for receiving our sacred faith is so great that it is rare that any one has been converted so far." Bocarro thought that it was owing to the lack of knowledge of Kannada on the part of the missionaries who could otherwise have written in Kannada the commandments and principles of Christianity for the benefit of the Kanarese. He also points out that no Missionary moved about in the kingdom of Ikkeri. However, he mentions that there were churches in the various Portuguese fortresses. Thus, in Basrur there were two churches, one named the See, inside the fortress, and the other named Miā (Mother ? just outside. The former was meant for captains, soldiers and others within, and the latter for the cazados. So also, in Mangalore, Honavar and Gangolly there were churches attached to the fortresses.<sup>23</sup> It may also be added here that there is no clause providing for the protection and privileges of Christians in Kanara

in the treaties of 1631 and 1633 entered into between the Portuguese and the rulers of Ikkeri. On the other hand, there are several such provisions in the treaties of 1678 and 1714. This indicates that a large number of Christians came to settle down in Kanara during the latter half of the 17th century. Thus, Fr. Giuseppe di Santa Maria, a Carmelite Friar, who passed through Kanara in 1656<sup>27</sup>, could say that there were 6,000 Christians in the kingdom of Ikkeri, though only <sup>namely,</sup> one Jesuit Father, <sup>24</sup> ~~Namely,~~ Spinola, was available for their religious requirements. This number went on increasing. From a letter of the Viceroy to the king of Portugal, dated 13 August, 1747, we learn that about 5,000 Christians fled from <sup>25</sup> Goa to Kanara during the course of the Maratha invasion of Goa beginning in 1738. There were about 30,000 Christians in the kingdom of Ikkeri when it fell into the <sup>26</sup> hands of Hyder Ali in 1763.

A reference may be made to some missionaries and their activities in Kanara. In 1580 the Franciscans built a church dedicated to St. Anthony in Mangalore, Father Fernando da Paz being its custodian. He and his successors accomplished a few conversions there. An interesting account is given of a Hindu convert. He had a vision whereafter he longed to be a Christian. Said he soon after his conversion: "I, gentlemen, had in my heart since long (a desire) to make myself a Christian and to receive the faith of Christ, believing it to be the true faith after I had a vision which I shall presently narrate. But until now I was not disposed for this .....on account of my wife, who always contradicted me regarding my sacred proposal. But, as God is merciful, (He) had the kindness to remember me, giving powers to ~~www~~ overcome all the difficulties which my wife, as a Hindu and captive of idolatry, put before me." The vision that he saw was a procession of priests of the Order of St. Domingos which came from the side of the territories of the Bangar chief on the occasion of the death of a Dominican Father, who resided in the church of Misericordia in Mangalore. The processionists, carrying candles in their hands, went back in the same direction. The element of surprise in the vision was the fact that so many Dominican Fathers were not to be found in Mangalore or its neighbourhood, though some were there in Cochin, Goa and Chatil.

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The convert was recruited a soldier in the Portuguese army. This might, in fact, have been the incentive for his conversion.

A church dedicated to 'Our Lady of Conception' was built in Gangolly, which was occupied by the Portuguese in 1630. It was ~~the work of two Franciscan Friars, namely, Father Francisco Cordeiro and his companion, Father Jorge da Conceição, who, "as a signal of the war which they had to wage against the Hindu population there, destroyed and razed to the ground a grand temple which existed near the site where the fortress (ST. Miguel of the Portuguese) was established."~~ It was a temple dedicated to Lord Shiva and was richly endowed with a revenue of 1,000 pagodas (Rs. 4,000) or 3,000 xerafins.<sup>(B. B. 102)</sup> There was in the temple "as an idol, a linga, which is a certain thing which they (the Hindus) consider divine, which, being ignoble and sordid, is not mentioned (by me) what it is." The church was built in the very place of the destroyed temple. At the same time, it is claimed that Gangolly was given to the Portuguese by the merchants of Basrur on the condition that only Franciscan missionaries should be allowed there. However, in the official documents of the Portuguese there is no reference to such a condition.<sup>28</sup>

By far, the greatest of the missionaries of Kanara was Father Joseph Vaz who was in Kanara from 1681 to 1684 and again in 1686. However, he had to work under difficult circumstances, for the conflict of jurisdiction between the Padroado<sup>29</sup> of the Portuguese king and the Sacred Congregation of the Propaganda Fidé<sup>30</sup> of the Pope entered Kanara in the latter half of the 17th century. The Pope appointed Thomas de Castro, a Brahmin Christian of Goa, as Bishop of Fulcivelum and Vicar Apostolic of Kanara and other places. Thomas, who was in Rome, reached India in 1674 by land via Syria and Babylonia. He adopted this route in order to avoid the Portuguese who did not approve of his appointment. Besides, it was repugnant to them that an Indian should have been appointed to such a high position in the church.<sup>31</sup>

Thomas began his missionary work with zeal. Though he made Bangalore his headquarters, he paid attention to Basrur, Barkur, Mulky, Kalyanpur and other

places of Kanara. From the very outset the Padroado tried to hinder his activities by forbidding the Christians of Kanara from receiving sacraments at his hands or at those of his prelates, unless he produced the Bulls conferring the jurisdiction over Kanara on him. Thomas responded by excommunicating those who received sacraments at the hands of the missionaries of the Padroado.<sup>32</sup>

In 1681 the Chapter of Goa appointed Father Joseph Vaz as Vicar Forane of Kanara. Father Vaz actually desired to go to Ceylon; but realising the need of a good missionary in Kanara, particularly to counter-act Thomas de Castro, the Chapter sent him to Kanara. Joseph acted very tactfully. His humility and honesty of purpose won him laurels. He did not declare open hostility against Thomas. Instead, he approached the latter and requested him to show the Papal documents of appointment, which the Chapter of Goa had declared fraudulent. On finding the documents legitimate, he proposed to Thomas that the latter should not excommunicate any more Kanarese Christians until the question of jurisdiction over Kanara was settled by the Chapter to whom he proposed to write on the matter. Thomas agreed. However, neither the Chapter nor the Archbishop, who succeeded him, was prepared to recognise the jurisdiction of Thomas. The matter was referred to the Pope. Joseph, being told of this, prostrated himself at the feet of Thomas, requesting him not to excommunicate Kanarese Christians who received sacraments from the missionaries of the Padroado until the Pope settled the matter. The sincere humility of Joseph won the heart of Thomas. Both continued their respective missionary activities until Thomas died in 1684.<sup>33</sup>

Thomas de Castro secured a plot of land at Mangalore from Queen Chennammaji. He built the first church of 'Our Lady of Miracles' in the site. At his death, his body was buried in the church, which, however, does not exist today. On its site we find only a cemetery and the grave of Thomas cannot be identified.<sup>34</sup>

Joseph Vaz worked in Kanara for about three years. During this short period he became very popular among the Christians there. He improved the church of 'Our Lady of the Rosary' of Mangalore and built two new churches in Basrur and

Gangolly, dedicated to 'Our Lady of the Rosary' and 'The Immaculate Conception', respectively. Where there were Christian communities, but no churches, he erected small huts and asked the Christians to gather in these huts to offer prayers even though there were no priests. He called such gatherings 'Irmidades' or  
Brotherhoods and visited them as often as possible.

35

From a letter of Joseph Vaz we learn that there were Christians in Bantwal and Arkol who went to the church in Mangalore on important festive occasions and for sacraments. So also there were Christian communities in Bhatkal, Kalyanpur, Sirul and Gandalim (?) who depended upon the Vicar of Basrur. The Christians of Kumta and Chandavar went to the Father of Honavar. Joseph urged his superiors in Goa to send more priests to Kanara so that those Christians, living so far away from the centres where there were churches, could avail the services of the  
36 additional priests.

Returning to Goa in 1684, Joseph organised the Congregation of the Oratory of Goa. He came back to Kanara in March, 1686 and worked there again for nine months, after which he left for Ceylon. This time he was not called upon to waste his energy in the conflict of jurisdiction, for the Pope had not appointed any regular successor to Thomas de Castro. The latter had nominated, before his death, Joseph de Castro, his relative, as Vicar General; but the successor had to promise not to exercise his powers until further orders from Pope, who did not send any. Joseph de Castro died in 1700 and the conflict of jurisdiction  
37 disappeared completely.

A few words may now be said regarding the non-religious activities of the missionaries in Kanara. The missionaries generally participated in the wars that were waged in that region, for the success of their mission depended largely upon the political successes of the Portuguese in the region. Some times it was a priest, with a cross aloft in his hand, who led the vanguard. Thus, three Jesuit chaplains accompanied the Portuguese expedition against Ullala in 1568. One of them, Father João Francisco,<sup>Esteponio,</sup> "always marched in the front with a holy cross

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aloft, animating the soldiers to fight." Similarly, five priests participated actively in the battle of Mangalore in 1619 against Venkatappa Nayaka. Three of them belonged to the Order of St. Augustin and two to that of St. Francis. Father Diogo Homem, one of the two Franciscan Friars, marched by the side of Gomes da Silva, captain of the vanguard. Diogo carried "a lance in his right hand and a cross on his breast." He was, however, killed along with two Augustinians. The remaining two escaped death and retreated to the fortress along with the remnant of the vanquished Portuguese soldiery. After this crushing defeat, the Hindu temple, which was within the Portuguese fortress, was destroyed on  
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the Viceroy's orders. This was probably at the instance of the missionaries who might have desired to avenge the death of the Fathers just mentioned.

It was common to employ missionaries as ambassadors. We have seen while discussing the Portuguese relations with the Nayakas of Ikkeri, that many of the Portuguese ambassadors to the Nayakas were Fathers. Besides this, in political counsels the clergy was given an important place. The factors in Kanara could deliver judgments in respect of cases involving Christians only in the company of the Vicar attached to the church of the factory. Where there was no factory, the priest of the church of the locality was empowered to settle disputes between  
40 Christians on the one hand, and between Christians and Hindus, on the other.

Some times the Fathers acted as informers. As we have seen, in 1702 Basavappa Nayaka imprisoned the Vicar of Honavar, who was suspected of having informed the Portuguese authorities that a ship, carrying some Arabs and certain prohibited articles, was about to sail for Mascat. The ship was captured by the Portuguese.  
41 Many a time the Nayakas of Ikkeri arrested or otherwise harassed the Christians in Kanara whenever there were hostilities between the Nayakas and the Portuguese.  
42

This was done in 1668. In 1702 the Vicar of Basrur was interned while that of  
43

Honavar was imprisoned. Again, in 1727 the Vicar of Mangalore was kept under  
44 custody by Somashekhar. Some priests were arrested by Basavappa Nayaka II in 1746, for having built a new church at Bantwala without his permission, though the

Portuguese contended that no such permission was necessary under the treaty of  
45  
1714.

The Portuguese government in Goa did whatever was possible to safeguard the interests of the missionaries and Christians in Kanara. This is particularly evident during the last hundred years of the Ikkeri rulers. In the various treaties that were entered into between the Portuguese and the Nayakas, provisions were included to protect the interests of the church and its ~~she~~ flock. We have seen what these provisions were in the treaties of 1678 and 1714.<sup>46</sup> The missionaries received all the encouragement from the government in their conversion activities. In January, 1751 Basavappa's ministers complained to the Viceroy that a missionary, working in the regions of Kalyanpur and Barkur, was trying to convert a Brahmin, Mahant Shankarayya, resident of Kalyanpur, and his wife to Christianity by force. In reply, the Viceroy denied to have received any information in this respect, but promised to command the missionary to "proceed as per justice", for his intention was not to "consent to violences."<sup>47</sup> By July, however, the couple was sent to Goa where it was converted and baptized. Shankarayya became Francisco and the Viceroy, Marquês de Tavora, his god-father. The relatives of Shankarayya seem to have tried to deprive him of his property. On being complained of this,<sup>48</sup> the Viceroy commanded the factor of Mangalore to do his best to get Shankarayya his property. The factor might have carried out the instruction, though we do not find any documentary evidence to this effect.

Before concluding this chapter, I may allude to the claim of some pious Christians that some times even Hindus venerate crosses and churches. Conde de Linhares, Viceroy (1629-35), records in his diary an interesting episode in this regard. A cross was erected at the distance of a gun-shot from the Portuguese fortress of Gangolly. One night, however, it was removed by the local tanadar, assisted by a few men, and was taken to Virabhadra Nayaka. Misfortune befell all the twenty men who thus stole it away; they died all of a sudden. What is more

all others who scornfully placed their hands upon it, ~~were~~ also fell dead. Presently, Virabhadra, seeing the fate of his men, ordered that the cross be restored to the Christians. In the meantime, it was very much venerated and  
worshipped by the Hindus with flowers.

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Foot-notes:

1. Sousa, Francisco de : Oriente Conquistado, pt. I, conquista I, divisão I, pp. 24-5.
2. APO-BP, tomo I, vol. I, pt. I, pp. 266-7.
3. CEO, I, p. 91.
4. Cunha, J. Gerson da : An Historical and Archaeological Sketch of the Island of Anjediva, in JBBRAS, No. XXXI, vol. XI, 1875, p. 303.
5. Rego, A. de Silva : História das Missões do Padroado Português do Oriente, vol. I, pp. 153-4. The Friars were : 1. Henrique de Coimbara, Superior; 2. Gaspar; 3. Francisco da Cruz; 4. Simão de Guimarães; 5. Luis de Salvador; 6. Messeu; 7. Pedro Neto; and 8. João da Vitória.
6. CEO, II, pp. 226-7. Antonio José de Herédia, in his article O Christianismo na Índia antes da erecção da Diocese de Goa, (in Memória Histórico-Ecclesiástica de Arquidiocese de Goa, 1533-1933, p. 20) mentions that 22 or 23 were baptized by these friars in Anjediva.
7. CEO, III, p. 284. Also, Documentação, I, p. 34, foot-note (1).
8. Lendas, tomo I, pt. II, p. 562.
9. Saldanha, M. F. Gabriel de : História de Goa, II, p. 284.
10. Meersman, Achilles : The Chapter-Lists of the Madre de Deus Province in India, 1569-1790, in Studia, July, 1960, p. 183.
11. Albuquerque, Viriato de : Senado de Goa, p. 447.
12. Meersman, art. cit., p. 184.



13. Herédia, Antonio José de : art. cit., p. 28; Sturrock, J. : The South Kanara District Manual, p. 68.
14. Carmo, I. : O Cristianismo no Canara, II, in 'Boletim Eclesiastico da Arquidiocese de Goa', Novembro, 1951, p. 174. Also, Silva, Severine : History of Christianity in Canara, vol. I, p. 37.
15. Cunha, J. G. da : The Portuguese in Kanara, in JBBRAS, vol. XIX, 1895-1897, p. 251.
16. Nazareth, C. C. de : Mitras Lusitanas na Oriente, vol. I, p. 171.
17. Xavier, Felippe Neri : Resumo Histórico da maravilhosa vida, conversões, e milagres de S. Francisco Xavier, p. 221.
18. Documentação, V, p. 254.
19. Silva, Severine, op. cit., pp. 43-4.
20. Moares, G. M. : Mangalore, pp. 58-60.
21. Valle, Pietro Della : Travells of, ed. Edward Grey, Vol. II, p. 301.
22. Ibid., p. 203.
23. APO-BP, tomo, IV, vol. II, pt. I, pp. 309, 317, 320.
24. Maria, G. di Santa : Prima Spedizione, quoted by G. M. Moraes in his Mangalore, p. 60.
25. Monções, No. 120-B, fl. 523.
26. M. M. D. L. T. : History of Hyder Shah, quoted by G. M. Moraes, op. cit., p. 61.
27. CEO, II, pp. 237-8.
28. Ibid., pp. 236, 242.
29. 'Padroado' implies the privilege of patronage conferred on the kings of Portugal by the Popes. The former were authorised to recommend candidates for bishoprics or other ecclesiastical benefices in the territories discovered by the Portuguese. This privilege was given right from 1481. In return, the Portuguese were to protect Christians in the territories which came under their control or influence. The names recommended were generally accepted by the Popes.
30. The Department of the Sacred Congregation of Propaganda Fidé was instituted

in 1622 by Pope Gregory XV. The purpose of this organ was to convert the Orient to Christianity directly through missionaries appointed by the Pope. In the 17<sup>th</sup> century, the Portuguese were not always in a position to discharge their responsibility of the Padroado on account of the series of defeats suffered by them at the hands of the Dutch.

31. Silva, Severine : op. cit., vol. I, p. 61.
32. Nagareth, C. C. de : op. cit., I, p. 185; Arsenio Tomaz Dias : Accão e Traços Biograficos dos Prelados, in Memória Histórico-Eclesiastica de Goa, 1533-1933, p. 118; Silva, Severine : op. cit., I, p. 62.
33. For a full account of Father Joseph Vaz's proceedings in Kanara one may read:
  - (1) Sebastião do Rego's Vida do Venerável Padre José Vaz, 3rd edition, pp. 31-53; (2) S. G. Perera's Life of the Venerable Father Joseph Vaz, pp. 19-35.
  - (3) Severine Silva's History of Christianity in Canara, vol. I, pp. 64-72.
34. Silva, Severine : op. cit., I, pp. 68, 69.
35. Rego, Sebastião do : op. cit., p. 33. Also Silva, Severine : op. cit., I, p. 71; and Dias, Euchides Rogaciano : Resumo da Vida do Venerável Padre José Vaz, pp. 11-2.
36. Rego, Sebastião, op. cit., pp. 51-2, foot-note 10. The letter is dated 14 September, 1681 and is addressed to the Chapter of Goa. For its English translation see Perera, S. G. : op. cit., pp. 28-30. Also Silva, Severine : op. cit., pp. 65-6.
37. Perera, S. G. : op. cit., pp. 44-5; Silva, Severine : op. cit., pp. 68, 71-2.
38. Sousa, Francisco de : op. cit., pt. II, con. I, div. I, p. 30.
39. ■■ CEO, II, pp. 239-42.
40. Supra, p. 251.
41. Supra, pp. 245.
42. Supra, p. 235.
43. Supra, pp. 245-6.

44. Supra, p. 255.
45. LRI, No. 14, fls. 6-9, Viceroy's Instructions to factor of Mangalore, 31.1.1747.
46. Supra, pp. 241, 251.
47. LCC, II, fl. 59.
48. Appendix XV.
49. Linhares, Conde de : Diario de, <sup>a</sup> tomo II, pp. 148, 201.

## Chapter 11

### THE PORTUGUESE TRADE AND COMMERCE IN KANARA

The primary object for which the Portuguese came to India was trade. To be sure, their commercial activities in Kanara throughout the period of our study form an interesting chapter. Pepper and rice were the two important articles of trade which attracted them to the region.

The first century of the Portuguese history after the discovery of the sea route to India was marked by their monopoly of spice trade between the East and the West. It is needless to say that Kanara too was subjected to this monopoly. They attempted to secure all the exportable pepper from this region. Thus, 1502 the Bhatkal chief was compelled to agree not to trade in pepper, except with the Portuguese, lest his ships be burnt. In the treaty of 2 November, 1540, between them and the chief of Gersoppa, we find a clause that no pepper should be exported by the latter. It implied that this article should be sold only to the Portuguese and not to the Arabs. From another document of 1574 we learn that the Queen of Gersoppa was obliged to sell the Portuguese 500 khandis of pepper at 25 gold pagodas (Rs. 100) a khandi. However, there was hostility between the two parties in 1570's and therefore the Queen did not fulfil her obligation.

In the 17th and the 18th centuries the situation was different. By then the Portuguese had lost their trade monopoly in the East to the Dutch and the English and had become weak politically and militarily. They were, therefore, unable to impose their monopolistic conditions on the Nayakas of Ikkeri, who were now masters of Kanara. On the other hand, the latter wanted to impose a condition that the Portuguese should compulsorily purchase from them every year a definite quantity of pepper at a fixed price. The Portuguese did their best to free themselves from this condition. By the treaty of 1631 with Virappa Nayaka they endeavoured to keep the pepper market open and free. They, no doubt, desired to have substantial quantity of pepper from Kanara, but they wanted no obligation either on their part to purchase or on the part of Virappa to sell,

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compulsorily. However, Virappa was a usurper and Virabhadra, who got rid of him, was not prepared to accept this term. By the treaty of 1633, which he concluded with the Portuguese, the latter were obliged to purchase 350 khandis of pepper from him every year at the rate of 22 pagodas (Rs. 88) a khandi. Subsequently,  
5  
as we have seen, Virabhadra demanded more than the agreed price and disputes arose. During the reign of Shivappa (1645-60) the reluctance or inability of the Portuguese to purchase substantial quantities of pepper from him became one of the primary causes of the war which led to the loss of their fortresses in Kanara. In the treaties of 1671,, 1678 and 1714, however, there was no clause for compulsory purchase or sale of the commodity between them and the Nayakas of Ikkeri.

The Portuguese depended heavily upon the rice supplies from Kanara. They secured much of the commodity by way of tributes exacted from local chiefs. They bought the rest. In 1502 they imposed on Bhatkal an annual rice tribute of 1,500  
6  
bags, which was increased to 2,000 bags in 1509. In 1540 Gersoppa agreed to pay  
7  
them an annual tribute of 2,000 bags of rice. In addition, the chief of Gersoppa  
8  
consented to sell 8,000 bags or more at a rate which was being paid formerly,  
implying thereby that the Portuguese used to purchase rice from Gersoppa at an  
agreed price prior to 1540. In 1548 Bhatkal revived the annual tribute of 2,000  
9  
bags of rice, which seems to have been stopped for some years. By 1554 the chiefs  
of Honavar and Basrur bound themselves to pay annual rice tributes of 2,000 and  
10  
500 bags, respectively. This practice of securing rice by means of treaties was  
continued in the 17th and the 18th centuries. By the treaty of 1631 they obtained  
an annual tribute of 500 bags from Virappa Nayaka; by that of 1678, 1,500 bags  
from Chennammaji; and by that of 1714, 1,900 bags from Basavappa Nayaka. Not  
that they always got the tributes. Whenever there was hostility between them and  
the Ikkeri rulers or when the latter were strong enough to refuse, no such tri-  
bute was given. Thus, in the treaty of 1633 there was no provision for a tribute.  
So also, they did not receive any rice tribute during the reign of Shivappa  
Nayaka.

Ample references can be found in Portuguese chronicles and documents to the Portuguese purchases of rice supplies from Kanara. Francisco de Almeida and secured rice from Honavar through Timmayya, Afonso de Albuquerque who gained much profit, for he could secure food-grains from Kanara almost for nothing as they were available there in abundance. A large ship was loaded at Bhatkal with rice and other articles in 1516. In 1525 Simão de Menezes was sent to Basrur and Bhatkal for provisions and he actually secured rice. The treaty of 1540 with Gersoppa shows that the Portuguese purchased every year a considerable quantity of rice, probably about 8,000 bags, from that region. In the chapters concerning the Portuguese relations with the Nayakas of Ikkeri, many references have been made to the importance that the former attached to the rice supplies from Kanara.

Other articles of trade which the Portuguese secured from the region were sugar, iron, ginger, choir, salt-petre, wood and timber. In 1498 Vasco da Gama had taken the sample of cinnamon from Anjediva, but it is not known if this article was purchased by the Portuguese from Kanara in due course. In 1508 Timmayya offered to sell to the Portuguese cloves, camphor and black-wood.

In exchange for the articles of trade which they purchased in Kanara the Portuguese sold there several articles which they brought with them from Portugal and other countries. Horses, copper, quicksilver, vermillion, coral, lead and salt were the important articles they sold in Kanara. It was calculated that the copper, quicksilver, vermillion and coral, which the fleet of João da Nova had in 1501, were worth 15,000 pardaos (Rs. 60,000) at the rates prevailing in Bhatkal. The Portuguese considered the rates very high and, therefore, sold much of these articles there and then whereby they gained considerable profit. A reference is found to the Portuguese slave trade in Bhatkal in 1540's. The orphans, who fell into their hands, were sold into ~~the~~ slavery to the Muslim merchants at Bhatkal for a price of four pardaos (Rs. 16).

The price of the various articles exchanged between the Portuguese and the Kanarese is scarcely indicated in Portuguese sources as far as the 16th century

is concerned. Nevertheless, Duarte Barbosa mentions that a bag of sugar cost only Rs. 3 1/3 in Bhatkal. From the financial statement of 1574 we learn that the Queen of Honavar (Gersoppa) had agreed to sell pepper to the Portuguese at the rate of 25 pagodas (Rs. 100) a khandi. More information regarding prices can be obtained in respect of the 17th and the 18th centuries. In a royal ordinance dated 19 March, 1612 the king of Portugal specified that a price of 28 1/2 to 29 pagodas (Rs. 114 to Rs. 116) be paid for a khandi of pepper of Kanara, which was considered superior to that of Cannanor. By the treaty of 1633 the Portuguese agreed to purchase annually 350 khandis of pepper from Virabhadra Nayaka at the rate of 22 pagodas (Rs. 88) a khandi. Earlier, in 1630, they endeavoured to secure pepper from Basrur at the rate of 56 xerafins (Rs. 64) a khandi. This was a very low quotation. The Portuguese themselves were not sure of getting it at this price and it is not indicated whether they really secured the commodity so cheap. Soon after the treaty of 1633 Virabhadra demanded 28 pagodas (Rs. 112) for a khandi. This was the price which Shivappa Nayaka also insisted upon subsequently and which the Portuguese were reluctant to pay.

The Portuguese were prepared to pay a price of 12 to 14 pagodas (Rs. 48 to Rs. 56) a korji of rice in the beginning of the 18th century.

The price of the different articles, of course, did not remain steady. Many a time it was rigged up owing to war condition or competition. The Portuguese raised the price of their articles if they found the local merchants quoting a high price for theirs. This was a common practice, for the English also did so. In 1637 the latter offered to purchase pepper from Virabhadra Nayaka at the rate of 30 pagodas (Rs. 120) a khandi in exchange for lead at the rate of 22 1/2 pagodas (Rs. 90) a khandi. The Portuguese pointed out that the English sold the same lead to them at the rate of 20 patacas or about 12 pagodas (Rs. 48) a khandi, and that they also were willing to pay Virabhadra 30 pagodas a khandi of pepper, instead of the contracted 22 pagodas (Rs. 88), if he was prepared to purchase lead from them at the rate quoted by the English. In 1677 the Kanarese

quoted 14 pagodas (Rs. 56) a korji of rice; but the Portuguese complained that  
the Arabs got the same rice from Kanara for 8 pagodas (Rs. 32) or even less. In  
war times the Portuguese found it difficult to procure any supplies from Kanara  
and even if anything was secured it was at an exorbitant rate. We have seen how  
the Nayakas of Ikkeri blocked the supply of provisions to the Portuguese whenever  
there was hostility between the two parties. In 1619 the Portuguese had to pay  
more than double the normal price for anything they purchased in Mangalore, be-  
cause of their hostility with Venkatappa Nayaka and the resultant scarcity con-  
dition created by the Nayaka.

The Portuguese used local weights and measures in their commercial dealings  
with the Kanarese. In 1501 they sold copper, quicksilver, vermillion and coral at  
Bhatkal by the local bar, meaning bhara or burden, which was then equivalent to  
three quintals and a half (205.632 kgs.). However, there were different bars in  
Bhatkal for different commodities in 1554. Thus, to weigh copper, iron, cinnamon  
and choir the bar of 212.058 kgs. was used. The bar for sugar weighed 192.780  
kgs. Lagume and coral were weighed by a bar of 11.016 kgs. only. Sometimes,  
sugar was weighed in bags also, each bag being 77.112 kgs. The bars differed from  
place to place too. For instance, the bar of Honavar, which was equivalent to  
201.960 kgs., differed from the various bars of Bhatkal. In 1574, a khandi of  
pepper in Honavar weighed 220.320 kgs. In the 17th and the 18th centuries the  
Kanarese pepper seems to have been purchased by the Portuguese in terms of this  
khandi of 220.320 kgs. In the treaty of 1671 there was a clause that the Portu-  
guese should use local weights and measures.

The Kanarese korji, a measure meant for rice, was used by the Portuguese for  
dealing in this commodity in Kanara in the 17th and the 18th centuries. It seems  
to have weighed 1,640.52 kgs. as at present.

It is difficult to have a clear picture of statistics regarding the quantity  
of goods exchanged between the Portuguese and the Kanarese year by year. By 1554  
the former obtained 6,500 bags of rice annually from Honavar, Bhatkal, Gersoppa

and Basrur. At the same time, 8,600 bags of rice were expected from other parts  
of Kanara by future treaties or other arrangements. In addition to this they  
might have secured further rice supplies by means of purchases as the treaty of  
1540 with Gersoppa would suggest. When Gangolly was occupied in 1630, they ex-  
pected to benefit by the 20,000 bags of exportable rice from there. It seems  
that the annual rice supplies required by the Portuguese in the 18th century were  
70,000 bags which they endeavoured to secure from Kanara by means of an agreement  
with Somashekha Nayaka of Ikkeri. In return for this, 60,000 bags of salt were  
to be supplied to the Nayaka.

As we have seen, the Portuguese secured by means of treaties the monopoly of  
pepper supplies from Gersoppa and Basrur. However, it is not known how much of  
pepper was secured from Kanara this way. From the financial statement of 1574,  
we learn that the Queen of Honavar was obliged to sell 500 khandis, but she did  
not do so in 1570's owing to hostility between her and the Portuguese. Towards  
the end of the 16th century the latter seem to have purchased 3,000 khandis of  
the commodity every year from Kanara as a whole. In the beginning of the 17th  
century, however, they purchased only 1,000 quintals a year. In 1620's, the  
Gongolly-Basrur region alone exported annually 1,500 khandis. In the middle of  
the 17th century Shivappa Nayaka insisted that the Portuguese should purchase from  
him 1,000 khandis of pepper in the year of a proposed agreement and 500 khandis  
subsequently every year.

In order to secure the various supplies from Kanara the Portuguese seem to  
have invested 500,000 gaz pagodas (Rs. 2,000,000) every year in the region in the  
middle of the 17th century, and "more than one million in gold, rupees and patakas"  
in the beginning of the 18th century.

On occupying Goa in 1510, Afonso de Albuquerque found that Muslim and Hindu  
coins were in circulation there. He, however, issued his own coins equivalent to  
the local ones. The first man who was authorised to mint coins was a Shetty of  
Bhatkal. The coins of Goa and Kanara were equal in exchange rate. That is why

Antonio Nunes, writing in 1554, could indicate that the currency of Bhatkal (or  
other places of Kanara) was similar to that of Goa. However, in due course some  
variation cropped up, as the Portuguese varied the value of their coins now and  
then. Thus, in the treaty of 1633, we find a clause wherein 100 pagodas (Rs. 400)  
of Ikkeri were considered equal to 102 São Tomés which were gold coins of Goa.  
The exchange rate thus being 1 to 1.02 between the Ikkeri pagoda and the São Tomé  
of Goa. In 1630's another coin, xerafin, which was current in Goa, was exchange-  
able with the Ikkeri pagoda at the rate of 3.5 to 1.

There were roads, some of which might have been fit for carts, and mediaeval  
means of transport to facilitate trade. There was a road from Bhatkal to Banka-  
pur via Honavar. Goa was linked up with Vijayanagara via Bankapur. Porters, and  
pack animals like horses, bullocks and asses were the usual means of transport.

Boats and ships were, no doubt, the most important means of transport. The  
Portuguese sources refer to different types of local vessels. It is very difficult,  
however, to determine their size, capacity and mast. The different rates of  
anchorage levied upon different vessels show their greater or smaller capacity  
and size. Thus, empalega, catacoulão and calamute were the smallest of these  
local vessels; larger than these were paráo, manchua, and sanguicel; then came  
pinnace, cathia and gundra, followed by taurim, paquel and zambuco; there were also  
big taurim and big paquel and nau, which were the largest of the local ships.  
These were vessels which were common on the coasts of Kanara and Malabar in the  
16th century, Pataxo, periche and palla were added in the following centuries.  
The Portuguese had their galley, galleon and galliot in the 16th and the 17th  
centuries, and these were reinforced by frigates in the 17th and the 18th centu-  
ries. They used the word 'náo' to indicate these ships. Navios stood for vessels  
in general. It is difficult to say what the freight charges were for carrying  
goods from one place to another by these vessels.

A few words may now be said regarding the Portuguese control over Kanarese  
trade and the organisation and the nature of their commercial dealings in the

region. They declared themselves lords of the sea and as such they imposed conditions on the local chiefs with regard to the latter's coastal and overseas trade. As early as 1502, Vasco da Gama, after burning the port of Bhatkal, told its chief that the king of Portugal was "the lord of the sea of the whole world, as also of all this coast; by reason of which all the rivers and ports, which had navigation, ought to obey him, and pay tributes to his men who moved about in his fleets." Further, he declared that the ships of Bhatkal would be burnt if the chief traded in pepper or dealt with the Arabs or sent his ships to Calicut. The chief agreed to pay an annual tribute of 1,000 bags of fine, and 500 bags of coarse rice, and to refrain from doing the forbidden. Afonso de Albuquerque attempted to secure Krishna Deva Raya's permission to erect a fortress, or at least a factory, at Bhatkal in order to control its trade. He did not succeed in obtaining the permission; but after occupying Goa in 1510 he employed some captains to compel merchant ships to sail into the port of Goa, thus damaging the sea trade of Bhatkal.

The Portuguese always endeavoured, either by force or by agreements with local chiefs, to exclude from Kanarese trade their enemies and rivals, particularly the merchants of Calicut, the Arabs, the Dutch and the English. Many a time the local chiefs themselves were punished for allowing the rivals to trade at the Kanarese ports. In 1513 Afonso de Albuquerque sent some of his captains to Bhatkal and Mangalore to take possession of some of the Calicut ships which were on their way to the Red Sea Strait. If the local chiefs were not to co-operate with the captains by allowing them to take the ships, the trade of the ports was to be hindered until the ships were secured. The chiefs, however, did not resist and the captains took the ships with goods. In 1525 the Portuguese destroyed a few of the Calicut ships which were trading at Mangalore. We have seen how a Hindu merchant of Mangalore, 'the Shetty of Mangalore', was punished and the city was burnt in 1530, because the Shetty had commercial dealings with the merchants of Calicut. So also, in 1558 Mangalore experienced the Portuguese brutality for

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dealing with their enemy ships from Malabar. In the 17th century the Portuguese could not exclude the Dutch and the English from Kanara by force. However, they did their best to prevent these rivals from gaining a foot-hold in Kanara by urging the Nayakas of Ikkeri not to admit the rivals. Some times their efforts were crowned with success. Thus, we find the ~~the~~ English factory of Bhatkal being destroyed in 1639 at their instance; but in 1642 the former were reinstated there.  
58  
In their treaties with the Nayakas of Ikkeri in 1678 and 1714, the Arabs were excluded from Kanara. However, many a time these provisions were not observed and the Arabs were allowed to trade at the Kanarese ports by the Nayakas. On such occasions the Portuguese attempted to expel the Arabs by force and punish  
59  
the Nayakas simultaneously. We have already referred to such cases.

Occasionally the Portuguese attempted to encourage the Kanarese to trade with them, while endeavouring to exclude other traders from elsewhere. Thus, by a charter of 21 October, 1522 the king of Portugal freed the merchants of Bhatkal, Honavar, Mangalore, Mirjan and Basrur from the entrance duty of 4 1/2 per cent. which was continued to be collected in respect of the articles coming into Goa  
60  
from other than Kanarese territories. This was an encouragement to the Kanarese merchants to trade with Goa.

The Portuguese organised their commercial affairs with the East through what  
61  
may be termed as the 'Fortress-Factory' system. In Kanara they had fortresses between 1568 and 1654, and more often than not, the captain of a fortress was also its factor. Before the establishment of these fortresses and after their loss, trade dealings were organised through a factory. However, it does not mean that the Portuguese always had a factory in Kanara. Their first factory in the region seems to have been established at Bhatkal in 1540 or thereabout, though they had commercial contacts with Kanara right from 1498. Castanheda tells us that the Governor sent in 1517 João Gonçalves de Castelo Branco to take possession of Bhatkal and leave a man with a factor to purchase all the  
62  
available saltpetre there. However, he does not indicate whether the place was

actually taken and whether the factor was successful in securing the article mentioned. He does not clarify also whether the Governor intended to have a factor at Bhatkal on a permanent basis, if the place were to be taken. Gaspar Correa, referring to the incident of 1542, already described, definitely mentions an established Portuguese factory at Bhatkal. It might have been founded a few years prior to 1542, say in 1540. Simão Botelho, writing in 1554 and speaking of the treaty of 1548, refers to this factory of Bhatkal. However, this factory seems to have been discontinued after the establishment of the fortresses in 1568-9, for no reference thereafter is found to any factory at Bhatkal. In 1660's, it appeared that the Portuguese would get back their lost fortresses of Kanara; but the Dutch came in their way. By virtue of the treaty of 1671, however, they established a factory at Mangalore, which was perpetuated by the subsequent treaties of 1678 and 1714.

The 'Fortress-Factory' system was headed by a captain-cum-factor, though for some years in the beginning (1568-70) these offices were entrusted to the care of two different persons. A reference has already been made to the administrative and financial arrangements of the system.<sup>65</sup> It may only be mentioned here that the system was not only the centre of the Portuguese commercial activities but also of their political and religious affairs in Kanara.

The Portuguese could control the commerce of Kanara more or less effectively to their own advantage through the system as long as they were unchallenged either by local chiefs or by European rivals. However, in the 17th century the Nayakas of Ikkeri, the Dutch and the English became a formidable ~~whole~~ challenge to their monopoly and they had to give in. While losing, however, they endeavoured to retain whatever commercial advantages were possible by means of treaties with the Nayakas of Ikkeri. Thus, under the treaty of 1633 Virabhadra was to allow supplies of rice and other food-grains to the Portuguese; to permit them to take necessary wood from his territories for their shipyard; not to impose upon them more taxes than was customary; to provide them with 24 masts for their vessels;

and to allow them to purchase pepper freely, other than the quantity of 350  
khandis which they had to purchase from him compulsorily every year. It is not  
necessary to repeat here what commercial advantages they secured under the trea-  
ties of 1671, 1678 and 1714, as they have been indicated in chapter 9.

Even as they were weak and impotent in the 17th and the 18th centuries, the Portuguese continued their attempt to control the overseas and coastal trade of Kanara in keeping with their notion that they were the lords of sea and therefore one could carry on sea trade only with their permission. To be sure, they did not bother their European rivals with their notions; but they did try to impose it particularly upon the Arabs and other non-European traders. The means by which they attempted to lord over the sea trade was the system of cartazes, meaning permits or passports.

The system seems to have been introduced in the first half of the 16th century itself. The first reference to it with regard to Kanara is in 1548. Simão Botelho, speaking of the treaty of that year between the Portuguese and the Bhatkal chief, says that the latter had agreed to the condition that the former could have a factor at Bhatkal "in order to issue passports to the ships which sailed out from the said port," and to carry on Portuguese commerce there. In the treaties of 1633, 1671, 1678 and 1714 between the Portuguese and the Nayakas of Ikkeri there were provisions imposing upon the latter the obligation to secure cartazes for their merchant ships. Even the royal ships were subject to this obligation. Ships, sailing without cartazes were subject to confiscation by the Portuguese. We had occasion to refer to such incidents of confiscation during the course of our discussion concerning Portuguese-Ikkeri relations.

A fee was generally charged while issuing cartazes, though some specified number of royal ships of Ikkeri were given cartazes free of any charge. For instance, under the treaty of 1678 two free cartazes were to be issued to Basavappa Nayaka. A cartaz generally specified the ports to which the ship was prohibited to go for trade and also the articles of trade which could not be carried

on board. Arab ports were forbidden and ships sailing into them, or violating  
other conditions, were subject to confiscation.<sup>70</sup> So also, horses were a Portuguese controlled article of trade. No Kanarese ship was allowed to carry or deal in horses without specific cartaz. In 1728 the Portuguese told Somashekhar Nayaka that they would issue cartazes free of any charge to all Kanarese ships, royal and others, and allow them to deal in horses, provided that he agreed to pay an annual rice tribute of more than 5,000 bags, and 2 horses for each ship  
<sup>71</sup> which brought the animals. Nothing came of this proposal.

The Portuguese entered into commercial dealings with the Kanarese merchants in different ways. Factory or 'Fortress-Factory' system was the centre of trade transactions, as has been said. However, before its establishment the Portuguese sailed into the Kanarese ports from time to time, sold their goods there or purchased whatever they needed. Normally, an interpreter assisted them in communicating with the local merchants. In course of time they found it inconvenient to go themselves to the interior and negotiate business transactions with local dealers. They therefore evolved the practice of appointing Goan or Kanarese merchants as their procurators in Kanara. Thus, by a Vice-regal order of 15 November, 1595, Santopá and Mango Sinai, two merchants of Goa, were appointed to procure and supply 3,000 khandis of pepper from Kanara. The commodity was to be delivered  
<sup>72</sup> to the Portuguese at their Kanarese fortresses. Sundardas Vishnudas, resident of Mangalore and owner of four barques, was the Portuguese procurator in Kanara  
<sup>73</sup> in 1720's and 1730's.

The Portuguese were notorious for their mal-practices and ill-treatments of the Kanarese merchants and ships. As Gaspar Correa ~~xx~~ remarks, it was common for them to indulge in mal-practices such as forcibly taking articles of trade  
<sup>74</sup> from local merchants, as they did at Bhatkal in 1542. Francisco de Mello de Sampaio, who became captain of Basrur in 1583, damaged the trade of that port so much by forcibly taking goods at a low price that the local merchants attempted  
<sup>75</sup> to drive the Portuguese away from there, though unsuccessfully. There were

also instances of captains who levied and collected illegal imposts from merchants at Basrur, contrary to Viceregal orders, as a ~~document~~ document dated 13 October, 1591 informs us that 5 larins were collected illegally from Muslim merchants for every korji of rice purchased by them at Basrur.<sup>76</sup> Some times the Portuguese confiscated Kanarese ships and sold their goods for sheer profit. They gave as low a compensation as possible if the Nayakas of Ikkeri threatened<sup>77</sup> and demanded satisfaction.

Foot-notes:

1. Lendas, tomo I, pt., I, p. 291.
2. Botelho, Simão : O Tombo de Estado da India, in Subsidios, pp. 257-8.
3. Orçamento, p. 95.
4. Supra, pp. 175-6.
5. Supra, p. 183.
6. Lendas, tomo I, pt. I, p. 291.
7. História, II, p. 441.
8. Botelho, Simão : op. cit., pp. 257-8. The Gazetteer of the Bombay Presidency (vol. XV, pt. II, Kanara, p. 114) wrongly says that 8,000 bags of rice were the past tributes.
9. Botelho, Simão : op. cit., p. 243.
10. Ibid., pp. 246-8. The Bombay Presidency Gazetteer (op. cit., p. 114) proceeds to say that Agrakona, Ankola, Kumta and Mirjan also paid certain rice tributes to the Portuguese by 1554. This, however, is not true. Simão Botelho, whom the Gazetteer also quotes, mentions these places under the title : "The rivers which can pay tributes" ("Os rios que podem pagar pareas"), implying clearly that they were not paying the tribute already.

The author estimated the figures of possible tributes that could be collected in the future from these places. This is all the more clear from the main heading of the whole list: "These are the tributes of rice which the king, our lord, has in this coast of Goa as far as Cannanor, and also some rivers which can pay, if they are bound for this purpose". (Underlining is mine). Honavar, Bhatkal and Basrur are included in the first category of places which were actually paying the tribute by 1554. Agrakona etc. are included in the second category of places from where certain tributes were expected in the future, if the Portuguese were to bind these places to pay by entering into treaties with them.

11. Lendas, tomo I, pt. I, p. 579.
12. Ibid., p. 469.
13. História, VI, pp. 291, 292.
14. Botelho, Simão : op. cit., p. 257.
15. Velho, A. : Roteiro da primeira viagem de Vasco da Gama, p. 71.
16. Cartas, III, p. 303.
17. Lendas, tomo I, pt. I, pp. 239-40.
18. Documentação, III, p. 211.
19. <sup>r</sup>~~O~~camento, p. 95.
20. DRI, II, p. 228.
21. Assentos, I, p. 257.
22. Supra, p. 259.
23. Assentos, II, p. 168.
24. Ibid., IV, p. 279.
25. Supra, pp. 171, 184, 185, 249.
26. Lendas, tomo I, pt. I, p. 239.
27. Nunes, Antonio : Livro dos pesos, medidas e moedas, in Subsidios, pp. 32, 45.
28. Ibid., pp. 33, 50.
29. Orçamento, p. 95.

30. Supra, p. 236.
31. Botelho, Simão : op. cit., pp. 246-8, 257-8.
32. Ibid., p. 257.
33. Assentos, I, p. 555.
34. APO-BP, tomo I, vol. III, pt. IV, p. 94.
35. Botelho, Simão : op. cit., p. 258.
36. LCF, fl. 42.
37. Orçamento, p. 95.
38. APO-CR, 3, p. 567.
39. Assentos, I, p. 115.
40. Heras, Henry : Expansion Wars of Venkatappa Nayaka, an article, p. 7.
41. ~~Assentos~~ - Assentos, II, p. 13.
42. Ibid., V, p. 163.
43. Cunha, J. Gerson da : Contribuições para a estudo da numismática Indo-Portuguesa, p. 21.
44. Nunes, Antonio : op. cit., pp. 61, 62.
45. Assentos, I, p. 570.
46. Ibid., p. 539.
47. Sewell, R. : A Forgotten Empire, p. 119.
48. Ibid.
49. APO-CR, 5, pt. 3, p. 1518.
50. Boxer, C. R., : The Carreira da India, p. 2.
51. Lendas, tomo, I, pt. I, p. 290.
52. Ibid., p. 291.
53. Commentarios, III, pp. 50-1.
54. Ibid., IV, p. 79.
55. História, VI, p. 291.
56. Supra, pp. 88-91.
57. Supra, pp. 91-2.

58. Assentos, III, p. 654; EF, 1642-1645, p. 109.
59. Supra, pp. 238-9, 244, 246-8.
60. APO-CR, 5, pt. 3, pp. 1553-4.
61. Orçamento, p. 443.
62. História, IV, p. 433.
63. ~~Supra~~ Supra, pp. 78-81.
64. Botelho, Simão : op. cit., p. 243.
65. Supra, pp. 110-119.
66. Assentos, I, pp. 569-70.
67. Botelho, Simão : op. cit., p. 243.
68. For details see the relevant provisions of the said treaties in chapters 7 and 9.
69. A fee of Rs. 10 for every 100 khandis was charged at Mangalore in the 18th century. In addition, the charges of writers and other officials were also collected along with this fee. (LRI, No. 16, fls. 65-6, 174-5). A fee of Rs. 10 only was charged in Goa. (Livro de Cartazes, No. 1, 1704-1766, fls. 54, 55, 56, etc.).
70. Appendix XVI.
71. APO-BP, tomo I, vol. III, pt. IV, p. 94.
72. APO-CR, 3, pp. 567-8.
73. Assentos, V, p. 378.
74. Lendas, tomo IV, pt. I, pp. 257-8.
75. D-DC, X, pt. I, pp. 381-2.
76. APO-CR, 3, pp. 335-6.
77. Assentos, II, pp. 543-5; IV, pp. 239-40,

#### CONCLUDING REMARKS

We have completed our narrative of the political, religious and commercial activities of the Portuguese in Kanara upto a definite stage of the history of the region, namely, the downfall of the Keladi dynasty and the establishment of Hyder Ali's rule in 1763. It is rather regrettable that extant Kannada sources throw very little light on the Portuguese-Kanarese relations. Even the Keladi-nripa Vijaya of Linganna Kavi says precious little on this subject. Most of the information we have is to be found only in Portuguese sources or other records of the Western powers who came to India. The lack of contemporary Kannada chronicles and records on the Portuguese-Kanarese relations may be attributed to the general lack of a sense of history among our countrymen, not only in the past but even today to a great extent.

The Portuguese relations with Kanara were marked by a belligerent attitude. They shaped their policy generally from a position of strength whenever it was possible. This was particularly true of the 16th century when no Indian ruler possessed a navy strong enough to curb their belligerence and when their power in the East was unchallenged by any other European country. They extracted tributes from the Kanarese chiefs and imposed trade conditions upon them. If any chief failed to abide by these arrangements, his ports and boats were attacked and damaged. Even on the loss of their fortresses of Kanara in the middle of the 17th century and thereafter when their power was not worth the name, they followed a policy based upon force. They would only wait until the annual fleet arrived from Portugal and, on its arrival, use it to hinder the trade and commerce of Kanara, or to damage the latter's ports and vessels. This was the method by which they endeavoured to get what they wanted from the Nayakas of Ikkeri. We find frequent references to such incidents in Portuguese sources, as we have seen. The Nayakas, after Shivappa, were not strong enough to punish the Portuguese for these acts of violence.

Of course, there were exceptions to this general policy of force. For instance, Afonso de Albuquerque, the greatest of the Portuguese conquerors and statesmen, was careful not to indulge in belligerence in Kanara. He tried to get concessions by negotiations and did not use force when negotiations failed. He was, no doubt, influenced by the aid given to him by the king of Gersoppa and the latter's officials in occupying Goa; and also by a desire to be on friendly terms with Vijayanagara in which Empire Kanara was included. However, he endeavoured to damage Kanarese commerce by compelling the ships from Arabia and Persia to sail to Goa and by excluding the ships of Calicut from the Kanarese ports.

The Political, commercial and religious activities of the Portuguese in Kanara were intermingled. However, commerce may be considered as the most decisive factor which influenced their policy towards the region. If they wished to possess fortresses in Kanara, it was mainly in order to control the commerce of the region. Not that they never had the ambition of establishing a territorial empire in India; but they did not succeed in doing so. No empire worth the name was ever established by them, though Afonso de Albuquerque and some others did their best towards the fulfilment of the ambition. The declared purpose of the Portuguese in establishing fortresses in Kanara was generally commercial. Afonso desired a fortress in Bhatkal for that purpose. Luis de Ataide established fortresses in Honavar and Basrur in order to exclude the Malabarese from the trade and commerce of the Kanarese ports. The fortresses of Mangalore and Gangolli also served the same end. If the Portuguese participated actively in the local political struggles, aiding one chief against another, the main purpose was to safeguard their own commercial interests in the region. Their endeavour was to see that no single chief became strong enough to deprive them of their privileged position there. To aid one local chief against another was a common practice of the European powers in the process of colonization and empire building. The Portuguese did not acquire an empire worth the name; but they did safeguard their

commercial interests in Kanara, as long as they could, by this usual means.

Some of the Nayakas of Ikkeri like Venkatappa I and Virabhadra were too strong and powerful for the Portuguese to cope with. Therefore, the latter generally felt happy whenever the former were in trouble, either because the Nayakas were attacked by their neighbourhood, that is, by their neighbouring potentates or because their own fuedatories were in revolt. The reason was that the Portuguese found their own strength in the weakness of the Nayakas. The Adil Shahi rulers of Bijapur proved to be stronger than the Nayakas. The Portuguese, therefore, rarely helped Bijapur against the latter; but sometimes they aided the Nayakas whom they did not want to see thoroughly beaten by the Adil Shahis, for the latter were considered more dangerous as neighbours. The Portuguese became uneasy if the Nayakas settled their differences with Bijapur and began to gain greater strength in other quarters. They also did not hesitate to aid the revolting feudatories of the Nayakas with a view to keep the latter engaged and weak. Under the rule of a strong Nayaka the Portuguese had no opportunity to carry on as they pleased in Kanara, particularly in commercial matters. Such a strong Nayaka certainly desired to share commercial benefits with the Portuguese by raising the price of articles of trade of Kanara or by levying additional imposts on sales and purchases and on imports and exports.

The Portuguese built their fortresses in Kanara in 1568-9. The time chosen for the purpose is noteworthy. It was about three years after the battle of Talikote where the glory and the might of the Vijayanagara Empire had departed. The successors of Rama Raja, who was defeated and killed in the battle field, became fugitives and many of their vassals declared themselves independent. It was a period of confusion within the Empire and the Portuguese successfully fished in the troubled waters. To be sure, they desired to have at least one fortress in Kanara right from 1505. One was actually built in Anjediva that year; but Anjediva was virtually nobody's land then and, besides, in the following year the fortress was destroyed. The Portuguese then tried to get a site in Bhatkal

by negotiations; but failed. Probably they did not dare to capture or establish by force any fortress in Kanara as long as the Vijayanagara Empire was united and powerful.

In fact the Portuguese followed an opportunistic policy in Kanara. They were always ready to exploit the weakness of the Kanarese chiefs and to benefit from the internal revolts and confusions. If the people of Basrur needed Portuguese aid, the latter would endeavour to get pepper from the former at nearly half the market rate and to ensure many other privileges. If there were revolts within the kingdom of Ikkeri or if the latter was attacked from outside, the Portuguese would encourage the rebels and try at the same time to acquire additional lands or fortresses or ~~privileges~~ privileges for themselves.

One of the redeeming features of the Portuguese policy in Kanara was their staunch loyalty to one of their allies, namely, the Bangar chief. No doubt they were motivated by their own interests; nevertheless, many a time they aided him with great risk to themselves. The chief had given them on his own accord a site in Mangalore to build their fortress in 1568, besides giving them many other concessions. Ever since then he was considered a friend and brother-in-arms to the king of Portugal. In due course he was aided against the chiefs of Ullala and the Nayakas of Ikkeri. In their battle with Venkatappa, waged on behalf of the Bangar chief, they suffered a good deal of loss in men and materials. Later on, when the chief lost everything inspite of their help, they did their best for him to secure the most favourable terms possible by means of a treaty with the Nayaka. The king of Portugal did not fail to instruct his Viceroy and Governors to restore the kingdom of Bangher to its chief, whenever an opportunity arose, by waging a war against the Nayakas.

Another feature of the Portuguese policy in Kanara was their application of whatever political hold they had in Kanara to the service of Christianity by protecting Christians and missionaries in the region. This was particularly

true of the 17th and the 18th centuries when there was a considerable number of Christians and churches in Kanara. The treaties between the Portuguese and the Nayakas of Ikkeri included provisions, as we have seen, to secure the freedom of movement for missionaries, the right to build churches at different places, the privilege for Christians not to be under the legal system of the Nayakas but of the Portuguese, and so on. If the Nayakas imprisoned priests or imposed restrictions on Christians, the Portuguese did not hesitate to threaten hostilities against the Nayakas. Whenever any Kanarese was converted to Christianity, full Portuguese support was given to the convert to secure for him his property which, sometimes, the relatives of the convert endeavoured to deprive him of.

Kanara became a granary for the Portuguese. Most of the rice required by them for sustaining Goa and other possessions like Ormus came from the lands of Kanara. Some times they secured it from the north, that is, from the Konkan and Gujarat; but it was difficult to do so particularly in the 17th and the 18th centuries on account of one or another hostile power there like the Dutch or the Adil Shahis of Bijapur or the Marathas. Their dependence on the Kanarese rice shaped their relations with the rulers of the region. Many a time they had an ardent desire to commence hostilities against the Nayakas of Ikkeri or to give open assistance against the latter; but the fear that the rice supplies would be stopped from the lands of Kanara restrained them. Some times they opened hostilities and made brave efforts to secure rice from the north; but generally it ended in scarcity in Goa and other places under their control.

APPENDICES

I

Pa o Rey do Canará

18.5.1699.

Tenho escrito a V. A. q para Septembro mandaria Armada contra os Siuagis q tinhão tomado o Ilheo de onor por não poder hir a tempo q V. A. o pedia pello não ter para se poder recolher a respeito da inuernada e q nella não poderia fazer os ditos Siuagis nenhum danno como a experiencia o mostrou na facillidade com q o largarão desta minha boa vontade Uzou tão mal o Governador desse Canara q diz q hade destrohir as Igrejas dos christãos; e pagarçé das Pareas q entregou para este Estado q sendo tão pouco para o q deuia q uinha ser nada. Como tão bem manda ao Rendr<sup>o</sup> q não cobraçe as Lagimas q pertence a feit<sup>r</sup>a de Mag. de e este Estado hé tão poderozo, e as parias, e as Lagimas hé couza tão pouca q lhe não serue de nada; e V. A. tem mais Lucro com o ouro q de cá vay pera a compra dos arros como a experiencia o tem mostrado, e assy mais conuē ter amizade (com) este Estado do q elle com o Canará, e se V. A. não dersatir façao do mao trato q tem dado aos Portuguezes (vassa)llos del Rey meu Snōr, e das Lagimas, e parias sabera este Estado tomada como conuē, e juntamente m.dar V. A. Inuiado ao Siuagi Inimigo do mesmo Estado sem me fazer sabedor o q ueo a minha prez.ça e eu não reprezei por minha gradeza (sic); espero reposta desta carta com toda a breuidade para me rezolver do q mais conuir a seruïço del Rey meu snōr. V. A. concedere este ponto, e depois não se queixem seus Vassallos da perda q sucederē e seja V. A. seruido de me entregar hum Vicente Roíz q foi lingoa da feitoria de Mangalor q hé o q anda fazendo estas trapaças e juntamente a comunicação q V. A. tem com os Arabies inimigos deste Estado correndosce incobertamente com elles q estas e outras couzas faz mostrar a pouca amizade, e fedellidade q tem cō este Estado principalm. te o. Ministro q governa: espero q V. A. me de toda satisfaçao, e tão bem da detença q fez a Armada nesse porto sem na carregar a tempo q foi couza de todo este des-



mancho Deus alumie a V. A. em sua diuina graça Goa 18 de Mayo de 699 Antonio  
Luiz da Camara Couttº.

- LCC, I, 1698-1720, fl. 3

(Translation)

18.5.1699.

To the King of Kanara

I have written to Your Highness that by September I would send the Navy against the Marathas who have taken the Island of Honavar, it being impossible (for the navy) to go at the time when Your Highness sought for it, as it was impossible to return on account of the monsoon; and that in the (monsoon) the Marathas would not be able to cause any damage, as the experience showed it in the ease with which they left it (the island). The Governor of Kanara (Mangalore) maltreated my good will so much that he says that the churches of the Christians should be destroyed; and (regarding) the payment of the Tributes which you entrusted for this State, (he says) that the due, being so small, comes to nothing; so also he commanded the Farmer of revenues that he should not collect the import & export duties which belonged to the factory of (His) Majesty (king of Portugal); and (he says) that this State is so powerful and the tribute and the import & export duties are such a small thing that it serves (the State) little. And Your Highness has much profit from the gold which goes from here for the purchase of rice, as the experience has demonstrated it; and thus it is more advantageous (for you) to have friendship (with) the State than for it with Kanara (you); and if Your Highness do not desist from the maltreatment which you have meeted out to the Portuguese, the vassals of the king, my lord, and (from the maltreatment regarding) the import & export duties and the tributes, this State would know what it should do; and at the same time, Your Highness send an <sup>envoy</sup> ~~anvay~~ to the Maratha

king, enemy of the State, without informing me; the envoy came to my presence and I did not arrest (him) owing to my greatness. I expect a reply to this letter with all brevity to enable me to decide what would suit more to the service of the king, my lord. Your Highness may consider this point and afterwards your vassals may not complain of the loss that may ensue. Your Highness may do me the service of handing over one Vicente Rodrigues, who was the interpreter of the factory of Mangalore, who it is who goes on communicating these frauds and the correspondence which Your Highness have with the Arabs, enemies of this State, dealing with them secretly. These and other things serve to demonstrate the little friendship and fidelity which you have towards this State; especially (the little friendship and fidelity of) the Minister who commands. I hope that Your Highness will give me all satisfaction and also (satisfaction) of the delay which the Navy experienced at the port without being loaded in time which was the cause of all this damage. May God enlighten Your Highness with his Divine Grace.  
Goa, 18 May, 1699. Antonio Luis Gonçalvez da Camara Coutinho.

II

29.1.1700.

Pa o Rey do Canará

Recebi a Carta q V. A. me mandou em reposta da que lhe escrevey quando mandey para esses portos do Canará a Armada deste estado. Pella qual uejo ter V. A. satisfeito as instancias da minha rezão em mandar leuantar os juncões e o tributo do mantimento e sal e juntamente haverse satisfeito o arros q se estava deuendo e desempedido o porto de onor para delle trazer os mastros que por ordem da faz<sup>a</sup> real se tinhão comprado para ~~enfim~~ a ribeira das naos desta Cidade. Cujo termo <sup>coração</sup> e rezolução não duuidey nunca de que V. A. assý o executasse, porque a ~~corrodação~~ da nossa amizade e as capitulações das pazes contrahidas entre V. A. e este estado

não permite se falte a observação deste acordo. Porem proximamente me acho com muitos motiuos de escandalo de se faltarẽ com .....algūas condições do dito tratado da paz, sendo a mais essencial a de admitir V. A. nos seus portos os maiores Inimigos, q̄ tem este estado como são os Arabios dandolhe comercio franco e juntamente concentimento para cometerẽ hum crime tão escandaloso como foi o de roubarẽ e jucumarẽ a Igreja. E a vista de hum excesso tão estupendo como este me acho obrigado a dizer a V. A. que pella sua conta corre darne satisfação delle com mandar entregar os ditos Arabios e não admitir mais nenhun's nesses portos por que de se o bravo contro podera receber V. A. mayor prejuizo com a cauza q̄ me da em alterar a capitulação das pazes com a corrolação e correspondencia q̄ tem com os Inimigos deste estado sem aduertir que com elle se deue tratar como amigos de amigos e inimigos de inimigos; e se V. A. assy o fizer como espero q̄ assy o fara he certo q̄ sempre hade achar muito prompto o meu animo p̄a o socorrer e defender de todos os inimigos que ententarẽ fazerlhe nesses portos o menor perjuizo por que em todo o tempo heide procurar de soprimilo com as Armadas deste estado assim como fiz este anno e ainda com mayor uentagẽ pedindo esta a necessid.e da occazião: a queixa q̄ V. A. me faz do Cap.m Mor da Armada he muy alhea de toda a rezão, por q̄ nas mãos da V. A. esta o remedio della e este se reduza a não premitir V. A. que os barcos Arabios não carregue de arros nos seus portos; nem tão pouco.....os dos vassalos de V. A. p̄a nelles leuarẽ p̄a Mascate o dito arros;  
.....  
q̄ V. A. com pretextos pingidos fauorecia mais as conuencencias dos Arabios q̄ dos deste estº e faltaua a fe da palaura real e aj.ta correspondencia q̄ deue ter com Mag.de del Rey meu Sr. e congeuentm.te com todos os seus vassalos; Porem a nada deste douintro credito, porq̄ suponho que todas estas desorden's procederão da ambiçao de algun's Ministros de V. A. E espero q̄ a todos estes particulares me de V. A. tão equal satisfação q̄ com ella se aumente mais a nossa amizade, por ser isto o q̄ so conuē a V. A. De.s guie e lumie a V. A. em sua diuina graça,

Goa 29 de Jan. ro de 1700.

- LCC, I, 1698-1720, fl. 9.

(Translation)

29.1.1700.

To the King of Kanara.

I received the letter which Your Highness sent to me in reply to that which I wrote to you when I sent the Navy of this State to those ports of Kanara. In which (your letter) I see Your Highness to have satisfied the instances of my cause by commanding to raise the tolls and the tribute of food-grains and salt, and simultaneously to have satisfied the rice (tribute) which was due and (to have rendered) the port of Honavar unimpeded to bring from there the masts which, by the order of the royal treasury, had been purchased for the shipyard of this City (of Goa). I never doubted that Your Highness would thus implement your term(s) and resolution, because the affection of our friendship and the provisions of the peace (treaty) concluded between Your Highness and this State do not permit the want of observation of this accord. However, side by side I find many causes of the scandal of unfulfilling .....some conditions of the said treaty of peace, the most essential being Your Highness admitting in your ports the greatest enemies of this State, as the Arabs are, giving them open commerce and simultaneously (giving them) consent to commit a crime so scandalous as it was to rob and damage a church. And in view of an excess so stupendous as this I am obliged to tell Your Highness that you are responsible to give me satisfaction for it by commanding to hand over the said Arabs and not to admit any one any more into those ports because if I find the savage(s), Your Highness may receive great damage with the cause it may give me to alter the provision of the peace (treaty) in view of the correlation and communication which you have with the Enemies of

this State without warning, whereas you ought to treat the friends (of the State) as friends and (its) enemies (as) enemies; and if Your Highness carry on in this way (as per the treaty), as I hope that you will do so, it is certain that you would find my enthusiasm very prompt to succour and defend from all the enemies who might intend to cause you in those ports the slightest damage, because at all times I would ensure the suppression (of enemies) with the fleets of this State just as I did this year, and with still more advantage (when you would be) requesting it on the necessity of the occasion. The complaint which Your Highness make to me of the Captain-Major of the Navy is very strange to all reason, because in the hands of Your Highness lies the remedy (of the complaint); and it boils down to Your Highness not permitting the Arab vessels to load rice at your ports; nor so little.... those of the vassals of Your Highness in order to take in them the said rice to Mascat; .....

.....  
that Your Highness, with <sup>lame</sup> ~~pingides~~ excuses favoured more the cause of the Arabs than that of this State and did not keep the royal promise and just correspondence which (you) ought to have with the Majesty, the king, my lord, and consequently with all his ~~wild~~ vassals; however, I do not give credit to any of this, ~~doubtless~~ (<sup>full</sup>) because I suppose that all these disorders resulted from the ambition of some Ministers of Your Highness. And I expect that Your Highness will give such a <sup>just</sup> satisfaction to all these particulars that with it improves (all the) more our friendship; to be so alone suits Your Highness. May God guide and enlighten Your Highness with his divine grace. Goa, 29 January, 1700.

III

31.1.1727.

Para o Regente do Reino do Canará Nirua Naya Nauaru.

Recebo a carta de v. m. estimando as nouas da sua saude.

A minha tenção tambem he conseruar a amizade deste Estado com esse Reino, mas tão bem de não consentir de quebrante as pazes ultimamente ajustadas, e como nestas em que está assinado por seu Embaxador (de) El Rey do Canara, e sejão as condições de que os barcos do dito Rey, que quiserem cartazes para buscar Caualos, se lhe dará sómente para dous nesta secretr<sup>a</sup> liures de dereitos, e que os mais que uierem com elles ainda que tragão cartas, serão julgados por presas, em cujos termos se procedeo contra o barco Issouary da mesma forma, que se tinha feito outras veses, ainda com o mesmo barco, e supposto tomei a resolução de o querer restituir a v. m. sem carga, a não deu tomar de lhe entregar a que trazia; e esta resolução he que auisei a v. m., de que me não heide mudar.

O Barco vai <sup>em</sup> companhia da Armada, e quando v.m. não tome as resoluções conuenientes, seruivá de o acompanhar, quando se ouuer de recolher. Não se me offerece mais. Nossa s.r etc. Goa. 31 de Janr<sup>o</sup> de 1727. João de Saldanha da Gama.

- LRV, No. 7, fl. 42.

(Translation)

To the Regent of the kingdom of Kanara, Nirvanayyanavaru. 31.1.1727.

I am in receipt of the letter of your majesty, esteeming the news of your health.

My intention too is to preserve the friendship of this State with that kingdom, and also not to consent the violation of the peace (treaty) lately concluded, as it is signed by the ambassador (of) the king of Kanara; and the conditions are that the vessels of the said king, which wanted passports in order to fetch horses, shall be given only for two at this secretariat, free of fees, and that the others (vessels) which came with them ~~shall~~ shall be considered captives even though they may bring passports; in contradiction to which terms proceeded the vessel Ishwary in the same way as she had done at other times; though it was the same vessel and

though I took the decision of desiring to restitute to your majesty without the cargo, I ought not to take (the decision) of handing over what it brought; and this decision is what I informed your majesty, which I ought not to change.

The vessel goes along with the Navy; and as long as your majesty do not take proper decisions, it (the vessel) will serve to accompany (the navy) when the latter has to return (to Goa). You offer me nothing more (than taking proper decisions). Our Lord etc. Goa, 31 January, 1727. João de Saldanha da Gama.

IV

(Extract)

31.1.1727

Pá o Feitor de Mangalor Mathias Roíz chaves

Recebo a uossa carta com a do regente do Canara, e supposto que elle me diz que não quer o barco, sem os cauallos, e a carga assim me parece o mandalo; e no cazo que não aceite me auizareis com tal promptidão, que eu possa cuidar no castigo que elle merecer, quando não consinta que se tira o arros e no rem<sup>o</sup> com que deuo suprir esta falta.

Goa 31 de Janr<sup>o</sup> de 1727 João de Sald<sup>a</sup> da Gama.

—LRV, No. 7, fl. 42.

(Translation)

31.1.1727.

To the Factor of Mangalore, Mathias Rodrigues Chaves.

I am in receipt of your letter with that of the Regent of Kanara; and granted that he tells me that he does not want the vessel without the horses and the cargo, methinks to send it in this way (without the horses and the cargo); in case he does not accept, you shall let me know with promptitude, so that I can think of the punishment which he deserves; and when he does not consent that rice be taken (I can think) of the remedy with which I have to make up the shortage.

Goa, 31 January, 1727, João de Saldanha da Gama.

V

26.12.1747.

Para o Rey Canará

Recebi a carta de V. A. a tempo que já por duas vezes tenho mandado huma  
náu com huma Palla a essa costa, e agora ultimamente mandey outra náu, e varias  
galveitas de guerra a fim de franquear o commercio, e de sopremir os portos de  
V. A., mas primitame que lhe diga que não hé igoal a correspondencia que este  
Estado experimenta com alguns dos Governadores dos portos de V. A. e que importa  
que eu mande embarcações para essa costa se os Governadores dos portos de V. A.  
dão nelles abrigo aos inimigos deste Estado, como ultimamente sucedeo em onor  
aonde se acolherão duas galveitas do Bounçuló para perturbar os mercadores que  
que vinhão a Goa com a sua fazenda deffendendo-as o dito Governador de sorte que  
lhe tirou os mastros, e artelharia, e mandou dizer a Ismal can que hia com cinco  
galveitas do Estado que as que se achavão naquelle porto erão do Melondim, e não  
do Bounçuló constando o contrario, e assim espero que V. A. castigue o dito Gov-  
ernador, para que não susceda o mesmo com outros Governadores.

Se o anno passado experimentou o porto de Mangalor a invazão do Angria, foi  
por me ver occupado em Rery, e espero que este anno não tenha o mesmo atreuimento,  
e se a nossa Feitrá não fora aberto, e se pudesse nella recolher gente que deffend-  
esse o porto, tal vez que o Angria se não atreuesse a entrar, mas na forma em que  
se acha necessariamente se hade desemparar quando vier qualquer inimigo por não ter  
com que se deffender. Deos alumie a V. A. em a sua Diuina graça. Goa 26 de Deze-  
mbro de 1747. Marquês de Castello Novo.

(Translation)

26.12.1747.

To the King (of) Kanara.

I received the letter of Your Highness at the time when I have already sent twice one ship with a palla to that coast, and now have sent lately another ship and various galliots of war in order to free the commerce and to suppress the ports of Your Highness; but allow me to tell you that the retaliation is not equal to what this State experiences with some of the Governors of the ports of Your Highness; and it means that I send embankments to that coast if the Governors of the ports of Your Highness give in them entrance to the enemies of this State, as it lately happened in Honavar where two galliots of Bhonsle gathered in order to perturb the merchants who might come to Goa with their goods, the said Governor defending them in such a way that they took masts and artillery. He sent words to Ismail Khan, who went there with five galliots of the State, that those which were found in that port were of Melondin, and not of Bhonsle, the contrary being the case. So, I expect that Your Highness shall punish the said Governor so that the same thing will not occur in case of other Governors.

If in the last year the port of Mangalore experienced the invasion of the Angria, it was because I was found occupied in Rery (Raigad). I hope that this year he may not have the same impudence. If our Factory were not open, and if the men who defended the port could take position in it, perhaps the Angria would not dare to enter it; but in the state in which it is found, necessarily it has to give in when any enemy comes, by not having (the means) with which to defend. May God enlighten Your Highness with his Divine grace. Goa, 26 December, 1747.

Marquês de Castelo Novo.

VI

4.1.1748.

Para o Feitor e Gov.or de Mangalore José Antunes Branco.

Recebi a carta do Feitor e Gov.or de Mangalor José Antunes Branco de 19 de Dezembro, e estimo m,to que esses gentios ficassem satisfeitos com a entrega do barco, eu hé que não tenho lugar (de ser) contestar do Governador desta costa do Canará por que o Governador de Onor esta dando abrigo ao Bounsuló para que se recolher nos seus portos para atacar as nossas embarcações, tanto assim que represando o Ismal can as duas galveitas que per ahi andavão as quiz defender o Gov.or de Onor dizendo que erão de Melondim, e como não pode conseguir lhe tirou os mastros, e artelharia, e recolheo a gente em terra, a q.l pelos avizos que tenho me dizem que andão e me dou tones que comprarão continuando o corso.

O Rey do Canará me escreveo aqui por hum patamar pedindome embarcações contra o Angria que temia fizesse algúia entrada como o anno passado. Eu lhe respondi que em nenhum anno se anticiparão tanto as nossas embarcações como neste pois já tinha (m)andado húa fragata e húa pala e varias manchus, e autualmente andavão lá húa fragata, mas que não havia couza mais extranha como pedirme elle ajuda contra os seus inimigos estando elle dando bom acolhimento aos meus, e juntamente são seus, e me queixava amargamente de Governador de onor pedindo lhe que o castigasse.

Se o Rey ahi estiver lhe fara o Feitor hua (sic) grande queixa sobre isso, e lhe dirá que se não puzer toda a emmenda que eu estou na rezolução de atacar o Bounsuló em qualquer porto q estiver e se ahi não estiver o Feitor e Gov.or escreverá nesta mesma forma ao dº Rey.

Tambem me vali desta occazião em que elle se lamentava da entrada q o Angria fez o anno passado em Mangalor, e lhe dizia que a culpa era sua, porque a nossa Feitoria adonde a gente se podia ser forte para embaraçar a entrada do inimigo, e estava por seu gosto aberta, e sem deffença e que sobre isso consideraria elle o que lhe convinha.

Tambem me avizão dessas partes que o Angria andava fabricando huma Feitr<sup>a</sup> em Ramataly, o Feitor e Gov.or averigoará logo esta materia com todo o cuidado e achando ser certa se queixará tbem disto ao Rey p.l que o não embaraça e me fará prompto avizo para eu tomar a determinação que me parecer, e remetera logo a resposta da carta que me remeteo Domingos Roiz. N. Sr. etc. Goa 4 de Janr<sup>a</sup> de 1748.

Marquês de Castello novo.

- LCC, II, fls. 11-2.

(Translation)

4.1.1748.

To the Factor and Governor of Mangalore, José Antunes Branco.

I received the letter of the Factor and Governor of Mangalore, José Antunes Branco, of 19 December and I appreciate much that those people should be satisfied with the delivery of the barque. I am the one who has the occasion to contend with the Lord of that coast of Kanara, because the Governor of Honavar is giving shelter to Bhonsle in order to gather in his ports to attack our embarkations, so much so that on Ismail Khan repressing the two galliots that moved about there, the Governor wanted to defend them, saying that they were of Malvan, and as he (Ismail Khan) could not prevail upon (the Governor) they took from (the port) masts and artillery and the men gathered on the land, who, through the news I have from those who move about and give me information, continue the piracy.

The King of Kanara wrote to me here through a messenger, asking me embarkations against the Angria who, he feared, might make an incursion as in the last year. I responded to him that in no year did our embarkations anticipate so much as in this, because I had already dispatched there a frigate and a palla and various manchuas. Actually there navigates one frigate. However, there was no stranger a thing than he asking me aid against his enemies (when) he is giving good shelter to mine, who are also his at the same time. I complained bitterly of the Governor of Honavar, requesting him that he should punish him.

If the King is there, the Factor shall make to him a strong complaint about this and shall tell him that unless everything is set right, I am determined to attack the Bhonsle in whichever port he might be; and if he (the king) is not there, the Factor and Governor shall write in the same form to the said king.

Also, I availed of the occasion when he lamented the incursion which the Angria effected in the last year into Mangalore, to tell him that the fault was his, because our Factory, from where the men could be effective to embarrass the entry of the enemy, was open on his own accord and without defence; and that in respect of this he should consider what suited him.

Also, they inform me from those parts that the Angria is erecting a factory in Ramataly (?). The Factor and Governor shall immediately investigate this matter with every care and, finding it true, shall complain of this also to the king so that it does not embarrass. You shall inform me promptly so that I may take a decision that I may think of and you shall immediately remit the reply of the letter which Domingos Rodrigues remitted to me. Our Lord etc. Goa, 4 January, 1748. Marquês de Castelo Novo.

VII

4.11.1748.

Para o Rey Canará.

Recebo a carta de V. A. pella qual vejo me recomenda a amizade que este Estado sempre conseruou desde o tempo antigo com os Reys do Canará e não me era necessaria esta aduertencia porque a tenho muito presente na minha memoria, deuo porem dizer lhe que para ser perpetua a amizade entre douis amigos deve ser igoalmente correspondida de ambas as partes. Da minha não pode V. A. ter nenhūa razão de queixa, nem a que V. A. faz de não tirem as minhas embarcaçoens mais cedo aos seus Portos havera douis annos, tem fundamento nenhum porque bem notorio seria V. A. que neste tempo me achaua ocupado em castigar ao Bounsole que tambem era inimigo de V. A.,

derrotando lhe a sua armada em Aromdem e tomndo lhe Tiracol, e Rery, e se neste tempo se aproproueitou o Angria para fazer inuazão em Mangalor, deuo dizer lhe que cada hum está obrigado primeiro que tudo a defender a sua propria caza, e dar tempo aos seus amigos a que o possa socorrer, pois pellas capitulaçõens da paz, não sou obrigado a ter todo o anno húa armada nos Portos da V. A., e só o deuo fazer em tempo competente, quando os inimigos mo não embaracem por outra parte, e se V. A. tem os seus Portos de sorte que dez ou doze galuetas basta para os insultarem, não hé isso culpa minha. Diz V. A. que a cauza principal da inuazão do Angria foi por não hauer fortificação na Feitoria Portugueza, e que por esta cauza se facilitou a entrada do Angria em Mangalor. Esta mesma concederaçao se fez por parte do Estado há muitos annos, e uirtude della se reprezentou o perigo a que estaua exposto o Porto de Mangalor, e nunca a corte de Bedrul attendeo à este perigo, antes suscederão as discordias que a V. A. serão presentes no tempo do Feitor Antonio Aique Pedro quando quiz pôr a Feitoria com algúâ deffença. O anno passado quando V. A. foi ~~visitando~~ os seus Portos do mar lhe fiz repreentar isto mesmo pello Feitor José Antunes Branco, e parecendo que V. A. se capacitaua da rezão, não deo prouidencia nenhúa a esta materia, nem tão pouco a deo a outras tres propoziçõens que lhe fez o mesmo Feitor: a primeira sobre as lagimas que se deuia tra(ta)das: a segunda, sobre se poderem leuantar as Igrejas de nossa santa Religião na mesma conformidade que se estabaleceo pella paz, a terceira, pagarem as bangaçaes os direitos que sempre pagarão, por que inda que V. A. sobre esta capº diz que os direitos dos ditos bangaçaes não importão quazi nada por isso mesmo não deuia alterar o costume e visto eu lhe não pedir nada mais do que está ajustado, e não sei a que possa atrebuir mandar V. A. a ordem ao Governador de Mangalor que pagasse estes direitos, e tornar logo a mandar lhe ordem para que os não pagasse, e semelhantes couzas não se uzão quando se quer conseruar a amizade; e assim espero que V. A. me responda logo sobre os quatro pontos asima declarados, e que se serua de se lembrar o que sobre elles está ajustado nas capitulaçõens da paz, que hé só o que pertendo, por que sentirei e ter me obrigado

quando mandar a minha armada a essa costa a deffender os seus ~~Rombesemponyew~~  
Portos empregala em me fazer justiça dar sem rezoens que se me fazem. Deos  
alumie a V. A. em a sua Diuina graça. Goa 4 de Novembro de 1748. Marquez de  
Alorna.

- LCC, II, fls. 24-5.

(Translation)

4.11.1748.

To the King (of) Kanara.

I am in receipt of the letter of Your Highness in which you recommend to me the friendship which this State always preserved with the kings of Kanara from olden days. This observation was not necessary, for I have it much in my memory. I should tell you, however, that the friendship between two friends, in order to be perpetual, should be equally reciprocal on each other's part. Of mine, Your Highness cannot have any cause to complain. Nor does the complaint, which Your Highness make regarding my embarkations not going out sooner (than they did) to your ports about two years ago, have any foundation, for it should be well known to Your Highness that I was found occupied then in chastising the Bhonsle, who was the enemy of Your Highness too, defeating his fleet in Aromdem (?) and taking from him Tiracol and Raigad. The Angria took advantage of the time to invade Mangalore. I ought to tell you that every one is obliged, first of all, to defend one's own house and (then) give time to one's friends whom he can help. Then, by the provisions of the peace (treaty), I am not obliged to have a fleet at the ports of ~~Mangalore~~ Your Highness throughout the year; I ought to have only at the due moment, when the enemies do not embarrass me on another side. If Your Highness ~~now~~ have your ports in such a manner that ten or twelve galliots suffice to damage them, it is not my ~~own~~ fault. Your Highness say that the principal cause

of the Angria's invasion was not to have had fortification at the Portuguese factory and that this situation facilitated the Angria's incursion into Mangalore. On the part of the State, this very consideration was held for several years and by virtue of it the danger to which the port of Mangalore was exposed was represented; but the court of Bednur never attended to this danger. On the contrary, dissensions followed, as Your Highness might remember, in the days of the Factor, Antonio Aique Pedro, when he wished to put the factory with some defence. Last year, when ~~Mangal~~ Your Highness visited your sea ports, this very thing was represented to you by the Factor, José Antunes Branco, thinking that Your Highness would listen to reason; but you did not take any measures in this respect; nor regarding the three other propositions which the very Factor made to you: the first, concerning the import & export duties which were due as per the treaty; the second, concerning the erection of churches of our holy Religion in conformity with the established provision of the peace (treaty); the third, the timber yards should pay the duties which they always paid; even though Your Highness say, in respect of this (last) provision, that the duties of the said timber yards come virtually to nothing, you should not change the custom for this reason. Seeing that I ask from you nothing more than what has been agreed upon, I do not know to what can be attributed Your Highness's sending command to the Governor of Mangalore that he should pay these duties and soon after send him the order not to pay them. Such things are not taken recourse to while desiring to conserve friendship. Thus, I hope that Your Highness will reply me soon concerning the four points declared above and that you will recall what has been agreed upon them in the provisions of the peace (treaty), which alone is what I intend (to be observed). I shall be sorry to have me compelled to send my fleet to that coast in order to employ it to have justice done, without giving reasons that I may have. May God enlighten Your Highness with his Divine Grace. Goa, 4 November, 1748. Marquês de Alorna.

VIII

27.11.1749.

Pa o Rey do Canará

Muito sinti a noticia que me mandou o Feitor José Antunes Branco de que o Angria fizera nova insulto a Mangalor, e não me admirei do seu atreuimento porque sempre q̄ elle achar a porta aberta como he Ladrão de porfissão hade entrar por ella, e isto mesmo o convida a que torne m.tas vezes com ~~prudencia~~ perjuizo assim de V. A. como dos seus vassalos, e dos mercadores que concorrem aquelle Porto, e como seu intento seja ter algum Porto no sul de donde possa fazer o corsso com mais comodo, quem sabe se hum dia lhe dará vontade de estabalerse mais Firmemente em Mangalore, o que será de peyores consenquencias.

Haverá ~~mais~~ dous annos quando o Angria fez semelhante insulto a Mangalor me escreveo V. A. queixandosse de que eu não tinha a minha armada para deffender esse Porto e eu lhe respondi que eu estava cõ húa guerra aberta assim com o Bou-nsulo, como com o mesmo Angria, e era precizo deffender primrº a minha casa, e ~~acudir~~ acodir depois aos amigos como pudesse e que era couzadura que V. A. que tinha obrigaçāo de deffender a sua propria terra a abandonasse, e não tinha força para a deffender e querer que sobre este Estado .....da sua deffença, sem tão pouco querer ajudar ao mesmo Estado a mesma deffença, pois tbem na primeira occazião que o Angria foi a Mangalor escrevi a V. A. que não importava que a Feitoria tivesse artelharia, se por toda a parte estava aberta, e se não podia deffender, e agora nesta, segunda occazião se vio palpavelmente porque a artelharia que jogava para o mar embaraçou por hum espaço que entrassem as galveitas p<sup>a</sup> dentro, mas como o Angria venha por terra, e os vassalos de V. A. não quererão acudir a Feitoria para a deffender que hé o que se podia fazer senão abandonala, e nestes termos pode ser que me rezolva a mandar retirar toda a arte-lharia por não estar sofrendo todos os dias este insulto do Angria nem as queixas de V. A. e desse povo, e se por hora surpendo esta dellig.ca he por esperar a

reposta de V. A. e ver a sua determinação, porque eu desejará como bom amigo seu contrebuir quanto pudesse para a deffença de seu Pais, e dos seus vassalos, mas isto não desobriga a V. A. para que faça da sua parte para deffendelos tbem, pois lhe incumbe esta obregação primr<sup>o</sup> do que a mim.

Eu não tenho empenho nenhum em fortificar a Feitoria porque o de que me serveria hé a representarme a despesa ... V. A. toca lhe m.to mais que esse Porto .....m.to eniuloado dos inimigos. Nesta materia tomará V. A. a rezolução que lhe parecer, que para mim qualquer será indifferent, e só desejaré ter m.tas occasioens em que lhe mostre a grande vont.e que tenho de servillo e deffender os seus vassalos, e conservar sempre hua fiel amizade. Deos alumie a V. A. com a sua diuina graça. Goa 27 de Nour<sup>o</sup> de 1749. Marquês de Alorna.

- LCC, II, fls. 39-40.

(Translation)

27.11.1749.

To the King of Kanara.

I felt very sorry at the news which the Factor, José Antunes Branco, sent me that the Angria committed a fresh aggression on Mangalore. I was not astonished at his boldness, because whenever he finds the door open, he has to enter through it, as he is a thief by profession, and this very factor (of the door being open) invites him to return to it many times, with damage to Your Highness as well as to your subjects, and to the merchants who gather at that port. As his intention may be to have a port in the south from where he can commit piracy with more convenience, who knows if he wills to establish himself more firmly in Mangalore one day, which will be of worse consequences.

About two years ago, when the Angria did similar damage to Mangalore, Your Highness wrote to me, complaining that I did not have my fleet to defend that port. And I replied to you that I was engaged in a war opened against Bhonsle

as well as against the very Angria. It was necessary to defend my house first and help the friends afterwards as I could; this was the cause that Your Highness, who had the obligation to defend your own land, abandoned it. I did not have the force to defend it and to wish that upon this State ..... its defence, without wishing even a little to aid the very State with the very defence. On the first occasion also, when the Angria attacked Mangalore, I wrote to Your Highness that it did not matter that the Factory had artillery, if it was open on all sides, and it could not be defended. Now, on this second occasion, he came obviously because the artillery which fired towards the sea embarrassed for a while (only) as the galliots entered inside; but as the Angria came by land and the subjects of Your Highness did not wish to assist the Factory to defend, which is what could be done without abandoning it. On these considerations, it may be that I may decide to command to remove all the artillery in order not to be suffering every day this attack of the Angria and the complaints of Your Highness and of those people. And if I suppress this course of action for the time being, it is to expect the reply of Your Highness and see your decision, because I shall, as your good friend, wish to contribute whatever is possible to the defence of your country and of your subjects; but this does not free Your Highness from what you should do on your part also to defend them, because this obligation is incumbent more on you than on me.

I have no desire at all to fortify the Factory, because what it should serve me is to augment the expense .....  
..... Your Highness may take, in this matter, whatever decision you may think of, which will, whatever it is, be of indifference to me. I shall only desire to have many occasions in which to show you the great willingness which I have to serve you and to defend your subjects, and to preserve for ever a loyal friendship. May God enlighten Your Highness with his Divine grace. Goa,  
27 November, 1749. Marquês de Alorna.

IX

(Extract)

14.12.1749.

Para Tulaji Angria Sarquel.

Por mão de estimado Ismalgi Nacoa recebi a carta de v. m. quando menos o esperava porque quando estavamos tratando com boa e fiel amizade e pertendendo v. m. estreitala com o Est<sup>o</sup> para conseguir melhor o fim que deseja do inimigo comum o Bounsoló, que me poderia crer que v. m. fosse sobre o porto de Mangalor aonde se acha húa Fortaleza Portugueza obrigada a deffendela pelos Tratados da paz com o Rey de Canará e roubar naquelle porto tudo quanto se achava no (Pataxo de Phelippe de) valadares, e a húa manchua de guerra que tinha ficado nelle este Inverno: isto me persuadio que v. m. não queria a paz, pois nos tratava como inimigos, e se assim não hé diga me v. m. o effeito que posso esperar desta paz q v. m. pertende a vista de sucesso semelhante, o que suposto se a cazo elle foi feito contra a ordem de v. m., para me persuadir a isso hé precizo que v. m. mande restituir o q naquelle porto se tomou no dito Pataxo de Phelippe de valadares, como constado rol incluzo e húa ancora e ancorote, com o mais que se roubou na manchua de guerra.

.....

Goa, 14 de Dez. ro de 1749, Marquês de Alorna.

-LRV, No. 12, fls. 232-3.

(Translation)

14.12.1749.

To Tulaji Angria Sarquel.

Through the esteemed hand of Ismailji Nacoa, I received the letter of Your Majesty, when I least expected him, because while we were negotiating for a good and loyal friendship and Your Majesty were intending to press upon this State in order to better succeed in the object which you have against the common enemy,

Bhonsle, how could I believe that Your Majesty would attack the port of Mangalore, where one comes across a Portuguese fortress, obliged to be defended on account of a treaty of peace with the king of Kanara, and (you would) rob at the port whatever was found in the (pataxo of Philip de) Valadares and an embarkation of war which was anchored there this winter ? This convinced me that Your Majesty did not desire peace but treated us as enemies. If it is not so, Your Majesty may please tell me the effect which I can expect from this peace, which Your Majesty intend, at such a happening. If it is supposed that it was done contrary to the order of Your Majesty, it is necessary in order to convince me, that Your Majesty order to restore what was taken at that port from the said pataxo of Philip de Valadares, as contained in the enclosed list; and an anchor and a small anchor, along with the other things which were robbed from the embarkation of war.

.....

Goa, 14 December, 1749, Marquês de Alorna.

X

Pa o Rey do Canará.

28.1.1750.

Duas cartas recebi de V. A., e em huma dellas me diz que está admirado da entrada que fez o Angria no porto de Mangallor, e eu estou mais admirado de que os vassallos de V. A. pertendão enganalo referindo lhe o sucesso muito differente do que foi porque o meu Feitor não se obrigou a guardar o porto como a V. A. lhe disserão senão na forma que lhe fosse possivel, nem tão pouco podia fazer mais do que fez em hum citio aberto, e sem deffença nenhūa porque V. A. nunca consentio que se fechasse o Forte donde estão as peças de artelharia, e húa caza sem portas e aberta por toda a parte não se pode guardar nem deffender, se os tiros que fez o Feitor não produzirão effeito, não hé muito de admirar, porque os tiros que se fazem de alto para baixo e da terra para o mar sempre são incertos, porque as embarcaçõens se achão em continuo movimento, onde se não podem bem empregar os

tiros, mas se em terra tivesse V. A. tropas que embaraçasse a entrada as embarcações do Angria e com outras embaraçasse a caminho de Bollor poderia muito bem susceder, que custasse mais cara a entrada ao Angria, e estimara que V. A. me dicesse que tropas tinha o Feitor, assim para deffender o Forte, como para deffender o caminho de Bollor, e como os vassallos de V. A. não quizerão deffender as suas caças, e fugirão para os mattos com o seu mesmo Governador, que forças ficarão .....Feitor para deffender, assim a terra como a barra, e ja em outra occazião disse a V. A. que cada hum era obrigado a deffender a sua propria caza, e depois esperar o socorro dos amigos.

Todos estes sucessos passados parece que obrigão a V. A. a cuidar muy no porto de Mangallor com mais cuidado que athe agora, porque eu tenho noticia certa que o Maratá intenta apoderarse da Fortaleza de Melondim e da de Mangallor para fazer liuremente o corso nestes mares deste o Norte athe o cabo de Camorim e que Irogi Naique esta tratando alguma traição contra V. A. no que deue ter a mayor cautela e prevenisse com tempo para todo o sucesso. Eu como bom amigo não deixarei de concorrer com tudo aquillo que me for possivel para ajudar a V. A. sempre que me não uir obrigado a defender a propria caza, porque V. A. bem sabe que cada hum está primeiro obrigado a sua propria deffença que a alheya, e se o Maratá se apoderar de Mangallor poderá correr grande risco todo o Estado de V. A. alem da grande deminuição que hão de ter as suas rendas, o que suposto não despreze V. A. esta noticia, porque a tenho por parte muito segura, e deue V. A. fortificar quanto poder o porto de Mangallor para que este inimigo não rogre o seu intento. Deos alumie a V. A. em a sua Divina graça. Goa. 28 de Janeiro de 1750.

Offereco a V. A. essa pessa de damasco que os portadores levão. Marquês de Alorna.

(Translation)

28.1.1750.

To the King of Kanara.

I received two letters of Your Highness. In one of them you tell me that you are surprised at the incursion of the Angria into the port of Mangalore. I am surprised all the more at the intention of the vassals of Your Highness to deceive you, relating to you the event very differently from what happened, because my Factor is not obliged to guard the port as they tell Your Highness, except in the manner which is possible for him; nor could he do anything more than what he did in an open place, without any defence, because Your Highness never consented that the Fort, where the pieces of artillery are, be enclosed. A house, without doors and open on all sides, can neither be guarded nor defended. If the shots, which the Factor discharged, did not produce effect, it is not much of a wonder, because the shots, which are discharged from above to beneath and from land to sea, are always uncertain, as the embarkations are found in continuous movement where the shots can not be well employed. However, if Your Highness had troops on the land which could embarrass the entry of the embarkations of the Angria, and with other (troops) could embarrass the path of Bolar, you could very well succeed, which would have cost the entry of the Angria very dear. One may calculate that Your Highness might tell me that the Factor had troops in order to defend the Fort as well as to defend the path of Bolar. As the vassals of Your Highness did not wish to defend their houses and fled to the woods with your very Governor, the (Portuguese) forces remained (with) the Factor in order to defend the land as well as the river mouth. Already, in another context, I told Your Highness that everyone was obliged to defend one's own house and then expect aid from friends. It appears that all these past events oblige Your Highness to care much concerning the port of Mangalore, with more care than hitherto. I have reliable information that the Maratha (the Angria) intends to capture the Fortress of MALVAN and that of Mangalore in order to freely commit piracy on the sea from the North

to the Cape of Kanya Kumari, and that Hiraji Nayaka is negotiating some treachery against Your Highness, regarding which you ought to have the greatest caution and should provide ~~sufficient~~ in time for every eventuality. As a good friend, I shall not omit to help with all that which should be possible for me to aid Your Highness, provided always that I do not become obliged to defend my own house, for Your Highness know well that every one is obliged first to his own defence and then to another. If the Maratha captures Mangalore, a great danger may befall the whole of the State of Your Highness, apart from the great decrease which your income should have. I hope Your Highness do not scorn this news, because I have it from a very reliable source. Your Highness should fortify the port of Mangalore as much as possible so that this enemy does not execute his intention. May God enlighten Your Highness with his Divine Grace Goa, 28 January, 1750.

I present to Your Highness this piece of damask which the messengers carry.  
Marquês de Alorna.

XI

16.3.1750.

(Extract)

Para o Feitor de Mangalor José Antunes Branco.

.....Suponho q̄ já o Feitor terá lá noticia do ataque que o Angriá fez nas terras do Canará,, e se apoderou da Fortaleza de Onor, e ainda que a largou, e voltou com a sua armada para Griem, na qual levou alem de hum grande despojo perto de mil e quinhentas pessoas das principaes de Onor, para lhe fazer pagar caro o resgate .....

Goa 16 de Mr.co de 1750. Marq̄ de Alorna.

(Translation)

16.3.1750.

To the Factor of Mangalore, José Antunes Branco.

..... I suppose that the Factor may have there already the news of the attack which the Angria made on the lands of Kanara. He captured the Fortress of Honavar. Though he gave it up and went back with his fleet to Griem (?), he carried away, apart from a great booty, nearly one thousand and five hundred important men of Honavar in order to make them pay a high ransom .....

Goa, 16 March, 1750. Marquês de Alorna.

XII

6.8.1750.

Para o Rey Canara.

Pelo honrado Tricama Dás recebi a carta de V. A. e estimei muito saber por elle que V. A. estava liure do justo cuidado em que o poz a doença da Rainha e a do seu Ministro, porque como seu verdadeiro amigo me interesso com affeito em todas as suas felicid.es e em tudo o que lhe desgosto. Por esta rezão não pode V. A. duvidar que eu concorrerei com a mayor vontade p<sup>o</sup> segurar a sua costa do mar, e evitar as invazoens de qualquer inimigo que a queria insultar; para isto não ignora V. A. que he necessario fazer cresida despeza e que quando entre amigos se propoem algum negocio que seja do interesse particular de hum delles, he precizo que o outro tenha no mesmo negocio igual interesse, pois as leis da amizade não podem obrigar a fazer se gastos excessivos com embarcaçoens, e moniçoens de guerra, e boca expôr ao perigo as embarcaçoens e as vidas dos homens sómente para beneficio do outro amigo, principalm.te quando o que faz estes gostos, ~~tem~~ tem que fazer muitas outras despezas para se deffender dos inimigos que tem ás portas de caza.

V. A. ainda que mosso poderá já estar informado que ha mais de cento e

sincoenta annos que os Reis do Canará experimentarão deste Estado húa fiel amizade, e boa correspondencia, e que por parte deste Est<sup>o</sup> se não tem faltado a nenhum dos cap.os das pazes que se celebrarão no anno de 1671 entre os Snores Gov.ores Antonio de Mello de Castro e Manuel Corte Real de Sampayo, e o honrado Vitulá Maló embaixador do illustre Rey do Canará Somaxacar Naique, nem as pazes que se celebrarão no anno de 1678 entre o S.or govern.or Antonio Paes de Sande, e Crisná Naique embaixador do illustre Rey do Canará Quelladi Bassopá Naique, nem as pazes que se celebrarão em 1714 entre o Ex.mo S.r V. Rey Vasco Fernandes Cesar, e Cadasse Damarsi Porobú embaixador de illustre Rey Queladi Bassappá Naique, e tendo sido o Estado tão fiel na observancia das ditas pazes não tem sido assim da parte de snores Reis do Canará, e sem embargo de terem jurado a observancia das ditas pazes, nunca derão á execução o primeiro Cap<sup>o</sup> dellas em que se obrigá o Rey do Canará a dar ao Est<sup>o</sup> Feitorias em Onor, Barsalor e Mangalor com seus bangaaes e cercas de pedra e cal dada pelo Rey do Canará pagando o Estado sómente aos officiaes o feito da obra, e não fazendo cava ao redor dellas nem paredes dobradas, mas singelas.

No discurso de tres annos tem V. A. experimentado duas invazoens do Angria em Mangalor, e huma em Onor, em Gocarna, nas de Mangalor sempre V. A. se me queixou de que os Feitores não deffenderão bem aquelle Porto, sem se capacitar da rezão, que o Feitoria aberta por todas as partes não he possivel que rezista a nenhum inimigo nem hum só instante, nem que possa esperar o socorro de V. A. quando fosse atacada e nestes termos he precizo que Feitor a dezampare.

Por tres vezes o tenho assim representado a V. A., e nunca mo respondeo a este ponto, e he certo que se a Feitoria estivesse fechada, poderá ser que os inimigos se não rezolvessem a fazer tanto estrago como fizerão nas duas vezes que o saquearão, mas como isto redunde em utilidade de V. A., e do seu povo, não continuei as minhas instancias, porque a V. A. toca dar a providencia, que lhe parecer, para melhor defença de seu Dominio, e pertender V. A. que Mangalor, ou qualquer outro Porto rezista ás entradas do inimigo sem lhe aplicar os meyos que são necessarios para lhe rebater o impulço he matr<sup>a</sup> quazi impossivel.

Não sei como V. A. sendo hum Principe de tanto espirito, não tem pejo de que hum pirata como Angria, que ha dous dias se levantou nesta costa, esteja todos os annos invadindo lhe as suas terras, quando não intentou isto mesmo nas de outros Principes menos poderozos, e que tenha agora o atrivimento de propôr a V. A. fazer se seu tributario, e justamente cuida V. A. em a bater lhe estes fimos.

O meya, que V. A. me mandou apontar pelo honrado Tricama Dás de se juntarem as suas embarcaçoens com as deste Estado, me parece muito bom, mas como o sucesso das armas depende da providencia Divina, requere a prudencia que alem deste meyo estejão os Portos e as Feitorias em estado que em qualquer sucesso que possa acontecer estejão preparados para rebater o inimigo, isto he dizer lhe a V. A. a verdade pura como seu amigo e dando V. A. da sua parte cumprimento ao que se jurou pelas pazes não se me offereceo duvida nenhuma a que as embarcaçoens desta Estado <sup>n</sup> justas com as de V. A. deffenda essa Costa, para o que seria precizo que V. A. mandasse aqui pessoa sua inteligente com quem se pudesse ajustar este negocio trazendo todos os poderes necessarios para celebrar este ajuste. Deos alumie a V. A. com a sua Divina graça. Goa 6 de Agosto de 1750. Marq.es de Alorna.

- LCC, II, fls. 49-50.

(Translation)

6.8.1750.

To the King (of) Kanara.

I received the letter of Your Highness through ~~the~~ honourable Trivikrama Dasa and I valued much to know from him that Your Highness were free from the just anxiety in which the illness of the Queen and that of your Minister placed you, because I am feelingly interested, as your true friend, in all your happiness and in every thing that grieves you. On account of this reason Your Highness can not doubt that I aided (you) with the greatest willingness to protect your sea coast and to prevent the invasions of any enemy who wanted to attack it. Just for this

Your Highness may not ignore that it is necessary to incur more expences and that when between (two) friends any business, which may be of particular interest to one of them, is proposed, it is necessary that the other has equal interest in the same business, for the laws of riendship can not oblige to incur excessive expences with embarkations and ammunitions of war, and to expose to the mouth of danger the embarkations and the lives of men only for the benefit of the other friend, particularly when he who incurs these expences has to incur many other expences in order to defend himself from enemies who are at the doors of the house.

Your Highness might have already been informed that it is more than one hundred and fifty years that the kings of Kanara experienced of this State a loyal friendship and a good reciprocity and that on the part of this State none of the provisions of the peace (treaty), which was concluded in the year 1671 between the Governors, Antonio de Mello de Castro and Manuel Corte Real de Sam-piao, and the Honourable Vittala Maló, ambassador of the illustrious King of Kanara, Somashekhar Nayaka, has been violated; nor the peace (treaty) which was concluded in the year 1678 between the Governor, Antonio Paes de Sande, and Krishna Naik, ambassador of the illustrious king of Kanara, Keladi Basavappa Nayaka; nor the peace (treaty) which was solemnised in the year 1714 between His Excellency, Vasco Fernandes Cezar, Viceroy, and Kaddase Damarasa Prabhu, ambassador of the illustrious king, Keladi Basavappa Nayaka. And the State having been so faithful in the observance of the said peace (treaties), on the part of the kings of Kanara it has not been so. Though the observance of the said peace (treaties) was promised, they never implemented the first provision of them, in which the King of Kanara is obliged to give the State factories in Honavar, Basrur and Mangalore with their timber yards and enclosures of stone and lime given by the King of Kanara, the State paying to the officials only the cost of labour, and not digging ditches around them, nor (constructing) double walls, but (only) single ones.

During the course of three years, Your Highness has experienced two invasions of the Angria in Mangalore and one in Honavar and Gokarna. Concerning those of Mangalore, Your Highness has always complained that the Factors did not defend the port well, without realising the cause that the Factory, open on every side, is not able to resist any enemy even for an instant, nor is it possible to expect the aid of Your Highness when it is attacked. Under these circumstances it is necessary that the Factor abandons it.

Thrice I have represented it this way to Your Highness and you never responded to this point. It is certain that if the Factory is enclosed, it is possible that the enemies may not venture to cause so much damage as they did on the two occasions when they sacked it. However, as this results in the service of Your Highness and that of your people, I did not continue my earnest appeals, because it concerns Your Highness to take measures which you think fit for the better defence of Your Dominions. It is almost an impossible matter that Your Highness intend Mangalore or any other Port should resist the intrusions of the enemy without applying to it the means which are necessary to repel their impulse.

I do not know how Your Highness, being a Prince of so much spirit, are not ashamed that a pirate like the Angria, who attacked that coast two days ago, be invading your lands every year, whereas he did not intend this very thing regarding those (lands) of other less powerful Princes, and that he has now the boldness to propose to Your Highness to make yourself his tributary. Your Highness are justly anxious to defeat these aims of his.

The means, which Your Highness pointed out through honourable Trivikrama Dasa,  
of assembling your embarkations with those of this State, appears very good to me. However, as the success of arms depends upon Divine providence, prudence is required that apart from this means, the Ports and the Factories should be in the State that in whatever eventuality that may take place they should be prepared to beat off the enemy. This is to tell Your Highness the pure truth as your friend. Fulfilling on the part of Your Highness what was sworn through the peace (treaties) would not allow me any doubt that the embarkations of this State combined with

those of Your Highness would defend that coast. For this it would be necessary that Your Highness send here an intelligent man of yours with whom I should be able to conclude this negotiation, (he) bringing all those powers necessary to solemnise this agreement. May God enlighten Your Highness with his Divine grace.  
Goa, 6 August, 1750. Marquês de Alorna.

XIII

January (?), 1751.

Para o Rey Canará Quelodi Bassapa Naigue.

Recebo a carta de V. A. com a estimação que faço da sua correspondencia, e das boas noticias da sua saude que sempre lhe dejejo com muitas felicidades.

Quando V. A. no principio da guerra que tem com os Naires me pedio socorro contra elles, logo me inclinei a socorrello com efficacia, e me dispuz a expedir o socorro logo que as minhas embarcaçõens se desocupassem como por vezes disse ao Enviado que aqui se acha de V. A. Entretanto os Francezes que tem comigo aliança me requererão tambem socorro de armas e de gente; e dizendo me ser contra V. A., porque lhe tinhão declarado a guerra, os dezenganei com a rezão de ser V. A. meu aliado, e assim dezenganados me requererão que pois lhes negava o socorro que os esperavão, o não concedesse tambem a V. A., e me conservasse neutral sem me declarar por huma, nem outra parte.

Para rezolver esta proposta dos Francezes, examinei os tratados de paz, e aliança celebrados entre V. A. e meus antecessores, e achando que o socorro a que este Estado se obrigou pelos mesmos tratados foi com expressa declaração de ser somente contra inimigos Aziaticos com quem V. A. tivesse guerra, e não fossem aliados do Estado, reconheci que sendo ella agora com Europeos muito meu aliados só tinha lugar a neutralidade, e que nella devia eu prezistir a requerimento dos mesmos aliados, principalmente quando a elles tambem negava o socorro que me pedião, como constantemente lhe neguei, e assim só devo concorrer para que se restabeleça a paz entre ambas as partes.

- LCC, II, fls. 77-8. This document is undated and unsigned. But it seems to have been written either on 17 or 18 January, 1752, for in his letter to the factor of Mangalore, dated 18.1.1752, the Vice-roy Marquês de Tavora, says that he included a copy of the letter to Basavappa, declaring neutrality (LCC, II, fls. 78-9).

(Translation)

January (?), 1752.

To the King (of) Kanara, Keladi Basavappa Nayaka.

I am in receipt of the letter of Your Highness, with the regard which I render to your correspondence and to the good news of your health which I always wish you with much happiness.

When Your Highness asked my aid against the Nairs at the beginning of the war which you have against them, I was soon inclined to aid you with efficacy and I was disposed to expedite the aid as soon as my embarkations were ~~engaged~~ disengaged, as I told several times to the Envoy of Your Highness who is found here. In the meantime, the French, who have alliance with me, also requested my aid with arms and men; and telling me (the aid) to be against Your Highness, as they had declared war on you, I undeceived them with the reason of Your Highness being my ally; and thus undeceived, they requested me that since I denied them the aid which they expected, I should not concede it to Your Highness too, and (that) I should be neutral, without declaring myself neither for the one nor (for) the other side.

In order to decide upon this proposal of the French, I examined the ~~existing~~ treaties of peace and alliance solemnised between Your Highness and my predecessors. Finding that the aid which this State was obliged by means of the very treaties was, with the express declaration, to be only against the Asiatic enemies with whom Your Highness should have ~~won~~ war, and (who) might not be allied with the State, I recognised that it (the war) being now with the Europeans, very much

allied to me, I had place only for neutrality, and that I ought to adhere to it at the request of the very allies, especially when I denied to them also the aid which they asked me. As I constantly denied (the aid) to them, I ought to proceed this way so that peace is re-established between both the parties.

XIV  
(Extract)

28.9.1752.

Para Baçapá Naique Rey Canará.

Recebi por este mesmo portador a carta de V. A.; e me alegrei com as boas noticias da sua saude, e que espero seja sempre perfeita com muitas felicidades.

Ao mesmo tempo que recebi esta carta de V. A. me chegou tambem a reposta da que eu tinha escrito aos Francezes, para que se tratasse da paz por minha mediação, e como elles, persuadidos da minha carta me segurão terem a mesma vontade: pode V. A. comonicar me as condicōens que pella sua parte quizer propor para que conferidas com as que os Francezes propuzerem se possa tratar deste negocio com eficacia, e concluirse com brevidade. Eu já da parte delles sei que o seu principal artigo hé ficarem conservando as Fortalezas de que actualmente estão de posse. V. A. seja que artigos lhe convem propor da sua parte; e eu não deixarei de interpor com todo o affecto os meus bons officios para que a paz seja reciprocamente util.

.....  
1752  
Goa 28 de Setembro de 1752 Marquês de Tavora.

-LCG, II, fl. 91.

(Translation)

To Basavappa Nayaka, King (of) Kanara. 28.9.1752.

I received through this same porter the letter of Your Highness. I was

happy with the good news of your health which I hope will always be perfect with much happiness.

At the same time when I received this letter of Your Highness, the reply to what I had written to the French, that you would negotiate for peace through my mediation, also reached me, and, persuaded by my letter, they assure me to have the same wish. Your Highness may communicate to me the conditions which you wish to propose on your part, so that compared with those which the French might propose, this negotiation can be conducted with efficacy and be concluded shortly. I already know from their side that their principal article is to retain the fortresses which they are actually in possession of. Your Highness may see what articles may suit you to propose on your part and I shall not omit to interpose with all consideration my good offices so that the peace shall be mutually useful.

.....  
Goa, 28 ~~September~~ September, 1752. Marquês de Tavora.

XV

19.7.1751.

Para o mesmo Feitor (José Antunes Branco).

Francisco, portador desta, que em gentio se chamava Mahant Sancraya, morador na Aldea de Galianpur, e sua mulher abraçarão a nossa santa fé Catholica, e se bautizarão nesta Cidade, e eu os apadrinhei, e como padecerão m.to para poderem por em execução a sua vocação e athe se lhe confiscarão por isso os seus bens e me pedem que eu recomende ao Capitão Feitor e Gouernador de Mangallor Joseph Antunes branco que faça todas as possiveis diligencias para elles serem restituídos dos referidos seus bens, o recomendo assim ao Capitão Feitor segurando lhe que terei grande gosto se elles pellas diligencias do Capitão Feitor Joseph Antunes branco conseguirem o que pertencem; e aos dous servidores do dito Francisco e sua mulher fará tambem todo o fauor de que elles necessitarem. Nossa Snör

etc. Goa 19 de Julho de 1751. Marques de Tavora.

- LCC, II, fl. 59.

(Translation)

19.7.1751.

To the same Factor (José Antunes Branco).

Francisco, bearer of this, who is called Mahant Shankarayya among the gentile, resident of the village of Kalyanpur, and his wife, embraced our holy Catholic ~~faith~~ faith, and were baptized in this City (of Goa), and I became their god-father. As they suffered much in order to be able to carry out their vocation and even their property was confiscated for this, and (as) they request me that I recommend to the Captain, Factor and Governor of Mangalore, Joseph Antunes <sup>Branco,</sup> that he (you) may do all the possible diligences for them to be restored of the said property of theirs. I crecommend it so to the Captain and Factor, assuring him (you) that I will have great pleasure if they, by means of the diligences of the Captain and Factor, Joseph Antunes Branco, secure what belongs (to them). And also to the two servants of the said Francisco and his wife you may do all the favour of which they may need. Our Lord, etc. Goa, 19 July, 1751. Marquês de Tavora.

XVI

27.2.1714.

Cartaz ao Rey do Canará.

Vasco Fr.z Cezar de Menezes do Concelho de Estado de S. Mag.e V. Rey e Capitão geral da India etc. Faço saber aos q este virem, que tendo respeito ao Rey do Canara haver mandado pedir cartaz para hum Barco seu poder nauegar, e por lhe fazer graça por esta vez somente. Hey por bem de lhe conceder licença, e seguro

ao dito seu Barco por nome Parmesuary de pregadura de porte de seis centos candis  
de Goa de que vay por Nacoda Hanssanabapa, Carrane Punddalicu, Piloto Mahamadagi,  
condestael Salû, Sarangue Ismal, Tandel Abdul, e mais gente de sua nauegação, e  
leua para sua deffença vinte e cinco pessas de artelhra, trinta espingardas,  
trinta espadas, sincoenta lanças, cinco ancoras, poluara e balla necessaria e mais  
petrechos de guerra, para que na monção do mez de Março ou de Abril do prezente  
anno de mil sete centos e quatorze possa fz.er sua Viagem do porto de Mangalor  
para o de Congo, e Ormuz, e não leuará escrauos, ou escrauas christãos ou filhos  
de christãos, e hauendo suspeita, ou informação q̄ os leua se fara com elles o  
exame declarado no concilio Prouincial, ainda que os taes filhos não sejão bapti-  
zados, nem poderá leuar, ou trazer Abexins, Rumes, nē Arabios das terras q̄ obedição  
ao Imamo de Mascate nem carregará ferro, asso, enxofre, madeira, bambus, machos  
por mercancia, nem fazendas pertencentes aos Arabios, ainda q̄ não sejão das  
prohibidas, nem leuará Portuguez, nem hira a porto algum dos que obedecem ao  
Imamo de Mascate, nem aos do Angrea, ou de outro algum Príncipe ou leuantado com  
que o Estado estiver em guerra, e supposto a todos seja prohibido o trazerem  
cauallos por particular graça concedo ao dito Rey q̄ este seu Barco os possa trazer  
do porto do Congo ou de Ormuz e chegando áquelle porto descarregará as fz.as que  
leuar naquelle Feitoria, e Alfandega, e pagará nella os dereitos que deuer de que  
trará certidão do nosso Feitor nas costas deste cartaz com declaração de como  
carregou os cauallos naquelles portos, para não hauer duuida se os carregou ou  
não em outros, e pertencentes ao Imamo de Mascate, e fazendo o contrº, ou hindo  
a portos prohibidos, e leuando, ou trazendo fz.as veadadas, lhe não valerá este  
cartaz, e será o tal Barco apreizado e perdido para o fzº real. Notificoo assy  
aos Gereraes, e capitães mores das Armadas deste Estado, mais capitães, officiaes,  
e pessoas a que pertencer para q̄ assy o cumprão e guardem, e deixem fz.er sua  
viagē a este Barco da hidra e volta sem impedimento algum, e passado hum anno lhe  
não valerá este cartaz, o qual será sellado com o sello das Armas reaes da coroa  
de Portugal e se declará q̄ este hé o septimo cartaz q̄ se passou neste prezente

verão do qual não pagará os dereitos nesta Cidade por lhe ser concedido liure dos ditos dereitos por hum dos capitullos das pazes cellebradas com o Rey do Canará. Gregorio Máz o fez em Goa ao primrº de Março de mil sete centos e quatorze; o secretrº João Rois Machº o fis escreuer. Vasco Fñz Cesar de Menezes. Por despº do Ex.mo Snôr V. Rey e Cap.m geral da India de 27 de feurº de 1714.

- Livro de Cartazes, Vol. I, 1704-1766, fl. 60.

(Translation)

27.2.1714.

Passport to the King of Kanara.

I, Vasco Fernandez Cesar de Menezes of the Council of State of His Majesty, Viceroy and Captain General of India, etc., make it known to those who see this that, having regard to the King of Kanara (who is pleased) to have requested for a passport for a barque of his to be able to navigate, and in order to favour him this time alone, I am pleased to grant him licence and security for his said barque, by name, Parameshwary, of the declared capacity of 600 khandis of Goa, <sup>goes as captain, (and also)</sup> in which ~~go~~ Nacoda Hanssanabappa, Carrane (?) Pundalika, Pilot Mahammadaji, artillery chief Salu, Sarangue Ismail, Tandel (?) Abdul and other men of her navigation, and carries for defence 25 men of artillery, 30 guns, 30 swords, 50 spears, 5 anchors, necessary gunpowder and shot(s), and other war materials, so that in the monsoon in the month of May or April of the current year of one thousand seven hundred and fourteen she can perform her voyage from the port of Mangalore to that of Congo and Ormus; and she shall not carry male or female slaves, (who are) Christians or children of Christians; and having suspicion or information that she carried them, examination will be made of them; making them known to the Provincial Council, even though such children may not be baptized; nor can she carry or bring Abyssinians, Rumes, or Arabs of the lands subject to the Imam of Mascat; nor will she load iron, albino, sulphur, timber, bamboos, (and) mules as merchandise, nor (shall she carry) goods belonging to the Arabs, even though they (such goods)

may not be among the prohibited; nor shall she carry the Portuguese, nor go to any port of those who obey the Imam of Mascat, nor to those of the Angria nor with of any other prince, or rebel whom the State may be at war; and even though all may be prohibited to bring horses, I grant, as a special favour to the said King, that this, his said barque, can bring them from the port of Congo or of Ormus; and (on) reaching that port she shall unload the goods which (one may) take in that Factory and Customs House, and shall pay therein the duties that are due, for which she shall bring the certificate of our Factor on the margin of this passport with the declaration that she took on board the horses in those ports, in order not to have doubt whether she took them on board or not in other ports and (in others) pertaining to the Imam of Mascat; and doing the contrary or going to the prohibited ports, and carrying or bringing forbidden goods, this passport shall not be valid for her and that barque shall be captured and confiscated for the royal treasury. I notify thus to the generals and captain-majors, of the fleets of this State, other captains, officials and persons to whomsoever it concerns, so that they may fulfil and guard it (passport) in this way and may allow this barque to perform her to and fro voyage, without any impediment; and on the expiry of one year, this passport shall not be valid for her; which (passport) shall be sealed with the seal of the royal Arms of the crown of Portugal, and shall declare that this is the seventh passport which was issued this summer, for which he will not pay the duties in this City as being granted to him free of the said duties by one of the articles of the peace (treaty) concluded with the King of Kanara. Gregory Mathias prepared this in Goa on the first of March of one thousand seven hundred and fourteen; the secretary, John Rodrigues Machado, wrote it. Vasco Fernandez Cezar de Menezes. As a despatch from the Most Excellent Lord, Viceroy and Captain General of India. 27 February, 1714.



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
Studia, Lisbon.

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THE PORTUGUESE IN KANARA : 1498-1763

By

B. S. SHASTRY



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(A thesis prepared under the guidance of *late* Dr. P. S. S.  
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#### CONCLUDING REMARKS

We have completed our narrative of the political, religious and commercial activities of the Portuguese in Kanara upto a definite stage of the history of the region, namely, the downfall of the Keladi dynasty and the establishment of Hyder Ali's rule in 1763. It is rather regrettable that extant Kannada sources throw very little light on the Portuguese-Kanarese relations. Even the Keladi-nripa Vijaya of Linganna Kavi says precious little on this subject. Most of the information we have is to be found only in Portuguese sources or other records of the Western powers who came to India. The lack of contemporary Kannada chronicles and records on the Portuguese-Kanarese relations may be attributed to the general lack of a sense of history among our countrymen, not only in the past but even today to a great extent.

The Portuguese relations with Kanara were marked by a belligerent attitude. They shaped their policy generally from a position of strength whenever it was possible. This was particularly true of the 16th century when no Indian ruler possessed a navy strong enough to curb their belligerence and when their power in the East was unchallenged by any other European country. They extracted tributes from the Kanarese chiefs and imposed trade conditions upon them. If any chief failed to abide by these arrangements, his ports and boats were attacked and damaged. Even on the loss of their fortresses of Kanara in the middle of the 17th century and thereafter when their power was not worth the name, they followed a policy based upon force. They would only wait until the annual fleet arrived from Portugal and, on its arrival, use it to hinder the trade and commerce of Kanara, or to damage the latter's ports and vessels. This was the method by which they endeavoured to get what they wanted from the Nayakas of Ikkeri. We find frequent references to such incidents in Portuguese sources, as we have seen. The Nayakas, after Shivappa, were not strong enough to punish the Portuguese for these acts of violence.

Of course, there were exceptions to this general policy of force. For instance, Afonso de Albuquerque, the greatest of the Portuguese conquerors and statesmen, was careful not to indulge in belligerence in Kanara. He tried to get concessions by negotiations and did not use force when negotiations failed. He was, no doubt, influenced by the aid given to him by the king of Gersoppa and the latter's officials in occupying Goa; and also by a desire to be on friendly terms with Vijayanagara in which Empire Kanara was included. However, he endeavoured to damage Kanarese commerce by compelling the ships from Arabia and Persia to sail to Goa and by excluding the ships of Calicut from the Kanarese ports.

The Political, commercial and religious activities of the Portuguese in Kanara were intermingled. However, commerce may be considered as the most decisive factor which influenced their policy towards the region. If they wished to possess fortresses in Kanara, it was mainly in order to control the commerce of the region. Not that they never had the ambition of establishing a territorial empire in India; but they did not succeed in doing so. No empire worth the name was ever established by them, though Afonso de Albuquerque and some others did their best towards the fulfilment of the ambition. The declared purpose of the Portuguese in establishing fortresses in Kanara was generally commercial. Afonso desired a fortress in Bhatkal for that purpose. Luis de Ataide established fortresses in Honavar and Basrur in order to exclude the Malabarese from the trade and commerce of the Kanarese ports. The fortresses of Mangalore and Gangolli also served the same end. If the Portuguese participated actively in the local political struggles, aiding one chief against another, the main purpose was to safeguard their own commercial interests in the region. Their endeavour was to see that no single chief became strong enough to deprive them of their privileged position there. To aid one local chief against another was a common practice of the European powers in the process of colonization and empire building. The Portuguese did not acquire an empire worth the name; but they did safeguard their

commercial interests in Kanara, as long as they could, by this usual means.

Some of the Nayakas of Ikkeri like Venkatappa I and Virabhadra were too strong and powerful for the Portuguese to cope with. Therefore, the latter generally felt happy whenever the former were in trouble, either because the Nayakas were attacked by their neighbourhood, that is, by their neighbouring potentates or because their own fuedatories were in revolt. The reason was that the Portuguese found their own strength in the weakness of the Nayakas. The Adil Shahi rulers of Bijapur proved to be stronger than the Nayakas. The Portuguese, therefore, rarely helped Bijapur against the latter; but sometimes they aided the Nayakas whom they did not want to see thoroughly beaten by the Adil Shahis, for the latter were considered more dangerous as neighbours. The Portuguese became uneasy if the Nayakas settled their differences with Bijapur and began to gain greater strength in other quarters. They also did not hesitate to aid the revolting feudatories of the Nayakas with a view to keep the latter engaged and weak. Under the rule of a strong Nayaka the Portuguese had no opportunity to carry on as they pleased in Kanara, particularly in commercial matters. Such a strong Nayaka certainly desired to share commercial benefits with the Portuguese by raising the price of articles of trade of Kanara or by levying additional imposts on sales and purchases and on imports and exports.

The Portuguese built their fortresses in Kanara in 1568-9. The time chosen for the purpose is noteworthy. It was about three years after the battle of Talikote where the glory and the might of the Vijayanagara Empire had departed. The successors of Rama Raja, who was defeated and killed in the battle field, became fugitives and many of their vassals declared themselves independent. It was a period of confusion within the Empire and the Portuguese successfully fished in the troubled waters. To be sure, they desired to have at least one fortress in Kanara right from 1505. One was actually built in Anjediva that year; but Anjediva was virtually nobody's land then and, besides, in the following year the fortress was destroyed. The Portuguese then tried to get a site in Bhatkal

by negotiations; but failed. Probably they did not dare to capture or establish by force any fortress in Kanara as long as the Vijayanagara Empire was united and powerful.

In fact the Portuguese followed an opportunistic policy in Kanara. They were always ready to exploit the weakness of the Kanarese chiefs and to benefit from the internal revolts and confusions. If the people of Basrur needed Portuguese aid, the latter would endeavour to get pepper from the former at nearly half the market rate and to ensure many other privileges. If there were revolts within the kingdom of Ikkeri or if the latter was attacked from outside, the Portuguese would encourage the rebels and try at the same time to acquire additional lands or fortresses or ~~privileges~~ privileges for themselves.

One of the redeeming features of the Portuguese policy in Kanara was their staunch loyalty to one of their allies, namely, the Bangar chief. No doubt they were motivated by their own interests; nevertheless, many a time they aided him with great risk to themselves. The chief had given them on his own accord a site in Mangalore to build their fortress in 1568, besides giving them many other concessions. Ever since then he was considered a friend and brother-in-arms to the king of Portugal. In due course he was aided against the chiefs of Ullala and the Nayakas of Ikkeri. In their battle with Venkatappa, waged on behalf of the Bangar chief, they suffered a good deal of loss in men and materials. Later on, when the chief lost everything inspite of their help, they did their best for him to secure the most favourable terms possible by means of a treaty with the Nayaka. The king of Portugal did not fail to instruct his Viceroy and Governors to restore the kingdom of Bangher to its chief, whenever an opportunity arose, by waging a war against the Nayakas.

Another feature of the Portuguese policy in Kanara was their application of whatever political hold they had in Kanara to the service of Christianity by protecting Christians and missionaries in the region. This was particularly

true of the 17th and the 18th centuries when there was a considerable number of Christians and churches in Kanara. The treaties between the Portuguese and the Nayakas of Ikkeri included provisions, as we have seen, to secure the freedom of movement for missionaries, the right to build churches at different places, the privilege for Christians not to be under the legal system of the Nayakas but of the Portuguese, and so on. If the Nayakas imprisoned priests or imposed restrictions on Christians, the Portuguese did not hesitate to threaten hostilities against the Nayakas. Whenever any Kanarese was converted to Christianity, full Portuguese support was given to the convert to secure for him his property which, sometimes, the relatives of the convert endeavoured to deprive him of.

Kanara became a granary for the Portuguese. Most of the rice required by them for sustaining Goa and other possessions like Ormus came from the lands of Kanara. Some times they secured it from the north, that is, from the Konkan and Gujarat; but it was difficult to do so particularly in the 17th and the 18th centuries on account of one or another hostile power there like the Dutch or the Adil Shahis of Bijapur or the Marathas. Their dependence on the Kanarese rice shaped their relations with the rulers of the region. Many a time they had an ardent desire to commence hostilities against the Nayakas of Ikkeri or to give open assistance against the latter; but the fear that the rice supplies would be stopped from the lands of Kanara restrained them. Some times they opened hostilities and made brave efforts to secure rice from the north; but generally it ended in scarcity in Goa and other places under their control.